Dianne Kathleen Rowley v Dennis Howell Williams

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Dianne Kathleen Rowley v Dennis Howell Williams [2010] NTSC 45

PARTIES:Dianne Kathleen Rowley

v

Dennis Howell Williams

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:121/09 (20927150)

DELIVERED:  7 September 2010

HEARING DATES:  17, 18 May, 11 June and Submissions concluding 26 July 2010

JUDGMENT OF:  MASTER LUPPINO

CATCHWORDS:

FAMILY LAW – De facto relationships – Application for adjustment of property interests – Separation agreement – Whether separation agreement should be set aside – Whether an inheritance is divisible by an adjusting order.

VALUATION OF LAND – Valuation of land – Determining correct approach to valuation – Admissibility of valuation where background data is not set out – Reconciling differing valuations.

De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT), ss 3, 14, 15, 16, 18, 44, 46

Van Jole v Cole [2000] NTSC 18; LF v RA (2006) 2 Qd R 561; Ottley v Chester [2010] NTSC 38; The Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 157; Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605; Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sproules (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; Riverbank Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 48 ALJR 483; Evans v Marmont (1997) 21 Fam LR 760; Wallace v Stanford (1995) 19 Fam LR 430; Kardos v Sarbutt (2006) 34 Fam LR 550; Parker v Parker (1993) DFC 95-139;

Freckelton & Selby, Expert Evidence, Law Practice, Procedure and Advocacy, 4th Ed, 2009.

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:Mr Young

Defendant:Mr Harper

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:Robert Welfare

Defendant:Withnalls

Judgment category classification:   B

Judgment ID Number:  LUP1002

Number of pages:  37

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Dianne Kathleen Rowley v Dennis Howell Williams [2010] NTSC 45

No. 121/09 (20927150)

BETWEEN:

Dianne Kathleen Rowley

Plaintiff

AND:

Dennis Howell Williams

Defendant

CORAM:    MASTER LUPPINO

REASONS FOR DECISION

(Delivered 7 September 2010)

  1. This claim is brought pursuant to the De Facto Relationships Act1991 (“the Act”). The Plaintiff seeks an order pursuant to section 46 setting aside a separation agreement and an order pursuant to section 18 adjusting property interests.

  2. The Court’s power to make an order adjusting the property interests of partners in a de facto relationship is contained in section 18 of the Act which provides as follows:

    18  The order for adjustment

    (1)The order which a court may make under this Division with respect to the property of de facto partners or either of them is such order adjusting the interests of the partners in the property as the court considers just and equitable having regard to:

    (a)the financial and non-financial contributions made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the partners to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property or to the financial resources of the partners or either of them; and

    (b)the contributions (including any made in the capacity of homemaker or parent) made by either of the partners to the welfare of…

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Details
Case
[2010] NTSC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dianne Kathleen Rowley versus Dennis Howell Williams involves a dispute regarding a separation agreement between the parties. The primary issue before the court was whether the separation agreement should be set aside, as well as whether an inheritance received by one party is divisible by an adjusting order. The matter was heard in the Family Court of Australia. The legal issues that the court needed to address included the interpretation of section 46 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which allows the court to set aside or vary a separation agreement if certain conditions are met, and the admissibility of a valuation report where the background data was not set out. Additionally, the court needed to determine the appropriate approach to valuing the land in question, and reconcile differing valuations provided by expert witnesses.

The court began by examining the nature of the separation agreement and its validity under section 3(1) of the Family Law Act. It was noted that the agreement was made in contemplation of terminating the de facto relationship and made provision for financial matters. The court then turned to section 46 of the Act, which allows for the setting aside of separation agreements in cases of serious injustice or impracticability. The court found that the term “serious injustice” should be understood in its ordinary sense, meaning a considerable wrong or unfairness. After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the court determined that there was no serious injustice in enforcing the separation agreement, and therefore it should not be set aside. The court also found that the inheritance received by one party was not divisible by an adjusting order, as it was not considered to be property acquired during the de facto relationship.

The court further addressed the issue of valuing the land in question, and the admissibility of the valuation report. It was noted that the background data for the valuation was not set out in the report, but the court determined that the report was still admissible as it was based on a recognised method of valuation. The court then considered the differing valuations provided by the expert witnesses, and reconciled the differences by taking into account the specific circumstances of the case.

In conclusion, the court found in favour of the respondent, Dennis Howell Williams, and dismissed the application by Dianne Kathleen Rowley for an adjustment of property interests. The separation agreement was upheld as valid and binding, and the inheritance received by one party was not considered to be divisible by an adjusting order. The court’s decision provides guidance on the interpretation of “serious injustice” under section 46 of the Family Law Act, as well as the admissibility of valuation reports and the valuation of land in family law cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A separation agreement is defined by section 3(1) of the Act as follows:separation agreement means an agreement (whenever entered into) between 2 adults, whether or not there are other parties to the agreement, which:(a)is made in contemplation of terminating a de facto relationship between them or after terminating it; and(b)makes provision with respect to financial matters (whether or not it also makes provision with respect to other matters). By section 44 of the Act, separation agreements are made valid and binding subject only to the power given to the Court by section 46 to set them aside in appropriate cases. The document signed by the Plaintiff is therefore, absent an order under section 46, an effective bar to the proceedings. Section 46 of the Act provides as follows:46 Variation and setting aside of agreements(1)On an application by a de facto partner for an order under Division 3 or 5 of Part 2, the court may, in the circumstances specified in this section, vary or set aside all or any of the provisions of a cohabitation agreement or separation agreement made between that de facto partner and the other, being an agreement which is in writing and is signed by that other.(2)The court may exercise its powers under subsection (1) in respect of a cohabitation agreement or separation agreement only if, in its opinion:(a)enforcement (whether on the application before the court or on any other application for any remedy or relief under any other Act or law) of the agreement would lead to serious injustice between the parties; or(b)circumstances have arisen since the time when the agreement was made making it impracticable for its provisions, or any of them, to be carried out.(3)A court may exercise its powers under subsection (1) notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in a cohabitation agreement or separation agreement. The Court’s power under section 46 of the Act to set aside or vary a separation agreement is essentially based on “serious injustice”. That term is not defined in the Act. In relation to that term, in Van Jole v Cole,[1] Riley J said:-“It is clear that the Court will not interfere with a separation agreement simply because it believes a different form of agreement was more appropriate. Further it will not interfere where there is simple injustice. Rather, it must be satisfied that a failure to intervene would result in “serious injustice” between the parties. What is meant by that expression is not defined in the Act and has not been explored in any helpful way in any case that either counsel or myself have been able to locate. The expression is not a term of art and does not have any technical legal sense. It is therefore to be understood in the sense in which it is commonly used in the English language.It is necessary for a court to look at the whole of the surrounding circumstances of such an agreement in order to determine whether, in accordance with the ordinary English usage of the words, a serious injustice arises. An injustice is opposite of justice and includes the concepts of wrong or unfairness. The word serious in this context suggests weighty, grave or considerable. I agree with the submission made by Mr Young, who appeared on behalf of the respondent, that in the circumstances of this matter the expression “serious injustice” should be given its ordinary meaning of a considerable wrong or unfairness.”