Di Mauro v The Queen

The case of *Di Mauro v The Queen* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia by the applicant, Di Mauro, against his conviction for murder. The central dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial and the subsequent impact of that evidence on the fairness of the proceedings.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that Di Mauro had previously threatened to kill the deceased. This involved considering the principles governing the admission of evidence of prior criminal conduct or bad character, particularly where such evidence might be relevant to motive or intent but also carries a significant risk of prejudice to the accused. The court also had to assess whether the admission of this evidence, even if technically admissible, had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

In their joint judgment, McHugh and Kirby JJ applied the principles established in cases such as *Pfennig v The Queen* and *IMM v The Queen*. They emphasised that evidence of prior misconduct is generally inadmissible if its sole purpose is to show that the accused has a propensity to commit the crime charged. However, such evidence may be admitted if it has a sufficient degree of probative value in relation to a fact in issue, such as motive, intent, or identity, that outweighs its prejudicial effect. The judges found that the threats made by Di Mauro were sufficiently connected to the deceased and the circumstances of the killing to be relevant to the issue of intent. They concluded that the trial judge had properly directed the jury on the limited use of this evidence, and therefore, its admission did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.