Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority v Heffernan, Lionel Luke

Case

[1978] FCA 63

4 Aug 1978

No judgment structure available for this case.

E

CATCHWORDS

Appeal - Administrative Appeals Tribunal

- Reclassification

by Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Authority

-

Invalidity classification

- Pensioner - Incapacity in relation

to civil employment at date of reclassification

- Fact or

event which occurs subsequent to original classification

-

Costs - Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948, ss.51(1),

51(2) , 53(1) - Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits

Act

-1973, s.99 (1) - Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975,

s . 4 4 ( 1 ) .

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY and

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA V.

LIONEL LUKE HEFFERNAN

NO. VG 13 of 1978.

I

Coram : Brennan, Deane and Fisher

JJ.

4 August 1978.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

No. VG 13 of 1978

GENERAL DIVISION

BETPEEN : DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT

AND

DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY and

THE COITMONVEALTH OF 4-USTRALIA

Plaintiffs

AND

- : LIONEL LUKE HEFFEFNAN

Defendant

JUDGES IviiING ORDER

: Brennan, Deane and Fisher

JJ.

DATE OF

ORDER

: 4 August 1978.

WHERE iUDE

: MELBOURNE.

THE COURT

ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal by the plaintiffs against the decision made on 10 February 1978 by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be dismissed.

2.

The plaintiff Commonwealth

of Australia pay the

defendant's costs to

be taxed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

No.

VG

13 of 1978

GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN : DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT

AND

DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY and THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Plaintiffs

: LIONEL LUKE HEFFWAN

Defendant

I

.

CORAM : Brennan, Deane and Fisher

JJ.

4th August

1978.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

This is

an appeal by the Defence Force

Retirement and Death Benefit Authority ("the Authority")

'

and the Commonwealth of Australia fr6m

a decision of the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal")

in its

General Division vrhereby the Tribunal set aside

a decision

of the Authority made

on the 3rd December

1976. By its

L ,

decision, the Authority had refused to alter the

classification of Lionel Luke Heffernan ("the defendant")

. -.

under s.51 of the Defence Forces Retirement

Ac 1948

("the Act") from Class

B to C!ass A.

The Tribunal determined

i

I

2.

that the defendantts relevant incapacity for civil

employment was

100 per cent and accordingly altered his

classification under

s.51 of the Act from Class

B to Class

A.

The only outstanding issue between the parties

concerns the interpretation and effect of

s.53(1) of the

Act which provides for the alteration of classification

under s.51.

For the plaintiffs, it has been submitted

that, in considering whether there should

be an alteration

of classification under

s.51, the Authority was restricted

to considering the effect of the medical condition of the defendant at the time of his premature discharge from the

Army on 9th July,

1971.

If the Authority were entitled to

reclassify the defendant by reference to the extent of

incapacity in relation

to civil employment as at the time

it reached its decision that the classification of the

defendant should notbealtered, it is common ground that

the Tribunal was correct in setting aside that decision

and altering the classification of the defendant from

Class B to Class A.

Section 51 of the Act, insofar

as it is presently

relevant, provides as follows:

"51. (1). ..... .where -

(a) a member who is

a contributor has been

retired before attaining the retiring

age

for the rank held by him;

........ ........ ........ .....

on the ground of invalidity

or of physical

or mental

incapacity to perform his duties...he is entitled to

benefit in accordance with

the next three succeeding

sections, but,...is not otherwise entitled

to benefit

under this -Act.

..

. h

3.

(2) Wherc a person

... is, or is about to become,

entitled to benefit

by virtue of the last preceding

sub-section, the Authority shall determine the percentage of total incapacity of the person in relation to civil employment and shall classify the

person according to the percentage of incapacity as

fol1or.r.s:-

Percentage

Incapacity

of

Class

Sixty or over

A.

Thirty or over but less

than sixty B.

thirty

than

Less

c.

-

I1

It can be seen from the provisions of

s.51 set out above,

that maximum incapacity

in relation to civil employment

will lead to classification

i Class A (i.e. over 60 per

cent incapacity).

Sectjon 53(1) of the Act provides:

"The Authority

may, from time to time,

if it is satisfied that the percentage of

incapacity in relation to

civil employment

of a pensioner classified under section

51

of this Act

is such that the classification

of the pensioner should be altered, reclassify

him accordingly

as if he were being classified

under section

51".

Counsel for the plaintiffs

in his

submission

gave to s.53 an extremely restricted scope. It had, he

contended, no application where the pensioner's capacity

had deteriorated

in consequence of medical conditions

not existing at the time of his discharge.

Nor could

regard be had to reduced capacity

in consequence of

exacerbation or aggravatim of

the medical condition

existing on discharge. The only relevant medical

condition, he said, was that existing at the time of

discharge from the forces. Grounds for

a reclassiflcation

under s.53 existed, in his

contention, only

if an error had

been made

in the initial classification

at the time

Of

4 .

discharge or if there was

a change in the

availability of the pensioner's employment. The latter

circumstance would arise

if the need for the particular

occupation engaged

in by the pensioner had disappeared.

If this submission be accepted, the scope

for reclassification

is indeed limited. Error apart,

a pensioner could not be reclassified although his percentage

of incapacity had manifestly altered

- ither by way of

increase or by way of decrease.

We have reached the

conclusion that the section does not require

so inconvenient

a construction to be put upon

it.

I

The power of reclassification conferred upon

the Authority by

s.53(1) may be exercised from time to time.

The expressed condition

of its exercise

is the Authority's

satisfaction that the relevant percentage

of incapacity is

"such that the classification

of the pensioner should be

altered". There is nothing in the quoted phrase which restricts the Authority to particular grounds of

reclassification or which precludes

it from considering

any

material fact

or event which occurs subsequent to the

original classification. Indeed one would think that the

circumstances which would satisfy the Authority that the

classification should be altered are circumstances which make

the original classification

no longer appropriate.

Section 53(1) arms the Authority with

a power which may be

exercised as frequently as necessary to reflect the relevant

incapacity of the pensioner from time to time.

It does not,

either expressly..or impliedly, require the Authority to

.

.

./5

I

. .

determine the question whether the particular pensioner

should be reclassified by reference

to his incapacity at

the time

of his discharge as distinct from his incapacity

at the time when the question whether he should be

reclassified arises for decision. If the suggested

restrictions upon the exercise of the

power to reclassify

be rejected, there is no difficulty

in applying the

provisions of s.51 relating to classification as at the

date of reclassification. That is the process

of which

s.53(1)

speaks in the phrase "reclassify him accordingly

as if he were being classified under

s.51".

Section 53(2) is consonant with this construction

for it requires the Authority

to specify the date from which

the reclassification

is to have effect. Moreover, the

construction for which the plaintiffs contend would attribute

to the 1973 amendment of

s.53 the effect of impairing

significantly the entitlement which members of the Defence

Force had prior to that time

- an entitlement under the

scheme to which they had contributed.

l

Section 53(1) was amended by the Defence Forces

Retirement Benefits Act

1973. Prior to its amendment the

*

sub-section stood as follows:

The Board may, from time to time, if it is

satisfied that the percentage of incapacity

of

a pensioner classified under section fifty-one

of this

Act has altered,

or, because of the

nature of his employment, should be varied, reclassify him in accordance with the altered percentage of incapacity."

Prior to the amendment,

a pensioner whose

incapacity had altered after original classification was

I -

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6.

entitled, upon proof of that fact to the Board's

satisfaction, to be reclassified accordingly.

It is

unlikely that the Parliament intended the amendment

l

I

to deprive those who were entitled

o benefit under the-

1948 Act of the right thus conferred, and to require

the Board'

S successor to omit consideration of the

alteration in determining his application.

It follows that,

in the circumstances, the

Tribunal was correct

in setting aside the decision of

the Authority and

in altering the classification of the

defendant under

s.51 of the Act from Class

B to Class

A.

I

The appeal should be dismissed. The Commonwealth of

I

Australia was said by its counsel

to be the more

I

'

appropriate plaintiff against which

an order for costs

!

should be made, and we agree.

The order of the Court will be that the appeal

by the plaintiffs against the decision of the Tribunal

be dismissed and

that the plaintiff Commonwealth

of

Australia pay the defendant's costs

to be taxed.