Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 165

File number: VID 67 of 2022
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 3 March 2022
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to stay orders pending outcome of prospective appeal from a decision refusing an application to set aside bankruptcy notice on the ground that the Court does not have jurisdiction – whether the proposed grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable – whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of a stay – application dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 30, 40(1), 41, 41(2A), 41(3)(a), 41(6A), 52

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 33ZF, 35A, 37M, 37N

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 1.34, 41.03

Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg 9

Charter of Human Rights and Obligations 2006 (Vic) s 32

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ss 3.4, 35.3

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2003] FCAFC 274; 133 FCR 487

Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd [2002] FMCA 82; 192 ALR 111

Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 217 ALR 251

Budimir v McMahon [2000] FCA 1312

Burns v AMP Finance Ltd [2005] FCA 761

Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; 221 FCR 450

Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 94

Nolten v Groenveld Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1494

Nugawela v Deputy Commissioner for Taxation [2016] FCA 578

Opie v Opie [1951] HCA 47; 84 CLR 362

Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corp [1996] FCA 460; 67 FCR 65

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132

Re Duckworth v Ex parte Lockett [1987] FCA 55

Re Grace (1931) 3 ABC 131

Re Lentini; Ex parte Lentini v CSR Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 363

Re Pollard; Ex parte Lensing ManagementCo Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 823; 23 FCR 284

Re Sterling; Ex parte Esanda Ltd (Federal Court of Australia, Lockhart J, 2 June 1980); 30 ALR 77

Re Vella; Ex parte Seymour [1983] FCA 114; 67 FLR 287

Streimer v Tamas [1981] FCA 140; 37 ALR 211

Vale v Sutherland [2009] HCA 26; 237 CLR 638

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 14 February 2022
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr P Ansell of Erudite Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms C Langford
Solicitor for the Respondent: LegalVision

ORDERS

VID 67 of 2022
BETWEEN:

MARIA DI GREGORIO

Applicant

AND:

LUMI FINANCIAL PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for a stay of the orders made on 11 February 2022 in proceeding VID 648/2021 be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd involved a dispute between the applicant, Ms Di Gregorio, and Lumi Financial Pty Ltd regarding the enforcement of a bankruptcy notice. The matter was before the Federal Court of Australia where Ms Di Gregorio sought to stay the orders made by the court in relation to the bankruptcy notice. The primary issues before the court were whether the proposed grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of a stay.

The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable. Ms Di Gregorio had argued that the bankruptcy notice did not comply with the orders made by the court regarding substituted service. However, the court found that the orders specified three methods by which substituted service was to be effected, and service was deemed to have been achieved once those actions were carried out in accordance with the orders. The court also found that the bankruptcy notice complied with the relevant statutory provisions.

In terms of the balance of convenience, the court found that it did not favour the grant of a stay. The court noted that Ms Di Gregorio had not provided a compelling reason for why a stay was necessary and that the granting of a stay would cause significant prejudice to Lumi Financial Pty Ltd.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for a stay of the orders made in relation to the bankruptcy notice. The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable and that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of a stay. The court also noted that it would hear the parties on the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for a stay of the orders made on 11 February 2022 in proceeding VID 648/2021 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Di Gregorio’s second affidavit annexes her submissions in the application before the primary judge. I requested that the applicant provide me with those submissions so that I could better understand the case that Ms Di Gregorio put below, in circumstances where her submissions before me were disorganised and confused.THE BACKGROUND FACTS In the primary judge’s reasons (Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 94) (J) her Honour set out some of the background facts at J[8]-[16]. In short:(a)on 19 June 2019 Lumi entered into a loan agreement with Efektiv Pty Ltd, in respect of which Ms Di Gregorio (who at all material times was a non-executive director of Efektiv) and others provided guarantees;(b)on 25 September 2019 Efektiv defaulted on the loan agreement. On 10 October 2019 Lumi sent a letter of demand to Efektiv and the guarantors but no payments were made in response;(c)on 14 November 2019 Lumi instituted proceedings in the Local Court, naming Ms Di Gregorio as the fifth defendant, seeking judgment in the sum of the outstanding loan amount plus interest and costs;(d)Ms Di Gregorio did not file a defence in the Local Court proceeding, and on 5 February 2021 a default judgment was entered in favour of Lumi against Ms Di Gregorio for the sum of $67,588.60;(e)on 2 September 2021 a bankruptcy notice was issued that was addressed to Ms Di Gregorio (the Notice); and(f)on 20 September 2021 Registrar Cridland made orders for substituted service of the Notice (the Orders). The Orders relevantly stated:1Service of Bankruptcy Notice No. BN 254129 issued 2 September 2021 and addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio] together with a sealed copy of this order may be effected by the following means:(a)by sending by pre-paid ordinary post addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio] at [her] […residential address];(b)by handing to any person apparently over the age of sixteen years but, if this is not possible, by leaving in the letterbox or affixing to the front door in a sealed envelope addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio at her] […residential address]; and(c)by scanning and sending by email to [Ms Di Gregorio] at [her then solicitor’s email address].2.Service in accordance with this order shall be deemed good and sufficient service of the Bankruptcy Notice upon [Ms Di Gregorio].3.The Bankruptcy Notice shall be deemed to have been served on [Ms Di Gregorio] on 30 September 2021.(Emphasis added.) On the basis that the Notice was deemed to have been served on 30 September 2021, as provided by order 3, Ms Di Gregorio had 21 days from that date (i.e. until 21 October 2021) to comply with the notice before she was taken to have committed an act of bankruptcy pursuant to s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. She also had until 21 October 2021 to institute any proceeding to set aside the default judgment or to commence an application to set aside the Notice, in order to enliven the Court’s power to extend the time for compliance with the Notice pursuant to s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act. Ms Di Gregorio did not comply with the Notice by 21 October 2021, and the primary judge found that she did not institute a proceeding in the Local Court to set aside the default judgment until 22 October 2021 (although that finding is challenged in the appeal). It is not in contest that Ms Di Gregorio did not file an application in this Court to set aside the Notice until 4 November 2021.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons explained below it is appropriate to dismiss the application for a stay. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.THE EVIDENCE The application is supported by two affidavits affirmed by Ms Di Gregorio on 14 February 2022, together with a draft notice of appeal dated 14 February 2022. I have determined the application by reference to the grounds in the draft notice of appeal, not the notice of appeal recently filed. Ms Di Gregorio’s first affidavit largely goes to the balance of convenience if a stay is not granted. Notwithstanding that some of the affidavit is just submissions, and it contains some irrelevant material, I have treated the affidavit as read except insofar as it exhibits Ms Di Gregorio’s earlier affidavit dated 2 November 2021 which runs to approximately 1881 pages with its annexures. I will not treat that voluminous and largely irrelevant material as read. Ms Di Gregorio’s second affidavit annexes her submissions in the application before the primary judge. I requested that the applicant provide me with those submissions so that I could better understand the case that Ms Di Gregorio put below, in circumstances where her submissions before me were disorganised and confused.THE BACKGROUND FACTS In the primary judge’s reasons (Di Gregorio v Lumi Financial Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 94) (J) her Honour set out some of the background facts at J[8]-[16]. In short:(a)on 19 June 2019 Lumi entered into a loan agreement with Efektiv Pty Ltd, in respect of which Ms Di Gregorio (who at all material times was a non-executive director of Efektiv) and others provided guarantees;(b)on 25 September 2019 Efektiv defaulted on the loan agreement. On 10 October 2019 Lumi sent a letter of demand to Efektiv and the guarantors but no payments were made in response;(c)on 14 November 2019 Lumi instituted proceedings in the Local Court, naming Ms Di Gregorio as the fifth defendant, seeking judgment in the sum of the outstanding loan amount plus interest and costs;(d)Ms Di Gregorio did not file a defence in the Local Court proceeding, and on 5 February 2021 a default judgment was entered in favour of Lumi against Ms Di Gregorio for the sum of $67,588.60;(e)on 2 September 2021 a bankruptcy notice was issued that was addressed to Ms Di Gregorio (the Notice); and(f)on 20 September 2021 Registrar Cridland made orders for substituted service of the Notice (the Orders). The Orders relevantly stated:1Service of Bankruptcy Notice No. BN 254129 issued 2 September 2021 and addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio] together with a sealed copy of this order may be effected by the following means:(a)by sending by pre-paid ordinary post addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio] at [her] […residential address];(b)by handing to any person apparently over the age of sixteen years but, if this is not possible, by leaving in the letterbox or affixing to the front door in a sealed envelope addressed to [Ms Di Gregorio at her] […residential address]; and(c)by scanning and sending by email to [Ms Di Gregorio] at [her then solicitor’s email address].2.Service in accordance with this order shall be deemed good and sufficient service of the Bankruptcy Notice upon [Ms Di Gregorio].3.The Bankruptcy Notice shall be deemed to have been served on [Ms Di Gregorio] on 30 September 2021.(Emphasis added.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the meantime, on 16 December 2021, by consent of the parties the Local Court made orders to set aside the default judgment entered on 5 February 2021 (at J[19]). Also, on 4 February 2022, an alleged co-debtor of Ms Di Gregorio, Mr Shivesh Kuksal filed a summons in the New South Wales Supreme Court seeking judicial review of the default judgment (at J[63]). In the hearing before me, Ms Di Gregorio submitted that Mr Kuksal’s summons seeks an order that the default judgment is a nullity.THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT The primary judge’s reasons may be summarised as follows. Ms Di Gregorio submitted that the Notice should be set aside because it did not comply with the Orders. That argument turned on the meaning of the Orders, which specified three methods by which substituted service was to be performed and expressly stated that upon such performance the Notice was deemed to have been served on Ms Di Gregorio on 30 September 2021. In summary, she submitted that each of the three specified methods of service were required to be completed before service was deemed to have been achieved, and because she received the Notice in the post (as a result of one of the three methods of service) at 6pm on 11 October 2021, the effective date of service was 12 October 2021 (in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules)) rather than 30 September 2021. The primary judge did not accept those arguments and decided (at J[28]-[29]) that, as a matter of construction, the Orders prescribed three actions by which substituted service was to be effected, and that service was effected by those three actions being carried out in accordance with the Orders, not by the documents actually being received by Ms Di Gregorio. Lumi adduced evidence that it took steps to effect all three methods of service on 21 September 2021 which her Honour accepted. As a matter of practicality, her Honour also had regard (at J[31]) to the fact that although Ms Di Gregorio did not receive the posted documents until the evening of 11 October 2021, on her own evidence a process server dropped the documents at her feet at her residential address on 23 September 2021, and Lumi’s solicitor emailed the documents to her solicitor on 21 September 2021. Thus, Ms Di Gregorio had received two copies of the Notice well prior to the receipt of the posted documents and the deemed date of service. The primary judge found that the Notice was deemed to have been served on 30 September 2021, and that there was no non-compliance with the Orders which might justify setting aside the Notice (at J[34]). Ms Di Gregorio also submitted that the Notice should be set aside on the basis that it did not comply with the following:(a)Section 41(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act, as it did not specify a 21 day period after service of the Notice for compliance, pursuant to the statutory period for compliance defined in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act. The primary judge did not accept that submission (at J[37]), noting that the Notice, as amended by the Orders, expressly stated:You are required, within 21 days after 30 September 2021, to either:(a)pay to the creditor the amount of the debt claimed; or(b)make arrangements to the creditor’s satisfaction for settlement of the debt.(b)Section 41(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and reg 9 of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) (the Regulations), as it was not in the prescribed form. The primary judge did not accept that submission (at J[38]), noting that the Notice was in the prescribed form in Schedule 1 of the Regulations, and Ms Di Gregorio did not identify any suggested errors in the Notice.(c)Section 41(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as the default judgment on which the Notice was based was obtained improperly in one of several ways: fraudulently or in bad faith; in breach of Ms Di Gregorio’s entitlement to natural justice; in breach of Ms Di Gregorio’s equitable rights; in breach of Ms Di Gregorio’s legitimate expectations; as a result of jurisdictional error, owing to Wednesbury unreasonableness (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) on the part of the Registrar who made the default judgment; and owing to the failure of the Registrar to consider relevant matters in making the default judgment. The primary judge did not accept that submission (at J[41]). Her Honour noted that at the time the Notice was issued Lumi had obtained a default judgment against Ms Di Gregorio and it was entitled to rely on that judgment to issue the notice. Her Honour did not consider it appropriate to go behind the default judgment when determining whether the Notice complied with the requirements in s 41. Her Honour said that the authorities on which Ms Di Gregorio sought to rely in support of its submission that the Court should go behind the judgment concerned proceedings on a creditor’s petition under s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act (e.g. Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132) and were not generally applicable to s 41 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.