Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION: Diamond & Anor v Birdon Contracting Pty Limited & Anor [2007] NSWLEC 92 PARTIES: FIRST APPLICANT:
Neville DiamondSECOND APPLICANT:
Mark RichardsonFIRST RESPONDENT:
SECOND RESPONDENT:
Birdon Contracting Pty Limited
Hawkesbury City CouncilFILE NUMBER(S): 40900 of 2006 CORAM: Lloyd J KEY ISSUES: Costs :- security for costs - relevant principles LEGISLATION CITED: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 123
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 s 63CASES CITED: KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Limited (1995) 56 FCR 189;
Melville v Craig Nowlan & Associates Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 82DATES OF HEARING: 07/11/2006 EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 7 November 2006 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: FIRST APPLICANT:
N Diamond in person
SOLICITORS:
N/ASECOND APPLICANT:
N/AFIRST RESPONDENT:
SECOND RESPONDENT:
J J Webster SC and A M Pickles (barrister)
SOLICITORS:
Russell C Byrnes
N/A
JUDGMENT:
IN THE LAND AND
ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Lloyd J
Tuesday, 7 November 2006
LEC No. 40900 of 2006
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENTDIAMOND & ANOR v BIRDON CONTRACTING PTY LIMITED & ANOR [2007] NSWLEC 92
1 HIS HONOUR: The first respondent Birdon Contracting Pty Limited, applies by notice of motion for an order for security for costs in relation to proceedings brought by the applicants relating to a sand mining operation conducted on land at Singleton Road, Colo Heights (Tinda Park). The proceeding are brought under s 123(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, which enable any person to bring proceedings in the Court for an order to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act, whether or not any right of that person has been or may be impinged by or as a consequence of that breach. The applicants allege that the sand mining operation is being conducted unlawfully.
2 The first applicant, Mr Neville Diamond who appears in person, is an undischarged bankrupt. He says that he has the written authority of the second applicant, Mr Mark Richardson, to appear as his agent. There is no evidence before me, however, of any written authorisation by Mr Richardson as required by s 63 of the Land & Environment Court Act 1979. Accordingly I must assume that Mr Diamond only represents himself.
3 There is evidence from the first respondent’s solicitor, Mr Gregory Miles of Russell C Byrnes solicitors, giving an estimate of the first respondent’s costs of the proceedings. In his affidavit sworn on 12 October 2006, Mr Miles sets out his estimate of these costs as follows:
6. It is my opinion that if this matter were to proceed to trial the days involved in the hearing would be at least 4 or more days and a days [sic] view. I have been instructed to engage Senior Counsel and a junior and I estimate the costs of preparation and hearing will exceed $40,000 for my client alone.
7. In making the above assessment I have estimated Senior Counsel’s fees at…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWLEC 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Birdon Contracting Pty Limited was entitled to an order for security for costs under section 69(3) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979. Lloyd J considered the relevant principles for granting such security, drawing from the case of KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Limited and the subsequent interpretation by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Melville v Craig Nowlan & Associates Pty Ltd.
Lloyd J applied the principles as modified by the Court of Appeal in Melville, focusing on whether the application was brought promptly, the strength of the case, and whether the application was oppressive. Lloyd J found that the application was brought promptly and that the case was arguable. The Court rejected the notion that the application would deny an impecunious citizen the right to litigate, as per the reasoning in Melville. The Court concluded that the application for security for costs should be granted.
The formal orders of the Court were that the applicants must provide security for costs in the sum of $50,000.00 or a bank guarantee in the same amount. In default of providing such security, the application would be permanently stayed or stayed until further order of the Court. The costs of the notice of motion were to be paid by the first applicant.
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