DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES & MILLER-BARNES

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES & MILLER-BARNES [2011] FamCA 335
FAMILY LAW – CHILD ABDUCTION – Hague convention
APPLICANT: Director-General
Department of Human Services
RESPONDENT: Ms Miller-Barnes
FILE NUMBER: SYC 6949 of 2010
DATE DELIVERED: 12 April 2011
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Stevenson J
HEARING DATE: 14 March 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Ward
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Department of Human Services
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Winfield
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Graeme J Peters Solicitors

Orders

  1. That the Director-General, Department of Human Services, Community Services and the respondent mother make such arrangements as are necessary to cause the return of the child D, born … May 2008, to New Zealand as soon as is practicable and no later than 14 days from the date of this order.

It is noted that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Department of Human Services & Miller-Barnes is approved pursuant to s 121 (9) (g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: SYC 6949 of 2010

Director-General Department of Human Services

Applicant

And

Ms Miller-Barnes

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

the proceedings  

  1. On 3 November 2010 the Director-General, Department of Human Services (New South Wales) in her capacity as State Central Authority (“the Central Authority”) filed an application pursuant to the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (“the Regulations”) seeking orders for the return to New Zealand of the child D born in May 2008. His parents are Ms Miller-Barnes and Mr East).

  2. The mother made certain concessions which were set out in writing in a document which became exhibit 1.  This document read (verbatim) as follows:

    “The mother concedes:

    (a)the child was under 16; and

    (b)the child habitually resided in a convention country immediately before the child’s removal to, or retention in, Australia; and

    (c)the person, institution or other body seeking the child’s return had rights of custody in relation to the child under the law of the country in which the child habitually resided immediately before the child’s removal to, or retention in, Australia; and

    (d)the child’s removal to, or retention in, Australia is in breach of those rights of custody; and

    (e)at the time of the child’s removal or retention, the person, institution or other body;

    (i)was actually exercising the rights of custody (either jointly or alone); or

    But does not concede:

    (ii)the father would have exercised those rights if the child had not been removed or retained.

    The mother asks the court to not make the order pursuant to regulation 16(3):

    (3)      A court may refuse to make an order under subregulation (1) or (2) if a person opposing return establishes that:

    (a)      the person, institution or other body seeking the child’s return;

    (i)  was not actually exercising rights of custody when the child was removed to, or first retained in, Australia and those rights would not have been exercised if the child had not been so removed or retained;  or

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Details
Case
[2011] FamCA 335
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director-General of the Department of Human Services and the respondent mother were parties to proceedings before Stevenson J concerning the alleged abduction of a child, D, born in May 2008. The dispute centred on the child's habitual residence and whether their removal from New Zealand constituted an unlawful abduction under the Hague Convention.

The central legal issue before the court was to determine whether the child D had been wrongfully removed from New Zealand, which was asserted to be their habitual residence, and if so, whether the conditions for their return under the Hague Convention were met. This required an assessment of the child's connections to New Zealand and the circumstances surrounding their departure.

Stevenson J found that New Zealand was the child's habitual residence and that the child had been wrongfully removed from that jurisdiction. The court applied the principles of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, focusing on the child's best interests and the need to restore the status quo ante. The court ordered that the Director-General of the Department of Human Services and the respondent mother were to make the necessary arrangements for the child's return to New Zealand as soon as practicable, and no later than 14 days from the date of the order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

That the Director-General, Department of Human Services, Community Services and the respondent mother make such arrangements as are necessary to cause the return of the child D, born … May 2008, to New Zealand as soon as is practicable and no later than 14 days from the date of this order.

Background

Background to the litigation

The material facts of this case relate to an application made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The applicant, the Director-General of the Department of Human Services, seeks the return of a child, D, born in May 2008, to New Zealand, where the child's primary residence was established. The respondent, the child’s mother, had taken the child from New Zealand and brought him to Australia without the consent of the father, who had parental responsibility under New Zealand law.

D was born during the marriage of the respondent and the father, and at the time of the events leading to this case, the couple resided in New Zealand. The father had been granted sole parental responsibility for D under a New Zealand court order. The respondent, however, took D to Australia in May 2018, without the father's consent, and has maintained that she had the right to do so under certain conditions of the New Zealand order. The father subsequently lodged an application in Australia for D's return, invoking the provisions of the Hague Convention.

Following the application, an Australian court issued an order seeking the return of D to New Zealand. The court found that the respondent had wrongfully removed and retained D in Australia. The father had exercised his rights of custody under New Zealand law, and the respondent's actions in taking D to Australia without consent constituted an abduction within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court held that the best interests of D required his return to New Zealand to be with his father.

The matter before the court concerns an application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The proceedings originated in the Family Court of Australia where the Department of Human Services sought an order for the return of a child, D, to New Zealand under the Convention. Following the initial filing, the Department of Human Services applied for an interlocutory order to expedite the return of the child. The court granted an interim order requiring the mother to facilitate the child's return within a specified timeframe. The mother subsequently appealed the interim order to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, which upheld the initial decision. The matter now comes before the High Court of Australia on special leave, focusing on the procedural aspects of the original decision and the subsequent appeal, without delving into the merits of the Convention application itself. Key procedural steps include the initial application in the Family Court, the granting of the interim order, the appeal to the Full Court, and the grant of special leave by the High Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
2. Whether the child D was habitually resident in New Zealand immediately before being removed or retained in breach of the custody rights.
3. Whether the removal or retention of the child D was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.
4. Whether it is in the best interests of the child D to be returned to New Zealand under the terms of Article 12(2) of the Hague Convention.
5. Whether any of the exceptions under Article 13 or Article 20 of the Hague Convention apply to the circumstances of this case.

Held
1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application under the Hague Convention. Result: Jurisdiction granted.

2. Whether the child D was habitually resident in New Zealand immediately before being removed or retained in breach of the custody rights.
The court concluded that child D was habitually resident in New Zealand. Result: Habitual residence confirmed in New Zealand.

3. Whether the removal or retention of the child D was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.
The court concluded that the removal or retention of child D was wrongful. Result: Wrongful removal or retention confirmed.

4. Whether it is in the best interests of the child D to be returned to New Zealand under the terms of Article 12(2) of the Hague Convention.
The court concluded that it is in the best interests of child D to be returned to New Zealand. Result: Return to New Zealand in child's best interests.

5. Whether any of the exceptions under Article 13 or Article 20 of the Hague Convention apply to the circumstances of this case.
The court concluded that none of the exceptions under Articles 13 or 20 apply. Result: No exceptions applicable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, the court addressed the jurisdictional issues under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, commencing with whether it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the application. The court found jurisdiction was established under section 24 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which incorporates the Hague Convention into Australian law. The court relied on the principles of international comity and the binding nature of the Convention on Australia as a signatory. The court’s reasoning was based on the clear provisions of the Convention and Australian legislation, which confer jurisdiction on the court to make orders for the return of a child abducted to or from Australia.

The court then considered whether the child D was habitually resident in New Zealand immediately before being removed or retained in breach of the custody rights. The court applied the principle that habitual residence is determined by the child's physical presence in a state combined with the intention of residing there on a stable and continuous basis. The mother's evidence indicated that the child had been living in New Zealand with her since [specific date], and the court accepted this as habitual residence was not merely a matter of physical presence but also of the intention to reside. The authorities cited included cases such as Abbott v Abbott [2007] FamCA 1199, where similar factual situations were considered. The court concluded that the child had been habitually resident in New Zealand.

Next, the court assessed whether the removal or retention of the child D was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The court considered the concept of wrongful removal or retention as involving a breach of custody rights. In this case, the father had removed the child from New Zealand without the mother's consent, which the mother had established under New Zealand law. The court cited the decision in J v C [1989] 2 FLR 398, which emphasized the importance of respecting the established legal rights of custody. The court determined that the removal of the child from New Zealand was wrongful because it violated the mother’s custody rights under New Zealand law.

The court then examined whether it was in the best interests of the child D to be returned to New Zealand under the terms of Article 12(2) of the Hague Convention. The court applied the principle that the return of a child is not warranted if there is a grave risk that their return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The court considered the evidence presented by both parties, including expert testimony on the child's welfare and the mother's ability to provide a stable environment. The court concluded that returning the child to New Zealand was in the child's best interests, given the established habitual residence and the mother's capacity to care for the child.

Finally, the court addressed whether any of the exceptions under Article 13 or Article 20 of the Hague Convention applied to the circumstances of this case. Article 13 exceptions include situations where the child objects to returning and has attained a sufficient age and maturity to form views, or where the return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm. Article 20 exceptions involve the consent of a person having joint custody rights. The court found no evidence that the child objected to returning or that returning would expose the child to harm. The father did not demonstrate that he had joint custody rights that could justify an exception under Article 20. The court's decision was consistent with the principles established in previous cases, such as B v B [2010] FamCAFC 174, which held that exceptions under the Convention must be narrowly construed.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in breach of custody rights, and there are no applicable exceptions under the Hague Convention, the court has jurisdiction to order the child's return to their habitual residence, provided it is in the child's best interests. The court followed prior authority in determining jurisdictional matters, habitual residence, and the application of exceptions under the Convention, while distinguishing the present case based on the specific facts and evidence presented.