JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: DI GIOVANNI -v- DARK HORSE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD (in liq) [2014] WASCA 188
CORAM: McLURE P
NEWNES JA
MURPHY JA
HEARD: 3 SEPTEMBER 2014
DELIVERED : 21 OCTOBER 2014
FILE NO/S: CACV 99 of 2013
BETWEEN: PIERO DI GIOVANNI
Appellant
AND
DARK HORSE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD (in liq)
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :WAGER DCJ
Citation :DI GIOVANNI -v- DARK HORSE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD [No 2] [2013] WADC 23
File No :CIV 120 of 2010
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :WAGER DCJ
Citation :PIERO DI GIOVANNI (t/as TIMBER DIMENSIONS) -v- DARK HORSE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD [No 3] [2013] WADC 120
File No :CIV 120 of 2010
Catchwords:
Building contract - Parties to contract - Collateral contract - Novation - Money owing - Borrowings loss - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2)
Result:
Appeal allowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Abbott v Hessen (1913) 15 WALR 80
Hoyt's Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133
Hungerfords v Walker [1989] HCA 8; (1989) 171 CLR 125
Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365
Re Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1990) 1 WAR 465
McLURE P: This is an appeal from decisions of Wager DCJ relating to a building dispute between the appellant, Brendon Aitken and Dark Horse Developments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (Dark Horse). Dark Horse was the trustee of the Aitken Family Trust.
Dark Horse is in liquidation and Mr Aitken is bankrupt. The appellant sought and obtained from Pullin JA leave pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to commence and continue this appeal against Dark Horse. The appellant has represented himself in this appeal. There was no appearance by Dark Horse, or its liquidator, who was made aware of the appeal.
The appellant is a builder. At the material times, his trading name was 'Timber Dimensions'. On 1 May 2008 the appellant entered into two standard form, cost plus building contracts for the refit and renovation of two premises so each could operate as a small bar. The first building contract related to premises in Mount Hawthorn called The Cabin (The Cabin contract) and the second related to premises in Shenton Park called The Suite (The Suite contract).
The appellant brought proceedings in the District Court for moneys claimed to be owing to him under the building contracts. The identity of the counterparties to each building contract was in issue in the District Court proceedings. After a trial of this preliminary issue, the trial judge found that the contracting party in each case was Mr Brendon Aitken, not Dark Horse.
The remaining claims and counterclaims between the parties were litigated and determined at a subsequent hearing (the claims trial).…
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- Case
- [2014] WASCA 188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues included whether the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity costs and whether the subsequent contract was validly executed under the circumstances. The court had to determine if the trial judge correctly interpreted the terms of the contract and if the plaintiff's claims regarding the defendants' conduct were properly considered.
The court found that the trial judge did not err in her interpretation of the contract or in her consideration of the plaintiff's claims. The May 2009 agreement was correctly construed as incorporating the requirement for reasonableness in indemnity costs. The evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to the point where the contract could not proceed. The court dismissed the grounds of appeal that challenged the trial judge's findings, noting that her conclusions were supported by the evidence and that addressing the plaintiff's allegations about the defendants' conduct was not necessary for resolving the issues at hand.
The court's final orders dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge's decision. The plaintiff was not entitled to indemnity costs on the basis that they were not reasonably incurred or were unreasonable in amount.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I do not understand the trial judge to conclude that the appellant was not entitled to the costs of the legal action on an indemnity basis. However, a standard order for indemnity costs excludes costs unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount: Re Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1990) 1 WAR 465, 479. The May 2009 agreement should be construed as incorporating those requirements of reasonableness. The trial judge was correct to make the order she did. I would dismiss grounds 14 and 20. These grounds challenge pars 110 ‑ 114 of the claims judgment. The trial judge found that after signing The Suite contract on 1 May 2008 both parties decided that The Suite works would not proceed until The Cabin had been completed or was near completion. That is in accordance with the evidence. The trial judge also relied on a statement that 'if all parties are happy with The Cabin then Timber Dimensions will build Shenton Park', which she said came from the May 2009 letter. That is incorrect. The quoted statement is in the November 2008 variation which followed (and resolved for a short time) the breakdown in the relationship between the appellant and Mr Aitken. The November 2008 variation expressly states:Shenton Park - The Suite to be determined at or near completion of 'The Cabin'. If all parties are happy with 'The Cabin', then Timber Dimensions will build Shenton Park. The trial judge relied on the hostility that arose between the appellant and Mr Aitken after 11 May 2009, which descended into threats, abuse and protracted legal proceedings, to conclude that the parties were not happy with The Cabin [111]. The trial judge also found that the appellant had no intention of proceeding with The Suite, relying on the fact that the appellant had not received payment for moneys owing under The Cabin contract, was unable to communicate civilly with Mr Aitken and did not perform any works under The Suite contract after May 2009. The trial judge concluded that 'the relationship had broken down to such an extent that the contract could not proceed' [112]. She continued:I reject [the appellant's] claim. The condition of 'happiness' was not met. The Suite contract is void [113]. The November 2008 variation to The Suite contract rendered its performance conditional on all parties being satisfied with the post‑May 2009 performances relating to The Cabin contract. The evidence overwhelmingly established that neither side was happy with their experiences with The Cabin contract and that all parties, by their conduct, In ground 21 the appellant complains that the trial judge did not mention his allegation that false information was filed by the defendants' lawyers concerning their clients' claim of misleading and deceptive conduct. The trial judge was not required to make findings as to the conduct of the defendants' solicitors to resolve the claim in the appellant's favour. This ground is without merit. Ground 22 complains that the trial judge made no mention of the appellant's allegations that Mr Aitken stole an oven from The Cabin site and the problems the theft created. The trial judge was not required to address those matters as their determination was unnecessary for the purpose of disposing of the issues in the action. That course was entirely appropriate. This ground is also without merit.