FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DFN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1474
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: DFN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 956 File number: NSD 876 of 2017 Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J Date of judgment: 21 November 2017 Date of publication of reasons: 7 December 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for leave to appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred – where applicant conceded before the primary judge that the Tribunal did not commit legal error – no appellable error identified – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and (aa)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 35.12(1)
Date of hearing: 21 November 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 16 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Pinder Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 876 of 2017 BETWEEN: DFN16
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)O’CALLAGHAN J:
The applicant seeks an extension of time under r 35.14(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) within which to file an application for leave to appeal against an order of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the FCCA), made on 11 May 2017, dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review. The primary judge dismissed that application under the relevant provision of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), because he held that the application did not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed.
The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia. He arrived in Australia on 8 August 2015, on a tourist visa. On 3 November 2015 the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa, claiming that he had taken out a series of loans from people described as loan sharks in Malaysia to meet expenses associated with his business, his home, his cars and his two families. The applicant claimed that he was unable to repay the loans and was threatened, and, as a result, fled Malaysia, fearing that harm would come to him from the loan sharks. On 27 January 2016 a…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1474
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that DFN16 did not identify any appellable error that would warrant the extension of time. The court emphasised that the applicant's concession that the AAT did not make a legal error meant that there was no basis for finding that the primary judge erred in not holding that the AAT had erred. Furthermore, the court noted that the absence of a legal error precluded any significant procedural irregularity that could justify an appeal. The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and for an extension of time, holding that no grounds for appeal were identified.
The court ordered that the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal be dismissed. Additionally, the applicant was required to pay the first respondent's costs, in accordance with the agreed terms or as assessed. The entry of these orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The court's decision effectively closed the avenue for DFN16 to appeal the primary judge's dismissal of the application for an extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
DFN16 initially sought relief from the Federal Circuit Court regarding their immigration status, which was ultimately dismissed. An application for leave to appeal this decision to the Federal Court was filed outside the statutory time limit. To remedy this, DFN16 applied for an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal. This application was heard by the primary judge who reviewed the circumstances and the concessions made by DFN16. The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time. DFN16 then sought to appeal the primary judge's decision to the Federal Court, but this appeal was also filed beyond the permissible timeframe. Consequently, DFN16 applied to the Federal Court for leave to appeal the dismissal of the application for an extension of time.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred in the original decision.
2. Whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal.
Held
1. The court held that the primary judge did not err in not holding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) erred in the original decision. Since the applicant conceded before the primary judge that the AAT did not commit legal error, no appellable error was identified.
2. The court held that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. The court found no sufficient grounds to grant the extension and thus dismissed the application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by addressing the first issue regarding whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the AAT erred in the original decision. The applicant conceded before the primary judge that the AAT did not commit any legal error, which formed the basis of the original decision. The court found that since no legal error was identified by the applicant, the primary judge was correct in not finding any error in the AAT's decision. The court noted that without identifying an appellable error, there was no basis to overturn the primary judge's decision on this point.
The second issue considered was whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. The court found that the primary judge's dismissal of the application was appropriate. The applicant had not provided sufficient grounds or justification for the extension, and the court saw no reason to overturn the primary judge's decision. The court emphasised that applications for extensions of time must be supported by compelling reasons, which were lacking in this case. Therefore, the court upheld the primary judge's decision to dismiss the application for an extension of time.
In this case, the ratio decidendi is that where an applicant concedes before the primary judge that no legal error was made by the AAT, and where there are no compelling reasons for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, the primary judge's decisions not to find error in the AAT's decision and to dismiss the application for an extension of time are correct. This reinforces the principles that admissions of no error by the applicant and the necessity for strong justification for time extensions are crucial in such proceedings.