Decker and Thames

[2019] FamCA 502

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DECKER & THAMES [2019] FamCA 502

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Interim parenting orders – high level of parental conflict.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Mr Decker

RESPONDENT: Ms Thames

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: CN Family Law

FILE NUMBER:   ADC 2187 of 2018

DATE DELIVERED: 4 July 2019

PLACE DELIVERED: Adelaide

PLACE HEARD: Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF: Mead J

HEARING DATE: 27 June 2019

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Read of Counsel

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Stanley & Co Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Dickson of Counsel

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Culshaw Miller Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Hemsley of Counsel

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: CN Family Law

Orders

1. That paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) and 3 of the order of Judge Brown of 7 March 2019 be discharged.

2. That pending trial X born … 2016 spend time with her father:

   (a)On Saturday of each week between 2:30pm and 5:00pm commencing 13 July 2019; and

   (b)On Tuesday of each week between 3:30pm and 6:00pm commencing 9 July 2019.

3. That the time referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be taken in the presence of and under the supervision of Mr A.

4. That the parties share the cost of Mr A’s supervision as to one (1) quarter thereof to be paid by the mother and three (3) quarters thereof to be paid by the father.

5. That pending trial handovers be effected:

   (a)By way of the mother delivering X to Mr A at S Playground 15 minutes prior to the commencement time in the absence of the father with the mother to forthwith depart the park and its environs and with the father not to attend within 500 metres of the park until he receives a telephone call from Mr A confirming that the mother has departed; and

   (b)By way of Mr A returning X to the mother at the conclusion time at S Playground in the absence of the father who is to depart S Playground and its environs immediately upon the conclusion of the time, with the mother not to attend within 500 metres of the park until she receives a telephone call from Mr A confirming that the father has departed.

6. That in the event of inclement weather Mr A be at liberty to change the place of handover upon giving not less than one (1) hours’ notice to each of the parties of the changed venue but that the order for handover contained in paragraph 5 hereof apply in all respects to the alternate place of handover.

7. That paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the consent order made herein on 22 March 2019 be discharged.

8. That the father do within 14 days of today’s date make an appointment and attend upon Dr T of BB Clinic, CC Street Suburb DD to receive instructions on how to administer an epi pen and to discuss X’s allergy or allergies generally, at his expense NOTING THAT this order is not to be regarded by the mother as a condition precedent to any other order contained herein.

9. That both parties apply for acceptance into and attend at the first available U Services post-separation parenting program.

10. That paragraph 5 of the consent order of Judge Brown of 22 March 2019 be discharged.

11. Until further order and without admission the parties be restrained and injunctions are hereby granted restraining each of them from carrying out or arranging or facilitating the carrying out of any form of surveillance whatsoever of the other of them, including but not limited to recording telephone calls or other communications, photographing handovers or the residence of the other of them or utilising any form of personal detection in relation to the other of them.

12. That paragraph 6 of the order of Judge Brown of 7 March 2019 be varied by inserting the words “or any members of the extended family of the other of them” in the second (2nd) line thereof after the word “other” and before the word “in”.

13. That the mother be at liberty to travel with X outside of the State of South Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia for a total period of 16 days including travel time between 1 August 2019 and 31 August 2019.

14. That on or before 5:00pm on 8 July 2019 the father sign all such documents necessary to enable the mother to obtain a passport for the child X.

15. Failure by the father to comply with the terms of paragraph 14 above in such a manner as to enable the mother to obtain the passport will result in the terms of paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 coming into effect.

16. That leave be granted for the issue of a passport in the name of and for the child X born … 2016 and that the said child be permitted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia.

17. That the Passports Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade issue a passport in the name of the said child upon the filing of the appropriate completed application form exhibiting the permission of the mother Ms Thames.

18. The requirement for the permission of the father Mr Decker to the issue of the said passport be dispensed with.

19. That SAVE AS TO any dates on which Mr A is unavailable to supervise time, any time for X to spend with her father that does not occur because of the mother’s absence from the Commonwealth of Australia be “made up” within 6 weeks of the missed time or times on dates and at times agreed in consultation with Mr A.

20. That paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the mother’s application in a case filed 17 April 2019 and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the father’s response filed 1 May 2019 and trial directions be adjourned to 18 July 2019 at 4:15pm.

21. That within 14 days of todays’ date the parties solicitors facilitate a joint informal conference involving both parties and counsel instructed for trial with respect to property settlement issues.

22. That if possible all counsel attend at the hearing on 18 July 2019 at 4:15pm.

23. That the father be at liberty to provide a copy of the family report of Ms V to Mr W, upon providing to the mother’s solicitor a receipt for payment of his outstanding share of the costs of Ms V’s report.

24. That costs generally with respect to the application in a case and the response be adjourned to trial.

25. That the application in a case and the response thereto be otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Decker & Thames has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE

FILE NUMBER: ADC 2187 of 2018

Mr Decker

Applicant

And

Ms Thames

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The parties in this matter commenced litigation with the father’s application filed on 15 June 2018.  The file now consists of 77 documents, an indication of the extent of the toxic conflict between the parties.  The parties are in dispute with respect to financial issues and parenting issues, but the financial aspects of the dispute seem to be progressing very slowly.  X, the child the subject of the parenting dispute, is two years and nine months old.  She lives with her mother in the home of the maternal grandparents.  She has spent time with her father on a supervised basis only since the parties separated in April 2018.  Initially that took place at the home of the maternal grandparents.

2. By way of a consent order made by Judge Brown on 10 September 2018, the time continued to occur at the home of the maternal grandparents but then became supervised by Mr A.

3. Both parties alleged and continue to allege that the other was the perpetrator of family violence against each of them.  The father was the defendant in an interim family violence order made on 26 April 2018.  That family violence order was later withdrawn by the police.  The mother has told the court in her affidavit material that she does not know why that occurred and thereafter she sought a private intervention order.

4. The mother was charged with assault against the father, consisting of three charges of aggravated assault.  The mother eventually pleaded guilty to one charge of basic assault.  Two other charges were withdrawn, and the matter was dismissed without penalty or conviction on 29 May 2019.

5. In June 2019 a final intervention order was made in the Magistrates Court in favour of the mother.  A trial had proceeded in relation to that application.  It had continued over nine days, including six days of cross‑examination of the mother, firstly by the father’s counsel and then for the final four days by the father himself.  These proceedings took place between 11 October 2018 and 6 June 2019.

6. The consent order in these proceedings of 10 September 2018 with respect to time spending provided for X to spend time with the father, supervised by Mr A, on Saturday of each week during the period of the adjournment, from 1:00pm to 3:00pm, with the adjourned date being 4 December 2018.  The consent orders also included an order for a family assessment report.  On 14 November 2018 an oral application was made seeking a stay of the part of the order relating to the preparation of the family assessment report until such time as the cross-examination of the mother in the intervention order proceedings in the Magistrates Court was concluded.  Judge Brown declined to stay that part of the order.

7. On 4 December 2018 the matter was adjourned by consent to 21 February 2019.  A further consent order provided for X to continue to spend time with her father from 3.30 pm to 5.30 pm on Saturday each week, supervised by Mr A at the home of the maternal grandparents.

8. On 21 February 2019 Judge Brown heard extensive submissions from the parties’ counsel, took evidence from the father’s mother in relation to the question of her “potential circuit breaker role”[1] supervising X’s time away from the home of the maternal grandparents, and reserved his decision as to those interim issues.

   [1]Decker & Thames [2019] FCCA 493, paragraph 38

9. On 7 March 2019 His Honour delivered reasons consisting of some 50 pages.  To say that His Honour carefully considered all issues in accordance with the relevant legislation would be a major understatement.  He summarised outstanding issues in paragraph 40 of his judgment.  He made detailed orders and adjourned the matter for further directions to 21 July 2019.  The orders made that day were expressed to be orders until further order and not orders during the period of the adjournment.  His Honour carefully considered the extent of X’s relationship with her father and in particular her level of comfort and safety in his care.  The orders made by His Honour on that occasion were as follows:

   Until further or other order the court orders that:

   1.The child of the relationship X born in 2016 “the child” live with the mother.

   2.The father spend time with the child at the following times and subject to the following conditions:

   a.For the next six (6) Saturdays commencing 9 March 2019 between 3:30pm and 6:00pm subject to the supervision of Mr A and Ms B;

   b.Thereafter on each Saturday commencing 27 April 2019 between the hours of 3:30pm and 6:00pm and each Tuesday commencing on 29 April 2019 between the hours of 3:30pm and 6:00pm subject to the supervision of Ms B.

   3.The time stipulated in order 2 hereof take place at the home of the father and to give effect to the order the child be exchanged under the auspices of Mr A (order (2)(a)) and thereafter Ms B (order (2)(b)) at a location to be agreed between the parties and failing agreement at the Suburb Y Library.

   4.The parties each create a personal email address and inform the other of it within four days of the date of these orders, which addresses are to be used for the sole purpose of exchanging parenting information concerning the child between them in a formal manner, with the information to be exchanged between them to consist of the following together with any other matter germane to the child’s care, welfare and development: her dietary requirements and any relevant preferences and allergies; any necessary modifications to handover arrangements; sleeping patterns; any illnesses or significant accidents or mishaps suffered by her; together with details of any medication prescribed for her; and any necessary medical appointments arranged for her.

   5.To give effect to order (4) hereof the parties exchange relevant emails with the mother to initiate the applicable email exchange at 6:00pm each Friday commencing 15 March 2019.

   6.The parties are each restrained and an injunction issues restraining each of them from denigrating, insulting, provoking or abusing the other in the presence or hearing of the child or permitting any other person to do so.

   7.The parties are each restrained and an injunction issues restraining each of them from discussing these proceeding and the other on social media sites or posting any information about these proceedings, on such sites, which will have the consequence of identifying either the child or the parties to these proceedings or permitting any person associated with them, including friends and relatives from doing so.

   8.The proceedings are adjourned to 25 July 2019 at 9:30am for directions.

10. Those orders were not appealed by either party.

11. On 19 March 2019 the father filed and served an application in a case in circumstances where the mother had allegedly not complied with the terms of that order in relation to X’s time with the father such that no time had occurred since 2 March 2019.  The mother filed a response to that application on 22 March 2019.  At the hearing on 22 March 2019, there were further consent orders made.  Those orders were as follows:

    Upon noting the father will be overseas from 12 April 2019 until 21 April 2019,

    By consent until further order the court orders:

    1.That make-up time occur between the father and X on or before 11 April 2019 at times and dates to be agreed between the parties for the time not proceeding on 9, 16 and 23 March 2019 subject to the availability of Mr A.

    2.That make-up time occur between the father and X on 21 April 2019 at 3.30-6:00pm for the time not proceeding on 13 and 20 April 2019.

    3.That the supervision costs of Mr A be shared equally between the parties upon the father discharging his arrears of child support in the sum of $1,215.00 and pending payment of such arrears the father shall pay the said costs of Mr A.

    4.The parties do keep the other informed of their current residential address in writing at all times.

    5.That on a without admission basis, the parties agree that they will not undertake any physical surveillance of the other at their home.

    6.That on a without admission basis the mother shall not:

    a.Enter or remain within 250 metres of the boundary of the father’s residential address or;

    b.Allow any person acting on her behalf to enter or remain 250 metres of the boundary of the father’s residential address.

    7.The interim applications be dismissed.

12. Time took place on each of 30 March 2019 and 7 April 2019, but concluded early on 30 March 2019 because of X’s distress, allegedly as a result of the presence of the paternal grandmother.

13. On 6 April 2019 time took place as agreed with the father and X supervised by Mr A.  On 7 April 2019 time took place supervised by Mr A, but the father attempted to have his mother and three nieces attend, which was thwarted by Mr A.  He had requested of the father that not take place and he understood the father had agreed.

14. No time as ordered by Judge Brown on each of 7 March 2019 and 22 March 2019 has otherwise occurred.  On 17 April 2019 the mother filed an application in a case.  Therein she sought, inter alia, a variation to the order of 7 March 2019 in relation to the paternal grandmother being removed as a supervisor of time and a change of supervisor as well as a change of times for time spending being varied.

15. The mother also sought a variation of handover arrangements and various other orders, including a variation of injunctive orders.  She sought the court’s permission to travel to Country FF with X in August of 2019 with or without the father’s consent to a passport issuing for X.

16. The father filed a response.  He sought, inter alia, that the orders of 7 March 2019 resume immediately in full force and effect.  He is opposed to X travelling overseas.

17. I have not read out the orders sought by each party in their entirety, because the central current issue is very clear.  X has only spent time with her father pursuant to the orders of 7 March 2019 on 30 March 2019 when the time concluded early, on 6 April 2019 when the time was for the full two and a half hours and on 7 April 2019 when the time concluded early.

18. On 22 June 2019 I heard extensive submissions from counsel for each of the parties and the independent children's lawyer as to what orders should now be in place.

19. As well as reserving judgment in relation to the interim issues, I listed the matter for trial on 14 October 2019 for five days.  That is 15 and a half weeks from the date of the interim argument.  As I have said previously, Judge Brown’s reasons were extensive and took into account the extent of the conflict between the parties as well as between the father and the maternal grandparents.  His Honour still determined that X was not at unacceptable risk with respect to spending time with her father supervised firstly by Mr A and then by the paternal grandmother.  He found that X had a viable relationship with her father.[2]  Notwithstanding the deeply held concerns of the mother in relation to the time X spent with her father, His Honour felt that it could not continue to be supervised by Mr A on an indefinite basis.

    [2]Decker & Thames [2019] FCCA 493, paragraph 172

20. After hearing evidence from the paternal grandmother, Judge Brown determined that she would be protective of X and a suitable supervisor for the time.  This was in circumstances where he was unable to make findings as to the competing allegations of the parties, because of the interim nature of the proceedings.  Since the extensive deliberations and reasons, the proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court have concluded.  They did so with a final intervention order being granted in favour of the mother against the father.  That issue was deposed to in the affidavit of Mr Z filed on 14 June 2019.

21. In addition, X’s time spending with her father with the paternal grandmother present has been unsuccessful.  X seems to become distressed in her presence.  The family report process did not include observation of interaction between X and the paternal grandmother.  After hearing evidence from the paternal grandmother at the interim hearing, Judge Brown said in his judgment at paragraph 38:

    I was interested in what part Ms B could play in the case, particularly whether she could form some sort of neutral circuit breaker.

22. On each of the occasions time took place in the absence of the paternal grandmother but supervised by Mr A, it was successful in terms of X’s interaction with her father.  Mr A’s reports annexed to the affidavit of the mother filed 17 April 2019 record that to be the position.

23. At the time Judge Brown delivered reasons on 7 March 2019 he did not have available to him the determination of the Magistrates' Court in relation to the charges against the mother, the intervention order proceedings or any evidence in relation to interaction between the paternal grandmother and X.  He was also not aware of where the father had rented a house.

24. The pertinent facts of this parenting case and current dispute are otherwise, for all intents and purposes, the same as were presented to His Honour on 26 February 2019.  The parties are effectively, in filing further interim applications, seeking “another bite of the cherry” or, to put it another way, a “backdoor appeal” to the orders of Judge Brown.  Neither party was happy with the outcome of the earlier interim hearing.  I am satisfied that neither party was committed to doing everything within their power to ensure the success of the interim parenting orders.

1. The mother made compliance with the orders conditional upon knowing the father’s address.  This was not a condition precedent to implementation of His Honour’s order.  The father determined that he knew better than Mr A as to how to create the best chance for success for the smooth progress of X’s time with him.  He was spectacularly unsuccessful.  Again, we have a situation where neither party are able to acknowledge contribution to X’s stressful situation.

2. Counsel for the independent children's lawyer went so far as to submit that, from his reading of the material filed by the parties after the orders of 7 March 2019 and 22 March 2019, compliance with those orders was regarded by each of the parties as optional.  I accept that submission.  He also submitted that he understood that at this time, it may be that the paternal grandmother would not be a suitable supervisor because of X’s reaction to her.  I also accept that submission.

3. Since the making of Judge Brown’s orders, which were intended to operate until further order and therefore at least until the end of July provide some four and a half months of time spending firstly of one occasion per week for six weeks and thereafter for two occasions per week, there have only been three occasions X has spent time with her father.  Even those three times occurred after the necessity of a further order of 26 March 2019.

4. It is not appropriate for the court to be asked to rethink the orders of Judge Brown other than in the context of any changed circumstances since the hearing on 26 February 2019.  Essentially, the changes are:

   a.The fact X has not spent time with her father to which she was entitled pursuant to the orders of 7 March 2019;

   b.X’s apparent distress when exposed to the company of the paternal grandmother;

   c.X’s apparent aversion to spending time with her father when asked;

   d.Mr A’s concern that in part, this relates to the sequence of transportation events that precede the time spending;

   e.the conclusion of the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court leading to:

   i)a withdrawal of two of three charges against the mother and the disposal of the third without conviction or penalty;

   ii)the statement of the agree facts tendered in the Magistrates' Court; and

   iii)a final intervention order naming the father as defendant and the mother as the protected person;

   f.the mother becoming aware of the father’s address and the alleged impact (because of the terms of the injunction made on 22 March 2019 restricting her area of travel) on her ability to travel in her local area;

   g.the mother and X being invited to travel to Country FF in August 2019 with family and friends.

5. Judge Brown carefully considered the question of risk to X’s emotional and physical safety from her father’s alleged reactive and volatile personality.  This issue was canvassed at length in paragraphs 176 to 186 of his reasons.  Findings have now been made in the Magistrates' Court against the father in relation to allegations of family violence made by the mother.  His Honour was alive to the allegations, notwithstanding they were being vigorously defended by the father.  These are matters of concern and certainly inform the mother’s attitude to the father.

6. Neither party seeks orders for unsupervised time spending.  The father seeks for the supervision to be conducted by his mother.  I could not find at this time, on the objective evidence contained primarily in the reports of Mr A, that such a course is in X’s best interests.  I am satisfied however that X should continue to spend time with her father supervised by an experienced professional person.  I find that this would ensure X’s psychological and physical safety, pending a final hearing when these matters can be canvassed in detail.  Neither party want Mr A to supervise.  I consider the position of both parties in that regard to be unhelpful and ill-founded.

7. X knows Mr A.  She usually goes happily with him.  She does not, for some reason, react well to her paternal grandmother.  She knows no one from the M Group.  I find the mother’s complaints in relation to Mr A to be without merit.  She sets these out in paragraphs 67 and 68 of her affidavit filed 16 April 2019.  To my mind, he should be applauded for his actions in trying to help X and seeking advice from colleagues, not criticised.

8. Judge Brown canvassed all of the reasons why X’s best interests were met by spending time with her father, in the process balancing the competing interests.  His Honour was concerned about the impact on the development of X’s relationship with her father if time spending continued to be supervised.  He did not consider that the completion of a course of anger management therapy should be a condition precedent to X spending more time with her father, given the controversial circumstances of this case.  This is referred to in paragraphs 194 and 195 of his reasons.

9. The circumstances are now a little less controversial in light of the outcome of the criminal charges against the mother and the summing up by the Magistrate in the Magistrates' Court in relation to the confirmation of the intervention order.  This is contained in the affidavit of Mr Z filed on 14 June 2019 at paragraph 13.

10. I am aware that Mr A comes at a significant financial cost to the parties.  Previously his charges were to be shared equally.

11. I am satisfied that a significant reason that Mr A became involved in these proceedings as a supervisor was because of the mother’s concerns for  X’s safety based on her experiences of the father’s conduct towards her during the relationship, and her concerns that his volatility may impact negatively on his parenting capacity.  In light of the further evidence before the court now in relation to the Magistrates' Court proceedings, I consider it appropriate that the majority of the cost relating to Mr A be borne by the father pending trial.

12. Mr A is available, as per his report dated 22 June 2019.  The parties both seek supervision.  To my mind he is the only available and suitable supervisor.

13. Taking those matters into account, I find that the mother’s proposal of supervised time two times a week is preferable to the father’s proposal of a resumption of X’s time with him in accordance with the terms of the order of 7 March 2019.  That proposal involves his mother supervising, which I have already found to be unsuitable at this time.

14. The mother’s proposal, using the AA Group as supervisors, would apparently cost the parties $65 each per session.  The skill of that agency appears, on its face, to be different to what is required for supervision in this matter.  I do not consider it to be in X’s best interests to be put in likely further distress by having to meet new supervisors to facilitate time with her father, which is already, on occasions, causing her distress.  I consider it appropriate, for these reasons, that the mother pay one quarter and the father pay three quarters towards each supervised session costs.

15. Mr A has helpfully suggested in his report of 22 June 2019 that alterations to handovers may alleviate X’s resistance to spending time with her father.  I do not consider that we are as yet at the stage of X requiring assistance from a therapist in relation to her apparent refusals to attend at supervised time.  The therapy would more usefully be accessed by X’s parents.  I agree that a change of venue and handover may be of benefit to X.

16. I see no reason why the mother could not transport X to S Playground to deliver her to Mr A and then forthwith depart the park and its environs.  The father is required by the terms of the intervention order to not be within 100 metres of the mother.  That could be achieved by him being restrained from arriving within at least 100 metres of the park before being advised by Mr A that the mother had departed.  The same arrangement could work in reverse at the conclusion of time.

17. Such arrangement may assist X, as it would indicate specific cooperation on the part of the mother in facilitating her time with her father.  If the father and Mr A want to travel to the father’s house during the supervised time, that would be a matter for them.  If there was inclement weather the handovers could occur at an agreed place easily accessible to all and as nominated to each party by Mr A not less than 30 minutes prior to handover times.

18. The mother seeks a discharge of the injunction contained in paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the order of 26 March 2019.  She tells the court that when she consented to the order, she did not know the father intended to live so close to her, her parents and X’s residence.  She says it impinges on her right of free travel in her local area and prevents her usual place of shopping and regular routes of travel.  I am satisfied that the father knew his address and its proximity to that of the mother when he sought the injunction against the mother.  The order was made by consent and not imposed by the court.  I am not satisfied as to the basis for the order, and intend to discharge the order for injunction.

19. Equally however, I see no reason why the terms of paragraph 5 of the consent order of 22 March 2019 are confined to “physical surveillance”.  Neither of these parties should be carrying out surveillance of the other of them in any form whatsoever, be that recording telephone calls and/or conversations, photographing handovers or the other’s residence, or using any other forms of surveillance whatsoever, including private detection.  Notwithstanding neither party seeks such an extensive order, or, in the case of the mother, any such order, I intend to make such an order in an attempt to reduce the level of conflict between the parties, as this conflict is not in X’s best interests.

20. In relation to the issue of the EpiPen use and order sought by the mother, I consider it in X’s best interests that both parents learn from the same source.  I do not consider such an order to be an imposition on the father, but rather something that will assist him in his parenting skills and knowledge of X’s health issues.

21. Both parties would benefit from the U Services program, if not already undertaken.  I intend to make such an order.  It may assist the parties to focus on their communication in relation to X, which is essential for her wellbeing.

22. The mother also seeks to be able to travel to Country FF.  I cannot comprehend why this is an issue before the court.  This child is two and a half.  Her mother and her grandparents have been invited to Country FF.  The father went off to Country R for two weeks this year.  Why X would not be able to travel to Country FF for a perfectly reasonable family holiday defies any reasonable belief.  I intend to make the orders sought by the mother, and I intend to make them without the necessity for the father to sign the passport application.

23. That concludes the orders sought by the mother other than the financial matters, to which I will come back at a later date.  Regarding the orders sought in the father’s response, I have effectively already dealt with the orders he seeks in paragraphs 1 and 2 in terms of what I have determined I intend to do.  Order 3 relates to a restraining order against denigrating members of extended families.  I am unable to issue injunctions in respect of the maternal grandparents, but I agree that an order should be made extending the non-denigration order to maternal grandparents, paternal grandparents and extended members of both families.

24. In paragraph 4 the father seeks that the mother do all things to encourage the child to spend time with the father.  I am not satisfied that the mother is not encouraging the child, and I make those comments in light of material contained in the reports of Ms V and Mr A.  In paragraph 5, the father seeks that the mother engage in counselling to support a relationship.  I am not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence prior to trial to make such an order, in light of the Magistrates' Court proceedings and lack of the court’s ability at this time to make findings as to the extent and characterisation of the father’s conduct towards the mother during the relationship.

25. Paragraph 6 relates to the maternal grandmother attending with the paternal grandmother.  For the reasons that I have already given, I would decline to make such an order, as time at present is to be in the absence of the paternal and maternal grandmothers.  Paragraphs 7 and 8 relate to restraining X from leaving the Commonwealth of Australia.  I have already said that I intend to make such an order, and accordingly decline to make any order as sought by the father.  Paragraph 9 of the father’s application and paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the mother’s applications relate to financial issues, that I will come back to later.

26. For those reasons the orders are as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Mead delivered on 4 July 2019.

Associate: 

Date: 19 August 2019