Dharun & Dharun
[2022] FedCFamC2F 1105
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Dharun & Dharun [2022] FedCFamC2F 1105
File number(s): MLC 8273 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE GLASS Date of judgment: 30 August 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – where it is just and equitable to alter parties’ property interests – where ownership and value of real property in India is be determined – whether a global or asset-by-asset approach is to be used – where majority of parties’ wealth is in Indian properties – where each party has made a myriad of contributions – significance of original contributions – impact of foreign proceedings Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79(2), 79(4)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law Rules) 2021 Part 7.1
Cases cited: Aleksovski & Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705
Benson & Drury (2020) FLC 93-998
Candle & Falkner (2021) FLC 94-609
Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595 at 81,911
Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244
Duarte & Another & Morse (2019) FLC 93-902
Fields & Smith (2015) FLC 93-638
Jabour & Jabour (2019) FLC 93-898
Lee Steere & Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626
Norbis & Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Palumbo & Mandel (2019) FLC 93-929
Roverati & Roverati (2021) FLC 94-027
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Wallis & Manning (2017) FLC 93-759
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 51 Date of last submission: 25 August 2022 Date of hearing: 18-19 July 2022 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Pearson Solicitor for the Applicant: Peter Lynch Lawyer Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Howe Solicitor for the Respondent: RRR Lawyers ORDERS
MLC 8273 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MR DHARUN
Applicant
AND: MS DHARUN
Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE GLASS
DATE OF ORDER:
30 August 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.That the balance of the monies held on trust for the parties of $42,613 be forthwith paid to the Wife.
2.That within 60 days of these orders (“the date”) the Husband pay to the Wife the sum of $72,144 (“the payment”).
3.That if the payment is not made by the date, the Husband cause the Husband’s interest in the agricultural property at B Road, Village C, District D, City E and/or the Indian residential property be forthwith thereafter sold altogether out of Court and the proceeds be distributed:
(a)Firstly, to pay costs of sale;
(b)Secondly, to pay to the Wife such part of the payment as remains unpaid;
(c)Thirdly, to pay to the Husband the remainder.
4.That the Trustee of the Husband’s Superannuation fund namely Super Fund F (“the Fund”) Member No. …04 is directed to split that policy pursuant to s.90XT of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) as herein set out.
5.That pursuant to Section 90XT(4) of the Act, the amount of $30,000 be allocated as the base amount to the Wife out of the Husband’s interest in the Fund.
6.That pursuant to Section 90XT(1)(a) of the Act, when the Trustee of the Fund makes a splittable payment out of the Husband’s interest in the Fund, the Trustee shall:
(a)pay to the Wife the entitlement calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 using the base amount specified in Order 5 above; and
(b)make a corresponding reduction in the entitlement that the Husband would otherwise have had in the Fund but for these Orders.
7.That the operative time for Order 4 is four (4) business days after the Trustee of the Fund has been served with a certified copy of the sealed Orders.
8.That the Trustee do all such acts and things and sign all necessary documents to fulfil any obligation set out in the Family Law Act 1975 and the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 so that the Wife’s entitlement can be calculated and paid to her in accordance with these Orders.
9.Until the payment of the interest of the Wife pursuant to these Orders, the Husband be and hereby is restrained from doing any act or thing or giving any direction which would have the effect of reducing or prejudicing the entitlements of the Wife.
10.That unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purpose of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:
(a)Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses in action) owned by or in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders.
(b)Each party forego any further claims they may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other.
(c)Insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named therein.
(d)Any monies or liabilities held in any bank or credit accounts remain the sole property of the owner named in whose name the accounts are held.
(e)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.
(f)Each party remain responsible for any debts in that party’s name.
(g)Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.
11.All extant applications be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Dharun & Dharun has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GLASS
Mr Dharun and Ms Dharun married in India in 2008, moved to Australia in 2008 and separated in February 2020. They were divorced in October 2021.
They have two children, X, born in 2009 and Y, born in 2013. Pursuant to final consent orders made on 18 July 2022, the children live with Ms Dharun and spend time with Mr Dharun in accordance with their wishes. It is common ground that they do not currently wish to spend time with their father, although it is agreed that the parties will engage in family therapy.
Remaining for determination are the parties’ respective claims for alteration of their property interests pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Mr Dharun proposes that the proceeds of sale of the parties’ former matrimonial home of $42,613 be distributed in the proportions of 55% to him and 45% to Ms Dharun. He otherwise proposes that each party retain their other interests in property. He relies on his affidavits filed 4 March 2022 and 24 June 2022, his Amended Financial Statement filed 18 March 2022 and the Affidavit of his new wife filed 4 March 2022.
Ms Dharun proposes that she retain assets worth 70% of the parties’ interests in property, which she contends to be valued at $296,120. She relies on her Affidavits filed 23 June 2022 and 13 July 2022 and her Financial Statement filed 22 June 2022.
Despite deficiencies in the material relied on by the parties, neither objected to any of the written evidence before the Court.
statutory framework
Pursuant to section 79 of the Act, I have a discretion to make such order altering the parties’ interests in property as I consider appropriate. I am prohibited from making an order unless I am satisfied it is just and equitable to do so.[1] If I am so satisfied, I am required to consider the matters prescribed by subsection 79(4) of the Act and by virtue of paragraph 79(4)(e), such matters as are relevant pursuant to subsection 75(2) of the Act.
[1] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(2).
property interests
It is necessary to begin by identifying, according to common law and equitable principles, the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property.[2] By the conclusion of the hearing, the parties largely agreed on the identity and value of their property interests. The only dispute remaining to be determined relates to the ownership and value of real property in India.
[2] Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 (“Stanford”) at [37].
Ms Dharun deposes to Mr Dharun having an interest in two properties in India. In his written evidence, Mr Dharun denies that he has any valuable property in India. His Amended Financial Statement makes no mention of any Indian property despite him deposing to the document setting out all of his property interests. Inconsistently, Mr Dharun gave oral evidence that he and other members of his family own a residential property in India. He subsequently gave oral evidence that he and his brother are the legal owners of that residential property.
It is Ms Dharun’s evidence that Mr Dharun and his brother are the owners of the residential property in India. That evidence was not successful impugned in cross-examination. A valuation obtained by her lists Mr Dharun as an owner of the property which is identified to be at G Road, Village H, District J, City E.
Mr Dharun gave oral evidence that because the property is his “ancestral property”, he “can’t claim”, like Ms Dharun “can’t claim”. He referred to there being a different rule in India. The basis for that assertion was not articulated by him. It is not evidence that satisfies me that Mr Dharun is anything other than the half owner of the residential property. It does not support Mr Dharun’s ultimate submission that he is prevented from being able to sell the property because it is his ancestral property.
I accept Ms Dharun’s evidence, given it is consistent with at least part of Mr Dharun’s oral evidence and find that Mr Dharun is the owner of a 50% interest in that residential property in India.
Ms Dharun annexed valuations undertaken in relation to both Indian properties to her affidavit. It was put to her in cross-examination that she hadn’t asked the valuer to swear an affidavit annexing the report. She gave evidence that she didn’t do so because nobody guided her, noting that she has essentially been self-represented in these proceedings. Mr Dharun submitted that reduced weight should be placed on the valuations given they were not in the form of single expert witness reports as is contemplated by Part 7.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law Rules) 2021. The difficulty with the submission is that the annexed valuation reports are the only evidence of value before the Court other than an unqualified assertion by Mr Dharun in oral evidence. Further, no objection was taken to the evidence being adduced by Ms Dharun, nor does it appear any application was made to obtain a single expert report.
The valuation adduced by Ms Dharun values the residential property at 43.5 Lakhs. Mr Dharun’s half interest is accordingly valued at 21.75 Lakhs. Mr Dharun gave evidence that he considered the value of his interest in the property to be between 100,000 and 200,000 rupees, being between one and two Lakhs. He gave evidence that the basis for his estimate was what he feels in his mind. It is not suggested he is qualified to give an opinion as to the value of property. Absent any objection or successful challenge to the valuation evidence relating to the residential property adduced by Ms Dharun, I find the value of Mr Dharun’s interest in it to be 21.75 Lakhs.
It is common ground that Mr Dharun previously had an interest in agricultural land in India. Ms Dharun asserts that he remains its owner. Mr Dharun denies that he now owns the property. Regrettably, no Certificate of Title or equivalent document has been produced. Mr Dharun attempted to sell the property to his sister-in-law after the parties’ separation. Ms Dharun gives evidence that an Indian Court has issued an injunction preventing the transfer in proceedings brought by her to protect her property rights. Her oral evidence was consistent with her affidavit, namely that the transfer of the property has not been completed as a result of the proceedings she has brought to restrain the transfer in India.
Mr Dharun’s evidence in relation to the transfer to his sister in law generally lacked consistency. He claimed that an agreement was reached for his family to buy or keep or sell the agricultural land to recover money received from his parents to settle here. The document he claimed recorded that agreement is inconsistent with his evidence. It is a statement signed by him on 7 November 2016 addressed “To Whom it May Concern”. Whilst it states funds were previously advanced to him by his family, it goes on to state “I have requested to you that if we require further financial assistance from you, we shall obtain it with the understanding that you may keep, dispose of our property to recover the debt.”[3] Despite being given an opportunity to explain that inconsistency, Mr Dharun was unable to do so. He maintained that the agreement had a meaning other than what is expressed in the document.
[3] Exhibit R1 (emphasis added).
Other aspects of Mr Dharun’s oral evidence in relation to the transfer also lacked internal consistency. He initially gave evidence that the property is being transferred to another name before giving evidence that it had already been transferred. He also agreed that there is an injunction preventing the transfer of the property before giving evidence that the property has been transferred contrary to the injunction. In attempting to clarify the evidence, the Court enquired of Mr Dharun what he understood the injunction to mean. His response was that Ms Dharun was without basis to challenge the transfer because the lands were his “ancestral property”. He then gave evidence that there is no injunction in India.
By contrast, Ms Dharun’s evidence in relation to the transfer was consistent and unimpeached. She gave evidence that the transfer had not been completed as a result of proceedings brought by her in India. I prefer her evidence and find on the balance of probabilities that the agricultural property remains owned by Mr Dharun. Any suggestion that Mr Dharun is unable to deal with the agricultural property because it is his “ancestral property” is readily refuted by observing that it was sold by him to his sister-in-law.
It is noteworthy that Mr Dharun gave evidence that he transferred the property out of his name because he thought Ms Dharun would make a claim against it. He also gave evidence that he entered into an earlier power of attorney to protect his property from any claim made by Ms Dharun.
Ms Dharun adduces evidence of a valuation of the agricultural land in December 2020 of 87.0625 Lakhs. Mr Dharun suggested there were arithmetical errors in the valuation. I do not accept the submission. The valuer opined the value of the land to be 20 Lakhs per acre. The land comprises more than 4 Acres and it is opined to be worth more than 80 Lakhs.
Mr Dharun gave no evidence in relation to the value of the agricultural land. He was asked what he thought it was worth and responded that it was “part of 4 acres something”. I accept the evidence adduced by Ms Dharun in relation to its value.
Accordingly, I find Mr Dharun to have interests in two real properties in India worth 108.8125 Lakhs. Ms Dharun’s contention that that sum converts to approximately $205,000 was not challenged and I accept it.
I accordingly find the parties’ interests in property to comprise the following:
Asset O'ship Value Proceeds of sale of K Street, Town L Joint $42,613 Indian agricultural property H $165,000 Indian residential property H $40,000 ANZ bank account H $153 Bank M account H $97 Mastercard H ($500) Commonwealth Bank Account W $9 Motor Vehicle 1 W $12,500 Super Fund F H $30,648 Super Fund N W $5,600 Total $296,120 is it just and equitable to make an order?
It is common ground the parties have a joint interest in the proceeds of sale in the former matrimonial home. That joint interest should be severed by way of an order under Part VIII of the Act.[4] In circumstances where both parties join in seeking an alteration of their interests in property and there will no longer be the common use of property by the parties,[5] I consider it just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
[4] Duarte & Another & Morse (2019) FLC 93-902 at [486].
[5] Stanford at [42].
contributions
I am required to take into account the parties’ financial and non-financial, direct and indirect, contributions to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of property.[6] I am also required to take into account the parties’ contributions to the welfare of the family.[7]
[6] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 79(4)(a-b).
[7] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 79(4)(c).
Both parties presented their asset and liability schedules on the basis of a global approach which did not distinguish between non-superannuation and superannuation assets. Ms Dharun opened her case by contending that a “one-pool” approach is appropriate given the practicalities of her application which seeks more than the value of the parties’ Australian assets. Mr Dharun, in effect, contended for an outcome that considered only one asset of the parties, namely the proceeds of sale of their former matrimonial home, to the exclusion of all others. I decline to exclude any of the parties’ property for consideration as appears to be proposed by Mr Dharun.
While both a global and asset-by-asset approach are open,[8] I consider the global approach proposed by Ms Dharun to be preferable in circumstances where a majority of the parties’ wealth is located overseas.
[8] Norbis & Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513.
At the commencement of the relationship, Mr Dharun owned his interest in both Indian properties. There is no evidence of any contribution having been made by either party during the relationship to their acquisition, conservation or improvement.
Mr Dharun gives unchallenged evidence that his family provided Ms Dharun’s family with 22ct of gold jewellery at the time of their marriage now worth approximately $7,500. Ms Dharun gives unchallenged evidence that her family provided a dowry of 22ct of gold jewellery and furniture worth a total of about $15,000 at the time of the wedding.
In 2018, the parties purchased the K Street, Town L property which was then vacant land and constructed a home on the land which was completed on or around April 2019. Mr Dharun gives evidence that he “managed to secure funding for a deposit and loan”[9] for the property. The nature and source of that funding is not particularised. I infer, as Ms Dharun’s evidence suggested, that the parties contributed to the purchase from their joint savings.
[9] Applicant’s Affidavit filed 4 March 2022, paragraph 54.
Mr Dharun deposes to having received money from his family during the parties’ relationship. He gives evidence of having “borrowed large sums of money from my brother to assist the responding [sic] and I to relocate to Australia, to settle and for ongoing living expenses. My brother also financially assisted us throughout our time in Australia across multiple relocations, interstate and within Melbourne and through the respondent’s hip joint treatment and surgery.” [10] Ms Dharun denied that any such funds had been received. In light of other inconsistencies in Mr Dharun’s evidence, I prefer Ms Dharun’s evidence. In any event, I would be unable to give any weight to the evidence of funds purportedly advanced absent any meaningful quantification of them.
[10] Applicant’s Affidavit filed 4 March 2022, paragraph 61.
It is common ground that Mr Dharun was the primary income earner during the parties’ relationship while Ms Dharun was the primary homemaker and parent. I reject Mr Dharun’s submission that those activities should sound in a greater assessment of his contributions because he was the predominant financial contributor, even if it is conceded by Ms Dharun that he was largely responsible for the mortgage repayments on the former matrimonial home.
In 2021, Ms Dharun withdrew $8,000 from her superannuation. Mr Dharun did not contend that sum should be added back to the assets now in existence. Ms Dharun’s unchallenged evidence is that she applied those funds to repayment of a credit card debt accrued during the parties’ relationship which in turn had funded the purchase of her motor vehicle. Accordingly, the parties’ net asset position is unchanged as a result of the withdrawal and I do not consider the withdrawal to result in any assessment favouring either party.
Mr Dharun gives evidence that “since we separated, I have paid the mortgage.”[11] Inconsistently, he also deposes that “Since I vacated the matrimonial home on 25 February 2020, no mortgage had been paid on the property which caused a backlog.”[12] Ms Dharun gave evidence that no mortgage repayments were made after separation. I prefer her evidence given the inconsistencies in Mr Dharun’s evidence. Mr Dharun gives no evidence of the arrears that were accrued during that period and I am not satisfied the accrual of arrears favours either party in the assessment of contributions.
[11] Applicant’s Affidavit filed 4 March 2022, paragraph 56.
[12] Applicant’s Affidavit filed 4 March 2022, paragraph 57.
Ms Dharun has remained primarily responsible for the children’s care in the period post separation.
In assessing the parties’ contributions, it must be observed that Mr Dharun’s interest in the Indian properties represents a majority of the parties’ present wealth. I am required to take into account and afford appropriate weight to the introduction of those assets and any use made of the contributions.[13] The parties have been resident in Australia since the year of their marriage and there is no evidence they have made any relevant use of the Indian properties.
[13] Roverati & Roverati (2021) FLC 94-027 at [42]; Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 at [14].
Nevertheless, all contributions must be weighed collectively, and it is an error to segment or compartmentalise various contributions and weigh one against the remainder.[14] It is wrong to weigh the myriad of contributions made by the parties against Mr Dharun’s contribution of the Indian properties.[15] Further, I am to consider the parties’ contributions all of relevant types holistically over the whole period from the commencement of cohabitation to trial.[16] Each party has made a substantial myriad of contributions[17] over the course of their nearly 12 year marriage, in particular through employment, parenting and homemaking.
[14] Benson & Drury (2020) FLC 93-998 at [35] and the cases there cited.
[15] Jabour & Jabour (2019) FLC 93-898 at [86]
[16] Fields &Smith (2015) FLC 93-638 per Bryant CJ and Ainslie-Wallace J at [168].
[17] Palumbo & Mandel (2019) FLC 93-929 at [99].
The length of the relationship impacts on how early significant capital contributions are viewed in assessing the totality of the parties’ contributions.[18] Over the course of a long relationship, the proportionality or significance of Mr Dharun’s original contribution is reduced.[19]
[18] Wallis & Manning (2017) FLC 93-759 at [116].
[19] Lee Steere & Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626 at 80,078; quoted in Wallis & Manning at [116]; Aleksovski & Aleksovski (1996) FLC 92-705 per Rowlands & Baker JJ at 83,437.
I determine that a holistic assessment of the myriad of contributions made by each of the parties results in assessment of contributions of 60% in favour of Mr Dharun and 40% in favour of Ms Dharun. The effect of that conclusion is that Mr Dharun is determined to have contributed assets worth approximately $177,700 and Ms Dharun is determined to have contributed assets worth approximately $118,400, being a differential of approximately $59,300.
paragraph 79(4)(d, e, f and g) and subsection 75(2) factors
Mr Dharun works part time as a transport worker earning $600 per week, or $31,200 per annum. He was asked in cross-examination why he doesn’t get a full time job, to which he answered: “there’s not enough work due to COVID, so I have to leave that job, I’m doing part time now”. He gave evidence that he couldn’t get a full time job even if he wanted to. Nevertheless, he gave no evidence of attempts he has made to obtain full time employment. Mr Dharun’s conclusory evidence does not satisfy me that there is any impediment to him obtaining more lucrative full time employment.
Mr Dharun is now married to and living with Ms O. They are expecting a child in this year. Despite their evidence that they are living together, Mr Dharun did not include her name, age, or relationship to him in his Amended Financial Statement where asked to do so. He does depose to the other income earners in his house hold receiving nil income. Although that is inconsistent with his wife’s evidence that she is working in child care, neither Mr Dharun nor his wife were cross-examined on the topic. I am accordingly unable to reach any conclusions as to the financial circumstances of Mr Dharun’s cohabitation with his wife.
Ms Dharun works as a casual carer and earns $550 per week or $28,600 per annum. She is otherwise in receipt of government benefits of $705 per week and child support. Her evidence that she is unable to work full-time given that she has responsibility for the parties’ two children was not challenged.
Ms Dharun is engaged to a new partner. Whilst she gave evidence of her new partner earning more than her, the evidence did not establish she is cohabiting with her fiancé. It is specifically the financial circumstances of any cohabitation that are relevant pursuant to paragraph 75(2)(m) of the Act.
Both parties are 44 years of age. There is no suggestion either suffer from poor health.
Mr Dharun pays child support at the rate of approximately $249 per month.
Mr Dharun contends that I should have regard to proceedings initiated by Ms Dharun in India pursuant to paragraph 75(2)(o) of the Act. Ms Dharun gave evidence that she has brought proceedings to prevent the agricultural land from being transferred from Mr Dharun’s name. She also gave evidence that other proceedings are brought by or on behalf of the parties’ children. The nature of that claim is inadequately articulated, although I accept Mr Dharun’s Counsel’s suggestion that it could be some sort of child maintenance application. To the extent any proceedings involving Mr Dharun, it was open to him to adduce evidence in relation to the relief sought in them, a step he elected not to take. The evidence does not enable me to reach any conclusions as to the possible or likely outcomes of the pending litigation. I am not satisfied either proceedings should result in any adjustment pursuant to paragraph 75(2)(o) of the Act.
In assessing any adjustment pursuant to these factors, my focus is on its real impact or value in money terms.[20] Ms Dharun is primarily responsible for the care of the parties’ children, now aged 13 and 9 years. Whilst her total income is greater than Mr Dharun’s, that is essentially the result of the government benefits to which she is presently entitled. Mr Dharun has a greater earning capacity than he is presently exercising and is paying modest child support. Given the relative modesty of the value of the parties’ assets, I consider that a 15% adjustment in Ms Dharun’s favour is appropriate in the circumstances, altering the contributions assessment by a total of approximately $88,800.
[20] Candle & Falkner (2021) FLC 94-069 at [102]; Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595 at 81,911.
conclusions
I accordingly determine that is just and equitable to distribute the value of the parties’ assets in the proportions of 55% or $162,866 to Ms Dharun and 45% or $133,254 to Mr Dharun.
I accept Ms Dharun’s submission that it is just and equitable that she retain the majority of the parties’ superannuation given the difficulties she is likely to encounter in enforcing any default by Mr Dharun in making a payment to her given the overseas assets.
Ms Dharun seeks to retain the proceeds of sale of the K Street, Town L property, her existing bank account, motor vehicle, her superannuation and to have $30,000 of Mr Dharun’s superannuation transferred to her. She accordingly requires a further sum of $72,144 to be paid to her in order to achieve the determined outcome.
Ms Dharun proposed, by way of default provision, the sale of the Indian property in the event Mr Dharun does not make the ordered payment to her. Mr Dharun made no submissions as to the appropriateness of such a default provision. I consider it to be just and equitable in the circumstances.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Glass. Associate:
Dated: 30 August 2022
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