Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs v Natalie Ward (a pseudonym)
[2022] QChCM 4
•2 December 2022
MAGISTRATES COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs v Natalie Ward (a pseudonym) [2022] QChCM 4
PARTIES:DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH JUSTICE AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
(Applicant)
v
NATALIE WARD
(Respondent)
FILE NO:Mount Isa CCM 666/22
PROCEEDING:Application for a Temporary Protection Order
COURT:Children’s Court, Mount Isa
DELIVERED ON:2 December 2022
DELIVERED AT: Mount Isa
HERAING DATES:28, 29, 30 November & 1 December 2022
MAGISTRATE:E. Mac Giolla Rí
ORDER:The application is dismissed (Order made on 1 December 2022)
APPEARANCES: E Morrison, Office of the Child and Family Official Solicitor for the applicant.
A Prihar, ATSILS for the respondent.
Overview
The applicant is an officer employed by the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs (‘the Department’) who works as Senior Child Safety Officer at the Mount Isa Child Safety Service Centre. The Department applies for orders in relation to Emily Ward[1], the respondent’s daughter. The respondent, Natalie Ward, is 28 years old. Emily is 16 months old. Ms Ward and Emily are indigenous.[2]
[1] All names used in this judgement, other than the names of legal representatives and the Chief Practitioner pseudonyms to protect the identity of the child in relation to whom the proceedings are taken. I note that Emily’s father is deceased.
The material relied on by the applicant is the sworn application by a departmental officer, filed 28 November 2022, an affidavit by the same officer, filed 29 November 2022 and an affidavit was filed on 30 November 2022 by ‘the Chief Practitioner’ at the Department, Dr Meegan Crawford. The applicant also provided very helpful written submissions.
The applicant seeks a Temporary Custody Order (‘TCO’):
a. Authorising an officer of her department or a police officer to have contact with Emily and to take Emily into the custody of the Chief Executive of the Department while the order is in force;
b. Directing the respondent mother, Natalie Ward, not to have contact (direct or indirect) with the child other than when a departmentally approved person is present; and
c. Authorising an officer of her department or a police officer to enter and search any place the officer reasonably believes the child is, to find the child.
The principal issue in this hearing is whether Emily will be at an unacceptable risk of suffering harm if I do not make the order. The onus is on the applicant to prove its case on the balance of probabilities.[3]
[3] S105(2)
The term ‘harm’ is given a wide definition at section 9 of the Child Protection Act 1999. (‘The Act’)
The applicant’s case is that I should infer from the Ms Ward’s care of Emily over the first 16 months of her life that Emily is at an unacceptable risk of suffering harm if she remains in Ms Ward’s care for the one to two week period until an agreed placement with Ms Ward’s aunt, Ms Johns can begin.
Ms Ward argues that the order should not be made because:
a. Both Ms Ward and the Department want to place Emily with a relative, a Ms Johns;
b. Whether or not an order is made Emily will be placed with Ms Johns within one to two weeks;
c. Whatever risk Ms Johns poses, Emily is at an equal or greater risk of harm by being unnecessarily placed in short-term foster care until the placement with Ms Johns starts.
d. Alternatively, any risk Ms Ward poses to Emily can be mitigated by making a TCO that does not grant custody to the Department but:
i.Authorises contact with Emily by police and the Department;
ii.Authorises medical treatment for Emily; and
iii.Directs Ms Ward not to have contact with Emily unless she is also in the presence of one of three named people: Friend A, Friend B and, a relative, Mrs Thompson.
Relevant Legislation
The relevant legislation is set out in Part 3AA of the Act. The relevant provisions in that part are:
51AB Purpose
(1) This part provides for the making of temporary custody orders.
(2) The purpose of a temporary custody order is to authorise the action necessary to ensure the immediate safety of a child—
(a) if the chief executive has referred a child protection matter relating to the child to the litigation director under the Director of Child Protection Litigation Act2016, section 15—while the chief executive works with the litigation director under section 53A; or
(b) otherwise—while the chief executive decides the most appropriate action to meet the child’s ongoing
51AC Making of application for order
…
(4) The magistrate may refuse to consider the application until the officer gives the magistrate all the information the magistrate requires51AE Making of temporary custody order
The magistrate may make a temporary custody order for the child only if he is satisfied-(a) the child will be at unacceptable risk of suffering harm if the order is not made; and
(b) the following person will be able, within the term of the temporary custody order, to decide the most appropriate action to meet the child’s ongoing protection and care needs and start taking that action
(i) if the chief executive has not referred a child protection matter relating to the child to the litigation director under the Director of Child Protection Litigation Act 2016, section 15—the chief executive; (ii) otherwise—the litigation director.
51AF Provisions of temporary custody order
(1) The magistrate may make a temporary custody order for the child that provides for any 1 or more of the following the magistrate considers to be appropriate in the circumstances—
(a) authorising an authorised officer or police officer—
(i) to have contact with the child; and
(ii) to take the child into, or keep the child in, the chief executive’s custody while the order is in force;
(b) authorising the child’s medical examination or treatment;
(c) directing a parent not to have contact (direct or indirect)—
(i) with the child; or
(ii) with the child other than when a stated person or a person of a stated category is present.
(2) In addition, the order may authorise an authorised officer or police officer to enter and search any place the officer
I am satisfied that the Litigation Director will be able, within the term of the temporary custody order, to decide the most appropriate action to meet the child’s ongoing protection and care needs and start taking that action. I am satisfied that the Litigation director could do that within 3 business days. As such, I have jurisdiction to make the TCO provided that I am satisfied that Emily is at an unacceptable risk of suffering harm if the order is not made.
10. While Part 3AA sets out the jurisdiction of the Court to make a Temporary Custody Order, I must exercise that jurisdiction by reference to the following principles:
5A – the ‘paramount principle’, which gives primacy to the best interests of the child;
5B – where several principles are set out covering a child’s rights, the role of the family and the State in ensuring a child’s welfare, principles governing placement and the need to avoid delay in dealing with matters of this kind.
5BA – that permanency and long-term stability are to be preferred in the administration of the Act and, in particular, that the first preference in any given situation is for the child to be cared for by its family.
5C – that, in dealing with indigenous children/families, the principles of prevention, partnership, placement, participation and connection have particular importance and are designed to ensure, as far as possible, that connection to culture and family are maintained.
5D – sets out relevant fairness principles in relation the administration of the Act, including by necessary implication when it is administered by a Court.
6AB – requiring a Court dealing with indigenous children to have regard to their customs and traditions and the placement principles.
Ex parte application 28 November 2022
11. The application was initially made on an ex parte basis on the afternoon of 28 November 2022. The written application sought an ex parte hearing because:
a. Ms Ward had been advised of the Department’s assessment that a two-year order would be sought;
b. So informed, Ms Ward was generally agreeable that Emily would be placed with her aunt, Ms Johns; and
c. The matter was urgent because Ms Ward had recently withdrawn her co-operation with the Department.
12. When Ms Morrison of OCFOS appeared by telephone after-hours on 28 November 2022 to argue the application, a further basis for an ex parte hearing was put forward, namely that Ms Ward does not have a phone and the person on whom she depended for a phone was not available at the residence at that time.
13. In those circumstances I began to hear the application ex parte.
14. In the course of hearing the application I considered that:
a. Emily is at some risk of harm while in Ms Ward’s custody;
b. The proposed placement with Ms Ward’s aunt, Ms Johns, is entirely suitable. Ms Johns is already a Departmentally approved carer and Emily would have access to other close family members when in Ms Johns’ care.
c. Ms Ward is in favour of Emily being placed with Ms Johns and, given the opportunity, will deliver the child to Ms Johns;[4]
d. There was inadequate information in the application about Ms Johns’ willingness to take Emily on, though it seemed likely that she would be willing;
e. There was inadequate information about the timing of and details for Emily’s travel to Ms Johns, who lives at a remote location.
f. The Department proposed that Emily have a short stay with foster carers between her removal from Ms Ward and her going to Ms Johns;
g. Given Ms Ward’s intention to co-operate with the plan to place Emily with Ms Johns and the relatively low risk posed to Emily by leaving her with Ms Ward for a week or two, the stay with foster carers which will separate Emily from the only carer she has known since birth seemed unnecessary and likely to be traumatic for Emily.
h. This trauma was likely to be exacerbated because the application made allowance for Ms Ward to have only two hours of contact with Emily per week while Emily is in foster care.
i. Equally, in the context of Ms Ward’s likely co-operation, an order authorising Emily’s removal by force seemed likely to cause Emily further unnecessary trauma.
j. Ms Ward’s conduct on 28 November 2022, which I will deal with later in these reasons, was not an indication of a permanent withdrawal of co-operation with the Department by Ms Ward.
[4] There was no argument by the applicant that Ms Ward was a risk of not giving Emily to Ms Johns. For the sake of completeness, I note my finding that, given the opportunity to do so, Ms Ward will give Emily to Ms Johns.
15. I communicated these issues to Ms Morrison.
16. In light of the above, I acted under s51AC(4) and declined to consider the application in the absence of the following further information:
a. Confirmation that Ms Johns is or is not willing to care for Emily.
b. Details of the proposed dates of travel for Emily to Ms Johns’ remote location and, in particular, whether it is proposed that Ms Ward will travel with Emily.
c. Any psychological research material the applicant wished to rely on in relation to any harm, or lack thereof, that Emily might experience if police are required to forcibly remove her from her mother's care.
d. Any psychological research material the applicant wished to rely on in relation to any harm, or lack thereof, that Emily might experience during a short placement in foster care between being removed from Ms Ward and her placement with Ms Johns.
17. The applicant was invited to file further material on 29 November 2022, to serve the respondent and to argue the matter at the Mount Isa Child Protection callover at 2pm that day.
Hearing, 29 November 2022
18. The further material filed was an affidavit by the applicant which, in summary,:
a. Confirmed that Ms Johns was willing and suitable to care for Emily;
b. Confirmed that a flight to Ms Johns remote location is available as early as 7 December (8 days after the filing of the affidavit.)
c. There is evidence Ms Ward was drinking to excess while caring for Emily on the night of 28 November 2022 and that she has had a falling out with Ms Thompson, at who’s home she has most recently resided.
d. While Ms Ward now has somewhere else to stay it appears less than ideal for her and Emily.
e. In discissions with departmental officers on 29 November 2022, Ms Ward confirmed her desire for Emily to live with Ms Johns and that she (Ms Ward) planned on moving back to Mornington too.[5]
[5] Affidavit of Departmental Officer, 29 November 2022, at page 3, (L)
19. Of note is that the affidavit was silent on three of the matters I had sough information about on 28 November 2022, namely:
a. Whether the Department intended to arrange for Ms Ward to travel with Emily to Mornington Island;
b. Psychological research material on potential harm to Emily from forcible removal;
c. Psychological research material on potential harm to Emily from a short stay in foster care.
20. When the matter came on for hearing on the afternoon of 29 November 2022 Ms Morrison, who appeared for the applicant by phone, advised me that the Department did not have any psychological material of the type sought by me.
21. Ms Ward was represented by Mr Prihar. On her behalf, Mr Prihar indicated that she agreed with the placement with Ms Johns and opposed any order but in the alternative sought an order in the terms I have set out at paragraph 7(d), above.
22. Ms Morrison advised the Court that Ms Johns had indicated that she would be travelling to Mount Isa next week for unrelated personal business but might be available to take custody of Emily at that time. This information created some uncertainty about the precise date of handover but involved no material change to the timeframe in which Emily would be given to Ms Johns.
23. I heard submissions from the parties on the question of whether s51AF(a) & (c) gave me jurisdiction to order 24/7 placement with Ms Ward or her nominee. I my view I have no jurisdiction to make an order for 24/7 placement under s51AF, nor do I have jurisdiction to make the alternative order suggested by the respondent, i.e. an order granting the Department access to Emily but not custody of Emily.[6]
24. I formed the view that the question that fell to me to decide was, in light of Ms Ward’s express plan to place Emily with her aunt, whether the risk of allowing Ms Ward to keep Emily in her care until she delivered Emily to Ms Johns in around one week (or at most 2 weeks) outweighed the risk of harm to Emily from placing her in foster care for that period.
25. In those circumstances I declined to consider the application further until I was provided with the psychological information I had requested.
Affidavit of Dr Meegan Crawford
26. On 30 November 2022 the Department filed a 350+ page affidavit from ‘the Chief Practitioner’ at the Department, Dr Meegan Crawford. Dr Crawford has worked for the Department since 1991 and has a Degree in Social Work and a PhD in an unspecified discipline but presumably a discipline that is relevant to her work with the Department.
27. Dr Crawford’s affidavit was produced in response to my request for information about any harm that might arise in from the removal of Emily from her mother and her placement in foster care.
28. The affidavit itself was 3 pages long but annexed 350 plus pages of brochures, reports and an academic article. It also referred to a particular ‘tool kit’ by way of a link to a website, which itself contained a further 68 resources.[7] The material was of limited assistance to me in understanding the risk of harm from the course of action proposed by the Department because the affidavit focused primarily on the identification and assessment of abuse and neglect, rather than on any issues concerning removal and foster placement.
[7] Para 6(iv) of Dr Crawford’s affidavit
29. The following aspects of the affidavit were of some relevance:
a. Dr Crawford was unaware of any research on the impact of forcibly removing a child from its mother/family, with or without police assistance.
b. Dr Crawford acknowledged that such removal is distressing and traumatic for children.
c. A 2004 study of the British foster care system found that “nearly three quarters of looked after children thought that being looked after had been a 'good idea'”
d. A 2018 study of the Australian foster care system found that 93% of children with experience of foster care when surveyed said that they felt “safe and secure” in their foster placement.[8] I note that this was in the context of foster homes that created a sense of belonging – a sense that, on any view, will not be achieved in a 1-2 week stay by a 16 month old child.
[8] Para 13 of Dr Crawford’s affidavit and page 286 of her affidavit.
30. Ultimately, Dr Crawford acknowledged that removal causes trauma for children but did not assist me to understand the likely consequences of that trauma. I infer, in any event, that any evidence on this point could only be general in nature and that responses to removal and placement on children would be highly individualised.
31. The hearing scheduled for 30 November 2022 could no proceed in a meaningful way because Mr Prihar needed time to consider Dr Crawford’s affidavit.
32. During the mention of the matter I was advised that officers from Child Safety had sighted Emily on 30 November 2022 and that Emily she appeared well.
Hearing, 1 December 2022
33. When the matter came on before me again on 1 December 2022 I was provided with the following further information by the parties:
a. There are good reasons to question whether Ms Ward’s nominated Friends A & B would substantially mitigate any risk to Emily. This was potentially relevant should I have been inclined to make an order directing Ms Ward not to have contact with Emily unless in the presence of these individuals.
b. The Department is in a position to fund and to make transport arrangements so that Emily can get to Ms Johns even if this TCO application is not granted.
c. The Department will decline to certify Ms Johns as an approved kinship carer under s133 unless I make the TCO sought by the Department in this application. Instead, the Department will do all the necessary research and paperwork in preparation for certification but, ultimately, the Chief Executive will not consider (or will not be asked to consider) granting a certificate unless this application for a TCO is successful. In my view, this is a factor which I do cannot take into account as it there is no legal basis for the Chief Executive not to consider an application based on the whether this Court makes particular orders.
Assessment of the evidence of the risk posed by Ms Ward
34. My assessment of the sworn application and affidavit material is that Emily is at some risk of harm were she to stay in Ms Ward’s care on a long-term basis because Ms Ward is dependent on alcohol to a high degree.
35. Whether or not I make the order Emily will not be staying with Ms Ward on a long-term basis. I find that Emily will be placed with Ms Johns by 7 December 2022 at the earliest or, even if there are unforeseen complications, within two weeks of the handing down of these reasons.
36. The risk of harm posed to Emily by Ms Ward’s drinking is, primarily, a risk of emotional and psychological harm due to a risk of neglect, though there is a limited risk of physical harm.
37. The emotional and psychological harm neglect, if it occurs, is likely to be manifested in:
a. Emily being physically proximate to Ms Ward with Ms Ward ignoring her during drinking sessions and focusing on drinking; and
b. Emily’s likely presence during extended drinking sessions where she will witness the effects of substantial alcohol consumption on Ms Ward and other adults, including its effect on Ms Ward’s mental health.
38. The material also supports a finding that were Emily to remain in Ms Ward’s care Emily would be at risk (though a low risk) of physical harm. I reach that conclusion because of the following incidents that all occurred in August 2022:[9]
a. Ms Ward was so intoxicated that she dropped Emily on her face on the road. There is no evidence of any injury to Emily.
b. Ms Ward put Emily on the side of the road and then placed herself in the middle of the road, apparently waiting to be hit by a car. Emily was not in danger of being hit by a car but the risk of physical harm to Emily in circumstances where Ms Ward was so distressed/intoxicated was substantial.
c. A report was made that Ms Ward handles Emily roughly when drunk and ‘slaps’ her around when she cries.
d. Ms Ward slapped Emily on the back and family had to intervene to stop her hitting Emily.
e. An intoxicated person punched Ms Ward while she was holding Emily.
[9] See [9], [14] & [15] of the application.
39. Ms Ward is facing criminal charges of Common Assault (x2) in relation to the incident at (c), above. The charges preferred suggest that no substantial physical injury was inflicted on Emily.
40. There is evidence that between 2015 and 2021 Ms Ward was convicted of ‘street’ type offences, breaches of DVO and Wounding (2019). I have no information in relation to the penalties she received nor the facts involved in those offences.
41. There is also evidence that the Department worked constructively with Ms Ward between September 2022 and 28 November 2022. Most recently, Ms Ward lived with a relative, Ms Thompson, who assisted in caring for Emily, particularly if Ms Ward was drinking. In this time officers of the Department were visiting Ms Ward’s home and assessing her care for Emily. There is no evidence of any neglect or mistreatment of Emily in this period, and I infer that departmental officers were regularly checking on Emily in this period.
42. I note during this time Ms Ward did not follow through with proposed treatment for alcohol dependency.
43. The immediate trigger for this application was a visit by officers of the Department, including the applicant, to Ms Ward’s home on 28 November 2022. During that visit Ms Ward spoke to the officers and answered some of their questions but ultimately told them she didn’t want to speak to them anymore that day. Ms Ward walked back into her house and closed the door. The officers asked to see Emily so Ms Ward reopened the door. Emily was described as screaming and crying but the officers noted no evidence of injury or harm, thought the only saw Emily from a distance.
44. It appears that the departmental officers took Ms Ward’s behaviour as a sign that Ms Ward was withdrawing all cooperation with the Department. If this was the view taken, I can see no justification for it in the description of the incident provided in the application. In addition, since these proceedings started there has been ongoing co-operation:
a. On 29 November departmental officers discussed the case with Ms Ward and Emily[10]
b. On 30 November Emily was again sighted by the department, inferentially with Ms Ward’s cooperation.
[10] Affidavit of departmental officer, filed 29 November 2022. [14].
45. I find that the risk of physical harm to Emily has receded substantially since August 2022 because of the interventions put in place by the Department and her ongoing cooperation with the Department. While the risk of physical harm has not gone away entirely, I find the risk that Emily will suffer physical harm from Ms Ward’s neglect or deliberate action is now quite remote, particularly in the context of the one to two week period Emily will be in her care before Ms Johns takes over.
46. On the evidence before me in find that Ms Ward provides Emily with appropriate shelter, food and medical care. There is no suggestion by the applicant that Emily is not in good physical health.
Decision
47. In Director of Child Protection Litigation v SP & ZC,[11] Judge Smith of the CCQ endorsed the following:
“In some custody cases…it is necessary for the Judge in the exercise of his discretion to have regard to the guiding rule that if of two decisions available to the court one would expose the child to risk or more risk than another decision, then that course should usually be adopted which is the least likely to expose such child to such risk.”
[11] [2018] QChC 19
48. As contemplated in the extract above, I am in a situation where I have two competing risks of harm: the risk posed by leaving Emily in her mother’s care for 1-2 weeks versus the risk of harm by placing Emily in foster care for 1-2 weeks.
49. Assessing the acceptability of risk requires an assessment of both the likelihood of an event and the consequences of that event. An extremely unlikely event can present an unacceptable risk if the consequences of the event are substantial. Conversely, the risk from an event causing limited harm may be unacceptable if the event is highly likely to occur.
50. If I were to make the order, the advantage in terms of Emily’s best interest would be that Emily will be removed from the risk of being harmed by Ms Ward’s neglect, drinking and irrational behaviour.
51. If I do not make the order, Emily will remain in Ms Ward’s care for a further one to two weeks. It is difficult to assess the impact a couple of weeks of the same type of life that Emily has experienced for 16 months would have on Emily. While appreciating that harm can be cumulative, it was difficult to see that two more weeks is likely to harm Emily to any substantially greater extent than any harm that has already occurred.
52. The disadvantage of making the order is that Emily will, necessarily be exposed to the new trauma of being placed with strangers for a one to two week period between the making of the order and her placement with Ms Johns. I find with a high degree of certainty that such a placement will cause a 16 month old child harm.[12] I suspect that it would cause substantial harm, though I cannot quantify that harm in a more meaningful way due, in part, to the absence of relevant information in the applicant’s material, which is relevant given the onus of proof.
[12] In terms of Emily’s best interests
53. Though the harm caused by the short placement in foster care may not be profound in nature, the harm is almost certain to arise.
54. This conclusion is not a finding that foster care is not an appropriate form of care for children who need to be removed from their parents. The undoubted trauma and distress a child will suffer on being removed from its parent(s) will often be a price well worth paying to remove a child from an abusive or neglectful family situation.
55. It is likely, in my view, that the harm caused by the proposed short placement in foster care is equal to or greater than the harm that will be caused by allowing Emily to remain in the left she knows for one to two more weeks.
56. The onus is on the prosecution to prove to me that Emily will be at an unacceptable risk of harm if I do not make the order. As discussed above, Emily is at risk of harm whether or not I make the order. I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that the risk of harm involved in leaving Emily with Ms Ward until Ms Johns takes over is greater than the risk of harm arising for a short placement in foster care.
57. I would, on that basis alone, refuse the order.
Assessing the order sought by the Department against the principles in the Act.
58. I have also assessed how placing Emily in foster care for one to two weeks until Emily is placed with Ms Johns aligns with the principles in the Act:[13]
[13] I have omitted some principles because they clearly did not arise in relation to this TCO or are intractably neutral in the context of the decision to be made.
| Section | Principle (Summary) | My assessment |
| 5A | Best interests of the child | Turns on my assessment of which option would cause least harm. |
| 5B(a) | Child’s right to be protected from harm. | Turns on my assessment of which option would cause least harm. |
| 5B(b)&(c) | Prefer supporting family over other options | Foster care is inconsistent with this principle |
| 5B(e) | State should limit action to only what is warranted in the circumstances. | Allowing only 2 hours contact per week for Ms Ward is a substantial over-reach by the State and well beyond what is warranted. |
| 5B(g) | Long term care to be preferred | A one to two week placement in foster care is piecemeal and inconsistent with this principle |
| 5B(h) | Removed children should be cared for by kin | Interposing foster care between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is inconsistent with this principle. |
| 5B(k) | Child to retain relationships with parents and kin | Interposing foster care between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is inconsistent with this principle. |
| 5BA(2)(a) | Positive relationships with family and carers | Allowing only 2 hours contact per week for Ms Ward is contrary to this principle. |
| 5BA(2)(b) | Stable living arrangements are to be preferred | 1-2 week foster care placement between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is contrary with this principle. |
| Section | Principle (Summary) | My assessment |
| 5BA(2)(c) | Sense of permanence is important | Interposing foster care between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is contrary with this principle. |
| 5BA(4)(a) | 1st preference is that child is to be cared for by child’s family. | 1-2 week foster care placement between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is contrary with this principle. |
| 5BA(4)(a) | 2nd preference is that child is to be cared for by extended family. | 1-2 week foster care placement between the mother’s care and placement with Ms Johns’ is contrary with this principle. |
| 5C(1)(a) | ATSI people have the right to self determination | Where the ATSI mother and ATSI aunty agree on what should happen to an ATSI child, 1-2 weeks in foster care is precisely the opposite of this principle. |
| 5C(2)(a) | Prevention – ATSI child has a right to be brought up in own family and community | Placement in foster care, where a viable family based alternative is available is contrary to this principle. |
| 5C(2)(b) | Partnership – ATSI people have a right to participate in decisions. | Where the ATSI mother and ATSI agree on what should happen to the ATSI child, 1-2 weeks in foster care is precisely the opposite of implementing this principle. |
59. I note that paragraph 10 of Dr Crawford’s affidavit emphasises the importance of these principles in mitigating the distress and trauma caused to children by their removal from parents.
60. In all the circumstances of this case and considering the principles in the Act, I dismiss the application.
In my view, under s51 I could make an order directing that Emily be medically examined and/or not have contact with Emily even if I don’t make an order for custody to the Department. I cannot make an order for contact by departmental officer and police without making an order for custody.
0
1
4