Dias v Minister for Education

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   DIAS -v- MINISTER FOR EDUCATION [2006] WADC 5

CORAM:   HH JACKSON DCJ

HEARD:   28 OCTOBER 2005

DELIVERED          :   30 JANUARY 2006

FILE NO/S:   CIV 357 of 2004

BETWEEN:   RUTH DIAS

Plaintiff

AND

MINISTER FOR EDUCATION
Defendant

Catchwords:

Appeal from Registrar on chamber summons to dismiss action

Legislation:

Education Act 1928

Limitation Act 1935 s 47A

Cemeteries Act 1986

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr T H Offer

Defendant:     Mr I R Freeman

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Friedman Lurie Singh & D'Angelo

Defendant:     Phillips Fox

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466

Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105

Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] 1 AC 242

Hudson v Vanderheld (1968) 118 CLR 171

Lokan v Metropolitan Cemeteries Board (1997) 18 SR(WA) 125

Case(s) also cited:

Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker (1993) 11 WAR 26

Matheson v Commissioner of Main Roads (2001) 25 WAR 269

Pilbara Iron Limited v Bonotto (1994) 11 WAR 348

  1. HH JACKSON DCJ:  By a writ of summons dated 19 February 2004 the plaintiff claimed by way of general endorsement:

    "The Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant is for damages for personal injuries sustained and losses suffered on or about 20 February 1998 caused by the negligence and/or breach of statutory duty and/or breach of contract of employment by or on the part of the Defendant, its servants or agents."

  2. The defendant filed a conditional appearance and took out a chamber summons for orders that the plaintiff's action be dismissed or alternatively that judgment be entered for the defendant pursuant to O 20 r 19(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court on the basis that:

    (a)there is no reasonable cause of action;

    (b)the action is frivolous or vexatious;

    (c)the action is an abuse of the process of the Court.

  3. The defendant argues that there is no reasonable cause of action because of the operation of s 47A of the Limitation Act.  If s 47A applies and the cause of action is statute barred, the claim is frivolous and has no prospect of success.  If s 47A does not apply the action was commenced within time.  The plaintiff opposed the application.  The defendant filed affidavits in support.  The matter came before Registrar Kingsley who struck out the action on 11 April 2005.

  4. From that decision the plaintiff appeals.  The appeal is heard de novo.  Each side filed written submissions.  The matter came before me on 28 October 2005 and I reserved my decision after hearing argument.

  5. The defendant's argument is that s 47A of the Limitation Act 1935 applies to the claim and that by reason thereof the plaintiff is now precluded from bringing an application for leave to commence proceedings pursuant to s 47A(3)(a) of the Limitation Act 1935 as it is now in excess of six years since her cause of action is alleged to have accrued.

  6. Section 47A provides as…

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Details
Case
[2006] WADC 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dias v Minister for Education was heard by O'Sullivan DCJ in the District Court of South Australia. The plaintiff, Dias, brought an action against the Minister for Education alleging various claims related to her treatment, specifically her consideration for promotion and a forced transfer. The defendant sought to dismiss the action on the basis of statutory immunity.

The central legal issue was whether the Minister for Education was immune from liability for the plaintiff's claims under the statutory provisions of the Education Act. The court had to determine if the actions in question, namely the consideration for promotion and the forced transfer, were integral to the core functions of the Minister under the Act. The defendant argued that these actions were central to the delivery of education and thus protected by statutory immunity, as opposed to being peripheral or ancillary activities. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the statutory immunity did not extend to her treatment in relation to these core functions.

O'Sullivan DCJ examined the statutory immunity provisions and distinguished the present case from previous decisions such as Lokan and Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman. The court found that the engagement, transfer, and promotion of teachers were central to the purpose of the Education Act and constituted core functions. The immunity was held not to apply because the complaint related directly to these core functions. The court also noted that statutory immunity should be strictly construed as it derogates from ordinary rights. The decision in Lokan and Australian Airlines Commission v Newman was distinguished based on the particular facts and the nature of the acts in question.

The court concluded that the statutory immunity did not apply to the plaintiff's claims and dismissed the defendant's application to dismiss the action.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

O'Sullivan DCJ referred inter alia to the reasons of Lord Buckmaster in Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] 1 AC 242 where his Lordship said at page 247:"In other words it is not because the act out of which the accident arises is within their power that a public authority enjoyed the benefit of the statute. It is because the act is one which is either an act in the direct execution of a statute or in the discharge of a public duty or the exercise of a public authority. I regard those latter words as meaning a duty owed to all the public alike or an authority exercised impartially with regard to all of the public. It assumes that there are duties and authorities which are not public and in the exercise or discharge of such duties or authorities this protection does not apply." The defendant seeks to distinguish the decision in Lokan. The defendant argues that the role of teachers is integral and key in the provision of public education in a system essentially compulsory for most children. Unlike the position in Lokan, the defendant argues that under the Education Act there is an express power and authority on the defendant to engage staff and thus to deal with issues of transfers and promotions of teachers. Thus the engagement, transfer and promotions of teachers is a matter central to, and not ancillary to, the purpose of the Act, namely the delivery of education. In those circumstances, it is a core function under the Education Act. It is distinct from, for example, the provisions of a safe system of work for teachers. "The complaint by the plaintiff is as to her treatment in relation to that core function – ie, the consideration by the defendant of her for promotion and forced transfer." The current case it argues is therefore unlike Lokan in that in Lokan the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a grave digger and claimed to have been injured in the course of his employment. The issue was whether or not the mere fact of the employment of the plaintiff in circumstances where he was injured was sufficient to define it as an act done in pursuance of, or execution of the statute or any public duty or authority in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of the act, duty or authority by the defendant. As four members of the High Court of Australia commented in Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman :"A limitation provision, because it derogates from the ordinary rights of individuals, should be strictly construed." In my view however, both the decision in Lokan and that in Australian Airlines Commission v Newman can be distinguished from the present case on the facts. The High Court in the latter case argued from the same principles that had been set out in Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 CLR 105 and Hudson v Vanderheld (1968) 118 CLR 171, commenting:"The Court in each of the two cases, for the purpose of determining whether the statutory provision applied, directed its attention to the particular act that caused the injury, the negligent driving of a vehicle on a public street, instead of looking to the general statutory function – operating as a fire brigade or as a local authority – in the course of which the particular act was done. Both Ardouin and Hudson are inconsistent with the notion that, for the purpose of deciding whether s. 63(1) applies, we should look to the carrying on of the business or operation of a flight services kitchen, rather than to the Commission's negligent failure to provide a safe means of access to a place of work or to maintain the floor in good order and condition or to maintain it properly. And, by parity of reasoning with the approach adopted by Kitto J. in Ardouin, we should not regard the act complained of by the respondent as something authorised … and, accordingly, as something done 'under' the Act."