Delaney v Great Western Milling Company Limited

The parties to this appeal were the Great Western Milling Company Limited (plaintiffs) and Albert Edward Delaney (defendant). The dispute concerned the recovery of £150 paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant under a contract dated 12 October 1914. The plaintiffs sought to recover this sum pursuant to the Wheat Acquisition Act 1914 (N.S.W.), which declared certain contracts relating to wheat void and mandated the repayment of money paid under them. The defendant, a resident of Victoria, was served with the writ of summons in Melbourne under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901-1912. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which ultimately entered a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. Firstly, whether the contract of 12 October 1914 fell within the scope of section 8 of the Wheat Acquisition Act 1914 (N.S.W.). Secondly, if the Act applied, whether section 8, as construed to apply to this contract, was within the legislative powers of the Parliament of New South Wales. Thirdly, whether the defendant, by virtue of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901-1912, was subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a manner that would render him liable under the Act.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, and Rich JJ., held that the October contract was indeed within the terms of section 8(2) of the Wheat Acquisition Act 1914. They reasoned that the Act, as applied to this contract, was not beyond the legislative competence of the New South Wales Parliament. Furthermore, they concluded that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales by virtue of section 12 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901-1912, which allowed for service of process outside the state and subjected the defendant to the jurisdiction of the issuing court. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment. Griffith C.J. and Barton J., dissenting, held that the New South Wales Legislature lacked the power to retrospectively impose a new liability on a person outside its territorial jurisdiction for a past transaction, and that the Service and Execution of Process Act did not confer jurisdiction to enforce such a law. The decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was affirmed.