Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Jewiss - [2004] SADC 168

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v JEWISS
Reasons for Ruling of His Honour Judge Clayton
26 November 2004
INCOME TAX
EVIDENCE - VOIR DIRE
The defendant objected to the admission into evidence of Notices of Assessment of his income on the basis that the assessments were made by a Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in "bad faith". A hearing on the voir dire was held to determine the objection at which the defendant produced evidence which was said to establish "bad faith" on the part of the Deputy Commissioner.
HELD: The evidence did not establish that the assessments were made in "bad faith". Notices of Assessment admitted into evidence.
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s.176, s.177, Part !VC; Income Tax Regulations 1936 reg. 172; Taxation Administration Regulations 1976 reg. 45, referred to.
F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Simons v Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 360; Seymour v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation Federal Court of Australia, 1 December 1992; R v Commissioner of Taxation (WA) ex parte Briggs (1986) 12 FCR 301; George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 86 CLR 183 at 203, considered.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v JEWISS
[2004] SADC 168
Reasons for Evidentiary Ruling on 14 October 2004

In this action the plaintiff claims against the defendant $1,165,144.91 being a Running Balance Account with the Australian Taxation Office as at 21 June 2004. The plaintiff has foreshadowed an application to update the amount of the claim to the date of any judgment. The debt comprises an alleged primary income tax liability and a general interest charge for late payment.
On 1 October 2004, I ruled that section 177 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 did not prevent the defendant from arguing in this Court that Notices of Assessment upon which the plaintiff relied were issued in “bad faith” and ineffective.
The trial of the action commenced on Tuesday, 5 October 2004. Counsel for the plaintiff opened and announced that the plaintiff proposed to prove its case through the Notices of Assessment.
Section 177(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 provides:
“The production of a notice of assessment, or of a document under the hand of the Commissioner, a Second Commissioner, or a Deputy Commissioner, purporting to be a copy of a notice of assessment, shall be conclusive evidence of the due making of the assessment and, except in proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 on a review or appeal relating to the assessment, that the amount and all the particulars of the assessment are correct.”
The defendant objected to the Notices of Assessment. He requested an opportunity to produce evidence that the assessment were made in “bad faith” before I ruled whether the Notices of Assessment could be received into evidence.
In paragraph 6 of his Defence the defendant pleaded:
“The action by the Plaintiff is an abuse of process as the assessments were made by the Plaintiff knowingly fraudulent, false and erroneous with the intent to cause me to be unable to plead my defence to the claim fully and with intent to prevent me from carrying on my lawful business of informing taxpayers of their legal rights and obligations relating to taxation.”
In a counterclaim the defendant pursued a similar theme. He alleged:
“The Plaintiff acted firstly beyond its powers in making an assessment of taxation against the defendant pursuant to the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as amended or alternatively secondly by recklessly, carelessly or fraudulently in a criminal or quasi criminal manner in making an assessments of taxation against the defendant purported to use powers assigned to it by the Commissioner of Taxation which powers cannot by the Constitution of Australia be delegated to any person including the Commissioner of Taxation. Thirdly acted through its officers, servants or agents with the intent to injure the defendant in his business and reputation.”
The defendant counterclaims the sum of $10,000,000 as compensation for loss and damage on the basis that his livelihood both in Australia and New Zealand has been destroyed by the conduct, actions and representations of the plaintiff. He claims that his business and credibility in New Zealand has been destroyed, that his credit ratings in Australia and New Zealand have been destroyed, that he has suffered a loss of his health together with “untold stress and anxiety” leaving him with a post traumatic stress disorder. He alleges that his health has deteriorated such that he would find it virtually impossible to establish his business to derive an income.
The defendant also alleges that the plaintiff has acted in a manner which amounts to common assault with threats against the defendant’s servants or agents. He complains that the plaintiff has failed to disclose the sums purported to be the income of the defendant which supports the assessments upon which the plaintiff’s claim relies.
The allegations of fraud were not particularised.
When the tender of the Notices of Assessment by the plaintiff was objected to, the defendant, who represented himself at the trial, was invited to explain how the plaintiff had acted in “bad faith”. He referred to a number of matters which included:
·    The plaintiff’s officers had not asked questions “as to where and what are the proper records” of the defendant.
·    Information which had been seized by departmental officers during two “access visits” was “flawed information”.
·    An association between the defendant and Mr M Petroulias who had previously been an officer of the Taxation Department.
·    Because the Australian Taxation Office was aware of the advice that Mr Jewiss had given clients, the Australian Taxation Office was of the view that he had to be stopped.
·    No one on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office had asked Mr Jewiss “to produce evidence of how (he had) lied (in his) tax returns”.
·    The defendant has been treated as if he was in control of Blemway Pty Ltd, a service company, but the company acted as the joint venture enterprise for four other parties.
Mr Jewiss said to the court:
“The information that I have tendered is full supporting evidence of bad faith and it is most relevant, especially when it comes to these assessments. There is a figure of $1.4 million of the difference between what my income is and what the commissioner says. $1.4 million, and it primarily comes from entities of which I have no control, or, rather, I have only a minority interest in, and I certainly had no voting control and my financial interest in one of the organisations where the bulk of the admitted income is alleged to have been omitted by me, is by an organisation called Nominee Trustee (NZ) Limited. I am not a director. I am not a shareholder. I acted purely professionally. I had a service agreement to it, and I can prove in the evidence that I have tendered, especially in affidavits from officers of those companies, that the money did not come to me. So, that is why I consider the department has acted in bad faith.”
Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon section 177 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and the decision of the High Court in F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Simons v Commissioner of Taxation[1], in particular the reasons of Mason and Wilson JJ at 378 where their Honours said that “.....it must follow that a notice in proper form of an assessment necessarily compels the conclusion that there was an assessment made in fact”. Their Honours also said:
“Accordingly, in our opinion the (....) Court is bound, on production of a notice of assessment, to rule that the assessment was duly made both in statutory proceedings and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.”
[1] (1981) 147 CLR 360
The Court did not consider what the position would have been if a defendant did establish that an assessment was issued in “bad faith”.
It was argued for the plaintiff that it was the specific policy and intent of the legislation “to once and for all preclude a taxpayer from challenging a Notice of Assessment in recovery proceedings”. It was said that the matters raised by the defendant were proper matters for a challenge in other courts pursuant to Part IVC of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, but not otherwise.
The defendant relied upon the reasons of Northrop J in Seymour v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation[2]. That action was based on a Rule of Court which enabled the Federal Court to give judgment where there was evidence that a respondent had no defence to the claim. After referring to R v Commissioner of Taxation (WA) ex parte Briggs[3] and George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[4], Northrop J held that the taxpayer should be permitted to rely upon his substantive defence. His Honour held (at page 5 of 5) that there was a basis for the taxpayer alleging that the assessment was made in the exercise of an abuse of power or for improper purposes and that there was a basis for the taxpayer making an allegation of bad faith on the part of the Commissioner, but His Honour concluded that the court was not required to decide the allegation on the particular motion that was before the court.
[2] Federal Court of Asustralia, 1 December 1992
[3] (1986) 12 FCR 301
[4] (1952) 86 CLR 183 at 203
Mr Jewiss requested that he be allowed to produce evidence of “bad faith” before I ruled on his objection to the admission of the assessments into evidence. I therefore determined that an inquiry should be conducted on the voir dire to determine the defendant’s objection to the admissibility of the relevant Notices of Assessment.
At the hearing of the voir dire, the case presented by the defendant expanded. It ranged beyond that which had been foreshadowed by the pleadings and Mr Jewiss orally. Mr Jewiss in opening on the voir dire indicated that he also wished to raise as evidence of “bad faith”:
·    Events which occurred when his office was raided in August 2001.
·    A list of names in an area under investigation by the Promotion Task Force of the Australian Taxation Office.
·    Evidence from Ms E M Johnson (Mr Jewiss’s assistant/bookkeeper) of a very lengthy and heated telephone discussion with Mr Greg Daly and Mr Colin O’Gorman of the Promotion Task Force of the Australian Taxation Office.
·    A threat to his life.
·    A tape recording of a conversation between Mr Jewiss and Mr Daly on the day after the Notices of Assessment were served.
·    The manner in which a second raid was conducted on Mr Jewiss’s office in Brisbane between 29 May and early June 2002.
Mr Jewiss said “the emphasis will be on fraud and bad faith”. He called Ms E M Johnson.
Ms Johnson gave evidence of a telephone conversation which she had with Mr Daly and Mr O’Gorman during the course of the raid on Mr Jewiss’s office by the Australian Taxation Office Promotion Task Force on 29 May 2002. She said she had offered free and unfettered access to all the information in the office and explained that the records in the office were not the correct records of the entities involved. She said Mr O’Gorman asked whether the information was connected with a Mr Petroulias. She said Mr O’Gorman was only concerned with the source of Ms Johnson’s information and was not interested in the veracity of the material which had been seized. The alleged failure of the Australian Taxation Office to check the veracity of the information seized from Mr Jewiss’s office is said to be evidence of “bad faith”.
Ms Johnson gave evidence of a conversation on 31 October 2002 about a garnishee order that had been placed on the defendant’s bank account and his unsuccessful attempts to have a relatively small amount of money released to enable him to purchase necessities. The withholding of the moneys by the Australian Taxation Office is said to evidence “bad faith”. Ms Johnson inferred that Mr Daly engaged in “threat tactics” because the release of funds required to pay for necessities was conditional upon Mr Jewiss coming to an arrangement with the Australian Taxation Office.
Ms Johnson also gave evidence of two conversations at the Qantas Club at Sydney Airport and at a hotel at the Sydney Airport with a “Mr P”. Ms Johnson believed “Mr P” to be an agent of the Australian Taxation Office.
Ms Johnson said that at a meeting in the Qantas Club it was said “that unless Harry Jewiss got out of the situation entirely he would have an accident”. She said that threat was mentioned several times on that occasion and also at a meeting which was held at the Sydney Airport International.
When asked how she knew “Mr P” to be an agent of the Australian Taxation Office Ms Johnson said:
"ABecause the Australian Taxation Office employs people of, shall I say, less than scrupled principles to do things like serve warrants, and serve warnings and so forth. I know this to be a fact in relation to how the notices of assessment were served on Mr Jewiss - sorry, notices of -
QWhat information do you have which suggests that (“Mr P”) was a servant or agent of the tax office.
AFrom the information that he gave to us, there is no way that he could have access to that information.
QWhat information.
AOn who was going to be raided, how the ATO was cleaning up the seminar industry. Specific names were made and just what actions were in the pipeline. So, that would be more information known about persons than what would normally be available to any person who conducted a security firm or a process server, etc., because -
QYou drew that inference because of the content -
AThe names from (“Mr P”) and the conversations that were said to me, and in relation to that he dealt with persons who were known to us, or acquaintances of us, but who we did not do business with.
QDid (“Mr P”) make any statement to the effect that he was a servant or agent of the tax office.
AHe made several references to being in the know and he was passing on the message as a whistleblower to us.”
She said that “Mr P” could not have had access to “information that he gave ...... on who was going to be raided, how the Australian Taxation Office was cleaning up the seminar industry” unless “Mr P” was an agent of the Australian Taxation Office.
Ms Johnson was asked whether “Mr P” made any statement to indicate that he was a servant or agent of the Australian Taxation Office and she answered “he made several references to being in the know and he was passing on the message as a whistleblower to us”.
Ms Johnson said “Mr P” spoke about conversations that he had had with the Federal Police, that he was talking about a Federal Police warrant in relation to a person who was named and was known to Ms Johnson and the defendant. She said that “Mr P” “spoke in great detail about the warrants that were issued by the Australian Federal Police in relation to himself” and “also spoke from a whistleblowers point of view about what would happen to us if we did not completely get out of the business”.
Ms Johnson said “Mr P” spoke of the damage that they (the defendant and Ms Johnson) were causing to the Australian Taxation Office because of the information they were “communicating to people in our education process”. She said that “Mr P” stated that “we were more of a risk to the Australian Taxation Office than what Mr Nick Petroulias was, and he (“Mr P”) knew in great detail why we were such a risk”.
In cross-examination Ms Johnson said that “Mr P” mentioned several times that as he was associated with them he wanted to let them know that they had to get out of the industry or they would wear the wrath of the Australian Taxation Office.
Ms Johnson is obviously an intelligent and competent person. However, at the time she gave her evidence she was unwell and in receipt of medical attention. Her evidence was rambling, disjointed and did not make out the defendant’s case that the plaintiff acted in “bad faith” in making the relevant assessments.
It is unnecessary for me to make any finding as to whether the events referred to by Ms Johnson occurred or not. Even if the alleged threats were made, I find that there is no evidence that “Mr P” was acting on behalf of the plaintiff in making those threats.
More importantly, I find that there is no evidence which establishes any connection between the threats of which Ms Johnson spoke and the other matters raised by her on the one hand and the making of any income tax assessments.
Ms Johnson gave evidence of a conversation with Mr O’Gorman of the Australian Taxation Office. She asked why she and the defendant were involved in the audit and asked what the taxation office was looking for. She said Mr O’Gorman told her “read between the lines, it’s on the door”. The words on the door were “Harry Jewiss CPA” and “Quantum Global Knowledge”. Her interpretation of that statement was never made clear. However, there is no basis to find that that conversation between Ms Johnson and Mr O’Gorman establishes that the assessments in question had been made in “bad faith”.
Ms Johnson gave evidence of a telephone conversation with Mr O’Gorman and Mr Daly. Both sides made a recording of the conversation and the defendant produced a transcript. I have listened to the recording. Ms Johnson says a threat was made in the form of a promise to release moneys so that Mr Jewiss could make a payment to his health fund if he came to an arrangement with the Australian Taxation Office. I do not agree with that interpretation of the conversation. I find that Mr Daly did not make any threat. Again, there is no connection between the conversation and the making of the assessments.
Ms Johnson complained that there was no communication between Mr O’Gorman and Mr Daly on the one hand or Mr Jewiss and herself on the other hand in relation to the veracity of any information between 29 May 2002 (the “access visit”) and October 2002 when the assessments were raised. She said that Mr Jewiss had offered to provide a videotape which would throw light on the income in respect of which the assessments were raised. There is a dispute as to whether the videotape was provided, but in my opinion the videotape has no bearing upon the issues in the case. Ms Johnson said that Mr Jewiss had not complied with an undertaking to provide a complete picture of his financial dealings because he was waiting for the videotape to arrive in the mail. The evidence is confusing. However, one thing is clear and that is that this evidence does not demonstrate “bad faith” on the part of the plaintiff in making assessments of income.
Mr Jewiss also gave evidence. He referred to what he called a “tap on the shoulder”. He said there was a meeting at the Hilton Airport hotel in Sydney attended by “Mr P” and another person. Ms Johnson was not present. Mr Jewiss was told that he needed to think about getting out of the business. He asked “and what if I decided not to?” to which “Mr P” replied “well then, ‘you might just have an accident’”. Mr Jewiss took that as a serious threat.
The business to which reference has been made was Mr Jewiss’s business as an accountant advising clients on sections 514 and 515 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. Mr Jewiss claimed that those sections allow a taxpayer who ticked a certain box in an income tax return to generate income overseas and thereupon become entitled to a $50,000 deduction. He claimed to have exploited the benefit of the provision on behalf of his clients in such a way that he had become a problem for the Australian Taxation Office. He said it was for that reason that the Australian Taxation Office wanted him out of the business.

Mr Jewiss suggested that when “Mr P” told him that if he did not get out of the business he “just might have an accident”, “Mr P” was acting on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office.
I do not need to comment on the seriousness of a suggestion that a threat of any kind could be made on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office. However, I need go no further than to say that on the defendant’s own case there is no evidence which indicates that even if “Mr P” did make a threat he did so as an agent of the Australian Taxation Office. Additionally, no connection has been established between the alleged threat and the issue of the assessments or the alleged threat and any person actually involved in the making of the assessments.
Mr Jewiss’s case involved the allegation that the Australian Taxation Office wanted him out of the business. He said:
“And yes, I do admit a lot of that is hearsay, however it all happened a year before these assessments hit me and they came out of the blue - which came out of the blue. I got a threatening letter from the Tax Agents Board indicating, without any reason given, simply to say that my tax agent certificate was coming up for renewal and I would need to show cause why it should be renewed. Without any further ado, I relinquished my tax agent’s certificate and decided then there is too much undue influence exercised by the Australian Tax Department over practising accountants.”
Mr Jewiss said the Australian Taxation Office wanted him out of the business because he was advising clients on sections 514 and 515. Mr Jewiss said he had built his business by conducting seminars on investments offshore. His reputation grew and so did the business. In a very short time he had attracted 600 clients. He implied that he was a thorn in the side of the Australian Taxation Office and the Promotion Task Force therefore began investigating him. He said:
“S.514 and 515 in itself is quite innocent, but when it’s multiplied by 1,000 clients, and that was what was fast approaching at that point of time - that’s if they all availed themself of it, because the tax man’s looking to protect the revenue - 1,000 x $50,000 is $50,000,000. That’s quite a substantial amount of assessable income that maybe the tax commissioner felt that they were missing out and it would be best if I was not giving that type of advice. I was also now able and was advising through Nick Petroulias, the tax adviser, of the far more sophisticated structure with the Netherlands. I was then beginning to receive some larger clients gravitating to me. In fact, the one that paid my fees to go to Germany could have been quite a large client.”
He said it was about August 2001 when he received the “tap on the shoulder” from “Mr P”. He said:
“The thing was I was given a very direct threat, I took it, to stop giving advice of the magnitude that I was, or the calibre of what I was. And my comment was ‘What if I don’t?’ and I was told in quite clear terms ‘Well, then, Harry you will have an accident’.”
Mr Jewiss said he took “Mr “P” to be an agent of the Australian Taxation Office. He said:
“I made that assumption because (“Mr P”) had a very close working liaison with the Australian Federal Police. I know that because of several people he named and what was going to happen to them.”
At about the same time Mr Jewiss received a letter from the Tax Agents Board asking him to show cause why his tax agent’s certificate should be renewed. Although he did relinquish his tax agent’s certificate, Mr Jewiss relied upon the letter as further evidence of “bad faith”. The letter had its origins in the fact that Mr Jewiss, who was a tax agent, was in default with the lodgement of personal tax returns.
One important fact, which is easily overlooked, is that the assessments of which Mr Jewiss complains were default assessments made by reason of his failure to lodge a taxation return in respect of the relevant years.
There is no basis to find that the letter from the Tax Agents Board requiring Mr Jewiss to show cause establishes “bad faith” on the part of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in making the assessments. No connection has been established between the Tax Agents Board and the persons who made the assessments.
Mr Jewiss gave evidence of his relationship with a Mr Petroulias who gave legal advice to his clients. Mr Petroulias had a “history” with the Australian Taxation Office. Mr Jewiss said he came under scrutiny because of his association with Mr Petroulias and his “working involvement with a foreign foundation trust in Holland”. The allegation is described in the following dialogue:
"QIt’s not my prerogative to tell you how to run your case. The important thing is that you tell the court why you think the commissioner or deputy commissioner has acted in bad faith in issuing the assessments.
AI consider he acted in bad faith because he would’ve been very aware of the calibre of the barristers and lawyers involved in giving the information and it wasn’t just information given to me, it was information given to other accountants whom the tax department had also been in communication with, but they wanted to get it first-hand and it went to the very modus operandi of how my practice functioned and what advice I was giving.”
That answer did not establish “bad faith” on the part of the plaintiff in making the assessments.
Mr Jewiss gave evidence of a second raid on his office in Queensland on 29 May 2002. Mr Jewiss was in Adelaide at the time. I do not accept that the evidence as to the raid establishes “bad faith” in the making of the assessments.
Mr Jewiss also gave evidence that his home in Collinswood South Australia was broken into. He told the police that officers from the Australian Taxation Office illegally broke into his home, although he did acknowledge in his evidence that he had no proof of that. Mr Jewiss also complained of interference with his telephone and other means of communication; but again could not provide any evidence which implicated the Australian Taxation Office. Mr Jewiss asserted on two occasions that officers or agents of the Australian Taxation Office intercepted his mail. That assertion was unsupported by proof.
Mr Jewiss said that “bad faith” on the part of the Australian Taxation Office was illustrated by the refusal of Centrelink to provide him with “emergency” money. However, the plaintiff established no connection between Centrelink and the making of any assessment. Also, as a matter of logic, it was never made clear how the actions of Centrelink could demonstrate “bad faith” by the Australian Taxation Office in making a taxation assessment.
The allegations of Mr Jewiss were wide and varied. In addition to the matters, which I have specifically mentioned, Mr Jewiss also referred in his evidence to correspondence which he had received from the Australian Taxation Office, a “75% culpability penalty”, conversations with Mr Daly and Mr O’Gorman of the Australian Taxation Office and other matters which I have not mentioned. The fact that I have not mentioned every matter raised by Mr Jewiss does not mean that I have not taken them into account.
Mr Jewiss is an urbane and intelligent person. He was a most articulate witness. If his allegations are correct they are very serious.
I find that the far-ranging complaints contain no evidence of conduct that could be treated as “bad faith” on the part of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. I find that there is no evidence that the relevant assessments were made in “bad faith”.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide whether the assessments should be excluded because they were made in “bad faith” because there is no evidence of “bad faith” on the part of the Deputy Commissioner.
Importantly, there is just no evidence which implicates the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation or the Australian Taxation Office. It is unnecessary to determine whether the matters of which evidence was given occurred or not, because taken at its highest the evidence does not implicate the plaintiff. For example, it does not matter whether a “Mr P” made a threat or not if there is no connection between the plaintiff and the income tax assessments. By itself, the threat does nothing to establish that the plaintiff was biased against Mr Jewiss.
The defendant’s objection was that the assessments had been issued in “bad faith”. I rejected the defendant’s argument that the certificates should not have been admitted into evidence because they were issued in “bad faith”. In my opinion, there was no evidence to support the defendant’s argument.
One of the themes raised by Mr Jewiss was that the Australian Taxation Office relied upon information obtained during the raids on his premises, and that the information was inaccurate and only held in Mr Jewiss’s office as “training material”. Submissions of that nature must be measured in the light of the fact that Mr Jewiss never explained how the information was incorrect. Indeed, the information was never identified. In the same vein, Mr Jewiss made no attempt to show how the assessments were erroneous, that is, he made no attempt to show what his correct income or assessment should have been. He was therefore not in a position to argue that the alleged “bad faith” on the part of the plaintiff was illustrated by an error in the assessments. The loose assertion that the Australian Taxation Office failed to check the veracity of the information which was seized is not established on the evidence. In addition, the claim takes the matter nowhere because there is no evidence of the use to which the information was put.
Mr Jewiss made a vague allegation that “they (the ATO) had failed to comply with the tax charter in many instances”, but that bald assertion was unaccompanied by any detail.
The plaintiff applied to tender copies of the Notices of Assessment. Section 176 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 directs courts to take judicial notice of the signature of every person who is or has been a Deputy Commissioner provided such signature is attached or appended to an official document. There are also regulations to the same effect. Regulation 172 of the Income Tax Regulations 1936 provides for judicial notice to be taken of the signature or stamped signature and printed signature of a Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. Regulation 45 of the Taxation Administration Regulations 1976 is to the same effect.
Counsel for the plaintiff tendered copies of Notices of Assessment for the defendant for each of the years ending 30 June 1998 to 30 June 2001 inclusive. Each notice was certified to be a copy of a Notice of Assessment which issued on 29 October 2002. The notices have the printed name “Geoff Robinson, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation”. The certification bears a stamped signature “Erin Holland” and the printed words “Erin Holland Deputy Commissioner of Taxation”.
I was satisfied that the plaintiff had proved the Notices of Assessment and they were admitted into evidence. In any event, there was no objection by the defendant to the admission of the notices into evidence on the basis that the formalities had not been established.