Diamarda & Diamarda (No 2) - [2024] FedCFamC1F 755

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Diamarda & Diamarda (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 755

File number: MLC 9432 of 2021

Judgment of: CARTER J

Date of judgment: 11 November 2024

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Final orders altering property interests – Where there is a dispute as to the quantum of the pool –Where orders for valuations were not complied with – Where the wife asserts the husband has sold vehicles for less than market value – Where the wife contends the husband continues to possess vehicles he claims were sold in clearing sales and by the liquidator – Where the husband unilaterally appointed liquidators –Where there are outstanding issues as to the liquidators’ fees and the finalisation of the liquidation of the parties’ companies and the treatment of those fees – Pool divided 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband.

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 81, 90XT, 106A

Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 (Cth) Part 6

Cases cited:
Aleksovski v Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705

Bevan v Bevan (2013) 49 Fam LR 387

Dickons v Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244

J & S [2003] FamCA 618

Omacini and Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218

Parshen v Parshen (1996) FLC 92-720

Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108

Stein v Stein (1986) FLC 91-779

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 203

Date of last submission/s: 17 October 2024

Date of hearing: 18 – 21, 25 – 26 March 2024

Place: Melbourne

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Stanley

Solicitor for the Applicant: Cahill Family Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Swann

Solicitor for the Respondent: Schembri + McCluskys
ORDERS

MLC 9432 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MS DIAMARDA

Applicant

AND:
MR DIAMARDA

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:

CARTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Division of the proceeds of sales of the real properties
1.The parties do all acts and things and sign all such documents to direct the net funds held by T Lawyers on behalf of U Company in respect of V Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ATF W Trust, be distributed as follows:
(a)first, to pay V Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ATF W Trust;
(b)secondly, the husband in his capacity as director cause the funds to be distributed to the W Trust;
(c)thirdly, the proceeds as held by W Trust be distributed in proportions of:
(i)60 per cent to the wife, plus a further sum of $4,130; and
(ii)the balance to the husband.

Y Pty Ltd ATF Z Unit Trust
2.The wife in her capacity as the director of Y Pty Ltd (“the company”) ATF the Z Unit Trust (“the trust”) do all such act and things and sign all documents necessary to sell the real property situate at and known as 1 AA Street, Suburb P (“[1 AA Street]”).
3.The net sale proceeds of the sale of 1 AA Street be distributed as follows:
(a)first, to pay the costs, commissions and expenses of the sale;
(b)secondly, to discharge the mortgage and any other encumbrance affecting the property, including outstanding rates and taxes;
(c)thirdly, to pay the sum of $240,000 to Cahill Family Lawyers to be held in an interest-bearing trust account, pending the payment of capital gains tax, in accordance with Order 12 herein;
(d)fourthly, to set aside $5,000 to meet the anticipated accountancy costs of obtaining taxation advice and winding up the company and the trust; and
(e)fifthly, the wife in her capacity as director cause the funds to be distributed in proportions of:
(i)60 per cent to the wife; and
(ii)40 per cent to the husband.

4.By no later than 14 days prior to the settlement of 1 AA Street, the husband do all acts and things required to remove all remaining items on the property (including but not limited to tools, car parts, engines and shipping containers), at his sole expense.
5.Contemporaneously with the settlement of 1 AA Street, the wife do all acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to withdraw, at the wife’s sole expense, including any PEXA fees, the Caveat (…) with respect to the property.
6.Upon completion of the sale of 1 AA Street the parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to wind up the company and vest the trust.
7.In the event there is insufficient funds to meet the costs of winding up from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(d), the parties meet the shortfall in the proportions of:
(a)40 per cent by the wife; and
(b)60 per cent by the husband.

8.In the event there is surplus funds after payment of the costs of winding up from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(d), the surplus funds be distributed in the proportions of:
(a)60 per cent to the wife; and
(b)40 per cent to the husband.

Capital Gains Tax
9.By 1 September of the relevant taxation year, the wife attend upon BB Accountants (or such other accountant elected by her), for the purpose of estimating the probable capital gains tax and any subsequent taxes payable upon settlement of the sale of 1 AA Street, noting Order 3(c) herein.
10.That for the purposes of Order 9, the wife shall pay the costs of the accountant from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(c).
11.Within 30 days of the end of the relevant financial year, the wife attend upon the accountant for the purpose of completing her individual taxation return and attend to lodging same with the Australian Taxation Office.
12.The wife provide to the husband a copy of the calculation provided by the accountant as to the capital gains tax payable within 14 days of receipt of same and within 7 days of providing the calculation to the husband, the wife direct Cahill Family Lawyers to pay the capital gains tax from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(c).
13.In the event there is insufficient funds to meet the capital gains tax payable from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(c), the parties meet the shortfall within 28 days of compliance with Order 12, in the proportions of:
(a)40 per cent by the wife; and
(b)60 per cent by the husband.

14.In the event there is surplus funds after payment of the capital gains tax from the funds held on trust in accordance with Order 3(c), the surplus funds be distributed within 28 days of compliance with Order 12 in the proportions of:
(a)60 per cent to the wife; and
(b)40 per cent to the husband.

CC Pty Ltd ATF DD Trust
15.Forthwith upon completion of the liquidation of CC Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ATF DD Trust the net funds, if any, held by T Lawyers on behalf of U Company in respect of that liquidation be distributed as follows:
(a)First, to pay CC Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ATF DD Trust;
(b)Secondly, the husband in his capacity as director cause to distribute the funds to DD Trust;
(c)Thirdly, from the proceeds as held by DD Trust be distributed in proportions of:
(i)60 per cent to the wife; and
(ii)40 per cent to the husband.

BY CONSENT
Australian Taxation Office liability
16.Upon the issue of a remittance (if any) to the husband and / or wife personally arising from the lodgement of the taxation returns contemplated by the orders made 30 April 2024 or 17 October 2024:
(a)The husband and wife do all things necessary to jointly instruct EE Accountants to negotiate with the Australian Taxation Office to mitigate any remittance, penalties or interest that has been issued.
(b)The costs of EE Accountants be limited to $3,000, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, and borne two thirds to the husband, and one third to the wife.
(c)The husband and wife be equally responsible for any remittance, penalty or interest incurred by the husband and wife, or either of them, arising from lodging the taxation returns for the entities.

BY THE COURT
Remaining vehicles
17.In the event the parties agree on the value of Motor Vehicle 1 driven by the wife, and the wife wishes to retain that vehicle, she shall forthwith pay to the husband a sum equal to 40% of the agreed value of the vehicle and thereafter retain that vehicle.
18.In the event the parties agree on the value of any of the other vehicles/parts that the husband wishes to retain, he shall forthwith pay to the wife a sum equal to 60% of the agreed value of the vehicle/s he wishes to retain and thereafter retain those vehicles.
19.In the event that within 28 days of these orders no agreement is reached pursuant to Orders 17 or 18, regarding the value of any remaining vehicles, trailers, trucks, excavators, forklifts, engines, vehicle parts and bodies;
(a)the parties forthwith do all acts and things and sign all necessary documents to jointly appoint a selling agent to conduct a clearing sale of all remaining vehicles and parts (save for Motor Vehicle 2 purchased by the parties for the child); and
(b)the net proceeds of the sale/s be divided 40% to the husband and 60% to the wife.

BY CONSENT
Superannuation
20.The wife retain her superannuation entitlements with Superannuation Fund 1.
21.The husband retain his superannuation entitlements with Superannuation Fund 2.
22.Within 60 days of these orders, the husband and wife convene a meeting and, in that meeting, do all such acts and things, and sign all such documents as may be necessary to cause FF Pty Ltd ATF GG Company (“SMSF”) to be wound up including but not limited to:
(a)sell all non-cash investments held by the SMSF with such sales to be at the usual market value, including but not limited to:
(i)the real property situate at HH Street, Suburb JJ; and
(ii)the real property situate at KK Street, Town LL.

(b)directing the accountant for the SMSF to do all things necessary to complete a final taxation return for the SMSF and have the final taxation return audited by an approved auditor upon the completion of the sale of investments contemplated in Order 22(a);
(c)identifying on the advice of the accountant for the SMSF an amount sufficient to pay the final taxation return and any further expenses related to these orders and to wind up the SMSF (“the windup reserve”);
(d)paying, if a condition of release has been met, or transferring to a complying fund, all superannuation benefits held in the name of the members as nominated by the members following the creation of the new interests in accordance with this Order less the windup reserve on a pro rata basis;
(e)completing and lodging the final SMSF audited annual return;
(f)paying any outstanding taxes and outstanding liabilities and close all accounts held in the name of the SMSF;
(g)after completion of the above, calculate a base amount necessary to equalise the parties’ interests in the SMSF having regard to their existing member entitlements (“the base amount”); and
(h)pursuant to section 90XT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):
(i)in the event that wife’s entitlements are greater than the husband’s, the Trustee of the SMSF shall pay to the husband the amount which is calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 (Cth) using the base amount specified in Order 22 (g) of these orders, and there be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement that the wife would have had but for these orders;
(ii)in the event that the husband’s entitlements are greater than the wife’s, the Trustee of the SMSF shall pay to the wife the amount which is calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 (Cth) using the base amount specified in Order 22 (g) of these orders, and there be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement that the husband would have had but for these orders; and
(iii)That Orders 22 (h)(i) and 22 (h)(ii) have effect from the operative time.

BY THE COURT
Other property
23.Unless otherwise provided for in these orders, the wife retain to the exclusion of the husband, the following:
(a)the NN Auctions clearing sale proceeds previously paid to her;
(b)funds in bank accounts in her sole name; and
(c)all other property (including choses-in-action) in her possession.

24.Unless otherwise provided for in these orders, the husband retain to the exclusion of the wife, the following:
(a)the NN Auctions clearing sale proceeds previously paid to him;
(b)funds in bank accounts in his sole name; and
(c)all other property (including choses-in-action) in his possession.

MISCELLANEOUS
25.Unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purposes of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:
(a)each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders;
(b)monies standing to the credit of the parties in any joint bank account are to be divided equally within 28 days of these orders and the parties shall forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to close all joint bank accounts with a further 14 days of the funds being distributed;
(c)each party forgoes any claims they may have to any superannuation benefits or other employment related benefits belonging to or earned by the other;
(d)insurance policies shall remain the sole property of the owner named thereon;
(e)each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders;
(f)each party be solely responsible for the payment of any debts in their respective names; and
(g)any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

26.The husband and wife be at liberty to provide a copy of these orders to the liquidators, conveyancer or accountant, as required to give effect to these orders.
27.The parties have liberty to apply to have the matter re–listed before her Honour Justice Carter on short notice regarding the implementation of these orders, and in relation to the terms and conditions of the various sales.
28.In the event that either party refuses or neglects to execute or return a deed, instrument or document in compliance with these orders, the Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia at Melbourne is hereby appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to sign or execute all deeds and/or instruments in the name of defaulting party and do all acts and things to give viability and operation to the deeds and/or instruments.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Pursuant to section 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the parties intend that these orders shall, as far as practicable, finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUSTICE CARTER

This is a matter involving disputes regarding the parties’ property. I delivered reasons and made final orders in relation to parenting on 26 August 2024. Substantially the parties do not agree on the quantum of the tangible pool, or the appropriate percentage division of it.
THE EVIDENCE
The Wife
In relation to the property dispute, the wife relied on:
(a)her Further Amended Initiating Application filed on 12 February 2024;
(b)her affidavit filed on 12 February 2024;
(c)her Financial Statement filed 12 February 2024;
(d)the affidavit of Mr MM, director at OO Real Estate, filed on 12 March 2024; and
(e)her affidavit-in-reply filed on 12 March 2024.
The Husband
The husband relied on:
(a)his Further Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 26 February 2024;
(b)his Financial Statement filed on 26 February 2024; and
(c)his affidavit filed on 27 February 2024.
The parties both gave evidence. As I already observed in the judgment delivered on 26 August 2024 both parties presented as authentic and reasonably candid in their evidence. However they remain highly distrustful of each other.
Mr MM also gave evidence. He was an impressive witness.
I also had the benefit of hearing some evidence from Mr PP, the liquidator appointed for V Pty Ltd.
BACKGROUND
The parties commenced living together in 1992 and were married later that year.
It is common ground that the parties collected cars, and various parts of cars. They also engaged in purchasing and selling properties through various entities. How various cars and properties were purchased and sold featured in the trial affidavits of each party with the parties giving different accounts. That detailed history is of no real relevance to the determinations that I must make.
In 2003 the parties set up the following entities:
(a)V Pty Ltd as trustee for the W Trust. The husband was the sole shareholder and director; and
(b)Y Pty Ltd as trustee for the Z Unit Trust. The wife was the sole shareholder and director.
In 2003 the parties purchased the property at 1 AA Street, Suburb P, through Y Pty Ltd. That was a vacant block of land which the parties have referred to as “the yard”. The parties used the premises for storing cars, car parts, trucks and trailers that were accumulated over the relationship.
In 2004 the parties purchased the former matrimonial home at 2 AA Street, Suburb P through V Pty Ltd. This property is adjacent to the yard.
In 2007 the husband established a business, QQ Company (later re–named), which he operated for 10 years. Much of the plant and equipment used for the business was stored at the yard, which the husband’s business rented. In addition, at some point in time the husband obtained rented premises at Region RR where some equipment, cars and car parts were stored.
In 2008 the husband registered another entity – CC Pty Ltd. This entity primarily traded and leased vehicles, plant and equipment to the husband’s business. CC Pty Ltd is also the trustee for the DD Trust.
In 2008 the wife stopped working as an educator. The parties’ daughter X was born in 2008. The wife was X’s primary carer throughout the relationship, and she did not return to the paid workforce after X was born.
The parties separated sometime between December 2020 and February 2021. Nothing turns on the precise date. The wife remained in the former matrimonial home and the husband retained X in his care and lived with her in rented accommodation.

It is common ground that at separation, there were many vehicles, trailers and vehicle parts owned by CC Pty Ltd, and owned by the parties’ personally, most of which were stored at the yard. There is a dispute as to what has happened to a number of those vehicles.
In mid-2021 the husband obtained an Intervention Order against the wife which prohibited the wife from attending the yard. At about that time the husband was charged with sexual offences that required him to cease working at the venue where he was doing maintenance. He has not engaged in paid employment since that time.
The wife obtained an Intervention Order against the husband in mid-2021 which prohibited the husband from attending at the former matrimonial home. This application was made after the wife said the husband had attended at the former matrimonial home and the yard on several occasions and removed a number of vehicles and parts.
The wife issued these proceedings on 24 August 2021. The husband sought in his response an order that the former matrimonial home be sold.
The matter came before the court on 21 September 2021. The focus that day was on the parenting dispute, and the court did not deal with the husband’s application for the sale of the former matrimonial home. It is the husband’s case that he was struggling financially to make the mortgage payments on the former matrimonial home and on the yard. The last payment he made towards the mortgage secured over the former matrimonial home was on 18 October 2021.
The matter returned to court on 22 November 2021. Again, the husband’s application for the sale of the former matrimonial home was not determined. However, orders were made that the husband was at liberty to sell trading stock and apply the proceeds of those sales towards the parties’ expenses, with the mortgages for the former matrimonial home and the yard to be paid first.
At that time, it was the wife’s proposal that the yard be sold, so she could remain in the former matrimonial home.
The husband sold only one vehicle. He did not make any mortgage payments towards the former matrimonial home. He did continue to make contributions towards the mortgage encumbering the yard.
In May 2022, the bank’s solicitors, SS Lawyers issued a notice of default in relation to the former matrimonial home as a result of the accumulated arrears. The wife however was having her own contemporaneous communications with the bank. She deposed that they reassured her they would not pursue a mortgagee sale. The wife produced a letter dated 8 June 2022 from SS Lawyers advising they would accept any part payment but if there were no payments received by 22 June 2022 the property would be sold. The wife also tendered a contemporaneous letter from her lawyers advising the husband’s solicitors of those discussions and that SS Lawyers had said a partial payment of the arrears on the former matrimonial home would allay their concerns.
The husband failed to make any further payments towards the former matrimonial home. It is plain that the husband prioritised retaining the yard – which was convenient for him – over retaining the home in which the wife and X were living.
The matter returned to court on 14 June 2022. Again, the husband’s application for the sale of the home was not pressed.
The husband, dissatisfied and frustrated, took matters into his own hands. On 16 June 2022 he unilaterally appointed U Company to liquidate V Pty Ltd (which owned the former matrimonial home in which the wife and child were residing) and CC Pty Ltd (which at that time owned some vehicles and trailers).
The husband’s evidence was that he understood that by appointing a liquidator for V Pty Ltd he would avoid a mortgagee sale. He said he was quoted $25,000 plus GST as the anticipated total costs of liquidation. He said he was quoted $10,000 plus GST as the expected costs to liquidate CC Pty Ltd. The husband said he was also told it would take about three months to complete the liquidation process and that the wife and X could remain in the premises until settlement.
Regrettably, the husband’s unilateral and ill-conceived decision to appoint a liquidator resulted in the incurring of unnecessary – and significant – liquidators’ fees.
The former matrimonial home was listed for sale in late 2022 by way of mortgagee sale. The liquidator for V Pty Ltd acted as the bank’s agent for that sale.
It was the husband’s case that the wife was not cooperative with the selling agent. That was denied by the wife, and not corroborated by any independent evidence put before me.
In late 2022, the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd sold several vehicles to the husband’s mother. It is the wife’s case that these sales were not at market value, and that in arranging these asserted “third party” sales the husband has further reduced the pool of assets available to the parties. The proceeds of those sales remain held on trust until the liquidation of CC Pty Ltd is complete. There remain a handful of vehicles still to be sold – although there is some debate and confusion as to what vehicles belong to CC Pty Ltd.
The first clearing sale was conducted at the yard in early 2023. The husband did not advise the wife beforehand. The husband asserted he was paid the net proceeds of that sale of $76,547. He said he used those monies to pay various bills and expenses for the parties. He only provided the wife with information as to the funds he received in early 2024.
Orders were made by consent on 24 February 2023 for the yard to be sold. It was the husband’s case that the wife caused significant delays to the sale of that property too, delaying signing the sales authority for over a month, and then insisting on an unrealistic sales price. That was denied by the wife who said it took some time for the property to be cleared in preparation of it being listed. Mr MM, the selling agent, could not recall any delay in the wife providing her signature on the sales authority.
Conversely, the wife asserted the husband acted in a manner that delayed the sale of the yard. She said he did not provide a key to the selling agent, thereby making it more difficult for him to show the property to potential purchasers. She said the husband was tardy in attending to the removal of items and rubbish stored at the yard. Mr MM did not corroborate the wife’s complaints. He confirmed that he did not have a key, but said the husband was always prompt in responding to calls and opening the property when requested. He also said that there were now significantly less car parts and equipment on the property than when it was first listed.
The former matrimonial home was sold at a mortgagee’s sale in mid-2023 for over $1,750,000 with the liquidator acting as the agent for the bank. The mortgage was paid. Fees to U Company as agent for mortgagee of $125,752.55 were paid. The proceeds of sale of $801,467 are held on trust by T Lawyers.
The liquidator’s fees for acting as liquidator of V Pty Ltd – which have not been finalised – will be deducted before the net proceeds can be paid to the parties. The evidence of the liquidator was their further fees (being in addition to the fees already paid to them to act as agent for the mortgagee) would be around $198,000.
By March 2023 the husband had allowed the mortgage payments on the yard to fall into arrears.
Despite being on the market for some time, the wife was hesitant to lower the listing price for the yard. She said she was concerned that the parties had “lost so much from the house” and she did not want to sell it for less than market value. However, she belatedly followed the advice of the selling agent, and the listing price was reduced.
In his evidence Mr MM advised there had been no real interest in the yard, even when the price was reduced. He said there had only been two offers, at $1,500,000 (which it transpires, was not a genuine offer, made by the partner of a friend of the wife) and another at $1,600,000. Mr MM said it was a significant parcel of land, that could become subdivisible and offered excellent views. He recommended the price be dropped further to generate interest.
The yard has still not been sold. I am not satisfied that either party has caused or contributed to the difficulties encountered in selling the land.
A second clearing sale was conducted in mid-2023. Again, the husband failed to advise the wife about this sale beforehand. In his oral evidence the husband said he did not consider he was required to inform her as to the disposal of assets.
On 19 June 2023 the husband received the net proceeds from that second clearing sale of $64,400 into his account. The wife has been paid $10,000 from those proceeds.
At the mention on 17 October 2024 I was advised a third clearing sale had been conducted and that a number of vehicles and parts had been sold. I was further advised the parties applied the net proceeds of sale towards the mortgage payments on the yard, which continues to remain unsold.
DISCLOSURE
It was the wife’s case that the husband had not discharged his obligations to make full and frank disclosure. She deposed to many requests for information being ignored, and that when documents were provided, they were incomplete. She has had to issue subpoenas on occasion to obtain the information that the husband should have provided to her. She said the husband had also not provided proper disclosure as to what vehicles and trailers have been sold, and what vehicles remain in his possession. It was her case that he had deliberately sought to engineer a situation where he minimised the value of the vehicles in his possession and obfuscated as to what vehicles have been sold and which ones he continues to retain. In addition, she said the husband was not upfront about leasing premises in Region RR where he continues to store a number of vehicles.
I accept that the husband has been tardy in relation to providing proper disclosure to the wife and has not provided all discoverable documents as he is obliged to do. This has made it very difficult for the wife to ascertain the husband’s true financial circumstances and to properly assess his application of the proceeds of the sale of motor vehicles post separation. I also accept that there are a large number of vehicles and parts, most of which have been in the custody and control of the husband post separation, and it has been extremely difficult for the wife to accurately understand what vehicles and parts are stored where, and which ones have been sold and for what price. For instance, during the running of the trial it became plain that at least three vehicles the husband had deposed were sold in the clearing sales were in fact not sold and were still in his possession. There was also a reference in the documents relating to the liquidation of CC Pty Ltd to there being about 100 vehicles or bodies owned by the entity. However, as at the date of hearing only 13 vehicles had been formally identified by the liquidator. It is the wife’s concern that the husband will retain a number of cars and parts of value that have not been properly disclosed.
The husband was also not up front regarding the proceeds of the first two clearing sales. He failed entirely to disclose the first sale and the proceeds he received from it until he referred to it in his trial material. He did not provide accurate instructions to his representatives regarding the funds he actually received from the second sale.
According to his Financial Statement, the husband receives $471 per week by way of government support. It was the husband’s evidence that he leases his home for $510 per week. He also said it costs $900 per month to rent the Region RR property where a number of vehicles are stored. He said his mother meets the costs of that. His mother was not on affidavit. Nor was there any reference to the Region RR property in the husband’s Financial Statement, or to his mother providing him with funds to meet the rental costs for same. It is difficult to understand how he is funding his lifestyle if his income is as restricted as he claims.
I accept that the husband has had control over the vehicles and parts post separation, and that he has been able to sell, or retain vehicles and parts, and apply the proceeds as he sees fit, substantially excluding the wife from that process. I also accept that there were – and continue to be – many vehicles and parts across both the yard and the Region RR property and that it has been difficult to accurately identify and account for each and every vehicle and part.
I am also satisfied that the wife did know about the Region RR premises, and that vehicles were stored there. In her oral evidence she conceded she knew that the husband used those premises in 2020, although she said she did not know he had entered a formal lease to do so. Accordingly, it is not correct to say she was unaware of the existence of those premises until well after separation.
In relation to the vehicles already sold, the husband’s use of the proceeds of same and his use of the proceeds of the clearing sales are matters appropriately taken into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Family Law Act (1975) Cth (“the Act”). In my view – in circumstances where it is extremely difficult for the Court to accurately identify what vehicles and parts remain and/or where they are – the appropriate way of dealing with the remaining vehicles and car parts is to order that whatever is remaining be sold. However, I also note that it will be difficult to know whether all vehicles and parts have been proffered for sale – and I accept that those vehicles and parts not sold will remain with the husband. It was plain at the mention on 17 October 2024 that the dispute as to what has been sold and what the husband has retained still remains very much alive.
ISSUES WITH THE TAXATION RETURNS OF THE VARIOUS ENTITIES
Notwithstanding that the parties’ asset pool is reasonably modest, they have over the course of their relationship set up numerous corporate entities. This would have been at considerable expense. A number of those entities had not completed financial statements or lodged taxation returns with the Australian Taxation Office since about 2015.
It was clear that I needed to know what taxation liabilities, if any, the parties had, so that I was able to accurately identify the parties’ current assets and liabilities.
It was the husband’s evidence that the parties’ accountant had quoted approximately $70,000 to complete the returns and arrange for their lodgement. Initially it was understood the accountant required pre-payment to attend to those matters. However, at a mention before me on 30 April 2024 I was advised the accountant was agreeable to payment being deferred. I then made orders by consent that the parties would jointly appoint EE Accountants to undertake the taxation returns for the entities, with the wife to meet one third of the costs of same to a maximum of $70,000, and the husband to be responsible for the balance of the costs.
Further submissions were made ultimately on 17 October 2024 that the documents were imminently ready to be lodged with the Australian Taxation Office. The parties had been advised by the jointly appointed accountant that there would likely be no company taxes due for any of the entities. However, it was anticipated that there will be a GST remittance of approximately $116,000.
The parties sensibly agreed they would be equally responsible to meet any amount owing to the Australian Taxation Office and a consent order reflecting their agreement is included in the suite of final orders.
DISPUTES IN RELATION TO THE POOL
The liquidators’ costs
There were a number of matters regarding the liquidators including;
(a)how the liquidation costs should be treated in the pool and apportioned between the parties; and
(b)whether the sale of the vehicles by the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd to the husband’s mother were for market value and how those sales are to be treated.
There also appeared to be some dispute as to what vehicles belong to CC Pty Ltd and will therefore fall to be liquidated.
Mr PP of U Company was subpoenaed to give evidence. It had been understood by the parties that Mr PP was the liquidator for both CC Pty Ltd and V Pty Ltd. However, Mr PP said he was appointed liquidator for V Pty Ltd only and that a Mr TT, from the same practice, was the appointed liquidator for CC Pty Ltd. That came as a surprise to the parties as the documents provided by U Company indicated Mr PP had been appointed as liquidator for both entities. In his evidence Mr PP said that appeared to be an error on the paperwork.
As set out, Mr PP ultimately acted as the agent for the bank when the former matrimonial home was sold at a mortgagee’s sale. The property sold in early 2023 for over $1,770,000. The parties were excluded from the conduct of that sale, and unable to participate in the terms of the sale or the engagement of the selling agent.
The fees paid to U Company acting as agent for the bank from the proceeds of sale were $125,752.
The liquidators have not yet provided the parties with their final account for either entity, so the total costs payable to the liquidators is not known.
Mr PP estimated his fees in relation to V Pty Ltd would be approximately $198,000 inclusive of GST and legal fees. Accordingly, the total amount that will be paid to U Company will be in excess of $323,000, notwithstanding the sale was simply for an unremarkable home in Town L. The costs of liquidation far exceeded the amount the husband asserted was quoted as the expected costs. The time taken also exceeded the timeframe the husband said he was told to expect. Indeed, the former matrimonial home was not listed for sale until late 2022 and was not sold until early 2023.
V Pty Ltd owned nothing other than the house and had no other debtors other than the mortgage. However, Mr PP maintained his position that the fees incurred by the liquidator were reasonable and proportionate. He said the liquidator had to ensure that there were no taxation issues, or additional creditors, and that these processes take time. He said that a mortgagee sale is less straightforward than a vendor sale and that several employees were engaged in work on the file and that the fees were justified as there were “five people working on this project”.
Mr PP said the liquidation processes had been hampered as V Pty Ltd had not completed financial statements or filed any taxation returns since 2015. Those documents needed to be completed and lodged with the Australian Taxation Office so that the liquidator could be satisfied there were no other creditors. The liquidators apparently engaged their own accountants to undertake that exercise. The husband deposed he also engaged his own accountant to complete the outstanding documents and provide same to the liquidator. I understand the returns were finalised at the end of 2023, and presumably have now been lodged.
The proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home have remained held on trust since early 2023 and have not been distributed. Mr PP said the balance was held pending further approval of the Supreme Court for the liquidator’s fees – and that the application for the appointment of a receiver to distribute funds had been lodged with the Supreme Court and would be dealt with in the usual course. As at the first day of trial before me I was informed the liquidator had yet to file that application. It remains unclear to me whether that has yet occurred.
The liquidation for CC Pty Ltd remains incomplete. I was advised the likely costs of that liquidation will be around $101,542. The liquidator has retained the proceeds of the sale of the vehicles to the husband’s mother. The likely costs will likely well exceed the funds that will be recouped from the sale of any remaining vehicles. Accordingly it is most unlikely that there will be any proceeds remaining. Mr PP said in those circumstances the liquidator would likely ‘write off’ fees exceeding the funds recouped.

The wife said the husband should bear the vast majority – if not all – of the costs paid and to be paid to the liquidators.
The husband did not agree he should be held responsible for the costs incurred by the appointment of liquidators. The husband referred to the context in which he appointed the liquidators – including that he said he was struggling to meet the mortgage and the court had not been able to hear the property issues.
I will return to this issue when considering s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
Valuation issues
Essentially, there are four categories of vehicles:
(a)vehicles owned by CC Pty Ltd – some of which were sold to the husband’s mother and some of which remain unsold;
(b)vehicles sold by the husband post separation;
(c)vehicles sold at the two clearing sales; and
(d)vehicles that remain in the possession of the parties.
The parties did not agree as to the value of the vehicles as at the date of separation – including a number of the vehicles which have now been sold. Nor did they agree as to the value of the vehicles that remain in the possession of either party. There was also some disagreement as to what additional vehicles were owned by CC Pty Ltd and therefore would be disposed of in the course of liquidation.
It was the wife’s case (and denied by the husband) that the husband:
(a)had cited the value of the vehicles he sought to retain as far less than market value;
(b)arranged for the liquidator to sell vehicles to his mother at less than market value; and
(c)allowed vehicles to be sold by him personally and at clearing sales post separation for less than market value.
The wife also asserted her belief that the husband had in fact retained various vehicles that he claimed had been sold. That was similarly denied by the husband.
It was difficult to identify precisely what vehicle had been sold as there were discrepancies between the UU Insurance policy and the NN Auctions vendor’s statement as to how vehicles had been described.
The value of the vehicles
Orders were made on 22 November 2021 for the parties to reach an agreement as to the value of various motor vehicles and trailers identified in the insurance policy taken out with UU Insurance. In the event the parties did not reach an agreement prior to the mediation then scheduled, they were to jointly appoint VV Valuers, or such other agreed valuer to conduct valuations. Similarly, the husband was to provide the wife with a schedule of any other vehicles, tools, excavators, trailers and trucks in his possession with his estimated value of each item. Again, if the parties did not agree, they were to jointly appoint VV Valuers to value such of those items that had not been sold.
The parties did not reach any agreement as to the valuation of various vehicles, trailers, trucks and the like. However, the expert valuations were never undertaken.
It was the wife’s position that in the absence of a valuation (which she said should have been arranged by the husband as the vehicles, and trailers were all in his possession) the Court should adopt the valuation ascribed by the husband for the purpose of insuring the vehicles with UU Insurance.
If I were to adopt the amounts for which the vehicles were insured as being the value of vehicles:
(a)The value of the vehicles sold by the liquidator to the husband’s mother would total about $119,670; and
(b)The value of the other vehicles in the husband’s possession as at separation (some of which have been sold by him, some sold in the clearing sales and some remain in the husband’s possession) would total about $600,000.
These were the figures the wife contended should be adopted when calculating the parties’ assets.
The husband said it would be inappropriate and inaccurate to adopt the insured value as the market value. It was his case that the insurance policy was outdated and reflected an “agreed value” of the vehicles and not the “market value”. It was his case that the vehicles were mostly old and unrestored; some were in parts; and only some were driveable. It was his evidence that the intention was to work on and restore the vehicles and that it was agreed with UU Insurance to insure the vehicles for a greater amount to cover any future restoration works undertaken. He also said that several vehicles on the policy had in fact been sold prior to separation, and he had neglected to have them removed from the policy.
The husband also asserted that the proceeds of items sold by him pre and post-separation were applied to the parties’ debts. He also said that irrespective of the insured value, the market value of the items sold by him or at the clearing sales was the amount the purchaser was willing to pay.
It is the husband’s case that the correct figures for the vehicles that were itemised on the UU Insurance policy would be:
(a)vehicles sold at the clearing sales: $63,600;
(b)vehicles purchased by his mother: total proceeds of $42,000 (paid to the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd); and
(c)other vehicles (sold post separation or remaining in his possession): $66,850.
I will deal with the vehicles sold to the husband’s mother separately.
I do not accept the insured values of the various vehicles as set out in the policy with UU Insurance accurately reflect the value of the vehicles for the purposes of calculating the asset pool.
First, the wife’s Motor Vehicle 1 was insured for $67,000 in the UU Insurance policy. However, according to the parties’ trial material, it was common ground that the vehicle was not worth the amount for which it was insured. However, to be consistent with her assertion that the insured amount should be adopted as the value of each vehicle, the wife included the vehicle at $67,000 on the joint balance sheet. This was notwithstanding her concession in her trial affidavit that the vehicle was worth a quarter of that amount, at just $17,275.
I am required to identify the existing assets and liabilities based on the evidence. I cannot arbitrarily treat Motor Vehicle 1 as worth almost four times what the wife earlier asserted was its market value. That the wife admitted there was this inconsistency between the UU Insurance value and the market value of at least her vehicle undermined her contention that it would be appropriate to simply adopt the insured value of all the various vehicles. The wife has had Motor Vehicle 1 in her possession. She could have arranged for it to be valued.
In relation to the vehicles sold at the clearing sales, and in the absence of any expert evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that the sales of the vehicles and parts at the two clearing sales reflected the market value of those items. That is what they were sold for to unrelated parties. That is what the market was prepared to pay for those items. As the wife acknowledged in her oral evidence vehicles can be sold for less than they are worth, and you can get a bargain, and sometimes a purchaser can overpay. In relation to the vehicles sold at the clearing sales, that did attract a commission and administration fee by the auctioneers – but those costs appear to be entirely reasonable given the large amount of stock that needed to be cleared to ready the yard for sale.
Additionally, the wife conceded that some of the vehicles included in the UU Insurance policy were unroadworthy, had missing doors, motors or other parts. Some were rusty and dilapidated. They were not restored vintage or classic cars. They were not inspected by UU Insurance when the policy was entered into.
I note further that the husband’s own figures as to the value of some vehicles was inconsistent. For instance he deposed Motor Vehicle 3 he wanted to retain was worth $20,000. In the aide memoire prepared by his counsel the vehicle was included at $25,000. Similarly, he deposed in his trial affidavit that Motor Vehicle 4 he wanted to retain was worth $10,000. In that aide memoire the figure provided by the husband is $14,000. Whilst these were not necessarily significant differences, those small differences do add up over the large number of vehicles. The UU Insurance policy insured those vehicles at $46,910 and $35,280 respectively. These matters reinforce that I simply do not have reliable valuation evidence.
I also note that there was also some dispute as to whether certain items had been sold as there were difficulties in identifying the correct vehicle in the sales schedules. In addition, the husband deposed he was in dispute with the liquidator in relation to one vehicle he wanted to retain – being Motor Vehicle 3 – with the liquidator asserting the vehicle is an asset of CC Pty Ltd. There was some suggestion at the mention on 17 October 2024 that the vehicle is now in the possession of the liquidator – although that was not clarified.
The husband also seeks to retain Motor Vehicle 5 and Motor Vehicle 6. He said those vehicles provide the only way he can continue to earn an income. However, he had the opportunity to have them valued as part of these proceedings, and that has not occurred.
It seems to me the most appropriate way to resolve the valuation issues in relation to all remaining vehicles (including those vehicles that each party has said they would like to retain, and any parts) is to simply order the sale of all remaining vehicles, trailers, excavators, trucks and the like, unless the parties are able to agree on a value. The net proceeds of sale can then be divided between the parties.
The sale of vehicles to the husband’s mother
In late 2022 the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd sold four vehicles and two trailers to the husband’s mother in two tranches, for a total of $42,000. The liquidator is holding those funds. They will likely be wholly consumed by the liquidator’s fees.
Confusingly, the parties have referred at times to the vehicles now owned by the husband’s mother as including certain vehicles, and at other times, to there being other vehicles transferred to her. According to the husband’s list of vehicles owned at separation, as best as I can tell there was Motor Vehicle 7 and Motor Vehicle 8.
It was the wife’s case that the sales by the liquidator to the husband’s mother were not at market value. She also asserted the husband’s mother holds those vehicles on trust for her son. It was the husband’s case that the vehicles sold to his mother were at an appropriate price, having been a price accepted by the liquidator.
The wife deposed the vehicles were insured under the UU Insurance policy as follows:
(a)Motor Vehicle 7 for $22,000;
(b)Motor Vehicle 9 for $23,800;
(c)Motor Vehicle 8 for $26,000;
(d)Trailer for $9,800;
(e)Trailer for $1,350; and
(f)Motor Vehicle 10 for $36,720.
Accordingly it was her case that the vehicles sold to the husband’s mother were worth $119,670.
As already set out, there are significant issues relying on the UU Insurance policy as providing reliable evidence as to the value of the vehicles. There was also no evidence that UU Insurance conducted independent valuations of the vehicles. I note further that, notwithstanding the insured value, the wife deposed that the parties paid $8,000 for Motor Vehicle 7 when it was purchased in 2019. In her oral evidence she said the parties paid $25,000 for Motor Vehicle 10. She said they paid $70,000 for Motor Vehicle 9 when they purchased the vehicle about 20 years ago. The husband deposed that Motor Vehicle 8 was purchased for $15,000 in about 2019.
I cannot be satisfied that the husband’s mother genuinely purchased the vehicles for market value for the reasons that follow.
The husband had conversations with the liquidator advising them that he wanted to purchase some of the vehicles from CC Pty Ltd. That was plain from an email dated 8 September 2022 in which one of the staff at U Company wrote to the husband:
As discussed, please find attached price listing of the plant and equipment.
Are you able to purchase the items as soon as possible…
…we do not really have any certainty that the items will be purchased by you at the later stage other than your verbal advice.
The price listing referred to in the email was not tendered into evidence before me.
The husband subsequently emailed the liquidator on 7 October 2022 advising that he had “third party offers” to purchase the following vehicles:
(a)Motor Vehicle 7 for $3,500;
(b)Motor Vehicle 9 for $11,000;
(c)Motor Vehicle 7 for $10,000;
(d)Trailer for $3,000;
(e)Trailer for $2,500; and
(f)Motor Vehicle 10 for $12,000.
In that email the husband also wrote “and the balance of Asset list to be purchased after receiving proceeds of house sale $30000 as discussed [sic]”. I am unsure what the “balance of Asset list” was referring to, or whether the husband’s arrangement with the liquidator to purchase those assets (whatever they may be) for $30,000 would be fair and reasonable.
The third-party offer was from his mother. This was not disclosed to the liquidator in that email.
I note the husband deposed that the “purchase of the above vehicles and trailers by my mother was made independently of me through a third party transaction”. In his oral evidence, the husband maintained the vehicles ‘were sold to a third party’, being his mother. I do not regard the husband’s elderly mother as being a genuine arm’s length third party purchaser – particularly in circumstances where the husband wanted to purchase the vehicles. His mother was not on affidavit to say that she independently purchased the vehicles.
There were some minor inconsistencies in the values the husband attributed to the vehicles sold to his mother. In the husband’s tendered list of cars, he listed:
(a)Motor Vehicle 7 at $5,000 (not the $3,500 as per the offer);
(b)Motor Vehicle 8 at $10,000;
(c)Motor Vehicle 10 at $15,000 (not $12,000 as per the offer); and
(d)Motor Vehicle 9 at $14,000 (not $11,000 as per the offer).
The list of vehicles provided to the husband by the liquidator and tendered into evidence ascribed other values to some of those vehicles. For instance:
(a)Motor Vehicle 10 was listed with a value of $15,000; and
(b)Motor Vehicle 9 was listed with a value of $13,000.
These discrepancies – although not individually significant – would suggest the husband himself regarded the offers of the ‘third party’ as being for less than market value.
The husband admitted at trial that his mother did not use the vehicles and they had been purchased by her for his benefit. Whilst legal ownership now rests with his mother, he conceded the vehicles remain in his possession and available for his use. I note further that the husband did not adduce any evidence from his mother regarding her purchase of the vehicles.
Mr PP’s evidence was that the liquidator has an obligation to sell vehicles for commercial prices – although he conceded that would not necessarily be a sale at market value. There was a reference in a document tendered by the husband that some vehicles had been valued. However no valuations were ever produced. There was no evidence that the vehicles were advertised for sale.
Doing the best I can with the confusing and limited evidence I have, I cannot be satisfied that the sale to the husband’s mother was a genuine sale for market value. The husband should have arranged for the vehicles to be valued by an expert – the order for that to occur was made in November 2021, 12 months prior to the vehicles being transferred to the his mother. He failed to make any arrangements for the vehicles to be independently valued. The vehicles were then sold to his mother at his prompting, and at a price that appears to have been nominated by him, with no evidence that there was any broader advertising. The vehicles are now registered in the husband’s mother’s name, and she has contributed $42,000 into the pool (all of which is likely to be consumed by the liquidator’s fees). I accept at the conclusion of these proceedings, the vehicles will then be effectively returned to the husband. Indeed, the husband continues to use at least Motor Vehicle 7.
It seems to me that these are matters that can be considered pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
X’s car
The husband asserted Motor Vehicle 2 purchased to give to X when she turns 18 should be excluded from the pool. I am satisfied that is appropriate. X understands the vehicle will be hers. I anticipate if it is disposed of that would likely cause friction between the wife and X. In circumstances where both parties effectively agree the vehicle will be gifted to X, I will exclude it from the pool.
Memorabilia
It was the husband’s case that the wife has had the benefit of a significant amount of memorabilia including collectables he estimated to be worth approximately $80,000. He said those items were left at the former matrimonial home by him at separation, along with his tools and equipment in the garage he said were worth about $20,000.
The wife denied that these items were left at the home, or that there were collectibles or equipment worth a total of $100,000. She said the husband attended the home in May and June 2021 and removed items from the former matrimonial home. She said any tools and equipment were stored in the yard, to which she did not have access.
There was no compelling evidence that such items existed, or that they were worth what the husband asserted or that they have been retained by the wife. Accordingly, I will not include them in the pool, nor make any adjustment in favour of the husband as he proposed.
Add backs
It is established law that it is a matter of discretion whether or not the Court will notionally addback assets and adding back an asset disposed of into the pool is the exception rather than the rule. In many cases, justice and equity can be achieved by consideration of the issue under s 75(2)(o) of the Act rather than by notionally adding back assets no longer in existence. It is not simply a matter that the Court will add back assets that existed at the date of separation which have been dissipated by the time of the final hearing.
In Omacini and Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218 at 79,617, the Full Court identified three categories where it may be appropriate to notionally add back an item of expenditure, which, relevantly included where monies have been expended on legal fees, and where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets.
Monies received from the clearing sales
As set out there were two clearing sales conducted by NN Auctions in early and mid-2023. In addition to the cars that were sold, the clearing sales included selling miscellaneous farming equipment, car parts and accessories, machinery attachments, agricultural tools and similar. The husband was not forthcoming with the information regarding the clearing sales. The wife was not advised prior to the first clearing sale taking place – and had no knowledge of it until the husband filed his trial affidavit. The husband also inaccurately reported to the wife that he received $50,000 from the second sale, when in fact he received $64,400.
The net payment to the husband after deductions for GST, commissions and administration fees was $76,547 for the first sale and $64,400 for the second sale. From that second sale the wife was paid $10,000.
The wife contended the monies paid to the husband from both clearing sales should be notionally added back (together with the $10,000 the wife received from the second clearing sale).
The husband said the sum of $10,000 should be notionally added back as part property payments to each of the parties, together with a further $4,129.30 paid by him towards his criminal law expenses on 10 March 2023. He said the balance of the monies was spent on joint expenses and he opposed any further notional addback.
The proceeds of the first clearing sale
The proceeds of $76,547 were paid into the husband’s ANZ account #...04 on 6 March 2023.

In his trial affidavit the husband asserted the proceeds of this sale were “mainly applied towards familial expenses” including telephone, mortgage, electricity bills and family therapy. That was denied by the wife who deposed that the only particulars provided by the husband as to the application of the proceeds of that sale amounted to a little over $6,600 plus meeting the costs of the parties’ phones. She said the husband could not have used the proceeds of the first sale to meet the costs of family therapy, as that was not commenced until after the second clearing sale.
The bank statement for the husband’s ANZ bank account #...04 (W8) showed the husband transferred the sum of $25,538 to his mother on 9 March 2023. It was the husband’s assertion that he paid those monies to his mother to reimburse her for monies she had advanced to meet the mortgage payments and expert reports. The husband did not adduce any evidence from his mother about this issue. None of his mother’s bank statements were provided to the wife to verify the husband’s assertions that his mother provided funds to him (beyond two deposits of $4,000 each). In the course of his re-examination, the husband sought to adduce a document purporting to be a handwritten loan agreement between himself and his mother dating from April 2022. It was clearly inappropriate that the husband sought to adduce previously undiscovered evidence at such a late stage, and I did not allow the document into evidence.
The bank statement also revealed that the husband paid the sum of $7,296.70 to WW Company in April 2023. In his oral evidence the husband said that was to pay an outstanding liability for vehicle repairs. However, he adduced no evidence to support that claim.
The husband did not refer to the monies being paid to his mother, nor did he depose to the payment to WW Company when he deposed as to how the proceeds of the first clearing sale were applied by him.
The proceeds of the second clearing sale
As indicated the husband advised the wife initially that he received $50,000 from the second sale instead of the $64,400. Under cross-examination the husband said he “did not know if [he] had that information” when his solicitors wrote to the wife on 6 July 2023 advising that only $50,000 was received. That cannot be correct. The funds were deposited into his account on 19 June 2023.
The husband said the proceeds of the second sale were applied in part to pay the mortgage encumbering the yard, for family therapy expenses, for his rent, to his accountant, and towards some bills. The wife also received $10,000.
In correspondence between solicitors the husband also advised that X had access to the funds “to pay for her food and other necessities” in circumstances where the husband asserted the wife did not purchase food for X. I do not accept that the wife was not adequately providing food and other necessities for X. There was no need for X to access those monies directly.
The wife did not accept the husband’s evidence as to the application of the proceeds of the second sale either. I am satisfied that whilst he did use the monies to pay for some joint expenses, he has not provided a proper accounting of how those monies were expended.
Determination as to the proceeds of the clearing sales
I do not accept that the entire proceeds of both clearing sales save for the $10,000 each party received were applied to joint expenses. I do accept that the much of the monies received by the husband from the clearing sales were applied to joint expenses including paying the mortgage for the yard, family therapy, mobile phone bills, car registration and insurances, some utilities and expert reports. However, the husband also used the funds from the clearing sales to pay part of legal fees ($2,597 to XX Lawyers, $10,000 to YY Lawyers Trust account; and $908 to ZZ Lawyers) which I am satisfied should be notionally added back.
The husband did not adequately set out how the balance of the funds were used, as I have already set out. I anticipate he also used the funds to meet his own living expenses, in circumstances where he had no other income, having lost his employment.
Accordingly, I will not notionally add back the proceeds of either clearing sale save for the amounts paid by the husband towards his legal costs and the funds each party received as a partial property distribution. However, I will take the husband’s use of and access to the funds – to the exclusion of the wife who was also not in paid employment and had the care of X – into account under s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
The value of the vehicles the husband said he has sold
There were a number of vehicles the husband said he had sold personally post separation. The wife did not accept that some of the vehicles had been sold and she did not accept the sales were for market value. This suspicion arose in part because there was considerable difficulty in accurately identifying the vehicles on the schedules of sale.
The wife’s assertion that any vehicles sold by the husband were sold for far less than market value was again based on the wife’s reliance on the amounts the vehicles were insured under the policy with UU Insurance. I have already set out the issues with that document as evidence of value. Moreover, I am satisfied that the market value of the vehicles sold was reflected in what the purchaser was prepared to pay. In relation to at least some of those sales the husband was able to identify the bank account into which the proceeds were paid. He was not challenged in any meaningful way in relation to the amounts he said he received for the sale of those vehicles. Nor was there any suggestion he had sold the vehicles in other than arm’s length transactions.
I am not of the view that it is appropriate for those funds to be notionally added back into the pool. Parties are not required to go into a state of suspended animation when a marriage ends, and the husband was still trading and selling stock in the ordinary course of business. At least for a period he was meeting the mortgage payments for the real properties and he deposed that the sale proceeds were applied towards payment of outstanding invoices for family therapy, various and living expense, mortgages, school fees and motor vehicle registration for the wife. However, I accept that he had control of those assets and the proceeds of sale, and that whilst utilising some proceeds for effectively joint expenses, he otherwise had the use of those funds. This is another matter relevant to take into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
FINDINGS AS TO THE PARTIES’ ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES AS AT THE DATE OF FINAL HEARING
I am not able to determine the value of the remaining vehicles, trucks, parts, trailers and the like. As set out, all the vehicles and parts, save that purchased for X, will need to be sold and the net proceeds added to the pool.
The parties may be able to reach an agreement as to the value of the vehicles they wish to retain (with the husband wanting to retain some motor vehicles and machinery; and the wife wanting to retain the motor vehicle she currently drives). If they cannot reach an agreement about the value of those vehicles, they too shall be sold, and the proceeds of sale divided.
I find the pool – excluding superannuation – is comprised as follows:

Balance of proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home (this amount is less the mortgage, the sale costs and less liquidator’s fees of $125,752 for acting as agent for mortgagee)

$801,029

ADDBACKS

Funds paid to the husband from clearing sales used for legal fees

$13,505

Funds to wife from clearing sale

$10,000

Proceeds of sale of the yard LESS selling costs, mortgage, outstanding council and land tax – proceeds estimated to be approximately $1,300,000 to $1,500,000 if the property sells for $1,800,000

$TBC

Net proceeds of sale of all remaining vehicles, trucks, trailers, parts and the like

$TBC

Net sale proceeds or agreed value of the wife’s Motor Vehicle 1

$TBC

Net sale proceeds or agreed value of any vehicles to be retained by the husband

$TBC

Funds remaining from liquidation of CC Pty Ltd once completed – if any

$TBC

LIABILITIES

Debt to the Australian Taxation Department arising from filing of returns for various entities – estimated $116,000

(TBC)

Capital gains tax arising from the sale of the yard – estimated to be approximately $236,000 if the property sells for $1,800,000

($TBC)

Liquidator’s anticipated fees, and legal fees, to finalise the liquidation of V Pty Ltd estimated to be $198,547

($TBC)

Liquidator’s fees for CC Pty Ltd, estimated to be $101,542 less the funds paid from the proceeds of sale of the vehicles to the husband’s mother

($TBC)

As already observed Mr PP was not the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd. However, he was asked about the likelihood of the liquidator recouping their costs. He said that the “usual practice” would be to write off the balance of the monies owed to the liquidator as it appeared unlikely the sale of the remaining vehicles owned by CC Pty Ltd would cover the costs of the liquidation.
Superannuation
The parties established a self-managed superannuation fund (“the SMSF”) in around 2017. They rolled their existing entitlements into the fund, with the wife contributing around $95,000 and the husband around $110,000.
The SMSF owns two properties; one in Suburb JJ and one in Town LL. Neither have been valued despite orders made on 22 November 2021 for this to occur. It also has some modest funds in the bank. I understand the land tax and council rates are in arrears in relation to the Town LL property. The husband deposed that the liability is around $25,000 and all monies in the fund’s account will be expended to pay those liabilities.
The Husband asserted the property at Suburb JJ is worth $200,000, and the wife asserted it is worth $285,000. The husband asserted the property at Town LL is worth $100,000 and the wife said it is worth $170,000.
It was agreed that the parties’ superannuation entitlements should be divided equally.
Each of the parties has extremely modest entitlements in industry superannuation funds – totalling less than $500 across four different funds. They are so modest that I will not include them in the pool.
IS IT JUST AND EQUITABLE THAT AN ORDER BE MADE?
Before making any order altering the interests of the parties to a marriage in relevant property, I must be satisfied it is just and equitable for me to do so: Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108. If I am so satisfied, I am then empowered to make such order as I consider appropriate taking into account a number of factors as set out in ss 79(4) and 75(2) of the Act, insofar as they are relevant. These are separate enquiries.
There is no presumption that the parties’ entitlements in the existing asset pool should be altered, or that one party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them only on the basis of the considerations in s 79(4) of the Act.
This is one of the “vast majority of cases” referred to by the plurality of the High Court in Bevan v Bevan (2013) 49 Fam LR 387 at [164] in which the requirements of s 79(2) of the Act are fairly readily satisfied. Both of the parties urge the Court that it is just and equitable that orders be made to alter their interests in their property and I am satisfied it is plainly just and equitable to make an order pursuant to s 79 of the Act in these proceedings for a division of property between the parties, following a marriage that lasted 28 years and produced one child.
SECTION 79(4) OF THE ACT
In determining what orders are to be made pursuant to s 79(4) of the Act, I must weigh and assess the contributions of both parties from all sources across their relationship, giving a “reasonable value to all of the elements that go to making up the entirety of the marriage relationship”; Aleksovski v Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705 at 83,443.
Those observations were quoted with approval by the Full Court Dickons v Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 (“Dickons”). At [21], their Honours said that “… the requirements of the section are met by approaching the assessment of contributions holistically…” by analysing the contributions of all types, and by reference to the particular circumstances of that particular relationship.
The assessment of contributions does not require “overzealous” attention to the ascertainment of contributions, and the process of the Court as required by s 79 of the Act “…is the exercise of a wide discretion, not the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise” as set out in Dickons at [25].
Initial contributions
The husband said he had cars and tools worth about $15,000 at the commencement of the parties’ relationship.
The wife said she had a car worth about $23,500 and savings of around $15,000.
The wife denied the husband’s initial contributions.
In my view nothing turns on any finding as to the precise quantum of the initial contributions, considering the modesty of such asserted contributions particularly when seen in the context of the length of the parties’ marriage and all the contributions of various kinds they each made throughout.
Contributions during the marriage
The husband operated a company for a number of years. The parties also engaged in property development, buying and selling a number of properties.
From around 2017 to 2021 the husband’s primary contract was at a venue in Town L where he was engaged to complete works and various projects.
The wife was engaged in paid employment until she fell pregnant. Thereafter she was engaged in full time home duties and provided primary care for X after X’s birth.
In 2009 the wife said she received $45,115 from her grandfather’s estate in 2009 and another $21,866 in 2015 from the estate and another $19,706 and $3,319 in 2018. The wife said the funds were contributed to the benefit of the family, to meet business expenses, to purchase vehicles and to pay off vehicle loans.
The husband partially acknowledged the wife received funds from her grandfather’s estate. However, he asserted the wife became very secretive about money and that she never informed him about additional monies she received. He disputed the funds were used as deposed by the wife.
The husband deposed that he received an inheritance from a family friend in 2006 of $25,000. He also said he received an executor’s fee of $25,000 and that he paid the total funds into the business. The wife said her recollection was that the husband received only $5,000. I understand no documents were adduced to resolve this dispute. Whether $5,000 or $50,000 was received, that was in excess of 17 years ago, and again needs to be seen in the context of all the other contributions made by the parties over the length of their relationship.
In relation to monies, or income received by each of the parties during the relationship, there is authority that the Court is to infer that, absent evidence to the contrary, the funds were used by the party for the benefit of the family unit; see Parshen v Parshen (1996) FLC 92-720; J & S [2003] FamCA 618. Whilst there is some dispute as to how precisely the wife’s inheritance was applied, it does not seem to me that there is any basis upon which I could infer the funds were not applied to the benefit of the family.
Contributions post-separation
The husband paid the mortgage on the former matrimonial home post separation until October 2021. The husband also attended to the payments on the yard, although the mortgage has fallen into in arrears. Some recent contributions were made to it from the proceeds of a third clearing sale – effectively being a joint contribution. There may be outstanding rates and land tax.
The husband had the primary care of X until August 2021. The wife has had the primary care – and at times the exclusive care – of X since then.
The husband did not pay the wife child support after X returned to her care in December 2021. Instead, he paid funds directly to X. The wife deposed that she had to rely on financial assistance from charitable agencies who provided her with food vouchers, pharmacy vouchers and vouchers to purchase clothing as well as receiving some grants.
Whilst the husband said he paid for joint expenses, including Family Reports, counselling, family therapy, car repairs and the like, he also received the funds from the sale of some vehicles post separation, and the monies from the two clearing sales which he used to fund those payments. Accordingly, I cannot treat those payments as contributions made by the husband as they were effectively made from joint assets.
RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 75(2) OF THE ACT
The husband is 53 years old. He is in good health. He has a medical condition but that is managed by him with the assistance of his doctor. The husband’s contract with the venue in Town L was terminated when he was charged with criminal offences. The husband is on a criminal register until 2030. These matters have affected the husband’s income earning capacity. He is not in paid employment and is in receipt of Centrelink payments. He has limited skills and limited resources.
The wife is 57 years old. She is also in reasonably good health, although she suffers from anxiety. The wife has not been engaged in paid employment since 2008 when she commenced maternity leave. She is also in receipt of Centrelink payments and undertakes some volunteer work. The wife was previously an educator but has not worked as such for more than 16 years. She would have to retrain to be able to re-register as an educator. The wife is also exempt from seeking work due to her diagnosis of anxiety. Accordingly, I accept it is not reasonable to expect the wife to retrain and return to work as an educator, and her earning capacity is limited.
The husband does not pay child support for X. He has not provided the wife, or X, with any funds since 8 December 2023. Prior to that the husband made direct financial payments to X, but not to the wife to meet the costs of primarily caring for their child. I accept that given the husband’s criminal charges it may be difficult for him to obtain employment.
The parenting orders I have made ultimately provide for X to move over time to live in a shared care arrangement between her parents.
Section 75(2)(o) of the Act
The appointment of the liquidators
The husband said the fees of the liquidators should be borne equally between the parties. He urged the Court to consider the circumstances in which he appointed the liquidators for V Pty Ltd; that he was struggling to meet the mortgage repayments, that he had repeatedly sought the wife vacate the former matrimonial home so it could be sold, and that the wife’s refusal to leave the home “resulted in the mortgage being in default and significant interest accruing on the mortgage”. The husband also said he was led to believe the costs incurred would be significantly smaller than those costs actually charged. Additionally, the husband asserted the wife’s actions surrounding the sale of the home caused the costs to be increased. For instance, he said the wife made it difficult for the liquidator to access the property with a photographer. That was denied by the wife and Mr PP did not refer to any issues with the wife’s behaviour in his evidence.
The wife was living in the home at the time the husband appointed the liquidator. The only creditors were the mortgagee and the husband’s lawyers.
The husband acknowledged that appointing the liquidator “was an unfortunate decision which I made out of frustration with the situation at the time”. He said he thought appointing a liquidator would avoid a mortgagee sale – which it did not, as the liquidator acted as agent for the mortgagee. As already set out, there was evidence that the mortgagee sale could have been avoided had the husband made some contribution towards the mortgage encumbering the former matrimonial home.

As already set out, in relation to CC Pty Ltd, it is expected that the liquidator’s fees will total around $101,542. They have some funds from the sale of the vehicles to the husband’s mother. It appears that the liquidator will sell the remaining vehicles, but will not cover their costs, which will likely ultimately be written off.
There was no plausible explanation proffered by the husband as to why he placed CC Pty Ltd into liquidation. As best I can tell, it owned around 13 or 14 vehicles and had no creditors of any significance. The husband already had orders – made on 22 November 2021 – pursuant to which he was at liberty to sell the trading stock. At its highest, the husband’s oral evidence was he appointed the liquidator “for clearance of stock which had become an insurmountable job for me”. However, there was no evidence that the husband made any genuine efforts to sell Motor Vehicle 9, Motor Vehicle 8, Motor Vehicle 10 or any other vehicle owned by CC Pty Ltd prior to appointing the liquidator. It was also unclear to me whether the husband has or will purchase back some of the other vehicles from CC Pty Ltd.
The total amount the liquidators will ultimately charge remains unknown, but it seems likely that the fees for the two appointed liquidators will be over $400,000 (although some of those fees may be written off) – for the sale of the former matrimonial home and some vehicles.
I am satisfied the justice of the case requires the appointment of the liquidators and subsequent diminution of the pool to be taken into account pursuant to s 75(2)(o) of the Act.
The husband’s unilateral determination to appoint liquidators has resulted in a significant reduction in the pool. The house could have been sold by the parties for considerably less expense. Mr PP will likely recover his costs of $198,000 from the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home, having already received $125,752 for acting as the bank’s agent at the mortgagee sale. It is patently clear that had the parties conducted the sale themselves, the costs of sale would have been dramatically reduced.
The proceeds of the sale of the vehicles to the husband’s mother of $42,000 have been paid to the liquidator for CC Pty Ltd. They will likely retain the proceeds of sale of any other vehicles towards their costs.
I accept that the husband’s decision to appoint liquidators was not designed to cheat the wife, but it was nonetheless a very poor financial decision. It was reckless. In my view, the justice of this case requires me to take this decision into account, where the liquidators’ fees have eaten into the pool that would otherwise have been available for distribution.
It was the wife’s case that the former matrimonial home was sold for less than market value. To that end she relied on appraisals obtained from OO Real Estate in early 2022 and AB Real Estate in mid-2022 – appraising the property at a range between $1,950,000 and $2,350,000. The property was ultimately sold almost a year later for over $1,750,000.
However, I have no sworn valuation as to the value of the former matrimonial home more proximate to the date it was sold, and no expert evidence that the property was sold for less than market value. I do have the evidence of Mr MM that the market in Suburb P in general had dropped over the last year or so. Mr MM conceded he had not returned to the property since April 2022. I accept the submissions made by counsel for the husband that in the absence of any evidence that the sale was not conducted properly, the reality is the market value of the property is what was achieved at sale. Accordingly I do not take the wife’s concerns in this regard to be a relevant consideration.
The vehicles purchased by the husband’s mother
I am of the view that the justice of this case requires me to take into account:
(a)the husband’s nomination of his mother to purchase the vehicles from the liquidator;
(b)his concession that he will continue to have the use of the vehicles and use them as his own; and
(c)my finding that the vehicles were sold to the husband’s mother at less than market value.
As already noted, the payment of $42,000 by the husband’s mother will be entirely consumed by the liquidator’s fees.
The clearing sale proceeds
As already observed, the husband retained control of the vast bulk of the proceeds of sales from the two clearing sales of $117,442 (being the total amounts received by him less the monies paid to the wife and the funds he applied towards legal costs). I accept that much of the funds were applied to joint expenses. However, the husband has not provided adequate explanations as to the application of the entire proceeds. That included not providing sufficient evidence to verify his assertion that the $25,538 he paid to his mother was to repay her for monies advanced to him to meet joint expenses.
The vehicles sold/retained by the husband
As already observed the husband sold a number of vehicles post separation. I accept that the husband applied the proceeds in part to joint expenses. However, he otherwise had the benefit and control of the funds, to the exclusion of the wife, and it is appropriate in my view, to factor this into the ultimate division of property in order to achieve a just and equitable outcome between the parties.
It has not been possible to accurately identify all the items in the husband’s possession. There was much confusion as to what was sold, what would be sold by the liquidator, and what remained available to the husband. I am satisfied that the husband is likely to retain some vehicles and parts and again, in my view it is appropriate to take this into account in order to achieve and just and equitable outcome.
The husband’s assertions as to wife’s anticipated inheritance
The husband sought an adjustment in his favour on the basis that he believes the wife will receive an inheritance under her mother’s will of about $750,000, and that when her father passes she will be entitled to receive further funds by way of inheritance.
The wife said she received no funds under her mother’s will, as there was no distribution at the time of her mother’s passing in 1988; all jointly owned property became the property of her father. The wife said she was currently estranged from her father and did not know what assets were in his name or whether she will or will not be entitled to receive any inheritance.
I note in the husband’s own trial affidavit he deposed that the wife was “kicked out of home by her father” in 1991. He also deposed that the wife “has had no real relationship with her father since a young age and to the best of my knowledge has had no contact with him after an IVO was taken out by [the wife] against her father in 1992”. The husband’s own evidence supports the wife’s assertions that she is estranged from her father.
There was no admissible evidence as to what the value of the wife’s father’s estate would likely be, nor indeed, any evidence that the wife stands to receive an inheritance at all from her father. In the circumstances there was no basis upon which there could appropriately be any adjustment made in the husband’s favour.
ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROSPECTIVE NEEDS
Weighing up all the contributions made by the parties over the course of their long marriage, I am satisfied that they are approximately equal. The parties’ needs, moving forward, will also be similar, as neither have a significant earning capacity.
However, in light of the s 75(2)(o) factors outlined, and for all the reasons I have already set out, I am satisfied that there should be an adjustment in the wife’s favour, such that the overall asset pool is to be divided 60 per cent to the wife and 40 per cent to the husband.
ORDERS TO BE MADE
My orders provide for the wife to receive 60 per cent of the net proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home, together with a small payment to her from the husband’s 40 per cent entitlement (of $4,130), to take into account the additional funds he received from the clearing sales and used by him for legal expenses. All other tangible assets – save for X’s car or any other vehicle upon which the parties agree – are to be sold, and the net proceeds divided in the same proportions. If the parties agree on the value of vehicles they wish to retain, the husband will pay to the wife a sum equal to 60 per cent of any vehicles he will retain, and the wife will pay the husband 40 per cent of the value of her Motor Vehicle 1.
The orders I am making provide for some funds from the sale of the yard to be quarantined to meet any capital gains tax. The proceeds will otherwise be divided 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband.
No orders for reimbursement of expert reports/family therapy
I am not making an order for the husband to be reimbursed half of the costs of experts reports and family therapy as sought by him. It was the husband’s evidence that the bulk of those expenses were met by application of the proceeds of the clearing sale/s and accordingly it would be inequitable to require the wife to reimburse the husband when joint funds were already substantially applied to meet those costs.
Superannuation
I am satisfied the appropriate orders for superannuation require that the parties’ entitlements in the SMSF are equalised, as proposed by the wife, and as ultimately agreed between the parties. The reality is that neither party is likely to be able to make significant contributions to their superannuation entitlements moving forward.
The agreed orders provide an effective method of dividing the parties’ superannuation and winding up of the SMSF.
The wife will then resign as a director and office-bearer for the trustee and transfer her shares to the husband.
As the parties industry entitlements are extremely modest, they will remain with the relevant party.
Funds from X’s bank account
The husband asserted the wife had withdrawn $50,000 from a bank account in X’s name. In his trial material the husband sought that the wife refund those monies to X’s account from her property settlement proceeds. The wife denied removing X’s funds, save for $1,000 which she used to meet living expenses. I will not be making the order as sought by the husband. No bank statements were adduced, and this matter was not ventilated in any meaningful way at the final hearing.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I make the orders as are set out.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and three (203) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Carter.
Associate:
Dated: 11 November 2024

File number:	MLC 9432 of 2021
Judgment of:	CARTER J
Date of judgment:	11 November 2024
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Final orders altering property interests – Where there is a dispute as to the quantum of the pool –Where orders for valuations were not complied with – Where the wife asserts the husband has sold vehicles for less than market value – Where the wife contends the husband continues to possess vehicles he claims were sold in clearing sales and by the liquidator – Where the husband unilaterally appointed liquidators –Where there are outstanding issues as to the liquidators’ fees and the finalisation of the liquidation of the parties’ companies and the treatment of those fees – Pool divided 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband.
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 81, 90XT, 106A Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 (Cth) Part 6
Cases cited:	Aleksovski v Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705 Bevan v Bevan (2013) 49 Fam LR 387 Dickons v Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 J & S [2003] FamCA 618 Omacini and Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218 Parshen v Parshen (1996) FLC 92-720 Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 Stein v Stein (1986) FLC 91-779
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	203
Date of last submission/s:	17 October 2024
Date of hearing:	18 – 21, 25 – 26 March 2024
Place:	Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Stanley
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Cahill Family Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Swann
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Schembri + McCluskys

MLC 9432 of 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MS DIAMARDA Applicant
AND:	MR DIAMARDA Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:	CARTER J
DATE OF ORDER:	11 NOVEMBER 2024

Balance of proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home (this amount is less the mortgage, the sale costs and less liquidator’s fees of $125,752 for acting as agent for mortgagee)	$801,029
ADDBACKS
Funds paid to the husband from clearing sales used for legal fees	$13,505
Funds to wife from clearing sale	$10,000

Proceeds of sale of the yard LESS selling costs, mortgage, outstanding council and land tax – proceeds estimated to be approximately $1,300,000 to $1,500,000 if the property sells for $1,800,000	$TBC
Net proceeds of sale of all remaining vehicles, trucks, trailers, parts and the like	$TBC
Net sale proceeds or agreed value of the wife’s Motor Vehicle 1	$TBC
Net sale proceeds or agreed value of any vehicles to be retained by the husband	$TBC
Funds remaining from liquidation of CC Pty Ltd once completed – if any	$TBC
LIABILITIES
Debt to the Australian Taxation Department arising from filing of returns for various entities – estimated $116,000	(TBC)
Capital gains tax arising from the sale of the yard – estimated to be approximately $236,000 if the property sells for $1,800,000	($TBC)
Liquidator’s anticipated fees, and legal fees, to finalise the liquidation of V Pty Ltd estimated to be $198,547	($TBC)
Liquidator’s fees for CC Pty Ltd, estimated to be $101,542 less the funds paid from the proceeds of sale of the vehicles to the husband’s mother	($TBC)