Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs & Handley
[2023] FedCFamC1F 301
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs & Handley [2023] FedCFamC1F 301
File number: BRC 4399 of 2023 Judgment of: BENNETT J Date of judgment: 11 April 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW- CHILD ABDUCTION- where return of a child is sought to the United States under the Family Law (Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986- consideration of the nature of ex-parte relief and the role of an independent children’s lawyer. Legislation: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Family Law (Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 reg 14
Cases: H v K (Return Order) [2017] EWHC 1141 (Fam) Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 42 Date of hearing: 11 April 2023 Place: Melbourne (via MS Teams) Counsel for the Applicant: McInness Wilson Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Ex-parte ORDERS
BRC 4399 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH JUSTICE AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Applicant
AND: MS HANDLEY
Respondent
order made by:
BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 APRIL 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.That leave is granted to the applicant State Central Authority to proceed ex-parte with orders in the terms of paragraphs 2 to 10 of the application filed 11 April 2023.
2.That this matter be adjourned for the further hearing of the said application before me at 10.00 am on Friday 14 April 2023 (“the adjourned date”).
3.That the applicant State Central Authority, Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs, Queensland (“the applicant SCA”) effect service of the application and this Order upon the respondent mother as soon as practicable and be in a position to prove service on the adjourned date.
4.That in the event that the respondent mother has been served with the application by the adjourned date:-
(a)she attend Court personally on the adjourned date and remain at Court pending further order of the Court;
(b)the mother deliver the child X, born 2022 (“the child”) to the Child Care Room at the Brisbane Registry of the Court by not later than 9:30 am, where the child shall remain pending further order of the Court and the applicant SCA be entitled to observe the child; and
(c)file and serve a Notice of Address for Service in the prescribed form.
5.IT IS DIRECTED that my Associate reserve a place in the Child Care Room for X, born 2022 on the adjourned date from 9.30 am onwards.
6.That until further order or return of the said child to the United States of America, the applicant SCA or her delegate make such arrangements as are necessary for the purposes of placing the said child with an appropriate person, institution or body and upon such terms and conditions as she shall determine to secure the welfare of the said child pending final determination of this proceeding.
7.That such Officers of the applicant SCA, as the Secretary to such department may from time to time direct, be and are hereby authorised and permitted to visit and enter the place of residence of the respondent and to have such access to the child as they may reasonably require for the purposes of investigating and determining the welfare of the child and if considered appropriate to take the child into care and make such alternative arrangements for accommodation of the child as she sees fit.
8.That until further order, the respondent, MS HANDLEY born 1980 by her servants or agents be restrained by injunction from causing or permitting or suffering the said child X, born 2022 (Amended 12 April 2023):-
(a)to be removed from the Commonwealth of Australia and in this regard all officers of the Australian Federal Police be directed to enforce, if required, the provisions of such order AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Australian Federal Police give effect to the order by placing the name of the said child on the Airport Watch List in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia;
(b)to be removed from the State of Queensland; and
(c)to reside at any other than their present residential address of B Street, Suburb C in the State of Queensland or any other residence at which the applicant SCA has agreed in writing that the child may reside; and
(d)to be assessed by a psychologist, counsellor, medical practitioner or like professional for the sole or ancillary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in this proceeding without the prior written consent of the applicant.
9.That forthwith upon service of this Order on the respondent mother, the respondent mother notify the solicitors for the applicant SCA in writing of the name and date of birth of any other occupants of any place at which the child resides and keep the said solicitors informed of any changes to those arrangements in writing.
10.That until further order, the respondent mother, MS HANDLEY born 1980 be restrained by injunction from departing from the Commonwealth of Australia and, in this regard, all officers of the Australian Federal Police be directed to enforce, if required, the provisions of this Order AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Australian Federal Police give effect to this order by placing the name of the respondent mother on the Airport Watch List in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia until further order. (Amended 12 April 2023)
11.That the prohibition against removal of X, born 2022 from Australia, out of Queensland and from her current residence applies mutatis mutandis to the requesting parent, MR D, born 1978, of E Street, City F, G State, United States of America AND IT IS DIRECTED that the applicant bring this Order to the attention of the requesting central authority so that the requesting parent will have notice of it.
12.That the respondent, her servants or agents forthwith deliver up to Ms J or her nominee (as an appropriately authorised officer for the applicant SCA) for safe custody any and all passports held in the name of the child or upon which the child appears and, then, be and is hereby restrained from applying for any further or other passports for the child pending further orders of this Court.
13.That a sealed copy of these Orders be provided forthwith to the Marshal of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, the Commissioner of the Federal Police and the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
14.AND IT IS REQUESTED that, on the adjourned date the applicant State Central Authority - Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs, Queensland - be in a position to inform the Court of what arrangements can be made to support the prompt return of the respondent and the child to the United States of America in the event that this Court determines that the child X, born 2022 must be returned to the United States of America pursuant to Regulation 16(1) of the Regulations but does not accede to the requesting parent’s proposal that he travel to Australia to collect the child and return with the child to the United States of America.
15.That I reserve to the requesting parent, MR D, liberty to apply to vary or set aside or discharge any injunctions provided in this Order which affect him or as he may be advised.
16.On the adjourned date all parties to the proceedings be in a position to inform the court as to whether she/he objects to the final hearing of this matter being conducted on the court’s MS Teams platform and, if so, the basis of any such objection.
17.There be liberty to apply to all parties in relation to:
(a)the mediation;
(b)a Regulation 26 report as to the impact on the child of being removed from her primary carer.
18.The practitioner for the applicant SCA inform my Chambers of what progress has been made in serving the respondent mother with all necessary documents in these proceedings by not later than 3:00 pm on the day prior to the adjourned date.
AND IT IS NOTED:
A.That to the extent that Division 4 of Part XIIIAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (International Protection of Children) applies to these proceedings the orders in relation to the care, custody and location of the child and / or directed to restricting the movement of the child are orders made pursuant to s111CD(1)(b)(i) of the Act being Commonwealth personal protection measures taken for the child’s protection as a matter of urgency.
B.That any person who fails or neglects to comply with this Order should anticipate that the application may be finally determined on the next return date without any further input by the defaulting party.
C.For the avoidance of doubt, any times and dates in this Order are times and dates applicable to Melbourne under AEST.
D.It is likely that the respondent mother will be required to file answering material within no more than 14 days after the adjourned date.
E.The applicant SCA opposes the appointment of an independent children’s lawyer to represent X’s interests in the return application on the basis that it is able to and will, if necessary, consider the extent to which the position of the parties to the proceedings and each of the parents of the child may be in conflict with the child’s interest in having the child’s return under the Regulations to be as free of ambiguity and uncertainty as is possible. The applicant SCA informs the court that it will be in a position to adduce any necessary evidence in the proceedings as to how a safe return of X to the United States of America may be implemented together with any other orders necessary to give effect to the 1980 Convention.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs & Handley of has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BENNETT J:
This application, which is filed today, is made by the Director-General of the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs for the State of Queensland in her capacity as State Central Authority for Queensland. The applicant seeks urgent ex-parte relief under the Family Law (Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986, which implement into Australian law the provisions of the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, specifically the return of the child X, born 2022, to the United States of America pursuant to regulation 14 of the Regulations.
The applicant is represented by Ms Fitzgibbon, solicitor. The officer within the department who has conduct of the matter on behalf of the applicant, Ms J, was present for the hearing. I have pronounced orders and excused anyone from attending to hear these reasons for decision which I mentioned I may amend and expand and I have done so.
The hearing was conducted on the Court’s MS Teams platform.
SOME HISTORY
The 1980 Convention entered into force between Australia and the United States of America on 1 July 1988.
The respondent mother is Ms Handley. She is approximately 43 years old, having been born in Australia in 1980. I will refer to her as “the mother”, “the respondent” or the “taking parent”. The respondent mother holds Australian and American citizenship.
The requesting parent, Mr D, is 45 years old. He is the father of X. I will refer to him as “the father”, the “left behind parent” or the “requesting parent”. The requesting parent resides at E Street, City F, G State. He holds Australian and American citizenship.
The mother and father met in City F in the United States of America in around 2020. They were engaged to be married in 2021. Prior to X’s birth, the mother and the father separated. The Form 2 application, from which I have taken the background facts set out in these reasons, indicates at page 4 that the father and mother ended their engagement to marry and their relationship in around mid-2022, so some months prior to X’s birth. X was born in 2022.
The application goes on to say:
The respondent mother did not list the applicant father as the child’s father on the birth certificate. The respondent mother declared under penalty of perjury that the applicant father is the father of the child. The respondent mother thereafter told the applicant father that she had cheated on him, having had sex with someone else and that he may not be the child’s father.
It appears from the application that, between 2022 (X’s birth) and early 2023 (removal of X from United States), the father’s time with X was three periods of six hours duration each.
The day before X’s removal from United States, in proceedings before the City F Family Court, orders were made which provided that the mother and father have legal custody of X and that the respondent mother have physical custody. There were orders providing for “the child to spend time with the applicant father commencing [the next day]”.
The father received a message from the mother the next day to the effect that she was driving back from City H in G State and would be late for the scheduled time for the father to see X. The father has since been informed by the US State Department and District-Attorney Child Abduction Unit that on that day, the respondent mother and the child flew from City F to Sydney, Australia, arriving two days later. In an affidavit sworn by Ms J on 6 April 2023, she deposes that the Australian Central Authority has movement records which substantiate X’s arrival in Australia on that date in the care of the mother.
Just over one week later, the City F Family Court modified the order made in early 2023 to provisionally find that the applicant father is the presumed parent of X and to award him with temporary sole legal and sole physical custody of X. There were further orders made to locate the respondent mother and child, for the child to then be returned to the care of the applicant father and for a further scheduled hearing the following month.
On 14 February 2023, the requesting parent executed a request for the return of the child pursuant to the 1980 Convention. That request was submitted to the Central Authority in the United States and later transmitted to the Australian Central Authority.
It is not clear what, if anything, happened in the City F Family Court on the date of the scheduled hearing.
Soon after, an order was made by the City F Family Court, for a warrant for the arrest of the respondent mother and the arrest of the child and provided that the child would not have any visitation with the respondent mother. Those orders are described at page 48 of the application filed this day in the form of a declaration by the attorney for the requesting parent. At paragraphs 4 and 5 of the declaration, Ms K, the attorney, states:–
The Court here has made a judicial determination that Petitioner, [Mr D] is the father of the minor child, [X] DOB [2022]. Petitioner, [Mr D] is awarded sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor child, [X] DOB [2022]. Respondent, [Ms Handley] shall have no visitation with the minor child until further order of the Court.
Ms J deposes that in early 2023 the respondent mother and child departed Australia and returned the following month.
The requesting parent did not consent to X being taken out of the United States or Australia.
As of today, the child has not departed Australia for a second time. The child and mother are thought to be residing at B Street, Suburb C, in the State of Queensland. That is a suburb of Brisbane. That information was obtained from an incoming passenger card on the return completed by the mother for herself and child when returning to Australia in early 2023.
PROCEEDING WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT
It is an important principle of Australian law that people are accorded procedural fairness in relation to orders sought to be made against them. This would entail the mother being duly served with the application of the applicant State Central Authority and the supporting documents, including the affidavit of Ms J. However, the applicant submits that the mother is a flight risk given that she has removed X over international borders, being the United States and Australia as well as the destination(s) to which she took X earlier this year, unilaterally and without the consent of the father.
On balance, I am satisfied that today’s hearing should proceed ex-parte because, to notify the respondent mother of the orders currently sought against her, would provide her with the opportunity to act in a way that could render nugatory the relief sought by the applicant. I am satisfied that, if the mother again removed X from Australia, any relief under the Regulations which give expression to the 1980 Convention could be either impossible to obtain or be unenforceable.
In making this determination, I make no finding against the mother. I am very mindful that I have only heard one side of the story. The mother has had no opportunity to put her version of events before the court. I am merely weighing the prejudice to the mother of not according her procedural fairness against the potential prejudice to the applicant of steps being taken to defeat the application to secure the child’s safety and whereabouts of the subject child until such time as the court can hear and determine the principal application for return of the child to the United States of America. I am satisfied that the justice of the situation and Australia’s obligation to implement the 1980 Convention require that today’s hearing proceed ex-parte, without the mother having notice of the hearing. Put another way, today it is more important to secure the child in Australia than it is to accord the respondent mother natural justice. That said, the mother should be served as soon as possible. I am informed by Ms Fitzgibbon that the applicant anticipates that service can be effected tomorrow.
I have reserved liberty to the taking parent to seek to vary or set aside the Order made today (or part of it) or as she may be advised. The matter should return to court as soon as possible after the mother has been served with a full suite of court documents including orders and reasons for decision.
DISCUSSION
The orders which I have made are standard orders which secure X’s situation in Australia between now and the final hearing. These holding orders can, of course, be amended from time to time up until the proceedings are determined and a return order is either made or not made. In spite of my order that the applicant is to have care of X until further order, I do not envisage that X will be separated from the mother unless it is considered by the applicant that the mother’s presence jeopardises the applicant’s ability to keep X safe and X’s whereabouts known pending the final determination. The applicant’s role in child protection the State of Queensland equips her with the adequate resources to oversee X’s welfare until the conclusion of the proceedings.
A further requirement under the orders is that by the return date, which is this Friday, the parties to the proceedings be able to inform the Court of whether they oppose the final hearing of these proceedings being conducted remotely, that is, on the Court’s MS Teams platform, rather than face to face. It is important to know the respective attitude of the parties because that may affect the promptness with which the application can be finally determined. The early interim hearings will be conducted at court via the court’s MS Teams platform.
On the adjourned date, the mother is required to bring X to court with her. This will provide the applicant with an opportunity to physically sight X, a basic requirement of the role delegated to her by the Australian Central Authority under the Regulations.
Notably, the requesting parent has obtained an order in the United States which precludes the mother having any visitation with the child pending further order of that court. At page 14 of the application, the proposed arrangements for return of X to the United States are specified by the requesting parent as follows:
As soon as baby is removed from mother and I am informed of such, I will immediately fly to Australia and accompany the baby back to [City F] along with my father.
The return order sought by the applicant provides with some particularity for the mother to be liable for travel expenses to return X to the United States but is silent as to whether the mother can accompany the child back to the United States if the mother wished to do so. The applicant seeks:
That the respondent mother, [Ms Handley] born […] 1980, pay all the necessary expenses associated with returning the child to the United States of America, including the cost of airfares and departure taxes (if any) for the child to travel from Brisbane Airport to the United States of America, and in the event the respondent mother fails or refuses to pay these expenses; the respondent mother pay to the applicant father the necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the applicant father, [Mr D], in returning the child to the United States of America, within two business days of the applicant father making a written demand for reimbursement of the said expenses.
Notably there is a warrant for the arrest of the mother which could, presumably, be executed immediately the mother and child disembark in the United States. I will say more about early punitive action against taking parents later in these reasons.
Regulation 26 provides that the court may direct a family consultant to report to the court on such matters as are relevant to the proceedings as the court considers to be appropriate and to adjourn the proceedings until the report is made. A family consultant, now called a court child expert, is an appropriately qualified social scientist employed exclusively by the court to provide expert evidence on childhood development and parenting after separation. The court child expert may report on any other matter that relates to the care, welfare or development of the child.
I have reserved to the parties liberty to apply for a reg 26 report which deals with the impact on X of being removed from her primary carer, as the application in its current form contemplates. I do not envisage that the child court expert charged with preparing that report would necessarily have to observe X with the mother or indeed interview the mother or the father. It is a child developmental issue but an important issue given the application clearly contemplates a sudden separation of X from the mother and that X be placed in the care of the father, allegedly a person with whom the child spent only 18 hours with from the time of her birth until early 2023. X was less than 6 months old when she was brought to Australia.
As time is of the essence, an application for any report should be made as soon as possible.
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
I sought submissions in relation to the appropriateness of my requesting an independent children’s lawyer be appointed. Section 68L(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) requires that there be special circumstances before a court requests the appointment of an independent children’s lawyer in proceedings such as this.
I expressed my preliminary view that a potential conflict between how X can most safely be returned to the Unites States and the positions which could conceivably be adopted by both of the parents, albeit for very different reasons, constituted special circumstances within the meaning of s 68L(3). Again, I am conscious that I have only heard part of one side of the story and nothing of what the mother has to say. However, in my experience of international parental child abduction cases, the brevity of the relationship between the mother and the father and the fact that they have never parented X together is frequently productive of a highly conflictual parental relationship in which each parent interprets the actions of the other parent as emblematic of wanting to exclude him or her from any involvement in X’s life. It is against this background that the applicant and the respondent may run their respective cases in these proceedings without interest in, and the exclusion of evidence about the safest way in terms of childhood development that X can be returned to the United States, if that is the outcome.
The requesting parent has obtained orders from the American courts that would see the mother arrested immediately upon her return to the United States of America and X remaining in the sole care of the father without X having any visitation from the mother pending further order of the court in the United States. This scenario is not uncommon in Hague return proceedings initiated by the United States and may make sense in the context of domestic law which is punitive and seeks to disincentivise international parental child abduction. However, from the perspective of return proceedings it is productive of a number of issues which are difficult to resolve. There is little incentive for the requesting father to relinquish the benefit of that arrangement which would see him with sole and complete care of the child, to the exclusion of the mother, without the time, expense or inconvenience of further parenting proceedings in the United States. I appreciate that the requesting parent does not have conduct of the applicant’s case. He is merely a witness. However, arrangements for return and any post-return arrangements will require input from the requesting parent and, presumably, his co-operation.
From the mother’s perspective, she may rely upon the orders obtained by the father as the basis for an exception to return under reg.16(3)(b) in that the return of X to the United States of America will result in the separation of the child from the only parent she has known and, thereby, expose X to a grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise place X in an intolerable situation.
To my mind, an independent children’s lawyer could scaffold the best possible return for the child, if ultimately a return is ordered. I speculate that could include the independent children’s lawyer considering the feasibility of any return on the basis that the mother not be immediately arrested and that the parents participate in negotiations or litigation for parenting arrangements which are in X’s best interests (whatever that may be) and presenting a case accordingly. However, that would be a delicate course to chart. There is jurisprudence which disapproves of the courts of the state to which a child is wrongfully removed (or retained in) meddling with consequences in the home state which flow from the wrongful actions of the taking parent. For example, H v K (Return Order) [2017] EWHC 1141 (Fam) where Macdonald J made the following observations:
56.Two further points fall to be made in this regard. First, a parent who chooses to abduct a child from one jurisdiction to another must expect to be the subject of arrest and prosecution. That is simply one of the proper consequences of a parent unwisely taking the law into his or her own hands rather than seeking relief through the courts. It sits ill in the mouth of a parent who has abducted a child to complain about the consequent risk of arrest and prosecution. Within this context, there is a principled argument that the court seeking to enforce the return of the child, and thereby maintain fidelity to an international instrument designed to discourage and prevent child abduction, has no business trying to protect the abducting parent from arrest and prosecution upon their return under domestic laws designed to achieve precisely the same end.
57. Second, and within this context, I am unable to accept Mr Devereux’s submission that the caveats that the father seeks to add to his undertaking not to support criminal proceedings against the mother with respect to her abduction of the children from the jurisdiction of the United States, namely that he will so undertake “to the extent that this does not violate or breach any public policy, statute, regulation, court order or other legal duty on the father” are inappropriate or devalue the undertaking. In my judgment, it is perfectly proper for the father to ensure that his undertaking does not bring him into conflict with the domestic laws of the United States. Once again, there is a principled argument that it would be entirely wrong to expect the innocent left behind parent to place themselves in conflict with the laws of their home country in order to prevent the lawful arrest and prosecution of the culpable abducting parent. In short, it is wrong in principle to expect the left behind parent to assume some of the legal risk created by the abducting parent by giving undertakings that have the potential to, or do come into conflict with the laws of the home state. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the caveats the father places on his undertaking are both reasonable and necessary.
58. Within this context, I am entirely satisfied that the undertaking offered by the father with respect to the risk of arrest and prosecution faced by the mother is appropriate in its terms and ambit and offers the maximum protection reasonably available against the risk contended for by the mother.
On the other hand, this court should be justifiably cautious of accepting “undertakings” from a left behind parent to do or to refrain from doing certain acts and things. This is because breach or non-compliance by the left behind parent with his/her undertaking is likely to be a matter which it is outside the practical jurisdiction of this court to police or punish.
X is a very young child. The extent to which any conditions to return can be securely bedded down will require co-operation from the requesting parent and/or expert evidence about the law and procedures in the United States (and particular states of the United States).
These proceedings are required to be expedited. The court must avoid a situation where, at the eleventh hour one or other party seeks to adjourn the final hearing for want of evidence which an independent children’s lawyer could have adduced earlier had they been appointed.
The applicant does not support a request for an independent children’s lawyer to be appointed. There was the following interchange between myself and the solicitor for the applicant:
MS FITZGIBBON: The order with respect to ICL appointment is opposed. Our position is that as model litigants the SCA feel that they can adequately manage the case. [Ms J] personally has been involved with matters before with issues related to warrants and she has a social worker background as opposed as to a legal officer and its quite common for her to speak to both of the parents in a case so that may be different than what other SCA do and why an ICL may be required in those so in effect it’s difficult to understand from our perspective what the ICL could bring to the matter than [Ms J] couldn’t carry out in her role.
HER HONOUR: What extent of training have ICLS in Queensland received?
Ms Fitzgibbon: With respect to Hague [matters] I’m not aware of any.
HER HONOUR: So you haven’t had really competent trained ICLs?
MS FITZGIBBON: I have been doing these matters for about 6 years now and I haven’t had an ICL appointed.
HER HONOUR: That is probably your best argument. If they are not appropriately trained they are potentially troublesome without much benefit.
The ability of the State Central Authority to “talk to the parents” does not equate to the benefits of an independent children’s lawyer. However, the applicant says that it will adduce all necessary evidence even if that evidence is contrary to the sentiments of the left behind parent. As indicated, the applicant does not take instructions from the requesting parent but I must question the wisdom of opposing the appointment of an honest broker to participate where it is reasonably foreseeable that the position of the applicant and the requesting parent may not be aligned from the outset. That said, my reference to an independent children’s lawyer assumes that the practitioner has been trained up and is experienced in Hague return applications and appreciate how the role in a Hague return application differs from the role they have in domestic parenting proceedings. They need to understand what is required to prepare for outcomes, know how to gather evidence in admissible form from another contracting state, be well versed in specialised Hague mediations, be able to draft conditions to return that can be rendered enforceable in the other jurisdiction and be able to put an argument or run a point which is properly put from the perspective of the child but not advanced by the applicant or the respondent.
The court is advised by Ms Fitzgibbon that there is no such practitioner in Queensland notwithstanding that the court has the benefit of such practitioners in Victoria and one in New South Wales. Proposed legislation has been introduced into this session of parliament which, if eventually passed will remove the requirement for special circumstances and may make the representation of children’s’ interests in Hague return applications more common. I therefore respectfully suggest that consideration be given by the Australian Central Authority to bringing about more even spread of skills throughout Australian states by education and training.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett. Associate:
Dated: 20 April 2023
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