Defteros v Google LLC

In the matter of Defteros v Google LLC, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, an internet search engine provider, liable for defamatory content published through its services. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant published defamatory content when it displayed search results and made accessible a webpage via a hyperlink within those results. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the defendant's actions constituted publication and whether the plaintiff's imputations were conveyed by the published matters.

The central legal issue was whether Google was responsible for the defamatory content published through its search engine. The court considered whether Google's actions amounted to a publication, taking into account when and to whom the matters were published, and whether Google was on notice that the search results included the complained-of matters. Additionally, the court examined the availability of various defences to the defamation claim, including common law qualified privilege, statutory qualified privilege, fair report, innocent dissemination, triviality, and consent. The court had to decide whether these defences applied to the facts of the case.

The court determined that Google was not liable for the defamatory content as it did not constitute a publication for the purposes of defamation law. The court found that Google's search engine did not actively publish the defamatory content but rather facilitated access to the content created by third parties. The court held that Google was not on notice of the defamatory content at the time of publication and that the matters were not published to the plaintiff. Additionally, the court found that none of the statutory defences were available to Google, as the users of the search engine did not have a sufficient interest in the content to establish the statutory qualified privilege. The court also held that the defences of fair report, innocent dissemination, and triviality were not applicable. Finally, the court found that the defence of consent was not available to Google, as there was no evidence that the plaintiff consented to the publication of the defamatory content.

The court did not award any damages to the plaintiff, as it found that there was no publication of defamatory content by Google and that the plaintiff had not suffered any harm or distress as a result of the content. The court also found that there was no evidence of a grapevine effect, which would have exacerbated the harm caused by the alleged defamation. The court held that aggravated damages were not warranted by the conduct of the defence and that the plaintiff's damages were not mitigated.