Debra Brewer v On the Spot Dry Cleaners

[2017] FWC 967

[2017] FWC 967

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Debra Brewer
v
On The Spot Dry Cleaners
(U2016/13473)

COMMISSIONER RYAN MELBOURNE, 2 MARCH 2017

Application for relief from unfair dismissal – small business – non compliance with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code – dismissal unfair.

[1] An application for an unfair dismissal remedy was made on 9 November 2016 pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) by Ms Debra Brewer (the Applicant). The Applicant claims that she was dismissed by On The Spot Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd (the Respondent) on 2 November 2016.

[2] The Respondent filed a Form F3 - Employer’s Response to Application for Unfair Dismissal Remedy on 23 November 2016 in which the Respondent raised the jurisdictional objection to the application, that the termination was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

[3] On 15 December 2016 directions were issued to the parties and the jurisdictional issue was listed for hearing on 14 February 2017.

[4] The Respondent identifies that it is a small business and the Applicant has not disputed this contention. Where an employer is a small business then the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code applies. Relevantly, s.396 provides that one of the initial matters that must be considered before any consideration of the merits of the unfair dismissal application can be undertaken is to determine whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code

[5] The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code is provided for in s.388 which is as follows:

“388 The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code

(1) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, declare a Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

(2) A person’s dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if:

(a) immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person’s employer was a small business employer; and

(b) the employer complied with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code in relation to the dismissal.”

[6] The terms of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code that are relevant to the present matter are:

“Summary Dismissal

It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal.

Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair, it is sufficient, though not essential, than an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.

Other Dismissal

In other cases, the small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed. The reason must be a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or capacity to do the job.

The employee must be warned either verbally, or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.

The small business employer must provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to the warning and give the employee a reasonable chance to rectify the problem having regard to the employee’s response.

Rectifying the problem might involve the employer providing additional training and ensuring the employee knows the employer’s job expectations.

Procedural Matters

In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.

A small business employer may be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia. Evidence may include a completed check list, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements.”

[7] The operation of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code has been considered by the FWC. In Puri v Sydney Strata P/L,Watson VP said:

“[5] The terms relating to “Other Dismissal” are somewhat confusing. It is not clear to me whether the requirements of the Code include the existence of a valid reason for the dismissal, as distinct from a valid reason being given to an employee that there is a risk of being dismissed. If the meaning of the Code is that there must be demonstrated to be a valid reason for the dismissal, it appears that the requirements of the Code are similar, and perhaps even more stringent in some respects, than the requirements relating to unfairness for other dismissals generally.

[6] Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this case I am prepared to assume that the requirements of the Code involve the employer giving the employee a reason for the dismissal, and that the reason must be a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or capacity, that there must be a warning that the employee risks being dismissed if there is no improvement, that the employee must be given an opportunity to respond to the warning and the employee must be given a reasonable chance to rectify the problem articulated in the warning having regard to the employee’s response.” 1

[8] In the present matter, the evidence of the Respondent is that the Respondent on Monday 25 July 2016 warned the Applicant that she would be “laid off” if she continued to take days off work and that on 10 August 2016 the Respondent warned the Applicant “that it was unacceptable” for her to take time off work and that on 29 August 2016 the Respondent told the Applicant “that she was very close to being dismissed” and the Applicant was warned that she would be dismissed if she had “3 months off sick”. 2 The Applicant concedes only that she received a warning from the Respondent.

[9] The evidence from both the Applicant and the Respondent is that the Applicant was taking time off work both as personal leave and as carer’s leave. There is no dispute that the Applicant had entitlements to paid personal/carer’s leave and that some of the days off work were properly taken as paid personal/carer’s leave.

[10] The Applicant’s evidence was that she had not taken much personal/carer’s leave up to 2015 and that she had accrued entitlements for personal/carer’s leave which she used in 2016 for personal leave for herself and for carer’s leave when she was looking after her sick father. The Respondent produced no evidence as to the leave accruals of the Applicant or the Applicant’s access to personal carer’s leave prior to November 2015. The Respondent however produced a document which indicated that the Applicant had taken 74 days off work (not including a block of 8 weeks’ annual leave) during the period 4 November 2015 to
2 November 2016.

[11] The Respondent’s file notes identify that as at 10 August 2016 that the Respondent was paying the Applicant for personal leave taken even when no medical certificate was produced by the Applicant and when it was reasonably obvious that the Applicant had no entitlement to paid personal/carer’s leave under the National Employment Standards (NES).

[12] Even in the absence of the Applicant’s leave records it is clear that the Applicant’s total entitlement to paid personal/carer’s leave from the commencement of her employment in June 2010 to the date of the warning given on 25 July 2016 would have been no more than 51 days. Yet in the period between 4 November 2015 and 25 July 2016 the Respondent contends that the Applicant took 56 days off work on either personal or carer’s leave. The Applicant was clearly taking days off work for which she had no entitlement to paid personal/carer’s leave. Between the warning given on 25 July 2016 and the warning given on 10 August 2016 the Applicant took a further 2 days off work, both of which would have been beyond the Applicant’s entitlements under the NES. Between 10 August 2016 and 29 August 2016 the Applicant took a further 7 days off work all of which would be beyond the Applicant’s entitlements under the NES. Between the warning on 29 August 2016 and the dismissal on 2 November 2016 the Applicant took a further 11 days off work, all of which would have been beyond the Applicant’s NES entitlements.

[13] As at the date of dismissal, 2 November 2016, the Applicant had taken at least 20 days off work since July 2016 which was beyond any entitlement she had under the NES.

[14] The Respondent contends that the taking of time off work by the Applicant provides a valid reason for the dismissal. This must be rejected if the Respondent includes days off work for which the Applicant has an entitlement to personal and or carer’s leave under the NES.

[15] The Respondent contended that he sought advice from the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) and that he acted on this advice. In relation to the warning given to the Applicant on 29 August 2016 that “if you have 3 months off sick you will be dismissed” the Respondent’s evidence was that this was the advice from the FWO. In the absence of unequivocal evidence that a person from FWO said this and said it in the same context as the Respondent conveyed it to the Applicant, I cannot accept the evidence of the Respondent. I also note the Respondent’s evidence where he says “she had 74 days off in only 10 months! In consultation with Fair Work these are grounds for dismissal.” Again, in the absence of unequivocal evidence that a person from FWO said this and said it in the same context as the Respondent conveys in his evidence, I cannot accept the evidence of the Respondent.

[16] The proper conclusion to be drawn is that the Respondent has sought to justify his conduct by significantly misquoting what the FWO said to him or significantly taking the FWO’s comments out of context. The Respondent’s contentions concerning the FWO’s advice to him are implausible in the extreme.

[17] Given the extreme implausibility of the Respondent’s evidence in relation to what the FWO said to him, I am not prepared to accept that the Respondent’s evidence on all other matters which are in contention is accurate.

[18] I am not satisfied that the Respondent properly warned the Applicant as required by the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code. The Respondent contended that Exhibit R1, with its recount of conversations between the Respondent and the Applicant, was taken from the Respondent’s HR system and reflects notes made by the Respondent at the time. The Respondent concedes that the Applicant was not given written warnings. The Commission has real doubts as to the accuracy of the notes relied on by the Respondent given the Respondent’s implausible evidence concerning his conversations with the FWO.

[19] Given the evidence in this matter I am not satisfied that the Respondent’s reason for the dismissal of the Applicant was a valid reason in the Selvachandran sense. 3

[20] It is clear that the Respondent has not complied with the requirements of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

[21] Section 396 requires that the Commission consider 4 initial matters before considering the merits of the application. The Commission is satisfied that the Respondent’s dismissal of the Applicant was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code. The Commission is satisfied that the application in this matter was made within the period required by s.394(2)(a). The Commission is satisfied that the Applicant was a person protected from unfair dismissal having regard to s.382. The Commission is satisfied that the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy having regard to s.389.

[22] I now turn to the requirements of s.387. which are as follows:

Whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees) – s.387(a)

[23] From the earlier discussion I have already found that the reason for the dismissal of the Applicant was not a valid reason.

Whether the person was notified of that reason – s.387(b)

[24] The Applicant was notified of the Respondent’s reason for dismissal at the meeting on 2 November 2016.

Whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person – s.387(c)

[25] The decision to dismiss the Applicant had been made by the Respondent before the Applicant was advised of her dismissal on 2 November 2016. The Respondent’s evidence is that the meeting on 2 November 2016 was simply to give the Applicant notice of dismissal. It is clear that the Respondent did not intend nor did the Respondent afford the Applicant any opportunity to respond to the reason for her dismissal.

Any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal – s.387(d)

[26] This criteria is not relevant in the present matter as the Respondent.

If the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal – s.387(e)

[27] This criteria is not relevant in the present matter.

The degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise s.387(f) and the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise s.387(g) would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal

[28] In the present matter it is clear that the lack of in-house HR expertise and the small size of the Respondent’s business have significantly impacted on the procedures followed by the Respondent in effecting the dismissal of the Applicant. Having said that, the small size of the Respondent’s business and the lack of in-house HR expertise does not excuse the Respondent’s conduct in relation to the manner in which the dismissal of the Applicant was effected.

Any other matters that the FWC considers relevant – s.387(h).

[29] There are a number of matters which the Commission considers relevant to a consideration as to whether the dismissal of the Applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

The dismissal meeting

[30] There is conflicting evidence as between the Applicant and the Respondent in describing the conduct of each other during the dismissal meeting

[31] I prefer the evidence of the Applicant

[32] The Respondent drew attention to the text message sent by the Applicant to the Respondent sometime in the afternoon or evening of 2 November 2016 to contend that “if we were harassing and yelling at her” at the dismissal meeting then “she wouldn’t be sending thank you text messages” 4. What is clear from the content of the text message is that it is not consistent with the Respondent’s evidence that the Applicant was aggressive towards the Respondent during the dismissal meeting. The content of the text message is consistent with the evidence of the Applicant.

[33] The Applicant conceded that she did not work out any of the period of notice given to her on 2 November 2016. The Applicant gave evidence that she was too upset to stay at work on 2 November 2016 and that she was “too upset to go back” to work during the notice period. 5

[34] Whilst the Respondent referred to the Applicant ‘storming out’ of the workplace on
2 November 2016 the more correct description would be to describe the Applicant as walking out of the workplace. The following exchange between Mr Vamvakitis and Ms Brewer explains this:

“Mr Vamvakitis: And did you storm out?---
Ms Brewer: I did.  I was so upset by what was going on, I didn't expect this to come to me at that time, so I just - I did walk out.
Mr Vamvakitis: Did I say to you when you were walking out that you were relinquishing all your rights by walking out?---
Ms Brewer: You told me I wasn't getting anything whatsoever, even the three weeks.” 6

The Respondent telling the Applicant if she left she would get nothing

[35] The Respondent was given the opportunity, whilst giving oral evidence, to clarify what he said to the Applicant in relation to her leaving the workplace:

Commissioner Ryan: What was the language you actually put to her when she was leaving?---
Mr Vamvakitis: I think it was along the lines of if you leave you won't get anything. 7

[36] It is very clear that the Respondent gave a very clear and very strong message to the Applicant that if she left the workplace she would not receive any payment from the Respondent. It is very clear from the Respondent’s own evidence that the Respondent did not qualify his statement by having regard to the reason for the Applicant leaving the workplace. The message that the Respondent gave was that any leaving of the workplace would result in no payment being given to the Applicant.

[37] In the context of this matter where the Applicant was upset and distressed at being dismissed and where the Applicant on her own evidence couldn’t stay at work because of this, the Respondent’s overt threat not to pay the Applicant anything if she left the workplace adds a real sense of maliciousness to the Respondent’s conduct.

[38] On the Respondent’s own evidence, it is clear that the Respondent’s threat not to pay the Applicant if she left work was based upon the Respondent’s view of the law:

Commissioner Ryan: Did you know at the time that she was leaving that she had no intention of ever coming back to work out the period of notice?---

Mr Vamvakitis: No, not at all - not at all.

Commissioner Ryan: Then why would you have said if you leave you will get nothing?---

Mr Vamvakitis: Because that's how I understood the law to be, and I confirmed that later on with the Fair Work Ombudsman. 8

[39] The Respondent’s evidence was that he did not speak to or communicate with the Applicant once he had told her that if she left she would not receive any payment.

[40] It is clear from the Respondent’s own evidence that he created an environment where the Applicant was not likely to return to the workplace after the Applicant was told that if she left the workplace after the meeting on 2 November 2016 that she would not receive any payment from the Respondent.

The failure of the Respondent to give the Applicant anything in writing about the dismissal, the reason for the dismissal or the period of notice.

[41] The Respondent conceded in his evidence that he did not give anything in writing to the Applicant at the time he dismissed her with notice. The Respondent’s oral evidence was that he went into the dismissal meeting with a termination letter but that he never gave the letter to the Applicant. When further questioned the Respondent conceded that he never sent the letter to the Applicant at any time after the dismissal meeting concluded. The termination letter was not mentioned in any of the Respondent’s material filed with the Commission.

[42] The Respondent explained why the dismissal letter was never sent to the Applicant as follows:

Commissioner Ryan: If you had the document and the meeting ended without you having given the document to the applicant, why did you not send it to her, courier it to her or whatever?---

Mr Vamvakitis: Because at that point the employment is terminated; she's walked out, and that was confirmed with the Ombudsman.  I had no other obligation.  We specifically asked the Ombudsman do we have any other obligations.  Their response was no, she has walked out, she has terminated her employment; you have given her an offer to stay to meet her obligations and she has stormed out.  So do we need to do anything else?  No.  And that was it.  We paid her entitlements and that was it.  That was the advice that we got.  There's the log there from the Ombudsman.  This has been brewing for 12 months.  We gave her ample opportunity to rectify it, and countless meetings that aren't even recorded there. 9

[43] The Respondent’s written evidence was that “the reason for her dismissal was outlined from the beginning of the meeting”, 10 yet at no time did the Respondent see fit to give the Applicant written notice of her dismissal.

[44] The Commission has real doubts as to whether any written notice of dismissal existed at the time of the dismissal. But even when those doubts are set aside, the failure of the Respondent to give the Applicant written notice of her dismissal remains a relevant issue.

Conflicting evidence as to the notice period given

[45] The Applicant in her written submissions 11 contended that no notice of dismissal was given to her at the meeting on 2 November 2016. The specific contention was:

“I say I was not offered 5 weeks notice on the 2 November 2016 and that I left that day due to harassment and bullying by my employers I was distressed and shocked at being sacked. In particular George Vamvakitis was very aggressive to me on 2 November 2016 which distressed me greatly. At the meeting they did not offer me 5 weeks notice. They communicated an immediate dismissal. It is common ground that no written offer of 5 weeks notice was provided.”

[46] In her oral evidence the Applicant conceded that she was given three weeks’ notice of dismissal at the meeting on 2 November 2016. This concession under oath contrasts with the clearly wrong statement in her written submission that “(t)hey communicated an immediate dismissal” at the meeting on 2 November 2016. Whilst there is conflict between the evidence of the Applicant and the Respondent as to the amount of notice the fact that the Applicant was told at the meeting on 2 November 2016 that she would be dismissed at a future date (i.e. dismissal with notice) is a relevant matter when considering whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[47] The Applicant was specifically questioned on her understanding of her obligations in relation to working out a period of notice:

Commissioner Ryan: Yes, but why didn't you go back to work and keep working, and get the next three weeks - - -?---

Ms Brewer: I didn't go back to work.  I left on that day.  I didn't do the three weeks.

Commissioner Ryan: But why - that's the question I'm asking - why didn't you go back to work to work out the period of notice?---

Ms Brewer: Because I was too upset to go back. 12

The amount of time taken off by the Applicant which was in excess of her NES entitlement

[48] The Applicant has not conceded that the Respondent’s evidence as to the number of days of personal/carer’s leave taken by the Applicant in 2016 was correct. However the Applicant has not led evidence which disproves or seriously questions the Respondent’s evidence on this point. The Commission accepts that the Respondent’s evidence as to the number of days not worked by the Applicant is correct.

[49] What flows from the evidence is that the Applicant very clearly used all of her paid personal/carer’s leave entitlements and then continued to take days off work for personal/carer’s leave. I accept the evidence of the Applicant that she produced medical certificates for these additional absences when requested by the Respondent. However, it is the fact of the Applicant continuing to take days off work as personal/carer’s leave after she had exhausted her entitlements to paid personal/carer’s leave which is a relevant matter for consideration as to the fairness of her dismissal. The Applicant’s conduct in continuing to take days off work when she had exhausted her personal/carer’s leave entitlement was conduct which clearly put her continued employment at risk. The Applicant’s own evidence does not identify any substantive measures taken by the Applicant to address this risk.

Personal circumstances of the Applicant – harshness of dismissal

[50] The Applicant contended that the dismissal was harsh given her personal circumstances and that these personal circumstances were known to the Respondent at the time of the dismissal. It is certainly a relevant matter to take into account the impact that the dismissal has on the Applicant given her personal circumstances.

Conclusion

[51] Having considered each relevant criteria under s.387 I am satisfied that the dismissal of the Applicant was harsh. Notwithstanding the valid concerns that the Respondent had about the number of days that the Applicant had taken off, which were in excess of her NES entitlement, the process effected by the Respondent to dismiss the Applicant rendered the dismissal harsh.

[52] The Respondent’s attempt to convert a dismissal with notice into a resignation by the Applicant or an abandonment of employment by the Applicant must be rejected in its entirety. The conduct of the Respondent at the dismissal meeting is deserving of significant criticism. The finding of the Commission that the dismissal was harsh flows directly from the conduct of the Respondent, and a significant aspect of that conduct was both the commissions and omissions of the Respondent at the dismissal meeting.

Remedy

[53] Where a dismissal is found to be unfair and where an applicant seeks an unfair dismissal remedy the Commission may at its discretion grant a remedy. The remedy provisions are relevantly as follows:

“390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal

(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person’s reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and

(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).

(2) The FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.

(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and

(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies.”

“391 Remedy—reinstatement etc.

Reinstatement

(1) An order for a person’s reinstatement must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal reinstate the person by:

(a) reappointing the person to the position in which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal; or

(b) appointing the person to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal.

“392 Remedy—compensation

Compensation

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

Criteria for deciding amounts

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer’s enterprise; and

(b) the length of the person’s service with the employer; and

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

Misconduct reduces amount

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

Shock, distress etc. disregarded

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal.”

[54] In the present matter the Commission considers that it is appropriate that the Commission grant a remedy to the Applicant for her unfair dismissal.

[55] The Commission is satisfied that reinstatement is an inappropriate remedy. The Commission is satisfied that compensation is an appropriate remedy in this matter.

[56] Having regard to the criteria enumerated in s.392 the Commission considers that any order for compensation will not affect the viability of the Respondent’s enterprise. The Respondent made no contention that it would.

[57] The Applicant had over 6 years of service with the Respondent. This is a significant period of employment. It is clear that the Applicant intended to continue working for the Respondent for many more years. However, it is not likely that the Applicant would have continued being employed by the Respondent for as long as the Applicant wanted or expected. Unless the Applicant and the Respondent had come to a very specific arrangement in relation to the hours of work of the Applicant to accommodate her taking days off work it is extremely unlikely that the employment relationship would have survived for a reasonable length of time. There is nothing in the evidence of the Applicant which would support a conclusion that the employment relationship would have continued for any reasonable length of time if the dismissal had not occurred when it did so. For the purpose of s.392(2)(c) the Commission considers that the Applicant would have earnt no more than the amount of wages between the date of dismissal and the Christmas/New Year holiday period ( a period of about 8 ½ weeks).

[58] The Commission notes that the personal circumstances of the Applicant and the impact that may have had on the Applicant seeking employment after her dismissal. The Commission notes that the Applicant has remained unemployed since the dismissal.

[59] In determining an amount of compensation the Commission has not taken into account any matter excluded by s.392(4).

[60] In determining an amount of compensation the Commission does not consider that s.392(3) applies.

[61] The explicit language of s.392(2) not only requires the Commission to take into account “any other matter that the FWC considers relevant” (which is itself a very broad criteria) but requires the Commission to “take into account all the circumstances of the case” when determining an amount of compensation.

[62] Importantly, in the present matter, the conduct of the Applicant in not attending work and continuing to take days off work on an unplanned basis for personal and or carer’s leave purposes when the Applicant had no entitlement to paid personal/carer’s leave is a relevant circumstance which must impact on the determination of any amount of compensation.

[63] In all of the circumstances of this matter the Commission considers that the amount of compensation that the Respondent must pay to the Applicant is an amount equal to 6 weeks’ pay. As the Respondent has identified that the Applicant was paid $798 per week gross then the amount of compensation is $4,788.00, which is to be taxed at the appropriate rate.

[64] An order giving effect to this decision will be issued separately.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Ms K. Paul of counsel for the Applicant

Mr G. Vamvakitis for the Respondent

Hearing details:

2017.

Melbourne:

February 14.

 1   [2012] FWA 7317.

 2   Exhibit R1.

 3   Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.

 4   Exhibit R1.

 5   Transcript at PN283.

 6   Transcript at PN160 – PN161.

 7   PN459.

 8   PN482 – PN483.

 9   PN490 – PN491.

 10   Exhibit R1.

 11   Exhibit A2.

 12   Transcript at PN282 – PN283.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<Price code G, PR590318>