Dileum Pty Ltd v Greenall Whitley Ltd

Case

[1987] FCA 263

29 May 1987

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTR

l

&STERN AUSTRAL-Id DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 No. hIA G 128 of 1987

1

GENERAL DIVISION

l

BETWEEN:

DILEUM

PTY.

LIMITED

Applicant

AND:

GREENALL

WHITLEY

LIMITED

Respondent

M I I W E OF

ORDER

J S E twiIIJG ORDEIi

: Neaves J.

G B

OF ORDER

:

29 May 1987

!EEs

kt

t

: Perth

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.

The applicant within 28 days from the date

of this

order uive security

in the

SM

of $7,500

for the

payment to the respondent

of costs that may be

awarded auainst the applicant in the proceeding.

2. The

said

security

be

given

by the payment into

Court of the sum of $7,500.

3 .

If

the applicant fails to comply with this order

for

security within 28 days,

the

proceeding be

thereupon stayed.

4.     The respondent's motion for security for costs of which notice was filed on 18 May 1987 be adjourned uenerally with liberty to restore it to the list at any tlme on reasonable notice.

5. The

applicant pay the respondent's

motlon to and includinu the entry of

-7

2-

. _ ,-\ I

I

.

N o t e :

N o t e :

Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in

Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in 6r68Fi%

of the

of the

Federal

Federal

Court

Court

Rules.

Rules.

FECERAL COURT OF

FECERAL COURT OF

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIA

PRINCIPAL

PRINCIPAL

HEOISTRY

HEOISTRY

_-

B E T E E N :

DILEUM

PTY.

LIMITED

Applicant

m:

GREENALL WHITLEY

LIMITED

Respondent

C m : Neaves 3 .

D=:

29 May 1987

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Fendlnu in the Court is

an application by Dileum Pty.

Limited t"the applicant") auainst Greenall Whitley Limited

\"the

respondent") In which the applicant seeks an order for

the delivery

of certain undelivered wines or, alternatively,

damaae

S.

The

basis

of

the claim may be shortly stated. In

October 1984 and December 1985 the applicant entered into two

contracts with Premier Exports SARL, a company registered and

carryinu on business in France, for the purchase of a total of

107 cases of French wines. The vendor company is alleged to be

a subsidiary in the uroup of companies

of which the respondent

(which carries on business in the United Kinqdom but not in

Australia) is the holdinu company thouqh this association is

2 .

denied by the respondent. The applicant alleaes that the total

purchase price was paid but only 60 cases of wine

were

delivered.

The applicant says that on or about 5 February 1986

Mr Stephenson.

one

of Its directors.

had

telephone

a

conversation wlth a Mr Anderson who was actlng on

behalf of the

respondent. Mr Anderson is alleged

to

have

said

that

the

respondent

would deliver. or procure

the

delivery

of, the

undelivered wines tu the applicant m Perth within a

reasonable

time.

A letter dated 11 February 1986 from the

respondent is

sard to have been to the same effect.

The wines were, in fact,

never dellvered. The respondent admits that a

conversation

took

place between Mr Stephenson and Mr Anderson

but denies

that

the substance

of

the conversation was as alleged and

denies that Mr Anderson was actinu on

behalf of the respondent.

The

conduct

of the respondent

is alleued to have been

in

contravention of s.52(1)

of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

in that,

at the time the statements were

made. the respondent

had no intention of aivinu effect

to them and did not have the

means of doinu so. The applicant says it relied on the statements made and. as a result, it suffered loss and damage. There is an alternative claim for damaues for breach of

contract on the part of

the respondent. By its defence, the

respondent denies any liability to

the applicant.

The

respondent has now applied to the

Court

for an

order that the applicant give security for costs in the

sum of

$10,000 or such other amount as

the Court may deem fit. A stay

of proceedings is souuht until security for costs

is given.

.

.C

3 .

The

evldence establishes that the applicant has

an

lssued capital of

$10.

It

is

a trustee company, its sole

tradina activity beina

the conduct of a business under the name

"Librrtv Liquors" as trustee for "The Carlton Unit Trust". The

applicant owns no assets beneficially and does not trade on its

own account.

There

is

in

evidence

an unaudited

balance

sheet

showinu the assets and liabilities of the business of "Liberty

Liquors" as at 30 June 1986 and a profit and loss statement for

the

business for the financial year ended on that date.

Current assets are shown at $1,152,075 and current liabilities at $1,034,508. Included in the current assets are short term deposits totalllna $417.863. The profit and loss statement

shows an operatinu profit for the year at $324,613,

an increase

from

$180,397 for the previous year. It is estimated by the

applicant

that the operatinu profit

of

the business for the

current year will be

of the order of

$500,000.

The notes

to, and forming part

of, the financial

statements of the applicant as at

30

June 1985 contain the

following statement:

"The total liabilities incurred on behalf

of The

Carlton Unit Trust were not in any Csic3 breach

of any provision of the trust deed and therefore

the company is entitled to be fully indemnified

for liabilities incurred."

4 .

There is.

however-. no information before the Court as to the

terms of the trust deed of

"The Carlton Unit Trust" nor any

information as to its activities other than

that

relatinu to

the

business

"Liberty

Liquors".

Apart

from

the

estimated

operatinu profit fiuure, no details are uiven concernins the

financial position in the current year of the liquor business.

Nor

are the terms of the idemnity to which the applicant is

said to be entitled In evidence and there is in the material no

assertion in relatlon

to the year ended

30 June 1986 similar to

that quoted above from the financial statements as at 30 June

1985. Mr Stephenson says in his affidavit sworn 27 May 1987

that he controls "The Carlton Unit Trust" through what 1 s

descrlbed as his "indirect control of units in the trust". No

detalls are uiven.

The case for the respondent is epitomised in

what was

said by Smithers J. in Laundrv Coin-Wash Nominees Ptv. Ltd.

v.

Dunlop Olvmpic Ltd. (1985)

ATPR 40-584 at p.46.729:

"Where the only tangible assets of an applicant

company are held

in trust for another entity and

its solvency depends on its right as trustee to indemnity auainst that entity it is necessary for the Court to have in mind the difficulties which

a successful respondent would have in attempting

to execute in respect of

an

order for costs.

Indeed. unless some

step is taken to alleviate

those difficulties it is reasonable i td just to treat the applicant company as if it were without

assets to meet such

a liability."

5.

The appllcant. in

opposinu the appllcatlon, polnts

to

lts

equltable riuht, as trustee, to indemnity

by

the

beneficiarles of the trust auainst

costs

and

expenses

properly incurred

in

execution

of the trust and

to its

riuht,

enforceable by lien over

the assets under its

control, to indemnity

out of the trust assets.

It is also

said that the respondent. in the event of costs

being

awarded in its favour. would have a riuht, by subrogation, to require the exercise bp the applicant of its riuht of

irldemnitv out of the assets of the trust. It

is submitted,

Ln

effect, that,

havlnu

regard to

those riqhts and the

clrcumstance that the business conducted

by the applicant in

execution of the trust

is in a healthy financial state, the

Court should be satisfied that the respondent's interests

are sufficiently protected and should, in the exercise

of

its discretion, decline to order that security for costs be

provided.

All this

is said, however, in the absence of any

evidence as

to the terms

of the trust and, in particular,

the

terms of any indemnity

for which

the trust deed

provides.

Apart from the rather bland statement that

Hr

Stephenson is entitled, indirectly,

to control "The Carlton

Unit Trust". there is no evidence as to the identity or the financial position of the beneficiaries. No undertaking is offered by or on behalf of the applicant that it will make provision. by the exercise of its lien, for the satisfaction

of an

order

for

payment of any

costs

awarded

to

the

i

respondent.

It

cannot.

of

course.

be

predicted

with

certainty that the applicant will remain the trustee of

"The

Carlton

Unit

Trust"

at

the

time

of !udgment

In

the

proceeding.

To this must be added that

it is not entirely

clear precisely how and in what circumstances the respondent

could enforce a right of subrogation.

In Laundrv Coin-Wash Nominees Ptv. Ltd. v. Dunlop

Olvmpic Ltd. (supra), Smithers

J. said at pp-46,730-1:

"The method

by

which

the

parties

concerned

construct the entities by whlch their interests

are pursued has,

no doubt. positlve benefits

for

them, and is a matter for decision by them. But

the trust structure does

involve

that

persons

dealing with a company

playing

the

part

of

trustee

in

the

adopted

business

structure,

necessarily deal with an entity, the beneficial ownership of all property in whose hands is in another entity to whom the legal estate therein

may be passed at any time. The accountability of such a company for amounts for which it may be legally liable is inherently less stable and

reliable than would be the case if it were in

business

on

its

own

behalf.

For reasons

mentioned

above a creditor

with

a

judgment

against the applicant should not normally be

restricted

to

reliance

on

the

applicant's

indemnity under the trust deed. Accordingly, but

for the giving of the undertaking referred to I

would

have

ordered

that the

applicant

give

security for costs.

I have

concluded

that

an

applicant

being

a

trustee company which

desires to resist an order

for security for costs should establish that

recourse to

property held by or for it will be

available

to

the

party

against

whom

it has

brought

its

action

and

be

adequate,

at the

appropriate time. to meet the possible liability

for

costs.

In

this

case

I considered

the

applicant might do

this by giving an undertaking

such as

I

have required. It ensures that the

appllcant

will

be

in

actual

possesslon

of

property and have leual entitlements in respect

thereof sufflcient in value to provide for the

appllcant's liability and

thus

providing

a

sufflcient measure of practical protection of the

interests of the respondents."

Reference mluht also be made to what was said by Jenklnson

J. in Chester

& Feln Propertv Developments

Pty.

Ltd. v.

&ndAm InvesLm>xts Ptv. Ltd.

(1985) 61 A.L.R.

729.

In my oplnion. it would not be

an appropriate

exerclse of the judicial discretion which

is vested in the

Court to decline to order security because of the mere

existence of the equitable riuhts to

which I have referred,

with whatever difficulties may be attendant upon their

enforcement. Such

an approach should, I think, properly be

reqarded

as

insufficiently

protecting

the

legitimate

interests of the respondent. It follows that this is, in my

view, an appropriate case in which to order

that

the

applicant uive security.

I

would add that there

is

no

suuuestion

that to order

security

will

frustrate

the

litiuation.

In relation to the amount of the security to

be

provided. the evidence is sparse. Apart from the somewhat

enlumatic

expression

of

opinion

by

the

respondent's

solicitor

that

the

party

and

party

costs

which

the

respondent would be entitled to recover from the applicant

in the event

of

it being successful in defending the

. *

I .

8.

proceedinu "is reflected In the amount claimed in the notice

of motion". there

1s little materlal upon which to form an

estlmate of the amount of costs which would be recoverable.

It is. however. of some significance that

the respondent has

no offlce in Australia.

Thls

will inevitably lncrease the

difficulty and expense in obtaining instructions

which must

be

sought

from

the

United

Kingdom

where

any

relevant

documents are situated and where all those to whom the

respondent might look to speak of the events on which the

applicant relies are to be found. Any witnesses which the

respondent may wish to call

as to those events will have to

travel to this country from the United Kingdom.

In my

opinion, the appropriate course is to order

that

the

applicant

within

28

days

of

this

order

give

security in the

sum

of $7,500 for the payment to the

respondent of any costs that may be awarded against the

applicant in the proceeding; that that security be given by

the payment into Court of the sum of $7,500; and that, if

the applicant fails to comply with the order for security

within

2 8 days,

the

proceeding

be

thereupon

stayed.

I

should make it clear that. in making those orders.

I rely on

the power conferred on the Court by s.56

of

the Federal

Court of Australia Act 1977 (Cth): see Bell Wholesale Co.

Ptv. Ltd. v.

Gates Export Corporation (1984)

5 2 A.L.R.

176.

It will be open to the respondent to make application for a

larger

sum

to

be

provided

by

way

of security

at an

appropriate time should

it be so advised. The respondent's

- .

. .

# .

9 .

motion for security for costs. of which notice was filed on

18 May 1987.

is ad?ourned generally with liberty to restore

it

to the list at any time on reasonable notice. The

applicant must pay the respondent's costs

of the motion to

and irlcludina the entry of this order.

I certify that this and

the preceding

8 pages are

a true copy of the Reasons for Judqment herein of the

Honourable

Justice

Mr

Neave

S .

Associate

Dated: 29 May 1987

Counsel

for

the

applicant

: Mr S. Paterniti

Solicitors for the applicant

: Parker h Parker

Counsel for the respondent

:

Mr B . S . Dodd

Solicitors for the respondent

:

Mallesons Stephen Jacques

Date of

hearina

: 29

1987

May

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