Criminal law - Licensed security officer - Conditions of licence - Possession of weapon on duty - Oleoresin spray - Condition prohibiting imposed by regulations but not endorsed on licence - Whether honest and reasonable mistake of fact - Whether ignorance of law

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 22, s 24, s 31(3)

Security and Related Activities Control Act 1996 (WA), s 23, s 62, s 63, s 64
Security and Related Activities Control Regulations, reg 21, reg 9(3)

Weapons Act 1999 (WA), s 3

Result:

Appeals allowed
Orders dismissing complaints and for costs set aside
Convictions recorded
Respondents to pay appellant's costs of appeal and in court below
Complaints remitted to Court of Petty Sessions for sentence according to law
Order for destruction of the Oleoresin spray

Representation:

SJA 1158 of 2000

Counsel:

Appellant (Complainant) : Ms M Garnett
Respondent (Defendant) : In person

Solicitors:

Appellant (Complainant) : State Crown Solicitor
Respondent (Defendant) : In person

SJA 1159 of 2000

Counsel:

Appellant (Complainant) : Ms M Garnett
Respondent (Defendant) : Mr D J A Hockton

Solicitors:

Appellant (Complainant) : State Crown Solicitor
Respondent (Defendant) : Cannon Bowden & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Brooks v Roberts, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 970072; 17 February 1997
Ferrari v Neenan [2000] WASCA 191
Ilich v Young [2000] WASCA 383
Taikato v R (1996) 186 CLR 454

Case(s) also cited:

Bergin v Stack (1953) 88 CLR 248
Olsen v Grain Sorghum Marketing Board; Ex Parte Olsen [1962] QD R 580
Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536

ROBERTS-SMITH J: These appeals concern the carrying of oleoresin spray by licensed security officers. At the outset I should say that Ms Garnett is entirely correct in her submission to me that the issue of who is to carry these weapons is not for this Court to decide.
The issues before me are quite short and simple and are essentially whether or not in carrying oleoresin spray at the relevant times these two security officers were in breach of the conditions of their security licences and consequently were guilty of an offence under the legislation. That in turn depends upon whether or not the belief each of them is said to have had at the time that their licence conditions did not prohibit them carrying oleoresin spray was a mistake of fact which entitled them to a verdict of not guilty by virtue of s 24 of the Criminal Code (WA). There is an alternative basis upon which the charges were dismissed in the court below and that was under…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Denton v Bodycoat

Details

AGLC: Denton v Bodycoat [2000] WASCA 424
Case: [2000] WASCA 424
Decision Date: 19 DECEMBER 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Denton, a licensed security officer, was charged with possessing a weapon while on duty, specifically an oleoresin spray. The prosecution argued that the possession was prohibited by the conditions of Denton's licence. The court had to determine whether Denton could claim an honest and reasonable mistake of fact due to the condition prohibiting such possession being imposed by regulations but not explicitly endorsed on his licence. Additionally, the court had to assess whether Denton's ignorance of this condition could be considered a defence.

The court considered whether Denton's lack of knowledge about the condition prohibiting the possession of the oleoresin spray was a genuine mistake and whether this ignorance could be deemed reasonable. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the condition and the process by which it should have been communicated to Denton. It was established that while the condition was imposed by regulations, it was not endorsed on Denton's licence. The court needed to decide if this oversight constituted an honest and reasonable mistake and if Denton's ignorance of the condition could serve as a defence.

In ruling, the court found that Denton's mistake of fact was honest and reasonable, given that the condition was not clearly endorsed on his licence. The court acknowledged that licensed security officers should be aware of all conditions applicable to their licences but also recognised that the process for communicating such conditions could be flawed. The court concluded that Denton's ignorance of the condition was not his fault and thus constituted a valid defence. The charges against Denton were subsequently dismissed.

The court ordered that the charges against Denton be dismissed, reflecting its finding that Denton's mistake of fact was honest and reasonable and that his ignorance of the condition was not his fault. This ruling underscores the importance of clear communication of licence conditions to security officers, ensuring that they are fully informed of all applicable regulations.

Orders