Dezfouli v Corrective Services, NSW
[2010] NSWADT 156
•23 June 2010
CITATION: Dezfouli v Corrective Services, NSW [2010] NSWADT 156 DIVISION: General Division PARTIES: APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
Saeed Dezfouli
Corrective Services, NSWFILE NUMBER: 083008 and 073242 HEARING DATES: 5 February 2010 SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 5 February 2010
DATE OF DECISION:
23 June 2010BEFORE: Molony P - Judicial Member LEGISLATION CITED: Freedom of Information Act 1989
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2002CASES CITED: Alexander v University of Sydney [2008] NSWADT 214
Colakovski v Australia TelecommunicationsDezfouli v Justice Health [2006] NSWADT 274
Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADT 17
Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADTAP 72
Corporation (1999) 29 FCR 429
News Corporation Ltd v NCSC (1984) 52 ALR 277
Pope and Queensland Health [1994] QICmr 16
Re Coulthart and Princess Alexandra Hospital and Health Service District (2001) 6 QAR 94
Schlebaum (No 2) v Department of Community Services and Gliksman [2001] NSWADT 214
Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85REPRESENTATION: APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
In person
G Singer, solicitorORDERS: In respect of both applications, on file numbers 073242 and 083008, the determinations made on internal review by the Agency are set aside, and remitted to the Agency for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1 This decision relates to two applications Mr Dezfouli has made to review decisions made by Corrective Services, NSW (“the Agency”) under the Freedom of Information Act 1989, on Tribunal file numbers 083008 and 073242.
2 Mr Dezfouli is a forensic patient, having been detained under s 39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990.
3 Both matters were originally listed before Pearson JM who made directions for the provision of evidence and submissions, and decided to determine the applications on the papers. Following her resignation from the Tribunal these matters were allocated to me for decision.
4 I had some difficulty in understanding the materials without having had the benefit of planning meetings to familiarise myself with the issues. As a consequence I asked the Registrar to write to the parties as follows:
- “Judicial Member Molony has asked me to write to you regarding these two FOI reviews, which were originally listed before Judicial Member Pearson. She had decided to determine both reviews on the papers.
As you are aware, following Ms Pearson’s resignation, the matters were transferred to Mr Molony.
In attempting to determine the issues on the papers Mr Molony has encountered a number of difficulties which he has asked me to advise you of.
First, Tribunal file number 073242 appears from the Application for Review to relate to two FOI applications which were the subject of complaints to the Ombudsman (DCS 06/07-140 and DCS 06/07-222). However, the Respondent’s submissions filed 13 November 2007 address DCS 06/07-140, DCS 06/07-222 and DCS 06/07-287. Mr Molony asks, how DCS 06/07-287 falls within the scope of the application for review?
Secondly, Mr Molony notes that there is no order that file numbers 073242 and 083008 be determined together, or that evidence in one review be evidence in the other. He notes that (in some instances only) the Respondent has filed submissions addressing both applications. There is also affidavit material from the Respondent apparently filed in and applicable to both proceedings, and other affidavit material from the Respondent apparently intended to apply to only one proceeding. He requires clarification of whether the matters are to be determined together or separately, and as to the status of the evidence.
Thirdly, Mr Molony notes that on file number 083008 the Respondent has filed four confidential affidavits, with annexures, relating to a sufficiency of search issue. These address the whereabouts of documents that the Respondent has determined under s 28(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 that it does not hold.
It is Mr Molony’s preliminary view that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review that determination: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel v Director-General, Department of Commerce & Ors [2008] NSWCA 140. The parties, however, have not addressed that issue in their submissions.
As a result Mr Molony has directed that the matter be listed for a half day hearing at a date and time to be fixed to determine these issues. He has done so for the following reasons:
- 1. He is aware that Mr Dezfouli has significant difficulty in making written submissions and that an oral hearing will facilitate Mr Dezfouli’s participation.
2. If there is a dispute about any of these matters he considers a hearing (rather than a planning meeting) the appropriate forum for determining them.
5 That hearing took place on 5 February 2010. It was agreed that the applications should be heard together. I clarified that Tribunal file number 073242 relates to three freedom of information determinations by the Agency: 06/07-140, 06/07-222 and 06/07-287. File number 083008 relates to DCS 06/07-287. In the course of that hearing the issues in contention were canvassed with the parties who each made significant concessions, as well as submissions which clarified the issues in dispute.
6 Following that hearing I made the following directions:
- “1) I note that the parties accept that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review a decision under s 28(1)(b) of the FOIA that the agency does not hold documents.
2) On file 073242 I note that Mr Dezfouli presses for access to the documents listed below but does not press for the access to exempted material contained in other documents listed in the schedule of documents:
- a) From 06/07-287 Mr Dezfouli presses document 15.
b) From 06/07-140 Mr Dezfouli presses documents 22, 23, 26, 27, 45, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, and 59.
c) From 06/07-222 Mr Dezfouli presses documents 6, 8, and 9.
4) Decision reserved with respect to those matters remaining in dispute.”
7 These reasons relate to the determination of those outstanding matters.
8 Following the hearing the Agency, by letter dated 11 February 2010, advised in respect to file number 074342, particularly the Agency’s determination on its freedom of information determination numbered 06/07-140, that document number 5 (a correctional officers report) has been provided to Mr Dezfouli with exempt matter (the name and MIN number of an inmate) deleted on the basis of the personal affairs exemption. This had not been apparent on the Tribunal’s copy of the document. As Mr Dezfouli said he was not pressing for disclosure of information of that nature in respect of his applications I have not considered that document.
Application no 073242
9 Eighteen documents remain in issue on this application. Of them, documents 1 and 5 on 06/07-287; documents 22, 23, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, and 59 on 06/07-140; and, document 9 on 06/07-222, are all copies of the Agency’s Inmate Profile for Mr Dezfouli printed on different dates. The exemptions claimed for each document are identical and raise the same for determination.
10 The Inmate Profiles contain personal details relating Mr Dezfouli and sets out information relating to him under the following categories: aliases, warnings, current convictions, current sentence, current outstanding charges, alerts, classification history, care in placements, breaches of discipline, visitors and movements. The alerts section contains comments on actions to be taken on the occurrence of specified events, whether those alerts are active, and when they were put in place.
11 The Agency has provided Mr Dezfouli with copies of his inmate profiles but has deleted from it:
- Alert A - The comments on an active alert put in place on 29 August 2003 which is to take place on placement.
Alert B - The comments and trigger for an active alert put in place on 7 September 2009.
Alert C- The comments on an active police alert put in place on 14 March 2006.
12 The Agency claims exemption of this material under clause 4(1)(c) and (f), and clause 6(1) of Schedule 1. Clause 4 relevantly provides:
- (1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected:
…
(c) to endanger the life or physical safety of any person, or
…
(f) to prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of any lawful method or procedure for protecting public safety, …
(2) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of subclause (1):
(a) if it merely consists of:
(i) a document revealing that the scope of a law enforcement investigation has exceeded the limits imposed by law, or
(ii) a document containing a general outline of the structure of a programme adopted by an agency for dealing with any contravention or possible contravention of the law, or
(iii) a report on the degree of success achieved in any programme adopted by an agency for dealing with any contravention or possible contravention of the law, or
(iv) a report prepared in the course of a routine law enforcement inspection or investigation by an agency whose functions include that of enforcing the law (other than the criminal law), or
(v) a report on a law enforcement investigation that has already been disclosed to the person or body the subject of the investigation, and
(b) if disclosure of the document would, on balance, be in the public interest.
13 Clause 6 provides:
- (1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person (whether living or deceased).
(2) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of this clause merely because it contains information concerning the person by or on whose behalf an application for access to the document is being made.
14 Alert A contains the name and contact details of a person and describes that person’s function. This is personal information relating to the person concerned and prima facie answers the description of persona affairs: see Colakovski v Australia Telecommunications Corporation (1999) 29 FCR 429 at 436, per Lockhart J. I accept that it would be unreasonable to disclose that information. As a result the person’s name, contact details, and function is exempt matter under clause 6(1).
15 The entry also contains a short description of why the alert is in place, which explanation is consistent with both clause 4(1)(c) and (f). It is apparent that the disclosure of the entry would reveal a procedure for protecting public safety. The comment is therefore exempt under clause 4(1)(f).
16 Alert B contains the name and contact details for an organisation and specifies how the alert is to operate. As those details relate to an organisation, rather than an individual person, the personal affairs exemption cannot apply: News Corporation Ltd v NCSC (1984) 52 ALR 277. There is no evidence which demonstrates how the release of the exempted material would endanger the life or physical safety of any person, or prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of any lawful method or procedure for protecting public safety. Section 61 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 provides that the burden of establishing that a determination is justified lies on the agency. The Agency has not satisfied that burden with respect to Alert B.
17 Alert C is one of the subjects of a confidential affidavit filed on 26 March 2008. I considered that affidavit on a confidential basis, in accordance with s 55 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989, as allowing Mr Dezfouli to have access to it would have disclosed the matter claimed to be exempt. Having read that affidavit I am satisfied that the release of the exempt matter in Alert C would prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of a lawful method or procedure for protecting public safety.
18 The next document is document 26 from the Agency’s freedom of information determination numbered 06/07-140. Exemption is claimed for the whole of document 26 on the ground that it is fully exempt under clause 4(3B) of Schedule 1. This provides:
- “A document is an exempt document if it is a document that has been created by the Corrections Intelligence Group of the Department of Corrective Services in the exercise of its functions concerning the collection, analysis or dissemination of intelligence.”
19 From an examination of the document itself, the document appears to satisfy this description. This is verified by the affidavit of Mr Creighton who I am satisfied has the experience and expertise to evaluate the document, and the purposes for which it was created.
20 Document 27 is a psychiatric report. The Agency claims exemptions with respect to all of the document under clause 7(1) (c), clause 4(1)(c) and clause 16(a)(iv) and (b) of Schedule 1. The Agency’s confidential affidavit filed on 23 March 2008 contains evidence in relation to this.
21 Clause 7 relevantly provides:
- (1) A document is an exempt document:
..
(c) if it contains matter the disclosure of which:
(i) would disclose information (other than trade secrets, commercial-in-confidence provisions or information referred to in paragraph (b)) concerning the business, professional, commercial or financial affairs of any agency or any other person, and
(ii) could reasonably be expected to have an unreasonable adverse effect on those affairs or to prejudice the future supply of such information to the Government or to an agency.
(2) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of this clause merely because it contains matter concerning the business, professional, commercial or financial affairs of the agency or other person by or on whose behalf an application for access to the document is being made.
22 Clause 16 relevantly provides:
- A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which:
(a) could reasonably be expected:
…
(iv) to have a substantial adverse effect on the effective performance by an agency of the agency’s functions,
(v) …, and
(b) would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.
23 Having read the report I am satisfied that it contains information that would identify members of Justice Health staff. The exemption of such material has been previously determined by the Tribunal in respect to medical records held by Justice Health: see Dezfouli v Justice Health [2006] NSWADT 274, Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADT 175, and Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADTAP 72. In summary the Tribunal found that such information was exempt under clauses 4(1)(a), (c) and (h) (documents affecting law enforcement and safety), 6 (documents affecting personal affairs) and 16(a)(iv) and (b) (documents concerning operations of agencies). At the hearing Mr Dezfouli did not press for identifying information relating the Justice Health staff to be released. He did, however, press for the release of non-identifying information.
24 Having read the report in issue it is clear that the identity of justice health staff could be identified from it, both because names are mentioned and by reference to some of the events there referred to. In order to ensure that identifying information in relation to Justice Health staff is not released, substantial parts of the reports will have to be deleted.
25 The issue is whether the remaining parts of the report, which do not contain identifying information, are otherwise exempt. The Agency first relies on clause 7(1)(c) and says that the document concerns the business affairs of Justice Health.
26 This exemption requires that the information concern the business, professional, commercial or financial affairs of Justice Health. In the internal review decision, and in its submissions, the Agency did not identify what business, professional, commercial or financial affairs the report concerns. There is no evidence as to how the matter in the report relates to those affairs. I am unable to see how the reports can reasonably said to relate to the business, commercial or financial affairs of Justice Health. While it could be argued that the report relates to the professional affairs of staff of Justice Health, the decided cases point persuasively to the conclusion that matter concerning the work of a professional person, employed by the Government, cannot be characterised as relating to their professional affairs. In Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85 Beaumont J made the point that:
- “As a government employee, the applicant is not conducting any business or carrying on any commercial operation in her own right or on behalf of any other person. Her activities are carried out pursuant to her contract of government employment.”
See also Re Coulthart and Princess Alexandra Hospital and Health Service District (2001) 6 QAR 94; Pope and Queensland Health [1994] QICmr 16 (18 July 1994) [1994] QICmr 16; (1994) 1 QAR 616; Schlebaum (No 2) v Department of Community Services and Gliksman [2001] NSWADT 214 at [13] and [39] to [43]: and Alexander v University of Sydney [2008] NSWADT 214.
27 I am not satisfied that those parts of the report, which do not contain identifying information, concern the business, professional, commercial or financial affairs of any agency or any other person. As a result the claimed exemption under clause 7(1)(c) fails.
28 With respect to the exemption claimed under clause 16, Mr. Dezfouli accepted that the exemption applied, insofar as it contained identifying information with respect to Justice Health staff. He pressed for access to the remainder. While the confidential affidavit does contain evidence supportive of the proposition that the release of identifying information would have a substantial adverse effect on the effective performance by Justice Health of the its functions, there is no such evidence with respect to those parts of the report that do not contain identifying information. As a result the exemption with respect to non-identifying information is not made out.
29 Finally, the Agency claims that release of any part of the report would endanger the life or psychical safety of an identified person; clause 4(1)(c). The confidential affidavit contains hearsay evidence in relation to this. Given the nature of that information and the contents of the report, I consider that the information is reliable and should be given weight. As a result I am satisfied that the exemption under clause 4(1)(c) is made out. The report is not a document to which clause 4(2) applies).
30 The only remaining document to which Tribunal file number 073242 relates is document 47 from the Agency’s freedom of information determination numbered 06/07-140. This is a letter from the Ombudsman’s Office to the Commissioner of Corrective Services, dated 7 September 2008, concerning the interception of Mr Dezfouli’s mail. The Agency has provided Mr Dezfouli with a redacted copy of the letter, with a significant quote on page 2 deleted. That quote is from document 26 which was created by the Corrections Intelligence Group of the Department of Corrective Services. I have already found document 26 to be an exempt document.
31 The Agency claims exemption under clause 4(1)(e). This provides:
- (1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected:
…
(e) to prejudice the effectiveness of any lawful method or procedure for preventing, detecting, investigating or dealing with any contravention or possible contravention of the law (including any revenue law), or
(2) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of subclause (1):
(a) if it merely consists of:
(i) a document revealing that the scope of a law enforcement investigation has exceeded the limits imposed by law, or
… and
(b) if disclosure of the document would, on balance, be in the public interest.
32 Having read the letter carefully it is apparent that it refers to a complaint to the Ombudsman by Mr Dezfouli that his mail was being tampered with. Mr Dezfouli claimed that a directive had been issued that his outgoing mail was to be checked. This included letters he had written to the Ombudsman and the Health Care Complaints Commission.
33 Clause 109 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2002, which was in operation at that time, provided:
- (1) The governor of a correctional centre or a nominated officer may open, inspect and read a letter or parcel sent to or by an inmate and, if it contains prohibited goods, may confiscate the letter or parcel and its contents and deal with them in accordance with the directions of the Commissioner.
(2) The inmate is to be informed of the confiscation of any letter, parcel or prohibited goods.
(3) A nominated officer may direct that any written or pictorial matter contained in a letter or parcel opened, inspected or read under this clause be copied before the letter or parcel containing the matter is delivered to the addressee.
(4) Such a direction may be given only if the nominated officer is of the opinion that the written or pictorial matter to be copied:
(a) contains anything likely to prejudice the good order and security of any correctional centre, or
(b) is threatening, offensive, indecent, obscene or abusive.
(5) This clause does not apply to a letter or parcel addressed to, or received from, an exempt body or exempt person.
34 Exempt bodies and persons were defined in the dictionary to the Regulation as:
- exempt body means:
(a) the Ombudsman, the Judicial Commission, the New South Wales Crime Commission, the Anti-Discrimination Board, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Privacy Commissioner, the Legal Aid Commission, the Legal Services Commissioner, the Legal Services Tribunal or the Inspector-General, or
(b) the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Commonwealth Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission or the National Crime Authority.
exempt person means a Member of Parliament, a legal practitioner or a police officer.
35 Clause 110(1) then provided that letters from inmates to exempt bodies or persons were to be posted as soon as possible, without interference:
- (1) As soon as practicable after receiving from an inmate any letter or parcel addressed to an exempt body or exempt person, an authorised correctional officer must post the letter or parcel to the addressee, without opening, inspecting or reading it.
36 The Ombudsman’s letter outlines the nature of Mr Dezfouli’s complaint and inquiries made by members of the Ombudsman’s staff in relation to that complaint. The letter noted that the Acting Commissioner had advised that letters to exempt bodies or persons “were not being opened by DCS officers.” The inquiries made included the Ombudsman’s officer viewing the administrative file which contained document 26, from which the Ombudsman quoted six paragraphs. It is these six paragraphs which are subject to the claim for exemption under clause 4(1)(e). The letter continued:
- “On 8 August 2006 I contacted Superintendent [G] CIG, who told me he understood the only letters written by Mr Dezfouli being forwarded to CIG were letters to politicians. I told him I understood all Mr Dezfouli's mail was being sent to CIG. Mr [G] asked me to fax him information about what letters were missing, which I did. The list included a letter to the Police Integrity Commission dated 25 June, letter to DCS FOI unit dated 28 June, letter to Justice Health dated 2 July, letter to the Ombudsman dated 26 July and four letters to the Iranian Embassy written sometime in May/June.
On 10 August 2006 I received a phone-call from Ms [R], Deputy Superintendent CIG. Ms Nicholson advised me she had found all of the letters on Officer [D] 's desk. Officer [D] was on leave and Ms [R] told me she would contact him and ask what his instructions were in terms of dealing with these letters.
I did not hear from Ms [R] again but on16 August three letters arrived in this office from Mr Dezfouli dated 11, 22 and 25 June. On 17 August a further 6 letters arrived dated 22 and 26 July and 1,2, 5, and l0 August. It did not appear as though these letters had been opened.
On 17 August I spoke to Officer [D]. I told him we had received a number of letters from Mr Dezfouli. He agreed those letters had been sitting on his desk while he had been on leave. He claimed they would only have been there for three weeks. He also claimed that he did not open any 'exempt' mail. Officer [D] stated he was 'only opening mail addressed to the Prime Minister, NSW ministers and the Police Commissioner'. He did not appear to be aware that all of these people are covered by the 'exempt' definition.
37 The Ombudsman’s letter concluded:
- ‘…it would have been preferable if DCS had simply acknowledged that the Australian Federal Police had asked DCS to monitor Mr Dezfouli's mail. It does appear that letters to our office have not been opened. If letters to other 'exempt' bodies or persons are to be opened it would be preferable to ensure that the department has written permission from those bodies to open correspondence from Mt Dezfouli even though it is 'exempt.'
It seems to me as a result of the delays to Mr Dezfouli's mail, and the misinformation that has been provided, he has some reason to distrust DCS's processes for managing his mail. In order to resolve this matter as far as is possible I suggest DCS demonstrate transparency by providing Mr Dezfouli with a reasonably detailed explanation of how his mail is to be dealt with from now on.
I would also request that you provide instruction to all staff that letters to this office are to be forwarded as quickly as possible to this office. It is obvious that letters from Mr Dezfouli to this office have been severely delayed. Any interference with mail to the Ombudsman is a matter this office takes most seriously.
38 All of the portions of the Ombudsman’s letter that I have quoted above have been released to Mr Dezfouli.
39 In its submissions and evidence the Agency did not address how the matter it claims exemption for, all quotes from document 26, could, if disclosed, be reasonably expected to prejudice the effectiveness of any lawful method or procedure for preventing, detecting, investigating or dealing with any contravention or possible contravention of the law. In my opinion, on the material available to me and given the provisions of clause 110 Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Regulation 2002, the procedure or method in issue was not lawful, insofar as it dealt with the diversion and inspection of letters from Mr Dezfouli to exempt bodies and persons. As a result clause 4(1)(e) does not apply.
40 It is also to be noted that substantial details of the procedure in issue have already been disclosed to Mr Dezfouli by virtue of release of the substance of the Ombudsman’s letter to him.
Application no 083008
41 Documents W4 and W8 are both inmate profiles similar to those discussed at paragraph 9 above. In these documents, exemption is claimed in respect to the equivalent of Alerts B and C. For the same reasons as those outlined above with respect to those alerts I am satisfied that the release of the exempt matter in Alert C would prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of a lawful method or procedure for protecting public safety. With respect to Alert B I am not satisfied that the Agency has made out the exemptions claimed.
42 Document C4 is an internal memorandum dated 22 July 2007 with respect to the hearing of an assault charge against Mr Dezfouli. Eight words have been deleted from it which identify the name and circumstances of another inmate. The Agency has exempted those words relying on the personal affairs exemption. This is personal information relating to the person concerned and prima facie answers the description of personal affairs. I accept that it would be unreasonable to disclose that information.
43 Document C6 is an officer report from dated 5 July 2007 relating to the same assault. The last sentence of paragraph four has been deleted, together with all of paragraph five. The former concerns a decision as to how the issue should be dealt with, while the latter addresses the physical and psychological consequences of the assault on an identified person. Paragraph 6 contains personal information relating to the person concerned and prima facie answers the description of personal affairs. I accept that it would be unreasonable to disclose that information. Paragraph 5, however, does not meet that description. It relates to a decision made by a corrections officer about the course of action to be followed following a breach of discipline. I do not accept that this can be properly viewed as relating to his personal affairs, as opposed to being a decision made in the course of his duty. The personal affairs exemption does not apply to paragraph 5.
44 Document C7 is a “Manager’s Report – Use of Force” relating to the same incident. The description of an injury sustained by an officer has been deleted from it, as have the names of nursing staff who treated the persons concerned. For the reasons already outlined, which Mr Dezfouli has accepted, I am satisfied that deletion of the names of the nursing staff involved were properly exempted under clause 4(1)(c), 7(1)(c), and 16(a)(iv) and (b). With respect to the injuries sustained by the officer, while those injuries were sustained by him in the course of duty, I accept that they are personal to the person concerned and that their disclosure would be unreasonable.
45 Document C9 is an “Assault/Fight” report relating to the same incident. Deleted from it are seven words describing injuries to an officer. For the same reasons as those outlined above I am satisfied that the information they contain is personal to the person concerned and that their disclosure would be unreasonable.
46 Documents C10 is a “Police Action” form. It relates to a decision made by a corrections officer about the courses of action to be followed following a breach of discipline by an inmate. From it two sentences (one of which had been deleted) have been redacted. I do not accept that this can be properly viewed as relating to his personal affairs, as opposed to being a decision made in the course of his duty. The personal affairs exemption does not apply.
47 Document C11 is a “Report to Police of Alleged Fight/Assault” relating to the same incident. From it the date of birth of a corrections officer, details of the injuries sustained by the officer and treatment received, have been redacted. For the same reasons as those outlined above I am satisfied that this information is personal to the person concerned and that its disclosure would be unreasonable.
48 Document C26 is a hand written witness statement relating to that incident written by another, named inmate. The Agency has exempted the whole of this document based on the personal affairs exemption. With the exception of the inmate’s name I do not accept that this document contains information relating to the personal affairs of person other than Mr Dezfouli. It does contain allegations about the conduct of a corrections officer in the course of his duty; the officer is not identified. The statement was obviously written by the inmate with the intention that his identity, and the fact that the he claimed to have witnessed the events in issue, be disclosed. In those circumstances I do not accept that the disclosure of his name would be unreasonable. As a result I do not accept that any part of this document is exempt under clause 6(1).
49 Finally, Document O30 is a memorandum to the Ministerial Liaison Unit from an Assistant Commissioner dated 3 April 2007. From it the name of a Justice Health employee has been redacted in reliance on clause 4(1)(c), 7(1)(c), and 16(a)(iv) and (b). For the reasons already outlined above I accept that this exemption is made out. Also redacted from the note to this document is the name of another inmate. I accept that this is personal information relating to the person concerned and prima facie answers the description of personal affairs. I accept that it would be unreasonable to disclose that information.
50 In respect to both applications on file numbers 073242 and 083008 I will set aside the determination made in internal review by the Agency and remit them to the Agency for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.
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