Deen v Krassof

[1999] NSWSC 378

CITATION:	DEEN v KRASSOF [1999] NSWSC 378
CURRENT JURISDICTION:	EQUITY
FILE NUMBER(S):	3747/97
HEARING DATE(S):	14 and 15 April, 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:	28 April 1999
PARTIES :	Tania DEEN as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Andre Ivanovich KRASSOFF v David Konstanten KRASSOF
JUDGMENT OF:	Bryson J

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) :

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:

COUNSEL :	B.E. Kinsella for the plaintiff. P.E. King for the defendant.
SOLICITORS:	Geoff Williams & Associates for the plaintiff. McLaughlins for the defendant.
CATCHWORDS:	Trusts - Creation of Trust - s 23C Conveyancing Act - Creation of trust by Deed not in evidence - Subsequent Deed of Release made trust null and void - Deed of Release effective to transfer beneficial interest.; Deeds - interpretation - deed containing condition - decision on provisions of Deed.
ACTS CITED:	Paragraphs (a) & (b) of subs. 23C(1) of the Conveyancing Act, 1919.
CASES CITED:	Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897) 1 Ch.196 Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 2 NSWLR 923 Wratten v Hunter [1978] 2 NSWLR 367 Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSRLR 685 Ogilvie v Ryan [1976] 2 NSWLR 504
DECISION:	On the plaintiff's claim I give judgment for the defendant with costs.; On the cross-claim I give judgment for the cross-defendant.; I order that each party pay his or her own costs of the cross-claim.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

BRYSON J

WEDNESDAY, 28 APRIL, 1999

3747/97 Tania DEEN as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Andre Ivanovich KRASSOFF v David Konstanten KRASSOF


JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR :
1 These proceedings relate to the equitable ownership of one-half share interest as tenant-in-common in the house property at 24 Bradford Street Balmain. The plaintiff sues as Administratrix and representative of the intestate Estate of her late father Andre Ivanovich Krassoff, and the defendant is the son of the deceased and the plaintiff’s brother. Until 25 August 1978 the deceased and Zoe Krassoff, to whom he had formerly been married, were registered proprietors as joint tenants. Their marriage was dissolved on 14 October 1976. The joint tenancy was severed on registration on 25 August 1978 of a Memorandum of Transfer from the deceased to the defendant of an undivided one-half share. The transfer was expressed to be for a consideration of Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00), and stamp duty was paid on the basis of that consideration. Since registration Zoe Krassoff and the defendant have been and remain registered proprietors as tenants-in-common. Zoe Krassoff’s affairs have for many years been under the control of the Protective Commissioner, and she is not a party to this dispute. Her entitlement to her one-half share is not under my consideration.
2 The deceased died aged 81 on 16 July 1992 intestate, and this court granted Letters of Administration on 17 February 1997. He was an Age Pensioner and his only significant asset was the interest which in these proceedings he is claimed to have had. The plaintiff’s primary claim is a claim for a declaration that the defendant holds his half-interest as trustee for the Estate. The plaintiff’s pleaded case when taken with particulars has the effect that the trust arose out of an oral agreement between the deceased and the defendant, and that it was a term of the agreement that the defendant would pay all accounts and disbursements incidental to the property and would be reimbursed for all such payments out of the proceeds of sale of the deceased’s interest There is an alternative claim for “ a declaration that upon sale of the said property, the Plaintiff is entitled to the nett proceeds of the sale of the said half-share of the said property after an account is taken of any monies which the defendant has contributed to the maintenance of the property by way of rates, land tax, mortgage payments, insurance payments and payments for maintenance.” This claim was based on Clause 2 of the Deed of Release. There are also claims for ancillary relief, for accounts and inquiries and for transfer of the property to the plaintiff. In oral submissions the plaintiff’s counsel also put forward a claim that there is a constructive trust over the property in favour of the Estate. In a cross-claim the defendant seeks to establish that if the Estate has an interest it is subject to a constructive trust or an equitable mortgage for him in respect of money he paid to the deceased relating to the property, or for loans.
3 There was no contemporaneous writing showing the constitution of the Trust and conforming to Paragraph (a) or Paragraph (b) of subs. 23C (1) of the Conveyancing Act, 1919. However a number of other writings and circumstances show, in my finding clearly, that the deceased and the defendant intended at the time of the transfer that the defendant should not become the beneficial owner of the property, but that he should hold it on trust for his father. Although the terms of the Memorandum of Transfer seem to show that consideration of Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00) was actually paid, and although the defendant’s evidence shows, in my finding correctly, that he paid significant sums of money in excess of Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00) to his father at about the time of the transfer, my finding is that no payment was in fact made to the deceased with the intention that it should be consideration for the transfer of the land.
4 The defendant’s evidence clearly shows that the transaction was entered into for the purpose of severing the joint tenancy so as to end the possibility that Zoe Krassoff would become sole owner by survivorship, after taking legal advice about how that possibility could be avoided. The deceased’s marriage to Zoe Krassoff had been dissolved, he had married Nadeschda Kavetsky now known as Nadia Kavetsky- Krassoff on 8 May 1977, and he wished to prevent Zoe Krassoff from benefiting by survivorship. He also wished if possible to get the proceeds of a sale of his interest into his own hands. The defendant obtained some legal advice on how to bring this about and told the deceased, shortly, what was to be done. I find that it was the intention of the deceased not to part with the beneficial ownership but to protect the beneficial ownership and keep it at his disposition, and that the defendant shared this intention. The defendant’s evidence on affidavit and in cross-examination confirm strongly that their intentions were as I have stated, and that the transaction was not one of sale.
5 Letters written on behalf of the defendant by Mr Peter Jay, solicitor who had acted for both parties on the transfer, confirm that their intentions were as I have found. Mr Jay’s letter of 13 December 1978 to solicitors who by that time represented the deceased in substance confirms that that was the true nature of the transaction, although it is doubtful whether the letter would constitute a writing conforming with subs. 23C(1). The letter stated, quite distinctly “ Our client has at all times considered himself to be a trustee of …..” (the house and other property). The letter went on to say that on advice the defendant wished to enter into a Deed of Trust declaring that he held the one-half share on trust, and the Deed was sent to the deceased’s solicitors. A letter which Mr Jay wrote to the deceased on 27 March 1981 also confirms, with unmistakable clarity, that the one-half share belonged to the deceased - “I recently had a telephone call from David who advised me that you wished to give him your half share in the Balmain property which he has been holding for some time as Trustee for you.” Mr Jay went on to request the deceased to return the earlier Deed of Trust on the basis that it was no longer valid as the defendant would hold the half share as beneficial owner, and Mr Jay forwarded a form of Deed of Release for execution.
6 The Deed of Release of 17 December 1981, which both the deceased and the defendant executed, contains a recital: “…the said son has at all times held his interest in the said property in Trust for the father…..”.
7 The correspondence, and also a recital in the Deed of Release referred to a Deed of Trust confirming the trust, and the recital says that the defendant had executed it. However, neither party has put the earlier Deed of Trust into evidence; the correspondence suggests that the last location for it which was known was that it was in the hands of the deceased at some time in or before 1981. There is no evidence which establishes its date, and its date is left blank in the reference to it in the recital. There is no clear secondary evidence of its contents apart from what can be inferred from the reference to it in the recital as a Deed of Trust confirming the trust. The defendant at one place denied that he had executed the Deed of Trust and at another said that he had no recollection of executing it. The solicitor Mr Jay who prepared it was unable to give evidence about whether it was ever executed. Indeed he had great difficulty in recollecting significant details of the transaction, and I did not find his difficulty in any way surprising in view of the length of time which has elapsed.
8 My finding on the probabilities is that a Deed of Trust probably was executed by the defendant and its terms probably established or recorded the terms of the trust alleged by the plaintiff. This finding is principally based upon the terms of the recital in the later Deed. The Deed of Trust probably satisfied subs.23C(1). Even if it did not, the intention to create a trust and the fact that it was created are proved clearly, and the parties are shown to have acted for several years on the basis that a trust existed, and to have entered into a further transaction, namely the Deed of Release on the same basis In these circumstances the absence of writing would not prevent the plaintiff from establishing the trust, having regard to the doctrine associated with Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897) 1 Ch. 196 at 20; see too Last v Rosenfeld [1972] 2 NSWLR 923, Wratten v Hunter [1978] 2 NSWLR 367. On enforcement notwithstanding lack of formal writing see also Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685 at 692 and Ogilvie v Ryan [1976] 2 NSWLR 504.
9 Even if the trust had not been lawfully constituted the effect of the recital, in a Deed executed by both parties, is in my opinion that both parties are bound to have their rights determined in accordance with the state of facts in the recital and are estopped from setting-up any other position.
10 The Deed of Release of 17 December 1981 is the document upon which the rights of the parties turn. The Deed in evidence does not bear a stamp but I satisfied myself when it was tendered that a copy has been duly stamped. It contains three recitals; one establishes that the defendant was the registered proprietor, the second I have quoted and the third recites:
“it has been agreed by and between the father and the son that the son should henceforth hold the interest in the said Balmain property for himself and not in Trust for the father.”
11 It is now necessary to address the meaning of the operative parts of the Deed of Release, and I set them out:
“1. The father HEREBY CONFIRMS AND RATIFIES that the interest in the said property of the son was held by the son beneficially for himself and not in Trust for the father and that the Deed hereinbefore referred to shall henceforth be null and void and have no effect.
2. The father will use his best endeavours to cause the said Deed of Trust to be forwarded to the son’s Solicitors for cancellation and in consideration of the premises the son will take such steps as are mutually agreed upon between the son and the father to provide accommodation for the father. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained the terms covenants and conditions herein are conditional upon the son being able to purchase at a reasonable market price from Zoey Krassof her share as tenant in common in equal shares in the said Balmain property and obtain vacant possession hereof bearing in mind the funds available to the son and the necessity for obtaining the consent of Zoey Krassoff to the sale with vacant possession and/or an order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales appointing a Trustee for the sale of the said property at Balmain i.e. of Zoey Krassoff’s one half share at a price he can reasonably
afford and which he is agreeable to pay. Alternatively, should the said David Krassoff sell his share in the property pursuant to any such Court Order then he will account to the father for the nett proceeds received upon such sale and legal costs incurred in acquiring into the name David Krassoff the share in the property formerly held by Andre Ivanovich Krassoff and all other subsequent ancillary legal expenses including, and if necessary expenses incurred in the Equity Court of New South Wales in obtaining an Order for Sale.”
12 According to its terms, Clause 1 confirms that the defendant held the property beneficially for himself and annuls the Deed of Trust. The words used speak of confirmation and ratification, but in substance they have the effect of conveying the beneficial interest in the property to the defendant; the intention to do so is clearly to be inferred. There is no express statement that the conveyance was a conveyance for consideration. Consideration of a kind appears from the terms of Clause 2; not necessarily very onerous but having substance as valuable consideration. The Deed meets the formal requirements of paragraph (c) of subs. 23C(1). Although there was no attack on this ground, I will say that I do not think that this should be regarded as a voluntary disposition but if it were, it would be binding because it was effected by a solemn document, executed under seal, and in the most formal manner possible for a voluntary assignment of an equitable interest in land.
13 The plaintiff’s position in summary was that all the provisions of Clauses 1 and 2, indeed the whole of the Deed, are conditional upon the condition in Clause 2, and as that condition has not been fulfilled the Deed is not in effect and in particular the conveyance in Clause 1 is not in effect.
14 Clause 2 is difficult to follow and the difficulty mainly arises from the long second sentence. It is difficult to understand how much of the provisions of the Deed of Release is affected by the words “Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained” and what is referred to as “the terms, covenants and conditions herein.” It is open to doubt whether Clause 1 is part of the matter “hereinbefore contained” which is made conditional, or whether the reference is only to the promises, one by the father and one by the son, made in the preceding sentence of Clause 2. It is also open to doubt whether “the terms, covenants and conditions herein” mean only the two contractual promises in the first sentence of Clause 1, or whether they extend to the confirmation and ratification in Clause 1 or, as the plaintiff’s counsel argued, to the recitals and also the whole Deed.
15 The provisions in the first sentence of Clause 2 could be spoken of as terms, covenants and conditions; it does not seem that the provisions of Clause 1 could be thought of as falling within the literal range of the words “covenants and conditions”, although they could be spoken of as terms. I do not think that the recitals fall within the literal range of meaning of “terms, covenants and conditions herein”. The third sentence opens with the word “Alternatively” . To what provisions are the provisions of the third sentence alternative? Looking at the matter narrowly, the words “Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained” are ambiguous and they could literally refer either to earlier provisions in Clause 2, or additionally to the provisions in Clause 1 or (a third alternative) to the recitals also.
16 I will seek to look at Clause 2 at a slightly greater distance and to consider the purposes of its provisions overall. In the Deed of Release the father gave up something, an interest in land; and it is to be expected that by another provision he got something back. The defendant gained something, the interest in land; and he incurred a burden, the covenant to take steps to provide accommodation; not necessarily an onerous burden, depending on what was later mutually agreed upon. The purposes of the Deed included putting the defendant into control of assets to enable him or to assist him to meet the accommodation obligation. The condition in the second sentence gave the son an opportunity to avoid obligations, if he could not purchase Zoe Krassoff’s share or could not sell his share on a basis agreeable to him; the condition was there to meet his difficulty and was wholly for his benefit. The defendant’s inability to purchase the other share or to force a sale by Court order would not create any need for the deceased to avoid the transaction. No time limit was set for the condition to be fulfilled, and there is no reason to think that the time within which the defendant could rely on the condition has yet expired. Consideration of the purposes of the provisions of the deed points towards the condition being one on which the defendant can escape from the accommodation obligation if he wishes to do so; but the purposes are not entirely inconsistent with its being a condition upon which he can escape from the whole transaction.
17 The facts make it clear that the defendant has never done anything to avoid the Deed or elect to rely on the condition. The evidence does not show that the deceased ever did any such thing either, or for that matter that the plaintiff has, and the evidence included no examination of whether the condition has been fulfilled or has failed. As there is no time limit for it to be fulfilled, there is no reason to find that it has failed. My view is that the condition probably affects only the earlier covenants in Clause 2; but even if this is wrong, the condition has never operated to have whatever avoiding effect it was intended to have. If the condition ever did fail only the defendant could rely on it, as it is wholly for his benefit. The evidence shows that the deceased did not ever cause the Deed of Trust to be forwarded for cancellation, and as the deceased has died and there is no longer any accommodation obligation, it is not practically possible that the son will ever hereafter attempt to rely on the condition to avoid the transaction. I find that the condition affects Clause 2 only, but the outcome would not be different if it affected the whole Deed of Release including the recitals.
18 In my view the provisions of the third sentence are alternative to the accommodation obligation; that is the only alternative burden which the defendant could bear. As he has not sold his share pursuant to a court order, and has not sold it at all, the obligation to account has never arisen. In my opinion, an obligation which was alternative to the accommodation obligation could only exist during the father’s lifetime. With the deceased’s death, any obligation to provide accommodation came to an end and any obligation which was alternative to that obligation also came to an end.
19 It is clear that the accommodation obligation and the accounting obligation in the third sentence do not create any equitable interest in the Balmain property, or any charge over it. Even if they did, the condition in the second sentence could not create any interest in the Balmain property unless and until the condition failed and was relied upon. There is no practical possibility that the covenant will be relied upon by the defendant, and there is no practical possibility that any interest or charge can ever come into existence.
20 There is no evidence that the defendant ever provided the deceased with any accommodation or showing whether or not he was willing to do so. The deceased was never in need of such provision. It is difficult to base any finding of any relevant fact on the evidence of Mrs Nadia Kavetsky-Krassoff, who was very undisciplined in her thinking and expression and had difficulty adhering to any line of relevance, but her evidence was that the deceased lived with her in her home at the time of the Deed of Release and continued to do so. No evidence established that there was ever mutual agreement about the provision of accommodation, or even any attempt to reach mutual agreement.
21 Both counsel put forward a view of the Deed of Release in which the termination of the original trust is conditional upon the terms of the Deed being carried-out. I do not think that this is a correct view of its operation. The terms in which the Deed is expressed speak wholly as if it operated forthwith, and the condition appears to me to have no impact unless the condition fails, and the defendant elects to rely on the condition. That is not practically possible. I do not accept the view in which there must be a sale for the condition to be effective and for the Deed to have effect, or the view that if there is no sale the earlier trust continues and the deceased had and his Administratrix as beneficiary now has the power to call for assignment of the legal title and bring the trust to an end.
22 Ownership of the half interest has brought little realised advantage. There has never been any arrangement for sale with the co-operation of the co-tenant or the Protective Commissioner, and the defendant has never had actual control of the premises, or an opportunity to receive income from it. There has been an advantage of a different kind in that with the passage of years the value of the property, although it has been neglected, has greatly increased. An Estate Manager in the office of the Protective Commissioner gave evidence which showed that in managing Mrs Zoe Krassoff’s affairs the Protective Commissioner has, since 1990, paid out $23,368.27 as expenses of the property, and has received no contribution from the defendant. The property has been unoccupied since about 1992. The defendant in his evidence associates the transfer of the beneficial interest in the property to him in December 1981 with payments made to the deceased which by that time, he says had reached $34,000; this association is not made by the terms of the second Deed.
23 Many payments were made by the defendant to the plaintiff; the amounts and times of the payments cannot be exactly established. The defendant also incurred relatively small sums for legal expenses or stamp duty; these were greatly outweighed by other sums which he paid to the deceased. I accept the evidence of the defendant, and other corroborating evidence which he called, which shows that various of these payments were made. The amounts were large and in my finding they were not in any way payments of consideration for acquisition of the property, or a recognition that the deceased had any interest in the property. With the small exceptions I have mentioned the defendant attributed the character of being gifts from son to father to these payments with a view to assisting his father in his old age, when he had very little means. I see nothing improbable in this evidence, which I accept, as it seems quite an ordinary incident of a relationship in which the father conferred benefits on the son, the father was aged and had very few resources and the son had, in relation to the circumstances of the family generally, relatively high earnings as an airline pilot.
24 There were no systematic records of these payments, and in the parties’ circumstances there is no reason to expect that records should have been maintained. The defendant gave evidence of having lost a number of records through their being spoilt by damp while in storage. I accept this explanation, but quite apart from the explanation it is in no way surprising that banking records or any other records from years in the distant past which might record or indirectly reflect large payments cannot now be produced.
25 The defendant paid the deceased $3,000 on one occasion before the transfer, a sum of $3,000 and a sum of $11,000 at about the time of the transfer, and significant payments later, including a payment for $20,000 which the defendant recorded by making a jotting in his air navigation log book, and another payment of $22,000 which the defendant directed Mr Brix-Nielsen, who owed the defendant some money, to pay to the deceased. There was a number of other payments, not all of them of such significant sums. They were gifts in a family situation and they were not business transactions or loans. In the deceased’s circumstances in life there could have been no expectation that he would ever be able to pay back significant sums of money.
26 I do not accept contentions of the plaintiff’s counsel that in the circumstances there is a constructive trust of the property. I see nothing in the circumstances which would demonstrate that the defendant’s reliance on his rights is unconscionable, and no such case was pleaded. I do not accept defendant’s counsel’s contentions that provisions of Clause 2 of the Deed of Release which might benefit the deceased are precatory only and not intended to create legal obligations. Nor do I accept the contention that the condition constitutes a void restraint on alienation, as it does not restrain alienation, and it has no operation except at the election of the defendant.
27 The plaintiff tendered evidence of conversations between the deceased and the defendant which were said to have taken place about 1990. Their significance was said to be that they show that the deceased then acted as if he believed that he retained an interest in the property, and that the defendant continued to deal with the deceased in respect of the property by seeking his advice and wishes; it was contended that this shows recognition that the deceased continued to have an equitable interest in the property.
28 The plaintiff said in evidence to the effect that in about 1990, on an occasion when the deceased and the defendant met for lunch at the Russian Club in Brisbane and then proceeded to her home at Upper Mount Gravatt, the deceased said to the effect: “ I want all my papers and property back” and the defendant replied: “you’ll get them back when you pay me what you owe me.” She said too that on that or it may be another occasion or occasions the defendant told the deceased words to this effect: “Okay I will give the papers to Ray and he can give them to you.” She said that the defendant also spoke to her about the position of the Balmain property in terms which were inconclusive and included his saying: “He can have it back any time he wants it back as long as he comes up with the money” ; the amount required was not stated. She also said that he claimed that the property had cost him significant money. Her husband, Mr Raymond Deen gave evidence corroborating some of these conversations.
29 The plaintiff’s evidence about the conversation at her house at Mt Gravatt about 1990 was to the following effects. In her presence the deceased said to the defendant: (T8 L55) “I want my papers back” and the defendant said: “You can have them but they cost me money. You are going to be paying for them.” The deceased said that he wanted the deeds and everything returned, that he wanted the deeds and the papers which the defendant was holding back; he wanted them all back. They were talking about the deeds to his house. The defendant said that $12,000 was what it was going to cost the deceased to get them back. (In chief, transcript 8,9 & 10). In evidence she also said:
“He just wanted everything that he had given David to do with the property back and in his name and in his control”. (Transcript 12XX). “….my father didn’t, you know, have excellent English; he could easily have called deeds papers. He wanted all his - anything he had given David he wanted it back, that’s what it amounted to”. (T.14XX).
“…he wanted anything to do with his property, his house, returned back to him that he had given David and he wanted full control.” (She could not be sure that he did not mention the word “ property”. (T.14XX).
30 Mr Raymond Deen’s evidence (T.23 in chief) was to the effect that on an occasion which may well be the same occasion the deceased said to the defendant:
“I want my deeds back and my Power of Attorney back.”
The defendant said that he would not give them to him: he said:
“They have cost me too much money and if you come up with the money, you give me back the money, you can have the deeds.”
Mr Deen did not recall any specific amount of money mentioned at that time.
In another conversation at a later date the amount of $12,000 was mentioned.(See T.24X L.8). The defendant said:
“If you give me back my $12,000 I will give you the papers.”
On another day, after the lunch at the Russian Club, and after a heated argument when Mr and Mrs Deen intervened, the defendant said:
“I can give the papers to Ray and he can give them back to you.” (T.24).
The deceased used the word “papers” and also used the word “ deeds” when saying what he wanted back. (See T.25XX).

31 The defendant denied the evidence of the supposed conversations of about 1990 and the parties are at issue, substantially on the relative credit of the witnesses who spoke of the matter.
32 In my finding there may well have been continuing discussions about the Balmain property, which was a standing disappointment for its being unproductive and being neutralised by Zoe Krassoff’s interest in it, and for a long time it was occupied without producing income by Zoe Krassoff’s mother and no income was produced from it.
33 I am unable to make any conclusive finding on the evidence of the conversations. At the outset it should be said that assertions by the deceased, if he made any, to the effect that he had an interest in the property would have no real weight or standing as evidence that he did have such an interest. Further the statements attributed to him in evidence, even if they were to be accepted, are not rightly to be understood as assertions that he owned the property or had some interest in it. Even as put forward in her affidavit-in-chief by the plaintiff the assertions were made in terms quite consistent with its being the deceased’s wish to have the property returned to him, not to have recognition of some interest which he already had. On that reading the statements would confirm that the deceased did not have an interest. As the plaintiff dealt further with the matter and was cross-examined about the conversations, they lost any elements of clarity that otherwise might have been attributed to them, and my view overall is that the evidence of the plaintiff of conversations around 1990 supports no more than a finding that the deceased made claims, not at all in precise terms, that he should be given back control of the Balmain property. I do not see this circumstance as capable of assisting the plaintiff’s claim.
34 I do not regard the plaintiff’s evidence as reliable on any matter of detail. Her manner appeared to me to show signs of interest and feeling. Indeed the defendant’s demeanour also revealed some such signs, but less markedly so, and I have relatively greater confidence in his evidence. The conversations in 1990, whatever exactly was said, were consistent with a request for a new transaction in which the equitable ownership was conveyed back to the deceased. In view of the terms of the second Deed the evidence is not on the whole consistent with there then being an existing trust interest.
35 Attempts to locate documents and recollect events from the distant past had very little success and I could not feel high confidence in evidence given of conversations and negotiations of many years ago, in some cases of well over twenty years ago. The case gives further support, if any were needed, to the obvious wisdom of legislation requiring writing for effective dealings in real property.

36 The orders are:
1. On the plaintiff’s claim I give judgment for the defendant with costs.
2. On the cross-claim I give judgment for the cross-defendant.
3. I order that each party pay his or her own costs of the cross-claim.
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I certify that paragraphs 1-36 are the reasons for
judgment of the Honourable Justice John Bryson.

Date: 28th April 1999. (J. Stevenson)
Associate

Last Modified: 04/29/1999