Deegan and Deegan v Vines - [1995] QCA 13

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 137 of 1994

Brisbane
[Vines v. Deegan]

BETWEEN

JAMES RAYMOND VINES

(Plaintiff) Respondent

AND

FRANCIS C. DEEGAN

(First Defendant) First Appellant

AND

HAZEL JEAN DEEGAN

(Second Defendant) Second Appellant
Macrossan C.J. McPherson J.A. Lee J.

Judgment delivered 15/02/95

Joint reasons for judgment by McPherson J.A. and Lee J.

Separate dissenting reasons by Macrossan C.J.

APPEAL ALLOWED WITH COSTS, AND THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT
VARIED BY REDUCING IT TO $48,057.57.

CATCHWORDS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - Motor vehicle accident - Personal Injury - Duty of care to traffic approaching from behind - Duty of driver to drive at safe speed and keep proper lookout - Braund v. Henning (1988) 7 M.U.R. 97.

Counsel:	P. Munro for the appellants Grant-Taylor for the respondent
Solicitors:	McInnes Wilson & Jensen for the appellants Smith & Stanton for the respondent

Hearing Date: 11 November 1994

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1995] QCA 013
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND	Appeal No. 137 of 1994
Brisbane
[Vines v. Deegan & Anor]
Before: Chief Justice

McPherson JA
Lee J

BETWEEN:

JAMES RAYMOND VINES

(Plaintiff) Respondent

AND:

FRANCIS C DEEGAN

(First Defendant) First Appellant

AND:

HAZEL JEAN DEEGAN

(Second Defendant) Second Appellant

JUDGMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Judgment delivered 15/02/1995

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of
McPherson JA and Lee J where the circumstances relevant to
this appeal are fully canvassed.

In my view, certain critical conclusions of the Trial Judge are supported by the facts.

The second appellant was in this case not necessarily blameworthy in choosing one exit rather than another that was available further to the west where her view of traffic approaching from the west would have been better. Still that very choice imposed an obligation on her to drive her vehicle in a manner particularly responsive to the situation which thus prevailed. Aware that traffic could be expected to approach from her right along Robinson Road and also that it would, due to the intervening crest, have a severely limited opportunity to observe her exiting manoeuvre and the consequent position of her vehicle upon the roadway, she should, after choosing a safe moment to exit, have accelerated briskly with due consideration for any approaching traffic that might come suddenly upon her over the crest and she should, as well, have kept some view behind in her rear vision mirror and otherwise kept her vehicle to the left as far as was possible. The effect of the Trial Judge's findings is that the second appellant did not do these things but, in practical terms, having emerged from the driveway proceeded slowly and moved to occupy a position on the roadway towards the middle rather than to the left of her traffic lane. Her lack of consideration for the presence of the respondent who happened to be approaching from the other side of the crest when she exited, justified the finding of negligence against her.

The respondent, for his part,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Deegan and Deegan v Vines

Details

AGLC: Deegan and Deegan v Vines [1995] QCA 13
Case: [1995] QCA 13
Decision Date: 15/02/1995

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Deegan and Deegan v Vines involved an appeal against a judgment from the District Court that apportioned responsibility for a motor vehicle accident. The respondents, James Raymond Vines, sued the appellants, Francis C. Deegan and Hazel Jean Deegan, for damages arising from personal injuries sustained in a collision between Vines' motorcycle and a car driven by Hazel Jean Deegan. The District Court found the appellants to be two-thirds liable and Vines one-third liable for the accident. The appellants challenged the apportionment of liability on appeal, arguing that there was either no negligence on the part of Hazel Jean Deegan or that the apportionment did not reflect the relative culpability of the parties.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether Hazel Jean Deegan was negligent in exiting the shopping centre car park from the eastern exit and whether the apportionment of liability was fair and reasonable. The Court of Appeal found that Hazel Jean Deegan was negligent in failing to accelerate away from the point of entry at an appropriate speed and in not keeping a proper lookout to her rear. However, the Court found that Vines was also negligent for not maintaining a proper lookout ahead and for travelling too fast to cope with any foreseeable need to stop or slow down.

The Court of Appeal varied the apportionment of liability to two-thirds to Vines and one-third to Hazel Jean Deegan, reducing the damages awarded to $48,057.57. The appeal was allowed with costs. The Court of Appeal's decision highlights the importance of drivers taking reasonable care to avoid accidents, including driving at a safe speed, keeping a proper lookout, and being aware of potential hazards on the road. The decision also emphasizes the need for a fair and reasonable apportionment of liability in personal injury cases.

Orders