Dick v Launceston Greyhound Racing Club Incorporated

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[2001] TASSC 142

CITATION:Dick v Launceston Greyhound Racing Club Incorporated  [2001] TASSC 142

PARTIES:  DICK, Leslie Walker
  v

LAUNCESTON GREYHOUND RACING CLUB INCORPORATED

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA           
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  66/1998
DELIVERED ON:  17 December 2001
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  20, 21 and 22 November 2001

JUDGMENT OF:  Slicer J

CATCHWORDS:

Real Property - Easements generally - Creation - By prescription - Length of time - Right of entry to rear of plaintiff's property over defendant's land - Sufficient change in usage.

Cargill v Gotts [1980] 2 All ER 49; Johns v Delaney (1890) 16 VLR 729; RPC Holdings Ltd v Rogers [1953] 1 All ER 1029; British Railways Board v Glass [1965] 1 Ch 538, followed.
Prescription Act 1934 (Tas).
Land Titles Amendment (Law Reform) Act 2001 (Tas).
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas), s8.
Aust Dig Real Property [413].

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  R A Hart
             Respondent:  R W Pearce
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Rae & Partners
             Defendant:  Douglas & Collins

Judgment Number:  [2001] TASSC 142
Number of Paragraphs:  32

Serial No 142/2001
File No 66/1998

LESLIE WALKER DICK v
LAUNCESTON GREYHOUND RACING CLUB INCORPORATED

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  SLICER J
  17 December 2001

  1. The plaintiff is the owner of land adjoining a racing complex owned and operated by the defendant.  He claims the existence of a right of way over portion of that land alongside the car park of the complex and seeks a declaration to that effect.

  1. The plaintiff's property is commercial and is leased to a business which requires access by vehicles.  The property has access onto Invermay Road, but its size and use make it preferable, if not necessary, for vehicles to travel through a rear entrance opening onto the car park. 

  1. In March 1998, the defendant, through its agents, obstructed the rear entrance to the plaintiff's property and these proceedings commenced on 15 May 1998.  The claim is pleaded in the following terms: 

"4The Plaintiff and the predecessors in title of the Plaintiff's land and the several occupiers thereof have for the full period of forty years before the commencing of this action enjoyed as of right and without interruption the rights of way referred to in paragraph 3 above and the Plaintiff claims the right to do so as a legal right pursuant to the Prescription Act 1932 [sic].

5The Plaintiff and the predecessors in title of the Plaintiff's land and the several occupiers thereof have for the full period of twenty years before the commencing of this action enjoyed as of right and without interruption the rights of way referred to in paragraph 3 above and the Plaintiff claims the right to do so as a legal right pursuant to the Prescription Act 1932 [sic]."

  1. Particulars of use were provided in the following terms:

(1)       use of the land commenced at a time well prior to 1968;

(2)       that it was used for the benefit of the plaintiff's land;

(3)that a double gate existed at…

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Case
[2001] TASSC 142
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Leslie Walker Dick, the owner of a commercial property, sued the Launceston Greyhound Racing Club Incorporated, the owner of an adjoining racing complex, seeking a declaration that he had a right of way over part of the complex's car park. The plaintiff claimed that he had enjoyed such a right for at least 20 years, and potentially for 40 years, without interruption, pursuant to the Prescription Act 1934 (Tas). The defendant denied the historic use and counterclaimed for an injunction restraining the plaintiff's continued use of its land. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff had established a prescriptive right to the claimed easement and, if so, the date on which such a right, if any, was acquired. The court also had to consider the defendant's counterclaim.
The court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove a continuous use of the defendant's land as a means of access to and from his property for the requisite period of 20 or 40 years. The plaintiff's use of the defendant's land was intermittent, and unknown to the defendant. The court found that the use increased significantly in 1984 when the plaintiff commenced operating a car yard on the property. The defendant was aware of the increased use and permitted the same. The defendant regularised the permitted use by restricting it to passage, rather than storage and ancillary usage. The defendant also asserted its right to exclusive possession of its premises by erecting gates and maintaining them in effective use until 1988. The court found that the plaintiff did not have unrestricted access to his property at the relevant times, as claimed by him in his evidence. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not acquired a prescriptive right to the claimed easement. The court also found that the defendant's claim of exclusive possession and its offer of a licence agreement provided notice to the plaintiff that it did not acquiesce in the claimed right of way. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim and invited the parties to consider the defendant's counterclaim.

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