FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2022] FCA 1338
File number(s): QUD 172 of 2020
QUD 177 of 2020Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 11 November 2022 Catchwords: APPEAL – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court granting summary judgment against the appellant – whereas the appellant contended that the respondent breached provisions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (NCCPA) and Code of Banking Practice 2013 by declining to provide her with additional finance – appellant alleged bias on the part of the primary Judge only after reasons delivered – no bias on the part of the primary Judge demonstrated - whereas a lender is not obligated to provide additional finance to an individual – primary Judge did not err in summarily dismissing the appellant’s action – appeal dismissed
APPEAL - appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court declining to dismiss the respondent’s claim for a breach of s 160D National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)(NCCPA) by the appellant – whereas the appellant declined to provide the respondent with additional finance – whereas the appellant did not engage in a credit activity for the purposes of the NCCPA by declining to provide the respondent with additional finance – no statements made in connection with that decision enliven the operation of s 160D of the NCCPA – appeal allowed
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001
Code of Banking Practice 2013
Cases cited: ASIC v Financial Circle Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1644
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29
Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2020] FCCA 1313
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48
Kumar v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2022] FCAFC 95
Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection Number of paragraphs: 65 Date of hearing: 26 August 2021 Counsel for the Appellant in QUD 172 of 2020 and Counsel for the respondent in QUD177 of 2020 The appellant/respondent appeared in-person Counsel for the Respondent in QUD 172 of 2020 and Counsel for the appellant in QUD 177 of 2020 Mr M Alexander Solicitors for the Respondent in QUD 172 of 2020 and Counsel for the appellant in QUD 177 of 2020 Gadens Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 172 of 2020 BETWEEN: SUSAN DENNIS
Appellant
AND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
QUD 177 of 2020 BETWEEN: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1338
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Bank's decision to decline Ms. Dennis's request for additional finance constituted a breach of the NCCPA, specifically section 160D, and whether such a refusal constituted a credit activity under the Act. The court also needed to assess if there was any evidence of bias by the primary judge in handling Ms. Dennis's case. The court found that a lender is not obligated to provide additional finance to an individual, and thus the Bank's refusal did not constitute a credit activity as defined under the NCCPA. Additionally, the court held that no evidence of bias was presented by Ms. Dennis against the primary judge.
The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in summarily dismissing Ms. Dennis's claims, as the Bank's refusal to provide additional finance did not trigger the provisions of section 160D of the NCCPA. Furthermore, the court found that Ms. Dennis's allegations of bias were unfounded. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with respect to the primary judge's decision, but the appeal was allowed in part regarding the primary judge's refusal to dismiss Ms. Dennis's claims under section 160D of the NCCPA. The court ordered that the appeal be allowed, with the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Alexander went on to submit as follows:One then needs to consider, well, what were the section 160D arguments or the misrepresentations that Ms Dennis says existed, and those are summarised by [the primary Judge] from paragraph 49 of the reasons for judgment, which is found at page 31 of the appeal book, your Honour. And, in effect, what Ms Dennis says is that she was told by the bank representative that they were prevented from lending money to her because of a lending code of practice, that there was no need for the CBA Upper Coomera Branch Manager to allow her to make an appointment to talk to her about an individual situation because of – and she goes on.In my respectful submission, the error here by the learned primary judge is that those representations are relevant – that those representations may be relevant to the provision of credit activity in section 128 through to 130, and I accept that there is no trial decision or appeal court decision on the application of this point, but I come back to the analogy earlier, that if it was the National Australia Bank with the primary loan and the Commonwealth Bank now, there could be no challenge to the fact that the application of one – that section 160D(1) could not apply.…The further error, in my respectful submission, and final error in respect of the application of 160D(1) is that it’s materially misleading, and there is no evidence led, and indeed, none exists as to how a statement in circumstances where – which is why these submissions in relation to both appeals are inextricably linked – upon your Honour finding, or accepting the submission, rather, about the application of 128 through 130, that is, that there is no positive obligation to provide finance, then how can, one asks rhetorically, a misrepresentation by the bank as to a refusal to provide finance be materially misleading?(emphasis added)Consideration In my view the primary Judge erred in not summarily dismissing Ms Dennis’ claims against the Bank referable to s 160D (1) of the NCCPA. Section 160D(1) is enlivened only when a person – in this case, the Bank – gives relevant information or a document to another person in the course of engaging in a credit activity. Even if the conversation Ms Dennis alleged occurred on 16 November 2015, the Bank had already refused to extend her credit – it was not information given to Ms Dennis by the Bank in the course of providing credit to her. I further accept the submission of the Bank that, again, if the conversation did occur, it was false or materially misleading within the meaning of s160D(1) for the Bank to have informed Ms Dennis that it was preventing from lending further funds to her when she was not working and had no income to service any such loan. Finally, in determining in a civil proceeding whether the Court is satisfied that a case has been proved on the balance of probabilities, 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) requires the Court to take into account (inter alia) the gravity of the matters alleged. Section 160D(1) of the NCCPA is a civil penalty provision, allowing the imposition of monetary penalties on the Bank should it be found to have contravened. In the circumstances as explained by his Honour, this aspect of Ms Dennis’ claim relied solely on an unsupported assertion of a communication to her by the relevant Bank employee. A letter by Ms Dennis to the Financial Services Ombudsman Service almost eighteen months after the alleged conversation, repeating the assertion, was plainly not evidence of substance.