Dep18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEP18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2020] FCCA 2726
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where the applicant claims the Authority came to an illogical, irrational or unreasonable conclusion – where the Authority did not accept that the applicant suffers from memory problems “in the absence of corroborative evidence” – where the applicant submitted a link between his symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and memory problems – consideration of the meaning of the word “corroborate” – not satisfied the Authority’s conclusion was unreasonable – application dismissed.  

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.473FA(2), pt. 7AA

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s.55

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) sch. 1 pt. 3 div. 1 item. 3

Cases cited:

R v Apostilides (1983) 11 A Crim R 381

Director of Public Prosecutions v Hester [1973] AC 296; [1972] 3 All ER 1056

Secondary Sources:

Heydon, JD, Cross on Evidence, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th edition, 2017)

Applicant: DEP18
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: ADG 241 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Young
Hearing date: 7 September 2020
Date of Last Submission: 7 September 2020
Delivered at: Darwin
Delivered on: 1 October 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Barnes
Solicitors for the Applicant: MSM Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Ellison
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed. 

  2. The applicant is to pay the Minister’s costs in the sum of $7,467. 

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

ADG 241 of 2018

DEP18

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) made on 23 May 2018 affirming a decision of the Minister's delegate made on 27 September 2017 to refuse the applicant a protection visa. 

  2. The applicant is a Sri Lankan Tamil who lived in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.  The Authority accepted a number of the claims made by the applicant, including that he was arrested and beaten by the Sri Lankan army (“SLA”) in 1987, his father’s cousin was shot by the SLA in 1987, the applicant fled to Northern Province until 1989 when he returned to his home in Eastern Province, in 1990 the SLA beat the applicant, and in December 1992 the applicant and his father were taken from their home by the police, SLA and militia, beaten, tortured and detained in a military camp, and then a military prison.  The applicant was released in January 1993.  His father was subsequently imprisoned.  

  3. The applicant made various other claims, including that his sister had been conscripted as a nurse for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”).  He said his sister had been released by the LTTE in 2008 because of poor health.  He gave inconsistent evidence about these events. In his screening interview he said…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2726
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Dep18, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The dispute concerned the IAA's finding that the applicant did not suffer from memory problems, a conclusion reached "in the absence of corroborative evidence." The applicant contended that this conclusion was illogical, irrational, or unreasonable. The matter was heard by Judge Young in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA's determination that there was no corroborating evidence for the applicant's claimed memory problems was unreasonable. This required the court to consider the meaning of "corroborative evidence" in the context of the IAA's review powers, particularly in light of section 473FA(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), which states the IAA is not bound by technicalities, legal forms, or the rules of evidence. The court also had to assess the relevance and weight of a letter provided by Ms. Tate, which indicated the applicant was symptomatic for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Judge Young reasoned that the respondent's submission, focusing on the admissibility of Ms. Tate's letter under the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth), was too narrow given the IAA's broad review powers. The court acknowledged that Ms. Tate's letter did not explicitly diagnose memory problems or link them to the applicant's mental health. However, the judge found that the IAA's interpretation of "corroborative evidence" might have been too restrictive. While the applicant's membership in a class of persons who have experienced torture and trauma does not automatically prove individual memory problems, Ms. Tate's letter, indicating PTSD symptoms and noting other aspects of the applicant's history suggestive of impaired mental functioning, was not entirely neutral. The court noted that PTSD is notoriously associated with memory deficits.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied that the IAA's conclusion that there was no corroborating evidence of the applicant's memory problems was unreasonable. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent submitted that it was thus the case that the applicant's assertion that he struggled with his memory because of mental ill health, resulting from torture or trauma, rose no higher that an assertion without confirmatory or adequate supporting evidence and, as such, the Authority's conclusion that there was no “corroborating evidence” of the applicant’s claim was accurate and was not illogical or irrational. Consideration In my view the submission that Ms Tate was not qualified to provide a medical diagnosis or opinion, that she had done no more than undertake a questionnaire which indicated the applicant may be symptomatic for PTSD, and that she did not mention the applicant having memory problems or express an opinion about the applicant's mental health causing memory problems, is correct. However, to approach the issue, as counsel for the respondent appeared to do, in terms of whether the letter or the opinion from Ms Tate would be admissible in proceedings to which the Evidence Act applies is too narrow because s 473FA(2) of the Migration Act provides: The Immigration Assessment Authority, in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or the rules of evidence. Part of the difficulty in this matter arises from unexpressed different meanings attributed to the words “corroborative” or “corroborating” by the applicant and the respondent. Implicit in the applicant’s submissions was an assertion that the Authority, in using the phrase “in the absence of corroborating evidence”, meant that Ms Tate’s letter did not constitute evidence which could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability that the inconsistencies in his narrative were the result of past trauma affecting his mental functioning. If this is what the Authority meant by the phrase I would tend to agree with the applicant’s argument that the letter from Ms Tate was at least relevant because it affected the assessment of the probability of his claim that the inconsistencies in his narrative were the result of past trauma affecting his mental functioning. I accept that the letter from Ms Tate does not refer to memory loss. Nevertheless, the applicant complained of memory loss. The Authority accepted that the applicant had experienced torture and other traumatic events and it may be accepted that in some cases such experiences can lead to: … apparent inconsistencies and/or inability to present a chronologically intact account. The fact that the applicant is a member of a class of persons having experienced torture and other traumatic events does not mean that the applicant, in fact, has memory problems or that it should, therefore, be accepted that he has memory problems affecting his capacity to provide a chronologically consistent and coherent account. Nevertheless, the letter from Ms Tate was not completely neutral on that issue. She undertook a questionnaire that indicated that the applicant was symptomatic for PTSD, a mental health disorder, and one notoriously associated with memory deficits, as reflected, for example, in the AAT Guidelines. She recorded other aspects of the applicant’s history indicative of impaired mental health or functioning.