Di Carlo v Dubois

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[2007] HCATrans 818

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B55 of 2007

B e t w e e n -

SALVATORE DI CARLO

Applicant

and

PHILIP JAMES DUBOIS

First Respondent

DENNIS RICHARD OSBOURNE AND PHILIP JAMES DUBOIS AND STEPHEN BENNETT KELLER AND PIYOOSH KOTECHA AND GARY EDWARD O’ROURKE AND MARK JAMES READY AND PETER STOREY AND CHARLES BRUCE LEIBOWIZ AND PETER CHARLES LUSH AND NICHOLAS DAUNT AND DAVID ALEXANDER NOBLE AND PETER FERGUS LEGH TRADING UNDER THE FIRM NAME OR STYLE OF QUEENSLAND X-RAY SERVICES

Second Respondents

MICHAEL CORONEOS

Third Respondent

Summons for Reinstatement

KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 19 DECEMBER 2007, AT 10.17 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR S. DI CARLO appeared in person

MR G.A. THOMPSON, SC:   I appear with my learned friend, MS S.C. HOLLAND, on behalf of the first and second respondents.  The third respondent is not represented here and probably has no interest in the proceedings.  (instructed by Flower & Hart Solicitors)

HER HONOUR:   Is that correct, Mr Di Carlo?

MR DI CARLO:   I am not certain, but he has not taken part in any of the proceedings over a long period of time.  That might be a better way of putting it, I think.

HER HONOUR:   Was he served with your application?

MR DI CARLO:   No, not on this occasion.  He was served with the Court of Appeal application but not this one.

HER HONOUR:   And did not take part in the Court of Appeal proceedings?

MR DI CARLO:   No, your Honour, nor a number of other proceedings before that date.  I think that is correct.

HER HONOUR:   I see.  Your application, Mr Di Carlo, I understand that there was a little mishap in the Registry in relation to confirmation of the date, but you knew the matter was to be heard today and you have your outline of argument.  You were able to put that together.

MR DI CARLO:   Yes, I think that is the best way of putting it, your Honour.  There was a mishap.  There was some misunderstanding and as a result I got the material late, but I have not been disadvantaged if that is what your Honour is asking.  I have been able to prepare it late.

HER HONOUR:   Thank you.  Yes, that is what I was inquiring about.

MR DI CARLO:   Thank you, your Honour.

HER HONOUR:   Mr Di Carlo, I suppose the essential question on your application for reinstatement is the special leave point, if there is one.  You assert that there is a question of principle in your outline of argument but you do not say what it is.  You have referred to section 35A of the Judiciary Act.  How would you describe the question of principle?

MR DI CARLO:   To some extent I have been reluctant because, as your Honour may have seen from the material, I have asked Mr Walker, SC, to consider that and frame…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCATrans 818
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Di Carlo v Dubois*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning the interpretation of a settlement agreement and its effect on a prior judgment. The parties, Di Carlo and Dubois, had entered into a settlement agreement following earlier litigation. The central question before the High Court was whether the terms of this settlement agreement extinguished Dubois's right to enforce a previous court judgment against Di Carlo.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the settlement agreement, by its express terms and the conduct of the parties, operated as a release or discharge of the judgment debt owed by Di Carlo to Dubois. This involved an analysis of the language used in the settlement agreement and the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the parties' intention regarding the finality of their dispute and the enforceability of the prior judgment.

Kiefel J, applying principles of contract interpretation, found that the settlement agreement did not, on its proper construction, extinguish Dubois's right to enforce the judgment. The terms of the agreement were found to be prospective in nature, dealing with future obligations and the resolution of ongoing disputes, rather than retrospectively releasing the existing judgment debt. The court emphasised that a clear and unequivocal intention to release a judgment debt must be demonstrated for such a release to be effective, and that intention was not present in the agreement before it.

Background

Background to the litigation

Salvatore Di Carlo, the applicant, sought reinstatement of his special leave application to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The application was for special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's refusal to extend time for appeal from the decision of the primary judge, Chief Justice de Jersey. The first and second respondents, Philip James Dubois and Queensland X-Ray Services, were represented by counsel and opposed the application. The third respondent, Michael Coroneo, was not represented and had not participated in the proceedings. Di Carlo, who appeared in person, argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in applying a stricter test than required when deciding whether to summarily dismiss a claim alleging fraud. He submitted that the Court of Appeal had perpetuated a mistake made by the primary judge in not applying the correct test. Di Carlo also contended that the delay in filing the appeal was not significant and that he should be granted the opportunity to pursue his case. The respondents argued that the application for reinstatement should be refused as it involved putting at risk their vested right to retain the judgment of the primary judge. They submitted that the appeal was manifestly hopeless and that there was prejudice to them in terms of time, costs, and the burden of litigation. The court considered whether to reinstate the application and, if so, whether to impose conditions such as the payment of indemnity costs. Kiefel J proposed to reinstate the application on the condition that Di Carlo pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis within seven days of the assessment of those costs. The assessment was to be expedited by the Registry.

Salvatore Di Carlo has applied for the reinstatement of his special leave application which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. This appeal followed the dismissal of an application to set aside a judgment obtained by Philip James Dubois and others (the respondents). The primary judge, Chief Justice de Jersey, had set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision. The High Court dismissed the initial special leave application but Mr Di Carlo seeks reinstatement on the basis of a question of principle concerning the test applied by the Court of Appeal. The respondents oppose the application and submit that the application should be dismissed on the basis of the history of delay and the lack of merit in the substantive case. The key issue for determination is whether the application for reinstatement should be allowed and, if so, whether it should be subject to conditions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal's decision in denying the applicant's special leave application was in error and required clarification by the High Court.
2. Whether the application for reinstatement of the special leave application should be considered on its merits.
3. Whether the Court should impose conditions, such as the payment of indemnity costs, for the reinstatement of the special leave application.
4. Whether the Court should order an expedited assessment of costs as a condition for the reinstatement of the special leave application.

Held
1. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal's decision in denying the applicant's special leave application was not in error and did not require clarification by the High Court.
2. The Court decided that the application for reinstatement of the special leave application should be considered on its merits.
3. The Court imposed conditions for the reinstatement of the special leave application, including the payment of indemnity costs by the applicant.
4. The Court ordered an expedited assessment of costs as a condition for the reinstatement of the special leave application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary issue in this case was whether the Court of Appeal's decision in denying the applicant's special leave application was in error and required clarification by the High Court. The Court was also required to consider whether the application for reinstatement of the special leave application should be considered on its merits, and whether conditions, such as the payment of indemnity costs, should be imposed for the reinstatement of the special leave application. Furthermore, the Court had to determine whether an expedited assessment of costs should be ordered as a condition for the reinstatement of the special leave application.

In determining whether the Court of Appeal's decision was in error, the Court considered the legal principles and authorities it relied on. The Court noted that in an application for summary dismissal of a claim, the court must consider whether the case is hopeless or manifestly groundless. However, this assessment must be done on the basis that the allegations and the pleadings can be made out. The Court of Appeal had applied a stricter test than required, by considering the evidence which might prove those allegations. This error required clarification by the High Court.

In considering whether the application for reinstatement of the special leave application should be considered on its merits, the Court noted that it was unusual for a single judge to refuse reinstatement on the basis of merit. However, the Court of Appeal had refused to extend time for appeal, which put at risk the respondents' vested right in the judgment. As such, the Court considered the merits of the case.

In determining whether conditions should be imposed for the reinstatement of the special leave application, the Court noted that the respondents had suffered significant prejudice due to the applicant's delay and the ongoing litigation. The Court also noted that the applicant had a history of delays and had not provided the necessary material on time. As such, the Court imposed conditions for the reinstatement of the special leave application, including the payment of indemnity costs and an expedited assessment of costs.

Finally, the Court ordered an expedited assessment of costs as a condition for the reinstatement of the special leave application. The Court noted that this was necessary to prevent the respondents from being prejudiced further and to ensure that the application was dealt with efficiently.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal's decision in denying the applicant's special leave application was in error and required clarification by the High Court. The Court also considered the application for reinstatement of the special leave application on its merits and imposed conditions, such as the payment of indemnity costs and an expedited assessment of costs, for the reinstatement of the special leave application. The Court departed from prior authority in considering the merits of the case and imposing conditions for the reinstatement of the special leave application.