Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 16 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 629

Citation: Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 629
Appeal from: Demillo and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 805
Parties: ROBERTO DEMILLO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1972 of 2012
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 27 June 2013
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474, s 476A, s 500, s 501, s 501F
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Date of hearing: 26 June 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr K Ramrakha
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr GT Johnson SC
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1972 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

ROBERTO DEMILLO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JUNE 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended application filed 25 February 2013 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1972 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

ROBERTO DEMILLO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE:

27 JUNE 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant was born in the Philippines in 1976.  He arrived in Australia in 1990 at the age of 14.  On 21 August 2012 a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) decided to cancel the applicant’s class BF Transitional (Permit) visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). Any other visas held by the applicant were also cancelled as a result of this decision by virtue of s 501F(3) of the Act.

  2. The delegate found that the applicant did not pass the character test prescribed by s 501(6). In making this finding the delegate relied upon the applicant’s numerous criminal convictions including, in particular, for a large number of offences for which the applicant was sentenced on 1 July 2011 to terms of imprisonment of 12 months or more. The delegate then considered whether or not the discretion to cancel the applicant’s visa should be exercised. He concluded that the visa should be cancelled.

  3. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) for merits review of the delegate’s decision by application filed with the Tribunal on 6 September 2012.  After a Tribunal hearing held on 25 October 2012, the Tribunal gave its decision on 16 November 2012.  By its decision the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

  4. The proceeding now before me…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCA 629
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Demillo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an applicant contesting the cancellation of his visa by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The applicant, represented by a migration agent, argued that the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) had denied him procedural fairness and that the Tribunal had erred in law by not allowing certain evidence or granting an adjournment. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and if there had been any procedural shortcomings.

The primary legal issues were whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness and whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make its decision. The applicant claimed that the Tribunal failed to provide him with sufficient time to review and respond to the Minister's Statement of Facts and documentary evidence, and that he was not given the opportunity to be represented by a solicitor. Additionally, the applicant argued that the Tribunal should have allowed his daughter to give oral evidence. The Minister contended that the Tribunal had acted reasonably and within its jurisdiction.

The Court found that the Tribunal did not act unreasonably by refusing the adjournment or by not allowing the applicant's daughter to give oral evidence. The Tribunal had provided the applicant with adequate time to review the documentary evidence and respond to the Minister's Statement of Facts, and there was no genuine prejudice caused by the timing of these materials. Furthermore, the Court held that the absence of a solicitor did not render the proceedings unfair, as the applicant had ample notice of the hearing date and the opportunity to arrange legal representation. The Court also noted that the Tribunal was constrained by statute from permitting the applicant's daughter to give evidence, as no written statement had been provided to the Minister.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant statutory provisions and Ministerial Direction No 55 in exercising its discretion to cancel the applicant's visa. The Court dismissed the applicant's amended application and ordered him to pay the Minister's costs.

The Court's decision underscores the importance of timely communication and adequate procedural fairness in administrative law, while also affirming the constraints imposed by statutory requirements on the Tribunal's discretion in such matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended application filed 25 February 2013 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

After the Tribunal completed the taking of the evidence of the applicant and his witnesses the Tribunal commenced to examine the documentary evidence including, in particular, Exhibit R2. Early in the course of Mr Temby’s discussion of the documentary evidence it became apparent that the Minister’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (Statement of Facts), which had been received by the Tribunal on 18 October 2012, may not have reached the applicant or Mr Khalsa. The Tribunal then suggested that Mr Khalsa would be given “some time in which to absorb” what was set out in the respondent’s Statement of Facts and Exhibit R2. Mr Temby agreed that he was content to proceed in that way. Mr Temby then took the Tribunal through at least some of the documents in Exhibit R2. The transcript shows that this took a little less than one hour. The Tribunal then took a luncheon adjournment. After the hearing resumed, the Tribunal raised with Mr Khalsa the matter of the Statement of Facts and Exhibit R2, asking Mr Khalsa whether he needed time to respond to them. Mr Khalsa sought a week which the Tribunal suggested was not feasible. After further discussion the Tribunal indicated that it would require Mr Temby to address it that afternoon, following which the applicant would be given further time to respond in writing and orally. However, Mr Khalsa indicated that it would be sufficient if he was given an opportunity to respond in writing, and that he did not wish to respond orally. The Tribunal then required the applicant to submit a written submission by 11.00am the following Monday, 29 October 2012. Mr Temby then made oral submissions. The following Monday, in accordance with the Tribunal’s direction, the applicant lodged his written submission prepared by Mr Khalsa. The submission prepared by Mr Khalsa was both detailed and thoughtful, extending to some 23 pages. It acknowledged that the applicant failed the character test, but sought to persuade the Tribunal that it should refrain from cancelling the applicant’s visa on discretionary grounds. CONSIDERATION The first matter to be considered is whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The relevant principles were recently considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225. That case concerned the refusal of an adjournment by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) pursuant to the exercise of its statutory power to adjourn the review of a decision under s 363(1)(b) of the Act. It was recognised that an unreasonable refusal by the MRT to grant an adjournment could result in jurisdictional error if it was established that the Tribunal did not conduct a review in the manner required by the Act: see Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [77]-[87]. There was nothing unreasonable about the Tribunal’s decision to refuse the adjournment sought by the applicant in this matter. The concession obtained by the Tribunal from the Minister concerning the content of Exhibit R2 and the additional time given to the applicant within which to make submissions accommodated all of the applicant’s concerns regarding the late service of Exhibit R2. Indeed, no attempt was made before me to demonstrate that the late service of any of this material or the late service of the Statement of Facts caused the applicant any genuine prejudice.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The decision of the Tribunal was one made under s 500 of the Act. It is therefore a “privative clause” decision pursuant to s 474 of the Act. Accordingly, jurisdiction to review the Tribunal’s decision lies under s 476A of the Act. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal was satisfied the applicant did not pass the character test. It therefore considered whether or not it should exercise the discretion to cancel the applicant’s visa. In doing so, the Tribunal had regard to Ministerial Direction No 55 (the Direction) and the following “primary” considerations referred to in the Direction:(1)Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct.(2)The strength, duration and nature of the person’s ties to Australia.(3)The best interests of minor children in Australia.(4)Whether Australia has international non-refoulement obligations to the person. The Tribunal took each of these considerations into account before arriving at its decision. As to primary consideration (1), the Tribunal observed that the applicant showed “high frequency repetitive disregard for the law with his offences increasing in seriousness”. The Tribunal also observed that “the applicant’s continual law-breaking makes it appear that the risk of re-offending is very high”. The Tribunal then turned to primary consideration (3) which was relevant in the applicant’s case because he had a young daughter (A), then about eight years of age, who lived with her mother (Ms H), the applicant’s partner. In relation to this consideration the Tribunal said:35A primary consideration is the best interests of the applicant’s daughter, A, born in 2004 and now aged eight and a half years. A has always lived with her mother Ms H. By contrast, the applicant has been in jail during A’s lifetime: 13 February to 16 March 2005, 6 April to 16 April 2005, 28 July 2005 to 13 August 2006, 9 January to 8 July 2007, 26 March to 24 October 2008, 10 February to 13 February 2010 and 13 April 2010 to September 2012 (and thereafter in Immigration detention). That is, of A’s approximately 102 months of life the applicant has been out of jail for just 29, separated from her mother for about two of those years and drug addicted and/or in fear of arrest during the balance.36In general, children’s best interests are best served by living with their natural parents. Applying Ministerial Direction 55 clause 9.3, I take into account the long periods of absence, lack of actual parenting behaviour, the fact that A has a constant and caring mother, the likelihood that the applicant will re-offend and be absent from the relationship in the future, and the dubious nature of the quality of parenting that the applicant would be able to provide if he were to remain in Australia. I find that only a minor degree of weight should be given to the likelihood of detriment to A if the applicant were to be deported. After referring to the two other primary considerations (which the Tribunal considered did not assist the applicant) the Tribunal turned to consider other non-primary considerations which it was required by the Direction to take into account. In this context, the Tribunal concluded that there would not be any serious impact on the applicant’s immediate family if he was deported except, it said, for Ms H and A. The Tribunal expressed its ultimate conclusion in these terms:40The applicant fails the character test and, applying the Ministerial Direction in the exercise of my discretion, it is my view that his visa should be cancelled. The applicant has a long criminal history escalating in seriousness and showing little sign of reformation. There are significant risks of re-offending with an unacceptable risk of harm to the community if he were allowed to remain. I have taken into account as a primary consideration the best interests of A, and my view is that those interests are not likely to be seriously affected by cancellation of the visa.JURISDICTIONAL ERROR

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The submission prepared by Mr Khalsa was both detailed and thoughtful, extending to some 23 pages. It acknowledged that the applicant failed the character test, but sought to persuade the Tribunal that it should refrain from cancelling the applicant’s visa on discretionary grounds. CONSIDERATION The first matter to be considered is whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness. The relevant principles were recently considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225. That case concerned the refusal of an adjournment by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) pursuant to the exercise of its statutory power to adjourn the review of a decision under s 363(1)(b) of the Act. It was recognised that an unreasonable refusal by the MRT to grant an adjournment could result in jurisdictional error if it was established that the Tribunal did not conduct a review in the manner required by the Act: see Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [77]-[87]. There was nothing unreasonable about the Tribunal’s decision to refuse the adjournment sought by the applicant in this matter. The concession obtained by the Tribunal from the Minister concerning the content of Exhibit R2 and the additional time given to the applicant within which to make submissions accommodated all of the applicant’s concerns regarding the late service of Exhibit R2. Indeed, no attempt was made before me to demonstrate that the late service of any of this material or the late service of the Statement of Facts caused the applicant any genuine prejudice. A related matter concerns the failure of the Tribunal to adjourn the hearing so that the applicant could be represented by a solicitor instead of a registered migration agent. There was nothing unreasonable in the Tribunal proceeding to hear the applicant’s application for review in circumstances where he was not represented by a solicitor. The applicant had ample opportunity to arrange to be represented by a solicitor at the hearing on 25 October 2012. He was first notified of the hearing date on or about 6 September 2012. The final matter to be considered is whether the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by failing to permit the applicant to call oral evidence from his daughter. In my view there is no substance to this complaint. As the Tribunal noted at the time Mr Khalsa informed it that the applicant proposed to call A, the Tribunal’s hands were tied by s 500(6H) of the Act because no written statement had been given to the Minister in accordance with the requirements of that provision. Moreover, Mr Khalsa did not say what evidence he wished to elicit from A. As the Tribunal asked rhetorically: “I don’t know … why you would want an eight year old girl to be giving evidence in a case such as this [?]”. Both the applicant and his partner gave evidence as to the applicant’s relationship with his daughter, none of which was challenged. In particular, both gave evidence directed to showing that A’s interests would be best served if the applicant was not deported. Even so, it seems clear that the Tribunal was heavily influenced by the significant amount of time the applicant had spent away from his daughter while he was in prison coupled with what the Tribunal assessed to be a very high risk of the applicant re-offending: see those paragraphs from the Tribunal’s decision extracted at [8] above. DISPOSITION