SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Permission to Appeal in Private)
DIEMOULD TOOLING SVCS P/L v OATEN & SANTOS v MARKOS
[2007] SASC 400
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Bleby and The Honourable Justice Layton)
13 November 2007
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL
Application to Full Court for permission to appeal in private - permission granted.
Occupational Health Safety and Welfare Act 1986 s 19, s 22(2); Dangerous Substances Act 1979 s 12(2)(2)(a), referred to.
DIEMOULD TOOLING SVCS P/L v OATEN & SANTOS v MARKOS
[2007] SASC 400Applications for permission to appeal
FULL COURT: Duggan, Bleby and Layton JJ
THE COURT: These are applications for permission to appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court.
The two matters which are the subject of the applications involve common legal issues. These issues were addressed in a decision of the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court following a referral of questions of law to that Court[1].
[1] [2007] SAIRC 44.
The applicants have been charged with failing to maintain standards of safety contrary to the Occupational Health Safety and Welfare Act 1986 and the Dangerous Substances Act 1979.
A preliminary issue has arisen as to whether the charges laid against the applicants are bad for duplicity.
The applications were considered in private on the papers.
The issues raised in the two cases concern matters of general principle about which conflicting views have been expressed in judgments in other jurisdictions.
In the light of these considerations the Court orders that permission be granted to the applicants to appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court.
- AGLC
- Diemould Tooling Svcs P/L v Oaten & Santos v Markos [2007] SASC 400
- Case
- [2007] SASC 400
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the lower court correctly interpreted the limitation of liability clause in the contract. The appellants argued that the clause was ambiguous and therefore should not be enforced. They contended that the clause was not clearly expressed and failed to adequately inform them of the extent of their liability. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the clause was clear and unambiguous and should be enforced as written.
The court, in considering the matter, examined the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its formation. It noted that the clause in question was drafted in plain language and was consistent with industry standards. The court found that there was no ambiguity in the clause and that it clearly limited the liability of the party in question. As such, the court upheld the lower court's decision and dismissed the appeal. The court also denied the motion for a new trial, finding that there were no grounds for it. In summary, the court held that the limitation of liability clause was valid and enforceable, and that the lower court's decision was correct.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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