Dickenson v Brown

[2001] NSWSC 714

CITATION:	Dickenson v Brown; Estate of Olga M. Bartle Deceased and The Family Provision Act [2001] NSWSC 714
CURRENT JURISDICTION:	Equity
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 4887/2000
HEARING DATE(S):	5 April 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:	5 April 2001
PARTIES :	Allan Dickenson (Plaintiff) Maureen Brown (Defendant)
JUDGMENT OF:	Bryson J at 1

COUNSEL :
SOLICITORS:	R. Schenko & Co (Plaintiff) Baker Ryrie Rickards Titmarsh (Defendant)
CATCHWORDS:	PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Alternative Dispute Resolution - Mediation - compulsory mediation under s.110K of SC Act 1970 - the Court made an order for compulsory mediation of its own motion where the projected four day hearing would use up a significant part of the estate.
LEGISLATION CITED:	Supreme Court Act 1970, section 110K; Family Provision Act 1982
DECISION:	1). Of my own motion I order pursuant to s.110K of the Supreme Court Act 1970 that the whole of the proceedings be referred for mediation. ; 2). Direct that the parties obtain an appointment for and attend an Information Session with Registrar Berecry. ; 3). Costs of the mediation are reserved.

- 1 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES

EQUITY DIVISION

4887/2000

Bryson J

5 April 2001

Allan Dickenson v Maureen Brown;
Estate Of Olga Monowai Bartle Deceased
And The Family Provision Act , 1982
Judgment

1 Bryson J: On 12 December 2000, I made an order for interim provision for the plaintiff, and made a number of procedural directions including terms requiring the plaintiff to apply to the Master for an expedited hearing. On 9 February 2001, Master McLaughlin recorded his view that it is appropriate that the hearing of the matter be expedited, and on 4 April the proceedings came before Master Macready when the Master called through the list for the purpose of fixing hearing dates. The Master was given an estimate that the hearing would take four days.
2 It is difficult to accommodate a hearing of four days in the Master’s list. Family Provision proceedings which are complex and lengthy are usually heard by judges.
3 A hearing of four days will involve both parties in expenditure which is seriously out of scale with the size of the estate and the provision which may be ordered for the plaintiff. If there is a four day hearing a significant part of the estate will be used up without corresponding advantage to the people who may be interested in the estate.
4 On 12 December 2000, I strongly recommended that the parties agree to go to Mediation when the affidavits are complete. They have not done so and I am concerned that the proceedings have taken a serious wrong direction if the parties are committing themselves to a contentious hearing.
5 In the circumstances I have decided to make a compulsory order referring the matter for Mediation. When the mediation has taken place the question of fixing a date for hearing should be put before me for consideration again.
6 Orders:-
1) Of my own motion I order pursuant to s.110K of the Supreme Court Act 1970 that the whole of the proceedings be referred for mediation.
2) Direct that the parties obtain an appointment for and attend an Information Session with Registrar Berecry.
3) Costs of the mediation are reserved.

Last Modified: 08/22/2001