Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Priestdale Property Holdings Pty Ltd
[2012] FCA 1325
.FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Priestdale Property Holdings Pty Ltd
[2012] FCA 1325
Citation: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Priestdale Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1325 Parties: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v PRIESTDALE PROPERTY HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 150 966 377 File number: QUD 263 of 2012 Judge: DOWSETT J Date of judgment: 8 November 2012 Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 467A, 459R
A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 11-5, 29-10(1) 195-1Cases cited: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 473 cited Date of hearing: 8 November 2012 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 31 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr R Schulte Solicitor for the Plaintiff: ATO Legal Services Branch Counsel for the Defendant: Mr D Marks Solicitor for the Defendant: Conomos Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 263 of 2012
BETWEEN: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
PlaintiffAND: PRIESTDALE PROPERTY HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 150 966 377
Defendant
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 NOVEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Michael Richard Peldan, an official liquidator, be appointed as the provisional liquidator of Priestdale Property Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 150 966 377 (“the Company”) under section 472(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the provisional liquidator).
2.The provisional liquidator will have the power to:
2.1Undertake all of the functions and powers conferred on him by the Corporations Act 2011 (Cth (“the Act”);
2.2To investigate, and if thought appropriate, prosecute Federal Court of Australia, Queensland Registry, proceeding number QUD468/2012 being an appeal under Part IVC Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (“TAA”);
2.3To investigate, and if thought appropriate:
2.3.1Lodge any objection(s) against the declaration already served by the Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”) under Division 165 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth);
2.3.2Take all steps to prosecute any appeal under Part IVC TAA in respect of the objection(s) referred to in subparagraph (i) above;
2.3.3To investigate, and if thought appropriate, lodge any objection(s) against any assessments that have been issued or that may issue by the Commissioner against the Company pursuant to the Taxation Administration Act 1953;
2.4To investigate, and if thought appropriate to defend or otherwise resolve the claim made against the Company by the St George Bank – A Division of the Westpac Banking Corporation ABN 33 007 457 141 in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Brisbane Registry, proceeding number BS3962/2012 (“the Supreme Court proceedings”);
2.5To take possession of, and preserve, the property of the Company, including but not limited to the books and records of the Company.
3.Pursuant to section 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the period within which the application for the Company to be wound up in insolvency is to be determined be extended to 5.00pm on 21 December 2012.
4.The provisional liquidator is to report to the Court on or before 23 November 2012, to the extent that he can at that time, the financial position of the company and as to the merits from the company’s point of view, of the proceedings identified or anticipated in paragraphs 2 (b), (c) and (d) hereto.
5.The matter be adjourned for directions on 23 November 2012.
6.The parties be given liberty to apply on three (3) days written notice.
7.The costs of and incidental to this application be reserved.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 263 of 2012
BETWEEN: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
PlaintiffAND: PRIESTDALE PROPERTY HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 150 966 377
Defendant
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE:
8 NOVEMBER 2012
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There are many unusual aspects to this case. It is, in effect an application for the winding up of Priestdale Property Holdings Pty Ltd. The petitioning creditor is the Commissioner of Taxation who petitions upon the basis of assessed outstanding amounts owing by way of GST. The company disputes its liability pursuant to the assessment and also claims a very substantial amount of money from the Commissioner for input tax credits allegedly due pursuant to the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (the “GST Act”). The Commissioner has already paid a substantial amount to the company by way of input tax credits. The assessment pursuant to which he now seeks to wind up the company depends upon his being entitled to recover the amount so paid. The Commissioner has disallowed certain objections made to his assessment, and the company has appealed to this court against such disallowance. In the meantime the Commissioner has filed his petition and, pursuant to s 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the “Act”), an order must be made by 29 November 2012 unless time is otherwise extended.
As I have said, the case has many curious aspects and is quite complex. The company is also involved in proceedings in the Supreme Court at the suit of St George Bank. The bank claims a very substantial amount as a debt, as moneys had and received or as damages. I shall say something more about those proceedings at a later stage. In general an assessment must be paid, whether or not the taxpayer objects to the assessment or challenges its validity. However the Commissioner has recently adopted a more liberal policy. In the decision of the High Court in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 473 at [13] the Court noted as follows:
Notwithstanding the presumption of insolvency that would apply under section 459C(2)(a) [of the Corporations Act], in written and oral submissions to this Court, the Commissioner made an important concession. This was that upon the hearing of such winding up applications the court might properly have regard to whether the taxpayer had a “reasonably arguable” case in proceedings under Pt IVC of the Administration Act, if those proceedings then still be on foot; questions of the kind canvassed in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) might arise.
The Commissioner makes the same general concession in this case. However he submits that in the circumstances of this case, such concession should not lead to refusal of a winding up order. The company, on the other hand, seeks an adjournment of the hearing of the petition in order to allow for the hearing and determination of its appeal against the Commissioner’s objection decision. At a relatively late stage in proceedings the Commissioner adopted an alternative position, seeking the appointment of a provisional liquidator, presumably for the purpose of getting in, and keeping safe the assets of the company, with power to examine the company’s appeal, to decide whether it should be prosecuted and also to decide whether the proceedings in the Supreme Court should be defended. Counsel for the company asserts that if a provisional liquidator is appointed, it should be upon the basis that its present director, Mr Kavvadas be permitted to supervise the conduct of the appeal and, presumably, the proceedings in the Supreme Court.
The first question is whether the company has a reasonably arguable appeal ground for prosecution in connection with the Commissioner’s notice of assessment. The point appears to arise under s 11-5 of the GST Act which provides that:
You make a creditable acquisition if:
(a)you acquire anything solely or partly for a creditable purpose; and
(b)the supply of the thing to you is a taxable supply; and
(c)you provide, or are liable to provide, consideration for the supply; and
(d)you are registered, or required to be registered.
Only para (c) is relevant for present purposes. It seems that the Commissioner initially considered that the company was entitled to receive a substantial sum of money (in the order of $7 million), as input tax credits. The company claims that a further amount is also due on that basis. I could say something about the circumstances in which such entitlement may or may not have arisen.
The argument appears to turn upon the definition of the term “invoice” in s 195-1, which is a definition section and s 29-10(1), which concerns the attribution of input tax credits. There appears to be a reasonable argument as to the proper construction of those provisions, although how they might apply to the facts of this case is a different question. In the circumstances I proceed upon the basis that there is a reasonable question of construction for determination. Although, in those circumstances, it may generally be appropriate to grant an adjournment in order to allow the appeal to be determined, it would not be appropriate to do so if the company were nonetheless, and without regard to the question of success on appeal, insolvent. A great deal of time has been taken up, today and yesterday, in arguing that question. It arises out of a complex series of transactions which can best be identified by reference to a chronology which appears as part of the Commissioner’s outline of argument. It appears at para 3. I shall annex that paragraph to these reasons.
Priestdale entered into a contract with a company called Amor Property Group Pty Ltd for the acquisition of property at Rochedale. That property was not then owned by Amor but by Eric Woo Pty Ltd. It was subject to a contract of sale by Woo to Amor, entered into on 6 May 2011. Priestdale was registered for the purpose of GST on 18 May 2011. The contract between Priestdale and Amor was entered into on 23 May 2011. On the same day, Priestdale signed a purported consultancy agreement with Amor pursuant to which the sum of $70 million was to become payable to Amor for the provision of consultancy services in connection with the development of the Rochedale land. Subsequently, tax invoices were issued for $77 million, being that amount plus GST. Priestdale then lodged a business activity statement (“BAS”) in which it claimed an entitlement to input tax credits in the amount of $4 million. On 4 July 2011 the tax office paid more than $4 million to Priestdale.. Subsequently, Priestdale lodged its BAS for June 2011, claiming input tax credits of $3 million. On 14 July the Australian Taxation Office (the “ATO”) paid that sum to Priestdale.
On 4 July, Priestdale entered into a loan agreement with its sole director, Mr Kavvadas, for the loan to him of $5 million at 8.5% per annum, capitalized monthly, with a repayment date on or before 4 July 2018. There was no security for the loan. On 15 July, Priestdale purportedly signed a further consultancy agreement contract with Amor, pursuant to which a further sum of $42 million plus GST was to be payable to Amor for additional consultancy services. On 15 July, Amor issued an invoice for $46.2 million.
At this point or shortly thereafter, the Commissioner indicated its intention to reassess Priestdale’s GST liability, including the amounts paid to Priestdale. On 20 July 2011, Priestdale paid to Amor the sum of $1.1 million by way of deposit pursuant to the earlier contract. On 15 November, the Commissioner issued a notice of assessment with penalties, in the amount of $3,500,000. On 16 November, further notices of assessment were issued. On 15 December, Priestdale lodged a notice of objection.
The settlement date on the contract with Amor was 6 January 2012. On that date, Mr Kavvadas asked for an extension but received no response, or so I was told in the course of argument. On 15 January, Mr Woo, on behalf of Eric Woo Pty Ltd, told him that it was no longer selling the land to Amor. On 13 March 2012, Priestdale and Amor entered into a deed of settlement, pursuant to which Amor released Priestdale from its alleged obligation to pay the amounts pursuant to the consultancy agreements, or some part thereof. That settlement appears to have involved the transfer to Amor of land in Nevada in the United States. There is a dispute as to the proper construction of that agreement. The Commissioner submits that on its face, it deals only with obligations arising under the first consultancy agreement. Mr Kavvadas, on behalf of the company, when prompted by Priestdale’s counsel during his cross-examination, indicated that his understanding was that the intention of both parties to the deed of settlement was that it extinguish all liability pursuant to both consultancy agreements. Whilst it is true that the language of the deed of settlement appears to deal only with the first consultancy agreement, it is at least arguable that the intention of the parties was as Mr Kavvadas suggested. It may be that, if necessary, Priestdale could obtain rectification of the contract.
The Commissioner also submits that, in any event the purpose of the agreement appears to have been to extinguish indebtedness for the amount of $110,000. A contrary argument advanced by the company is that the intention was to release the parties from all other obligations, each to the other, except for those obligations created by the deed of settlement. I have formed no final view as to the proper construction of the deed of settlement.
The Commissioner submits that further GST and/or income tax liability may arise out of the deed of settlement. That may be the case, but I cannot sensibly speculate about that matter for present purposes, in the absence of any formal notice of assessment by the Commissioner.
I turn now to the dealings between the St George Bank and the company. On 20 March 2012, Mr Kavvadas, as the sole director of another company, VK Property Group, entered into an agreement with a Mr David Moran, described as a “preferential investor agreement”. Pursuant to that agreement Mr Moran was to lend $8.5 million to VK Property Group for the development of land at Carina Heights. On 29 March 2012, three cheques totalling $8.5 million were drawn by Mr Moran in favour of VK Property Group. On 18 April, the Commissioner served a statutory demand on Priestdale in the amount of $11,282,916.69. On 2 May 2012, St George commenced proceedings against Priestdale, VK Property Group and Mr Kavvadas, claiming the amount of $7,974,151, by way of debt, as moneys had and received or as damages. I shall say a little more about the nature of those proceedings in a moment. In the course of the proceedings in the Supreme Court, orders were made against Mr Kavvadas and Priestdale for disclosure of assets and for freezing orders. A statement of claim was served on 31 May 2010.
The notice of application for winding up was lodged on 1 June 2012. The application has been advertised. On 29 June, the application for winding up was adjourned to 17 August. On 29 June, Priestdale filed a defence in the Supreme Court. On 9 August, Priestdale was notified that the Commissioner intended to proceed with the winding up application. On 17 August 2012 the matter came before a Deputy District Registrar and was referred to a judge. On 4 September, Priestdale filed a notice of appeal in the Federal Court concerning its objection decision. The winding up proceedings was previously mentioned before Greenwood J on 7 September, and subsequently mentioned before Collier J. It then came on before me.
It is now appropriate that I say a little more about the proceedings in the Supreme Court. It seems that following the agreement, Mr Moran handed the cheques to which I have referred, drawn on the account of Local Focus Design and Construction Pty Ltd with the National Bank. It is asserted that the cheques were delivered upon an undertaking that they would not be presented without VK Property Group first giving Mr Moran 30 days’ notice, or perhaps a shorter period of notice, of his intention to do so and without getting the “all clear” from Mr Moran. It is said that at that time the first, second and third defendants knew that the cheques would not be honoured unless such notice was given or that, at least, there was a real or appreciable risk that this would be the case.
Mr Kavvadas subsequently contacted St George and spoke to Mr Hale, a person described as the “Relationship Manager”, saying that he wished to open a new account. Mr Hale met with him on 16 April and provided documents for the opening of an account in the name of VK Property Group. At that time, Mr Kavvadas advised that he had substantial funds which would be coming into his account in the amount of $500,000, followed by amounts of $3 million, $4 million, $2 million and $3 million over the period between April and June 2012. He inquired of Mr Hale as to whether the Bank would allow him to drawn on uncleared cheques. Mr Hale said that drawing against uncleared cheques was not something that the Bank liked to do. He said that depending on the source of the funds and the amount, the Bank would consider any such request. Accounts were then opened in the name of Priestdale. On 18 April, Mr Kavvadas attended a meeting at the St George branch at Broadbeach Waters. On that occasion, Mr Kavvadas advised a bank officer that he was expecting to receive about $500,000 by the end of the week and “a couple of million the following week”. On 19 April, Mr Kavvadas telephoned Mr Hale and advised that he had some money coming into the Priestdale accounts on the following day and asked that such money be released as cleared funds. Mr Hale said that he would authorize the release of money as cleared funds.
It is said that, Mr Hale then believed that the amount to be cleared was only $500,000, and that the defendants knew of such belief. Shortly thereafter, on 19 April, Mr Kavvadas attended at the Queen Street branch of the Bank and sought to deposit $500 in the form of a CBA bank cheque. He asked about accessing the $500 as cleared funds and told another bank officer that he had arranged with Mr Hale to access that amount as cleared funds. The second officer spoke to Mr Hale on the telephone. He authorized the clearance and the funds were made available.
Mr Kavvadas then informed the second officer that he would be returning in the next few days with a deposit of $3 million which he wished to have treated as cleared funds. The officer said that nobody at the Queen Street branch had approval to authorise clearance of that amount, and that if any such amount was required as cleared funds, Mr Kavvadas would have to make specific arrangements with his Relationship Manager. He also said that the branch would need the authority of the Relationship Manager before it could give access to any such sum. In the alternative, it is alleged that on 19 April, and subsequent to those events, Mr Kavvadas contacted Mr Hale by telephone and sought authorization of the provision of cleared funds in respect of a deposit of approximately $3 million by cheque which he intended to deposit in Priestdale’s account on 20 April.
It is said that pursuant to that conversation, and without the authority of the Bank, Mr Hale caused an email to be sent to the Queen Street branch authorizing the sum of $3 million being treated as cleared funds. On the morning of 20 April 2012, Mr Kavvadas presented one of the Local Focus cheques in the amount of $3.2 million, signed by Mr Moran and drawn in favour of the VK Property Trust. At about 9.50 on the same day, he deposited a cheque in the amount of $3.2 million, drawn by VK Property Group in favour of Priestdale, into the Priestdale account. At the time of presenting the Priestdale cheque, Mr Kavvadas asked the bank clerk that the deposit be treated as cleared funds, advising that there was an email from his relationship manager to that effect.
As a result, Mr Kavvadas was given access to that amount as cleared funds without any actual authority from the Bank. This is said to have been the result of a mistaken belief by the bank clerk and another employee that there was appropriate authorisation. Later on that day, at about 9.54 am, Mr Kavvadas transferred $3.2 million to an account with Suncorp by withdrawing $3.2 million plus transfer fees from the Priestdale account. On the morning of 20 April 2012, Mr Kavvadas banked the Focus cheque in the sum of $2.7 million and the cheque in the sum of $2.6 million to a VK Property Group account with the Bank of Queensland. On 20 April, at about 10.18 am, Mr Kavvadas made a second deposit of $5.3 million into the Priestdale Property St George cheque account.
The drawer of both cheques was VK Property Group on that company’s Bank of Queensland account. The cheques were in the amounts of $2.7 million and $2.6 million. At the time of such deposits, Mr Kavvadas requested that the bank clerk treat the deposits as cleared funds. In any event, he was given access to the money equivalent to the value of the said cheques as cleared funds under the mistaken belief, as it is alleged, that there had been a proper authorisation for him to do so. Eventually, the Focus cheques were dishonoured. As I have previously mentioned, it is said that the first, second and third defendants were conscious of the fact that the cheques would be dishonoured before they were presented.
Subsequently, there were a number of transfers of various amounts of money for various purposes and from various accounts. It is not necessary that I say anything more, save to say that the case, as pleaded by the Bank of Queensland, suggests a clear course of conduct designed to defraud. Apart from the first, second and third defendants, there is a fourth defendant, Alpha Tiling. Alpha Tiling’s account seems to have received a substantial amount of the money obtained from St George. It is said that Alpha Tiling was carrying on a clothing wholesale supply business and that the payments were made against the provision of clothing stock. It is not necessary that I say anything more about the involvement of that company in these transactions.
All four defendants have defended. Although the transactions appear to be substantially admitted, the first, second and third defendants dispute many of the conversations, or parts of them and seem to assert that such disputes undermine the assertions made by, or on behalf of St George that there was no authorization of the treatment of the cheques as being cleared. It is not possible for me, in proceedings of the present kind to determine virtually anything about the strength or weakness of either the St George case or that of the defendants, other than to say that there are very serious allegations against Mr Kavvadas, both personally and in his capacity as a sole director.
There is one other matter I should deal with concerning these transactions, more particularly the deed of settlement and the consultancy agreements. The consultancy agreements are for very large amounts of money for work which was apparently to be performed over a quite short period of time, measured in months. No doubt the development was a large one, but it is difficult to avoid having doubts about the physical capacity of Amor to perform consultancy services to that value in such a short period of time. I say no more than that.
I turn to the question of the financial position of Priestdale. As I have said, the matter was the subject of some evidence in the Supreme Court where an order was sought to freeze the assets of the first, second and third defendants pending the outcome of the proceedings. Such order was made. For present purposes further information has been provided. It is fair to say that, as counsel for the Commissioner points out in his written submissions, there is a certain degree of unexplained inconsistency between what was said in the Supreme Court and what is now said. I consider that much of the information supplied is questionable, although I do not necessarily conclude that there has been any deliberate attempt to mislead. It may be that such inconsistency came about through misunderstandings. Nonetheless it is troubling in the context of this case. I note also that Mr Pleash, an accountant gives a qualified opinion concerning the company’s solvency. In effect, he says that, in certain circumstances, and on a certain view of the evidence, it may be solvent. I have not put any real weight upon Mr Pleash’s evidence. Firstly the information upon which it is based was changed shortly before he was presented for cross-examination. Secondly, given the relatively simple nature of the information as to the financial position of Priestdale which is now before me, I consider that I am in equally as good a position to draw an inference as to its solvency or otherwise as is he.
In exhibit 1 it is said that Priestdale’s assets include a Westpac account containing $3 and a loan to Mr Kavvadas in the amount of $5.9 million. Mr Kavvadas’ assets are said to include property totalling about $2.56 million. Taking those figures at face value, Priestdale would have only about $2.3 million available to pay its own debts, whatever they may be, in the event that Mr Kavvadas repays the debt. In fact, as I pointed out, the debt is not repayable until 2018 and there has been no suggestion that he will repay it earlier. Interest has accrued to date in the sum of about $500,000 and continues to accrue.
One would expect that the interest would, at some time, become liable to income tax. The Commissioner has sought to rely upon an estimated tax liability of about $200,000 as going to the question of solvency. Again, I am somewhat reluctant to go into such matters in the current proceedings. I should make one observation concerning Mr Kavvadas’ oral evidence. He was cross-examined briefly and appeared to be relatively frank in his evidence, although it was at odds with the affidavit material. In particular he was asked whether or not the company was indebted to St George. He agreed that it was. When asked if he was indebted in the amount claimed he agreed that he was.
As is pointed out by counsel for Priestdale, this is an admission made by a lay person. It seems to be inconsistent with the fact that both Priestdale and Mr Kavvadas are defending the proceedings in the Supreme Court, although on grounds which appear to be rather difficult to identify. Nonetheless he made the concession. In proceedings of this kind one cannot simply ignore that. He may, I suppose, have meant that the money was obtained pursuant to the transactions as outlined above, but subject to the fact that he understood them to have been appropriately authorised.
Priestdale seems effectively to have no assets to which it may presently have recourse. Its only substantial asset, the loan to Mr Kavvadas, is not repayable in the immediate future. The company is not trading and has a very substantial liability to the Commissioner, subject to appeal. There is a very substantial claim by St George against it, the admitted aspects of which cause some considerable concern. There is also the very significant fact that of the $7.9 million drawn from the bank and the $7 million paid to Priestdale by the Commissioner, not a dollar remains in the account. Nor is there any indication as to where any of it may be, save that it has allegedly been expended. In other words, the company has been in possession of very substantial amounts of money, received in a very short period of time, in circumstances which are surprising, and has disposed of all of it. The irregularities and inconsistencies in the material as to the asset position of the company offer no further support. Further, in company accounts an amount of $1.1 million is shown as representing the value of an asset when in fact it is the amount of a deposit which has been lost.
In all of those circumstances one can only have very serious doubts as to the appropriateness of leaving the management of the company in Mr Kavvadas’ hands for the foreseeable future. Were it not for the fact that there seems to be, at least superficially, defences or arguments in respect of all of these claims, and the doubts I have about the appropriateness of relying on Mr Kavvadas’ admission, I would have made a winding up order. However, in these circumstances it will be better if I make an order for the appointment of a provisional liquidator, with power to investigate and, if thought appropriate prosecute the appeal against the Commissioner’s decision and similarly to investigate, and if thought appropriate, prosecute the defence of the proceedings in the Supreme Court.
There should also be power otherwise to get in and protect the assets of the company. I shall consider any application to grant further or additional powers, should either the Commissioner or the provisional liquidator so apply. The Commissioner has not filed a consent to act as provisional liquidator as required by the rules of court. However I am content to order, pursuant to s 467A of the Act, that compliance with that requirement be dispensed with, provided that an appropriate consent is filed by midday, tomorrow.
I certify that the preceding thirty one (31) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett. Associate:
Dated: 9 April 2014
PART 3 CHRONOLOGY
3. The relevant chronological background is:
11 Nov 2012 Audit Decision issued to Defendant.
15 Nov 2012 ATO Issued Notice of Assessment and Liability to Pay Penalty
16 Nov 2012 ATO Issued Notice of Assessment of GST net amount for the periods 01/05/2011 to 31/05/2011, 01/06/2011 to 30/06/2011, 01/07/2011 to 31/07/2011.
15 Dec 2012 Defendant sent a Notice of Objection18 April 2012 Plaintiff served a Statutory Demand on the Company in the amount of $11,282,916.69 relating to a Running Balance Account deficit debt by post to the Registered Office of the Company in accordance with s109X(1)(a) of the Act.
30 May 2012 Originating Process was filed by the Plaintiff to have the Company wound up in insolvency.
1 June 2012 Notice of the Application was lodged with ASIC
1 June 2012 The Originating Process was served on the Company by post to itsregistered office address in accordance with s109X( 1)(a) of the Act.
19 June 2012 The Application for winding up was advertised in the Courier Mail
27 June 2012 Defendant's solicitor wrote to ATO requesting an objection decision under 14ZYA of the TAA 1953 within 60 days.29 June 2012 Matter adjourned to Friday 17 August 2012 with orders made by Deputy District Registrar Lynch, granting leave to the Defendant to amend its Notice of Appearance and that the Defendant file and serve any material by 4:00pm 3 August 2012.
27 July 2012 Copy of Notice of Objection Decision provided to the Defendant's solicitor (Notice issued by the ATO Objection Officer on 25 July 2012)
9 August 2012 Defendant notified of Plaintiff's intention to proceed with the winding up application given that no material filed.
17 August 2012 Hearing before Deputy District Registrar Belcher
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