Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, in the matter of Golding
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1189
•29 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, in the matter of Golding [2025] FedCFamC2G 1189
File number(s): MLG 858 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT Date of judgment: 29 July 2025 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for review of the exercise of power by a Registrar– Whether there is any sufficient cause why sequestration order ought not be made – Submissions based on pseudo-law – Whether obligation to pay pecuniary liability discharged by a promissory note – Whether promissory note was issued and tendered – Application dismissed - Sequestration order affirmed. Legislation: Act of Elizabeth 1
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 40(1)(g), 52(1), 52(1)(a), 52(1)(b), 52(1)(c), 52(2), 52(2)(b), 52(4), 58, 115
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth), s 51(xvii)
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), ss 55, 59
Financial Emergencies Acts 1931-1933 (Cth)
Financial Emergencies Act 1933 (Cth)
Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1, sub-div 255A
Taxation Administration Regulations 2017 (Cth) (reg 21)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), ss 254, 254(2)(l), 256(1)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth), Sch 1, Pts 1, 4, rr 1.04(1), 1.04(2), 2.02(1), 2.02(3), 4.06, 7.05
Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), rr 1.07, 21.04
Cases cited: Bank of Queensland v G.L. & L.A. Collis Pty Ltd [2019] VCC 2062
Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34
Busch v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2025] QCAT 220
Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78
Collis v Bank of Queensland Limited [2021] VSCA 17
Davy v Garrett (1877) 7 Ch D 473
Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 148
McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529
McMaster, Re; Ex parte McMaster (1991) 33 FCR 70; (1991) 105 ALR 156
Mesha Feet Pty Ltd v Allen acting (as Deputy Commissioner of Taxation) [2024] FCA 680
Osborne v Schembri McCluskys Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 691
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28
S G White Pty Ltd v Findlay (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 484
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 84 Date of last submission/s: 22 May 2025 Date of hearing: 22 May 2025 Solicitor for the Applicant Mr D Olthof, Craddock Murray Neumann Solicitor for the Respondent The respondent appeared in person, self-represented ORDERS
MLG 858 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant
AND: BRETT DAVID GOLDING
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CORBETT
DATE OF ORDER:
29 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for review dated 19 February 2025 is dismissed;
2.The sequestration order made by the Registrar on 30 January 2025 is affirmed; and
3.The costs of the review application be the applicant’s costs in the administration of the estate of the respondent and be paid to the applicant in priority pursuant to s 109 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CORBETT
The respondent seeks to review the orders of a Registrar of this Court made 30 January 2025 in which the Registrar ordered that the estate of the respondent be sequestrated under s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act).
RULES
The power of the Court to delegate the power to make the orders under review is contained in s 254(2)(l) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act). Rule 2.02(1) and Sch 1 Pt 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Rules) prescribe that a Registrar of the Court may make a sequestration order under s 52(1) of the Act.
Section 256(1) of the FCFCOA Act permits any party to proceedings in which a delegate has exercised any of the powers of the Court under s 254 of the FCFCOA Act to apply to review the exercise of the delegated power.
Rule 2.02(3) of the Bankruptcy Rules requires that any application for review of the exercise of the power of the Court by a Registrar under s 256(1) of the FCFCOA Act, be in Form B3A and made within 21 days of the exercise of power by the Registrar. The application for review in this proceeding was made in Form B3A and within the prescribed period.
Rule 7.05 of the Bankruptcy Rules provides that:
7.05 Review of Registrar’s decision
(1) This rule applies in relation to an application under subsection 256(1) of the Act for review of a decision by a Registrar to make a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor (the bankrupt).
Note: For the form of the application and the time for filing the application, see rule 2.02.
(2) The application must be served on the trustee at least 7 days before the date fixed for the hearing of the application.
(3) The applicant must give notice of the application to each person known to the applicant to be a creditor of the bankrupt.
(4) The notice must be in accordance with Form B12.
(5) The applicant must serve the notice on each creditor at least 7 days before the date fixed for the hearing of the application.
There is no evidence of compliance with this Rule by the respondent. A Notice to Creditors in Form B12 was filed with the Court by the respondent on 19 February 2025 but there is no evidence that it was served on the known creditors of the respondent.
Rule 1.04(2) of the Bankruptcy Rules provides that the other Rules of this Court apply, to the extent that they are relevant and not inconsistent with these Bankruptcy Rules. Rule 1.04(1) of the Bankruptcy Rules also gives the Court the general power to otherwise order that the Bankruptcy Rules do not apply to a proceeding.
Rule 1.07 of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (General Rules) provides that this Court may dispense with compliance or full compliance with any of the Rules at any time if it ‘is in the interest of justice to do so’. The Court is prepared in this case to dispense with compliance with r 7.05 of the Bankruptcy Rules because it is the interests of justice to do so and is appropriate to facilitate the quick, inexpensive and efficient disposition of this application for review.
Rule 21.04 of the General Rules provides that the review of an exercise of power by a Registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. Rule 21.04 also gives the Court the discretion to receive as evidence any affidavit or exhibit tendered before the Registrar and receive further evidence.
The onus is therefore on the applicant to prosecute the creditor’s petition and the only onus on the respondent is to prove either solvency or any other sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order under s 52(2) of the Act (see Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34 at [27] per Allsop CJ, Markovic and Colvin JJ) (Bechara)).
BACKGROUND
On 6 July 2023, a judgment was obtained by the applicant against the respondent in the County Court of Victoria for the sum of $345,862.21 (Judgment Debt).
On 15 October 2023, the Official Receiver at the request of the applicant issued a Bankruptcy Notice for the Judgment Debt. The Bankruptcy Notice was served on the respondent personally on 27 November 2023. On 15 December 2023, the respondent was deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy (s 40(1)(g) of the Act).
On 11 April 2024, the applicant presented a Creditor’s Petition. The Petition was served on the respondent on 20 November 2024 in accordance with orders for substituted service made by a Registrar on 6 November 2024. A date for hearing of the Petition was fixed for 12 December 2024.
On 12 December 2024, the respondent, who was self-represented before the Registrar and in this Court, presented two documents to the Court described as ‘Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA]’ that were notarised by a Notary Public on 29 November 2024 and upon which the respondent sought to rely in opposition to the making of a sequestration order. The hearing of the Creditor’s Petition was adjourned to 30 January 2025.
On 28 January 2025, the applicant filed an outline of submissions confirming proof of each of the formal steps required by the Act and that the applicant was prima facie entitled to a sequestration order. Affidavits were also filed confirming that the sum claimed in the Creditor’s Petition had not been paid and that the applicant had conducted the required searches of the National Personal Insolvency Index and the Court registries. Those searches revealed that the respondent remained an undischarged bankrupt pursuant to a previous sequestration order made 17 April 2008.
On 30 January 2025, the hearing of the Creditor’s Petition proceeded and the Registrar made a sequestration order against the estate of the respondent.
On 19 February 2025, the respondent filed an application for review of the Registrar’s order (application for review).
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
The application for review was first returnable for directions before this Court on 24 March 2025. On that date, orders were made directing the respondent to file and serve any affidavits upon which he intended to rely and an outline of submissions by 11 April 2025. The applicant was also ordered to file any affidavit in opposition and an outline of written submissions by 24 April 2025. The hearing of the application for review was listed for final hearing in person at Melbourne on 22 May 2025.
On 10 April 2025, the respondent sent to chambers an email that attached four documents said to be affidavits in support of the application for review and a document described as ‘Written apology, grounds of review’ (grounds of review). The documents were not formally filed with the Court. The documents that were said to be affidavits were not in a form required by the General Rules nor did they comply with any known Court precedent.
The grounds of review were in the following form:
The applicant filed an outline of submissions as ordered on 24 April 2025, in which the applicant again addressed the formal requirements necessary to satisfy the requirements of s 52(1) of the Act. The applicant also addressed the grounds of opposition and, in particular, whether the debt claimed in the Petition had been discharged by the provision of a promissory note by the respondent.
At the hearing of the application of review on 22 May 2022 the applicant was represented by Mr Olthof, solicitor. The respondent appeared in person, self-represented.
ISSUES
The legal issue to be determined in this application for review is whether at the hearing of the application for review there was proof of the matters listed in ss 52(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act and if so, whether the respondent has discharged the onus under s 52(2) of the Act, of establishing sufficient cause not to make an order (Bechara at [27] and more recently Osborne v Schembri McCluskys Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 691 at [11] per Hespe J).
I am satisfied by the affidavits relied on by the applicant at the hearing of the application for review that the applicant has satisfied the necessary proof required by s 52(1) of the Act. The applicant has complied with the Bankruptcy Rules (in particular Pt 4 of the Bankruptcy Rules) and is prima facie entitled to a sequestration order. Those matters are:
•The debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy in accordance with s 40 of the Act;
•At the time that the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor had a territorial connection to Australia of the type prescribed (s 43(1)(b) of the Act);
•The creditor who seeks to petition the Court for a sequestration order has presented a Petition within the period of six months of the commission of the act of bankruptcy (s 44(1)(c) of the Act);
•The creditor is owed a liquidated sum of $5,000.00 or more which is payable immediately or at a certain future time (s 44(1)(b) of the Act);
•The Petition is verified by a person who knows the relevant facts relied on (s 47 of the Act);
•Prior to the hearing, the applicant creditor has complied with r 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules; and
•At the hearing of the Petition, the Court has proof of the matters stated in the Petition, service of the Petition, and the fact that the debt or debts on which the Petition relies are still owing (s 52(1) of the Act).
APPLICANT’S EVIDENCE
At the hearing of the application for review on 22 May 2025, Mr Olthof read and tendered the affidavits of Khaja Ahmed Mohiuddin affirmed 21 May 2025 (to confirm the debt claimed in the Petition) and an Affidavit of Final Search by Michael Brandon affirmed 21 May 2025 confirming that the searches required by r 4.06 of the Bankruptcy Rules had been undertaken and that there is no debt agreement in relation to the debt on which the applicant relies, and no other bankruptcy proceedings in the Victorian district are pending against the respondent, other than the applicant’s Petition. The affidavit of Mr Brandon also confirmed that the respondent remains an undischarged bankrupt pursuant to the sequestration order made against his estate on 17 April 2008.
The applicant also read and tendered the affidavits relied at the hearing of the Petition before the Registrar on 30 January 2025. They were:
•Affidavit of Service of the Bankruptcy Notice of Ken Neale Fraser sworn 27 November 2023;
•Affidavit of Searches of Michael Brandon affirmed 10 April 2024;
•Affidavit of Service of the Creditor’s Petition (and other documents) of Charmaine Teresa Keir-Ward sworn 15 November 2024;
•Affidavit of personal service of the Creditor’s Petition (and other documents) of David Keen sworn 5 December 2025;
•Affidavit of Debt of Aditya Punj affirmed 28 January 2025; and
•Affidavit of Final Search of Michael Brandon affirmed 29 January 2025.
These affidavits cumulatively satisfied the necessary requirements of the Act both at the date of the sequestration order made 30 January 2025 and the date of the hearing of the review application (Bechara at [88] and [89]). I also note for the sake of completeness that the Creditor’s Petition was not stale at the time of making the sequestration order and does not need to be extended unless the sequestration order is set aside because of the operation of s 52(4) of the Act (Bechara at [154] and [155]).
RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE
The material on which the respondent sought to rely at the hearing of the application did not comply with the requirements of the General Rules. Nevertheless, the Court was prepared to consider the materials submitted by the respondent so that the matters he wished to articulate could be considered in context and because it was in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. The respondent did not seek to formally tender these documents, but they formed the basis on which the grounds of review were cast and were to be understood in that context.
The respondent relied on a document described as ‘Evidence for Brett David Golding’. The document comprised 46 paginated pages and referred to a bundle of documents marked by the respondent as exhibit ‘BDG-1’ (Exhibit Bundle) (EB). The Exhibit Bundle included the four affidavits sent to chambers by the respondent’s email on 10 April 2025. These were documents described as ‘Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA]’ autographed by the deponents and witnessed by a Notary Public. They bore a fingerprint in red ink and the seal of the Notary (Living Testimony) (EB pp 3-10).
Also in the Exhibit Bundle was a document described as a ‘promissory note’ dated 22 November 2024 (EB 11-2). The promissory note was for the sum of $750,000.00 and addressed to the order of the applicant. A copy of the note (with the respondent’s tax file number redacted) is reproduced in its entirety:
(a)Front of promissory note:
(b)Back of promissory note:
Immediately it will be observed that the promissory note was not issued by a financial institution in Australia and purports to be issued pursuant to Public Law 73-10 and what appears to be the Financial Emergencies Act 1933 (Cth).
The promissory note was one of the bases upon which the respondent claimed that he was not indebted to the applicant at the date of the making of the sequestration order and why there was other sufficient cause why a sequestration order ought not to be made.
The applicant also relied on a number of other submissions as to why a sequestration order ought not to have been made by the Registrar and these were identified in the grounds of review and in the respondent’s oral submissions at the hearing.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS IN OPPOSITION TO THE MAKING OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER
The starting point of the respondent’s submissions is to be found in the Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA] dated 29 November 2024 (EB 3). There, it was asserted that the respondent is the victim of an unconscionable contract wherein his mother did not knowingly or willingly agree to the terms and conditions of his Birth Certificate, submitting: ‘Birth Certificate fraud nor ‘have I given my fullest informed consent authorizing any trustee to act on my behalf; fraud vitiates everything (sic)’ (EB 3 [3]).
Allegations of fraud and ‘constructive fraud’ were repeated frequently in the respondent’s submissions and as a basis upon which the Court should reject in entirety the evidence tendered by the applicant in support of the making of a sequestration order.
The second foundation to the respondent’s submissions, identified in the Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA] made 29 November 2024, was that the respondent is free to use the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) (Bills of Exchange Act) and make promissory notes to ‘discharge liabilities and obligations’ (EB 3 [7]). The respondent claims that he has done so by issuing the promissory note dated 22 November 2024. He then attended on the applicant with the promissory note on 22 November 2024 at Docklands, Victoria to present the note. The note was redeemable at ‘Nick’s Bakehouse, 40 Princes Way, Drouin, Victoria’ at 10.00am on 28 November 2024’.
The respondent then says he attended at Nick’s Bakehouse at Drouin, Victoria, with others on 28 November 2024 at 10.00am but the applicant did not attend to redeem the promissory note. Therefore, the respondent claims, the Judgment Debt has been discharged and that all liability for it and the underlying tax obligation has also been discharged. Further, by failing to redeem the promissory note, the applicant has agreed to waive or release the Judgment Debt and there has been “an accord and satisfaction” of any debt due (citing Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 (Butler)).
The respondent then asserts in the Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA] made 29 November 2024 that ‘any point of this affidavit that is rebutted in substance will be removed’ (EB 4 [25]). It was stated that a “…failure to provide [the respondent] with a verified point by point rebuttal to this affidavit, no later than (30) calendar days from the date of delivery, will compromise the Respondent’s agreement with and Tacit Procuration of all facts herein, in perpetuity’(EB 4 [24]). This is the foundation upon which the respondent submits that an “unrebutted affidavit stands as truth in law” and that “an unrebutted affidavit is Judgment in Commerce”.
These facts were then repeated and supported by the deponent of a Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA] made 29 November 2024 (EB 5-6).
The next foundation on which the respondent contends that a sequestration order ought not be made is that, “there is no valid international contract upon which the applicant could rely on during that hearing”. The respondent explained that the applicant’s entitlement to impose taxation obligations on him must first be established by a valid international contract. In the absence of proof of that contract there was no debt due and payable.
The respondent also submits that the applicant was required to prove any debt with evidence from a “forensic accountant”. This was also identified as a requirement in the respondent’s Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit [LTA] made 29 November 2024 (EB 4 [23]).
In the respondent’s Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit made 17 December 2024, the respondent repeats that there is no international contract with the applicant, nor an international contract made with fully informed consent with the respondent (EB 7-8 [4]).
The respondent says that there is also no quasi/implied, assumed or presumed contracts with the applicant. In the absence of proof of a valid contract the proceeding in the County Court upon which the Judgement Debt was made was, “started in fraud”. The respondent did not consent to fraud and the applicant has not established that he did not engage in fraud and therefore fraud is presumed to exists- fraud vitiates “everything” including the Judgment Debt. These allegations are also repeated and supported by the deponent of another Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit made 17 December 2024 (EB 9-10).
The balance of the EB prepared by the respondent contains notices and other correspondence asserting the validity and failure to redeem the promissory note.
The EB also contains a letter to the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Australia claiming that the respondent was misaddressed and impersonated by the Court. The respondent claimed that he owns the copyright to and trademark in the vessel bearing his name and that use of his name was ‘fraud, theft and criminal’ (EB 19). Attached to the letter were certificates of ownership and other documents demanding a refund of the respondent’s collateral and the payment of fines. Included in these documents was a Mandatory Notice that the vessels bearing the respondent’s name were ‘Foreign Sovereigns’ that were not subject to the laws of Victoria, ‘Terra Australis’ (EB 20-31).
These documents were relied on in support of the respondent’s submission that he was not bound by the jurisdiction of this Court or the County Court of Victoria because he had given notice that he was not a State National and the Registrar erred in “law and commerce” in recognising the Judgement Debt, entertaining the Creditor’s Petition and making the sequestration order against him.
The respondent’s EB contained a Notice to Produce and Subpoena (neither of which were filed with or issued by the Court) requiring the applicant to produce:
·Forensic accounting report of promissory note numbered #221120240912, affirmed or sworn by a lawful person;
·Certified or notarised copy of any binding contract between the respondent and the respondent (sic) (presumably this is an erroneous reference to the applicant);
·Certified or notarised copy of the instrument wherein the applicant did obtain jurisdiction over the defendant case (sic) (again presumably the respondent’s case); and
·Certified and notarised copy of any bill giving rise to case numbered MLG 858 of 2024.
Finally, the EB contained three Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit made 18 March 2025 (EB 39-44) wherein the respondent said that he rebutted; the affidavit of service of the Bankruptcy Notice of Ken Neale Fraser on 27 November 2024, the affidavit of searches of Michael Brandon affirmed 10 April 2025 and the affidavit of debt of Khaja Ahmed Mohiuddin affirmed 9 April 2025. The respondent also maintained that the Bankruptcy Notice and this proceeding was void ab initio and vitiated by fraud (EB 39-40). Once again, the respondent claimed that his liabilities to the applicant were discharged by accord and satisfaction, in the absence of an international contract and were void for fraud by the applicant. A failure to rebut these allegations within (30) calendar days was acceptance of all facts therein (EB 39 [15]). In support of all of these propositions was an article by Anna von Reitz explaining the ‘Clearfield Doctrine’ (EB 45-6).
The respondent also submitted in the grounds of review that the Registrar erred by failing to provide procedural fairness by permitting the applicant to file late submissions and affidavits before the hearing on 30 January 2025 and not allowing the respondent to review and rebut these affidavits. These documents were also void ab initio due to fraud by the applicant.
On 4 June 2025, after the hearing of the application for review the respondent sent a further document by email to chambers with a copy to the solicitor for the applicant. This document was not filed with the Court but claimed to contain key points for consideration by the Court. Those key points were that:
·The Registrar’s order made 30 January 2025 was void ab initio for fraud.
·There had been no assignment or consent to use the respondent’s names or to refer to his vessel, therefore penalties applied.
·The respondent’s affidavits were unrebutted. Therefore, fraud was involved and the hearing of the applicant’s application for an order was a “fundamental violation of due process and void ab initio. The Court lacks lawful authority and jurisdiction.
·The affidavits on which the applicant relied to satisfy the requirements of the act were rebutted by the respondent and therefore his assertions were truth in law.
·The respondent exercised his Right of Subrogation at the hearing before the Registrar which was ignored by the applicant’s solicitor and therefore there was Tacit Acquince (sic) on behalf of the applicant which was not accepted by the Registrar.
·There was late filing of affidavits and submissions by the applicant’s solicitor which was a ‘constructive fraud’. The respondent’s affidavits should be accepted as proof of the facts asserted therein.
·The promissory note had not been redeemed or monetised and therefore the Judgment Debt was satisfied.
The solicitor for the applicant opposed receipt of the key points document and the Court did not require the applicant to respond to it because it was a repetition of the submissions made by the respondent before and at the hearing of the application for review.
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The applicant relied on the outlines of written submissions dated 28 January 2025 (provided to the Registrar) and 24 April 2025 (provided to this Court). The applicant submitted that the necessary formal requirement of s 52(1) of the Act had been satisfied both before the Registrar and this Court. The applicant also submitted that each of the grounds of opposition to the making of the sequestration order lacked merit. There was no attempt by the respondent to prove that he was solvent and there was no credible proof that the Judgment Debt claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice and Creditor’s Petition was not owing.
The promissory note was no more than a piece of paper and was without legal effect (see Bank of Queensland v G.L. & L.A. Collis Pty Ltd [2019] VCC 2062 at [82] per Judge Cosgrave). Further the provision of a promissory note was not an approved method of payment for tax-related liabilities under the Taxation Administration Regulations 2017 (Cth) (Regulations) (reg 21) (see Mesha Feet Pty Ltd v Allen acting (as Deputy Commissioner of Taxation) [2024] FCA 680 (Allen) at [44] per Button J). Therefore, the promissory note did not discharge the Judgment Debt claimed in the Creditor’s Petition.
The applicant also denied all allegations of fraud which must be clearly made and proven. It was the obligation of the respondent to clearly articulate and then prove all allegations of fraud. He had not done so. Simple assertions without evidence do not establish fraud, nor does it require the applicant to rebut such allegations to disprove them. The debt claimed was proven and nothing in the respondent’s submissions revealed sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order.
This Court and the County Court of Victoria had jurisdiction in relation to the Judgment Debt and the obligation to pay tax was an obligation imposed by the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA) and not by contract, international contract or otherwise.
There was no prejudice suffered or identified by the respondent by the filing of any affidavit or submission and no denial of procedural fairness by the Registrar who granted the applicant an adjournment of the first hearing of the Creditor’s Petition on 12 December 2024 to advance his case. The application for review should be dismissed and the Registrar’s order affirmed.
REPLY
The respondent submitted that because the applicant did not call any witness to testify to rebut his affidavits they must be taken to be the truth in law and in commerce.
CONSIDERATION
The reasoning of Button J in Allen at [44] and [45] is dispositive of this application for review and the principal submission made by the respondent that the promissory note discharged the debt and Judgment Debt due to the applicant under the TAA. The submission that presentation of the promissory note discharges the respondent’s liability to the applicant is spurious and must be rejected. Payment by a promissory note is not a means of payment of a tax related liability approved by the applicant under reg 21 of the Regulations. The alleged tender of the promissory note and the applicant’s refusal to redeem it does not operate as an accord and satisfaction or acceptance of any alternative method of payment by the applicant.
The case of Butler, cited by the respondent, is not authority for the proposition that there is a binding accord and satisfaction in relation to an unpaid debt upon refusal to redeem a promissory note drawn personally by the debtor. The decision of the High Court in that case and in particular the reasons of Issacs J at page 96, show that for there to be a binding contract not to commence proceeding or to not enforce a legal right there must be valuable consideration given by the creditor. There was none in this case. There was no accord and satisfaction reached in relation to the Judgment Debt and no waiver of an entitlement to payment of the statutory debt by the applicant simply because the respondent purported to tender a promissory note drawn on himself.
I have found that the applicant has satisfied the requirements of s 52(1) of the Act and the Registrar was entitled to make a sequestration order on 30 January 2025. The respondent has not satisfied this Court that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made.
Each of the submissions made by the respondent as to why no order ought to be made must be rejected because they have no foundation in law or fact. Each of those submissions is addressed as follows.
CONTRACT
The obligation to pay a tax liability under Sch 1 of the TAA is a pecuniary liability to the Commonwealth arising under a Taxation law (sub-div 255A of Sch 1 of the TAA). It is not a debt arising from contract. The applicant is not obliged to enter into a contract or prove the existence of a contract with the respondent to recover a pecuniary liability. The respondent’s submission that the applicant must provide or prove a valid ‘international contract’ has no substance or foundation in Australian law. The respondent does not identify any legal basis for his assertions as to the applicable law of contract or his authority for the proposition that absent knowing maternal consent he is not bound by the laws of the Commonwealth or the States and Territories of Australia. The absence of proof by the applicant of a binding contract with the respondent is not a sufficient reason not to make a sequestration order against his estate.
There is also no authority for the proposition that proof of a contract at law or a debt due must be established by evidence from a forensic accountant. This is neither a principle of the Common law or any other Australian law. The absence of forensic accounting evidence as to the entitlement to a Judgment Debt entered in the County Court does not without more establish sufficient grounds to not make a sequestration order. The respondent is required to satisfy the Court on admissible evidence that a sequestration order ought not be made because the Judgment Debt does not reflect the true indebtedness of the debtor to the petitioning creditor (see Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 at [54]-[55] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ (Ramsay)). The respondent has not satisfied that onus nor are there any admissible facts upon which the Court could exercise the discretion under s 52(2) of the Act.
SOVERIGN CITIZENSHIP
Although the respondent did not refer to himself as a ‘sovereign citizen’ many of his submissions and the documents upon which he sought to rely have the hallmarks of sovereign citizen ideology. In the recent decision of Busch v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2025] QCAT 220 at [14], Member Poteri of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal said:
[14] The term “sovereign citizen was discussed in the matter of Pivotto v Queensland Police Service — Weapons Licencing [2025] QCAT 130. At paragraph 32 the presiding member said:
The origins of the sovereign citizen … are etched in history. It is said to have first begun in America during the patriot movement and draws upon central tenants of social and political philosophy — the social contract, natural rights and the theory of the state.
Its anti-government platforms are strongly embedded with a mixture of conspiracy theories, constitutional re-interpretations and alternative versions of history.
In a nutshell, sovereign citizens are people who believe that the laws of the state do not apply to them as they have revoked their ‘consent’ for this to occur. They consider themselves to be ‘natural’ persons — born with their own natural rights that are unable to be constrained by governments. Often they refer to the ‘common law’ as being the only law they recognise as legitimate.
Usually they oppose the very foundations of our democracy and rely on pseudo legal language, piecemeal, cryptic and often incorrect legal arguments to assert their independence.
…
The respondent’s reliance on the Bills of Exchange Act, Copyright law, the law of Contract and the presumption of fraud are consistent with these notions of pseudo-law.
The respondent claims that he gave the Registrar notice of his status as a ‘Victorian State National’. He did not clearly identify to this Court how he had done so. In the EB that he produced to this Court the respondent produced a copy of a Mandatory Notice that the vessels doing business under his name and all derivates thereof are not subject to Territorial or Municipal law (EB 21). He claims that any Municipal Officers and employees have no permission to approach or address them. Any harm resulting from trespass shall be subject to full commercial liability and penalty under the Crimes Act 1958 (Cth). The respondent also refers to various unassigned claims to copyright in his name and all derivates thereof. None of these documents are admissible and do not constitute proof of the matters asserted in them under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) or the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (ss 55 and 59). All of these claims have no basis in Australian law and do not establish any basis upon which the Registrar or this Court ought not make a sequestration order for the debt claimed in the Creditor’s Petition.
The respondent also submitted at the hearing of the application of review that the applicant (and the Court) must establish a ‘territorial connection’ to establish jurisdiction over the respondent’s estate. No authority for that proposition was referred to by the respondent. The power of the Parliament of Australia to make laws in respect of bankruptcy is contained in s 51(xvii) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth). Pursuant to that power the Act was made and prior to the Act, laws in respect of bankruptcy and the power to seize a debtor’s assets and distribute them among creditors date back to 1542 and the Act of Elizabeth 1 in 1571. Simply because the respondent claims to have absented himself from the laws of the Commonwealth and the State of Victoria, by a Mandatory Notice (EB 21) and the ‘vessels doing business’ under his names, does not remove him from the operation of the Act or the TAA. There is a sufficient jurisdictional connection between the respondent, the Judgment Debt, the Creditor’s Petition and the power to make a sequestration order under the Act to invoke the Registrar’s power to do so.
The jurisdiction of this Court and other courts under the Act is an important commercial remedy available to protect and regulate persons dealing in contract and commerce, with insolvent individuals and to give the debtor a fresh start (Ramsay at [59] and McMaster, Re; Ex parte McMaster (1991) 33 FCR 70; (1991) 105 ALR 156 at 159 and at 72-73 per Hill J). If individuals wish to invoke the law of Contract and the laws of commerce then it is fundamental that they also submit to the powers created by the Act unless they can establish, on admissible evidence and according to recognised principles of law, that there is sufficient reason not to make a sequestration order. There was no error of law by the Registrar in proceeding to make an order against the respondent’s estate upon proof of the requirements of s 52(1) of the Act and in the absence of proof of other sufficient cause under s 52(2) of the Act.
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE
The respondent claimed that his unrebutted evidence in the documents described as Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit establishes the proof of the matters asserted therein. This was the respondent said “Truth in Law”. No authority, statutory or otherwise was produced to support that proposition.
Insofar as allegation of fraud are to be made it has long been established that an allegation must be clear and distinct and must be so stated as to show that fraud is charged. It is not allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts alleged but must be clearly alleged and distinctly proven (Davy v Garrett (1877) 7 Ch D 473 at 489). In order to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud it is usually necessary or at least preferable to commence a fresh proceeding (see McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529 (McDonald) at 533 per Barwick CJ). Regardless of procedure an allegation of fraud is a serious matter and a judgment will be set aside on that ground only after an affirmative finding of the fraud alleged (McDonald at 535 per Taylor J). The onus of proof is substantial, and fraud is not to be lightly inferred. Proof must be strict and cogent (see S G White Pty Ltd v Findlay (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 484 and Karam v Palmone Shoes Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 148 at [31] per Nettle JA).
It is not sufficient for the respondent to simply assert that the Judgment Debt was procured as a result of fraud or that the sequestration order was procured by fraud and then to reverse the onus of proof to require the applicant to prove otherwise. All of the authorities referred to in the preceding paragraph are to the contrary. The respondent has not established that the pecuniary liability, the Judgment Debt or the sequestration order were obtained due to any dishonest or fraudulent design or contrary to known evidence. These submissions and the unparticularised allegations of fraud must be dismissed. They are also based on a contrived notion of the laws of evidence that is misconceived.
PROMISSORY NOTE
Regardless of whether the promissory note was issued pursuant to Public Law 73-100 (which is a statutory instrument of the House of Congress of the United States made on June 5, 1933 regarding the future use of coins as legal tender and gold in the United States of America), or the Financial Emergencies Acts 1931-1933 (Cth) which were enacted to ensure the reduction of salaries for parliamentarians and government spending during the Great Depression and thereafter to ensure supply from consolidated revenue, the promissory note is not a valid bill of exchange for several reason.
At the time of creation of the promissory note the respondent was an undischarged bankrupt and lacked the necessary capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill of exchange (s 27 of the Bills of Exchange Act). The respondent remained subject to the sequestration order made against his estate on 17 April 2008 of which there was proof before the Court (see the Affidavits of Final Searches of 29 January 2025 and 21 May 2025). Therefore, his ability to pledge his property for the payment of a debt under a bill of exchange or promissory note was compromised under s 58 of the Act.
Further, for the reasons explained by Judge Cosgrave (as his Honour then was) in Bank of Queensland Limited v GL and LA Collis Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] VCC 2062 at [82]-[83] (which was confirmed on appeal in Collis v Bank of Queensland Limited [2021] VSCA 17 at [107]) an unsecured home-made promissory note that is not drawn on a reputable and substantial financial institution is no more than a piece of paper devoid of legal content, other than perhaps having some effect as an acknowledgment of debt. A home-made promissory note is not equivalent to payment in cash and the applicant was under no obligation to accept it. Especially where the TAA provides for legislated modes of payment (see also Allen at [58]).
The tender of the promissory note did not discharge the obligation to pay the pecuniary liability and nor did the applicant waive the pecuniary liability by refusing to accept it as payment for the substantial liability then due.
COPYRIGHT
The respondent submits that the Registrar erred in law and commerce by failing to recognise the respondent’s claimed copyright ownership of all his names and their derivates. It is unclear why or how the Registrar erred or why the respondent’s claimed copyright would invalidate the making of a sequestration order following the presentation of a Creditor’s Petition. The respondent did not refer to any legal principle to support his contention.
It can be inferred from the Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit contained in the EB that the respondent contends that he is the victim of ‘unconscionable conduct’ and fraud in the use of his names. In oral submissions he also referred to that he has “claimed his name since birth”. The legal consequence, of which is not clear, other than the respondent’s overarching submission that “fraud vitiates everything”. For the reasons previously explained the obligation to clearly allege and prove fraud is substantial. The respondent simply alleges fraud and ‘unconscionable conduct’ without any particularisation or necessary proof. Therefore, the allegations of fraud must be rejected and dismissed.
The requisite evidence to establish the existence of copyright in a name are not present in this case. Further, there is no evidence of infringement by the applicant or any other person of any established rights. Even if there was an infringement of copyright within the meaning of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) the remedies available are limited to relief under s 115 of that Act. The submission made is based on pseudo-law. This submission is rejected and does not establish a basis upon which the Court ought not make a sequestration order under s 52(2) of the Act.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Finally, it was submitted in the grounds of review that the Registrar “erred in procedural fairness” by permitting the applicant to file late submissions and denying the opportunity to review and rebut affidavits. In oral submissions the respondent submitted that he was not given “due process”.
The Creditor’s Petition was first listed for hearing on 12 December 2024. On that occasion the respondent sough to rely on the two Living Testimony in the Form of an Affidavit dated 29 November 2024. An adjournment was ordered. The hearing of the Creditor’s Petition was adjourned to 30 January 2025. Prior to that hearing the applicant filed further affidavits in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules as it was required to do. Meanwhile the underlying facts and evidence that supported the Creditor’s Petition had not changed. The applicant filed submissions in support of the relief sought on 30 January 2025 as it was entitled to do. Those submissions explained the statutory entitlement to the relief sought. They also addressed the respondent’s claim that the promissory note discharged the Judgement Debt. The respondent well knew the basis on which a sequestration order was sought and was not denied an opportunity to respond to or file evidence in opposition or to establish proof that for ‘other sufficient cause an order should not be made’ (s 52(2)(b) of the Act). The respondent was permitted to make submissions and appeared before the Registrar to do so. There was no denial of procedural fairness by the Registrar or failure to follow “due process”. The Registrar required the applicant to satisfy the requirements of s 51(1) of the Act before making the orders and it did so with evidence in admissible and approved form.
The respondent was permitted to refer to the documents presented to the Registrar on 12 December 2024 and it appears he also sought to rely on documents now contained in the EB. Before this Court the respondent was permitted to refer to the documents in the EB and to make submissions (including in the grounds of review) all of which have been entertained, considered but dismissed. There has been no denial of procedural fairness or due process in the making of the sequestration order and the respondent has not proven that a sequestration order ought not be made.
NOTICE TO PRODUCE
The notice to produce and subpoena prepared by the respondent (EB 32-6) were not filed with the Court or issued in accordance with the General Rules. In any event, the applicant did not produce any documents in response to them and that is not surprising because the documents sought were self-serving to the respondent’s submissions and not relevant to the applicant’s entitlement to a sequestration order. Even if the notice to produce and the subpoena had been prepared and filed in accordance with the General Rules they would have been struck out as irrelevant and vexatious. The fact that the applicant did not produce documents in answer to these demand does not prove that a sequestration order ought not to have been made by the Registrar.
DISPOSITION
The application for review dated 19 February 2025 is dismissed. The sequestration order of the Registrar made 30 January 2025 is affirmed.
The applicant is entitled to the costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application for review which should be paid to the applicant in priority to any other creditors pursuant to s 109(1) of the Act.
I certify that the preceding eighty-four (84) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett. Associate:
Dated: 29 July 2025
0
15
14