Di Benedetto v Chelliah

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[2019] TASSC 33

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:                 Di Benedetto v Chelliah [2019] TASSC 33

PARTIES:  DI BENEDETTO, Anthony
  DI BENEDETTO, Dino
  L'AQUILA OF AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
  v
  CHELLIAH, Satchithananthan

FILE NO:  FCA 991/2019
DELIVERED ON:  16 August 2019
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  30 July, 8 August 2019
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow CJ

CATCHWORDS:

Appeal and New Trial – Appeal – Practice and procedure – Tasmania – Time for appeal – Extension of time – No realistic prospect of success.

Aust Dig Appeal and New Trial [387]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Second Appellant:  In person
             Other Appellants:  No appearances
             Respondent:  T Barrett
Solicitors:
             Respondent:  Tierney Law

Judgment Number:  [2019] TASSC 33
Number of paragraphs:  27

Serial No 33/2019

File No CCA 991/2019

ANTHONY DI BENEDETTO, DINO DI BENEDETTO,
L'AQUILA OF AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
v SATCHITHANANTHAN CHELLIAH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  BLOW CJ

16 August 2019

  1. On 8 August 2019 I dismissed an application for an extension of time for the institution of a Full Court appeal.  I also ordered one of the appellants, Dino Di Benedetto, to pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to that application, on an indemnity basis.  These are my reasons for making those orders.

  2. The proceedings arose out of a dispute about a property in Goulburn Street, West Hobart.  On the basis of unchallenged affidavit evidence in the proceedings at first instance, the history of the relevant transactions and dealings can be summarised as follows:

    ·     In the beginning, the registered proprietor of the property was the appellant Dino Di Benedetto. 

    ·     By a transfer dated 19 April 2002, he transferred that property to the respondent, Satchithananthan Chelliah.

    ·     By a mortgage bearing the same date, the respondent mortgaged the property to Dalvey Pty Ltd.  At that time the sole director of that company was a man named Alan David Gray, also known as Alan David Forsyth.  He was then acting as Dino Di Benedetto's accountant.

    ·     In March 2003 the respondent took steps to refinance the property.  He executed a new mortgage in favour of Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited. A discharge of the earlier mortgage was executed under the common seal of Dalvey Pty Ltd. There was a settlement at which a representative of the ANZ Bank handed over a cheque to a representative of Dalvey, and that person handed that company's discharge of mortgage to the bank's representative.

    ·     Before the discharge of mortgage was registered, a transfer of the same mortgage was purportedly executed under the common seal of Dalvey. The transferees were the appellants Anthony Di Benedetto and Dino Di Benedetto. Anthony is the son of Dino. That transfer of mortgage was registered on 26 March 2003. 

    ·     On 28 March 2003, the ANZ Bank lodged for registration the discharge of the Dalvey mortgage and its mortgage from the respondent.  Because of the registration of the transfer of mortgage, it was unable to register the discharge of the Dalvey mortgage,…

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Details
Case
[2019] TASSC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Di Benedetto v Chelliah involved an appeal against a decision of Estcourt J in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The appeal was brought by Dino Di Benedetto, who sought to challenge the decision of Estcourt J to decline to set aside his orders and to order a new hearing in the proceeding. Estcourt J had previously declared that the transfer of mortgage in question was attended by fraud, but did not specify who was responsible for the fraud. Di Benedetto argued that a new hearing was necessary to determine the identity of the fraudulent party. However, Estcourt J declined to order a new hearing, finding that it would be futile as the mortgage debt had been paid in full by the ANZ Bank and Dalvey had given the bank an executed discharge of its mortgage.

The legal issues before the court were whether the appeal was within time and whether an extension of time should be granted to allow the appeal to proceed. The court considered the relevant rules of the Supreme Court, which provided that the time limit for the institution of an appeal from the refusal of an application is 10 days from the date of the refusal. The notice of appeal was filed 54 days after the relevant refusal, which was outside the prescribed time limit. The court also considered the merits of the appeal, including the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. The court found that there was no realistic prospect of success for the appeal and that an extension of time would not be in the interests of justice.

In the end, the court dismissed the appeal and refused to grant an extension of time. The court held that the appeal was not within time and that there was no merit in the appeal. The court also found that an extension of time would not be appropriate as the appeal had no realistic prospect of success. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the time limits for the institution of appeals and the need to ensure that appeals are not pursued where there is no prospect of success. The court's decision in this case highlights the importance of strict compliance with the rules of court and the need for parties to carefully consider the merits of their appeals before proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

That interlocutory application indicated that rr 563 and 570 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000 were relied upon. Those rules read as follows:"563 Setting aside judgment(1) The Court or a judge may set aside a verdict, judgment or order if a party did not appear when the proceeding was called on for trial on application by that party.(2) A verdict, judgment or order may be set aside on any appropriate terms.(3) An application for an order must be made within 6 days after the proceeding is called on for trial.... The interlocutory application was heard by Estcourt J on 1 March 2019. Dino Di Benedetto represented himself. The other appellants were neither present nor represented. Mr Di Benedetto relied upon an affidavit sworn by him on 28 February 2019. That affidavit contained assertions to the following effect:· Mr Forsyth, as his then accountant, prepared the documents for the sale of the property to Mr Chelliah.· He instructed Mr Forsyth to prepare a mortgage from Mr Chelliah to L'Aquila. · He would not have agreed to the property being mortgaged to Dalvey.· At Mr Forsyth's instigation, he reluctantly signed a power of attorney in favour of him on 26 April 2002.· After returning from a trip to Italy in October 2002, he concluded that Mr Forsyth was trying to defraud him. · He went to the Land Titles Office on 28 February 2003. On that day he learned of the mortgage to Dalvey. · On 25 March 2003 he and his son went to see Mr Forsyth, who signed the transfer of mortgage and affixed the company seal of Dalvey. Estcourt J decided not to set aside any of his orders and not to order a new hearing. He varied the first of his orders of 4 February 2019 to read, "It is declared that the transfer of mortgage number C448121 was attended by fraud." In substance, that change removed all suggestion as to who had acted fraudulently. His Honour explained in the course of the hearing of the interlocutory application that he did not consider that the Di Benedettos could succeed at a new hearing because there was uncontradicted evidence that the mortgage debt owed to Dalvey had been paid in full by the ANZ Bank and that Dalvey had given the bank an executed discharge of its mortgage. That is to say, he did not order a new hearing because a new hearing would have been futile. On 24 April 2019 Dino Di Benedetto filed a notice of appeal in respect of that second decision of Estcourt J – the decision of 1 March 2019 when he declined to order a new hearing. There has been no appeal in respect of the decision of 4 February 2019. Under r 659 of the Supreme Court Rules, the time limit for the institution of an appeal from the refusal of an application is 10 days from the date of the refusal. The notice of appeal was filed 54 days after the relevant refusal. When Mr Di Benedetto filed the notice of appeal, he also filed the application that came before me, seeking an extension of time for the institution of the appeal. The application for the extension of time came before me on 30 July 2019. Dino Di Benedetto represented himself. The other appellants were neither present nor represented. Mr Di Benedetto told me that his new counsel was Mr Slipper, but that Mr Slipper was away. After some discussion as to the issues raised by the application, I adjourned it to 8 August 2019 at 10am. On that occasion all of the appellants were absent and unrepresented. Counsel for the respondent relied upon two affidavits sworn by another practitioner from his firm, Mr Buckley, which contained material as to the history of the litigation. I indicated that I would be taking into account the affidavit material that was before Estcourt J on 4 February 2019 in assessing the merits of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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