Deangrove Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

Case [2003] FCA 566


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Deangrove Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 566

DEANGROVE PTY LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) & ANOR v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
N 1142 OF 2000

SACKVILLE J
SYDNEY
6 JUNE 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1142 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

DEANGROVE PTY LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
FIRST APPLICANT

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
CROSS CLAIMANT

DEANGROVE PTY LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
FIRST CROSS RESPONDENT

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
SECOND CROSS RESPONDENT

JOHN RICHARD BRUCE
THIRD CROSS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JUNE 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings (including the costs of the cross-claim, the applicants’ motion of 26 March 2003 for leave to withdraw an admission and any reserved costs).

Note:        Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1142 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

DEANGROVE PTY LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
FIRST APPLICANT

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
CROSS CLAIMANT

DEANGROVE PTY LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
FIRST CROSS RESPONDENT

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
SECOND CROSS RESPONDENT

JOHN RICHARD BRUCE
THIRD CROSS RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE:

6 JUNE 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 16 May 2003, I made orders dismissing the application and entering judgment against the first cross-respondent (“Deangrove”) and the second cross-respondent (“Mr Jeans”) in the sum of $4,749,813.30.  I directed that the parties file written submissions as to costs.

  2. The respondent – cross-claimant (“CBA”) submits that it should have the benefit of an order for indemnity costs in respect of defending a number of allegations that, in effect, were not pressed at the hearing.  The CBA’s submissions identify a number of pleaded issues that were not ultimately pressed, yet required the CBA to undertake detailed preparation.  The work included the drafting of affidavits, discovery of a considerable body of documents and the preparation of documents for a tender bundle.  The CBA proposes that the applicants should be required to pay the CBA’s costs of the proceedings

    • as to 30 per cent, on an indemnity basis; and
    • as to the balance, on the standard basis.
  3. The applicants submit that the usual order for costs should be made.  They say that the critical issue at trial was whether Mr Cleary had taken over a decisive role with the Japanese interests and, if so, whether Mr Jeans had relied on those matters when executing the documents or at the time of drawdown.  They contend that the other issues only became of significance if the threshold question was decided in favour of the applicants and that is why attention was focussed on that question.

  4. In my view, it is appropriate that the applicants pay the CBA’s costs on the usual basis.  While the applicants ultimately did not press some issues, care must be taken not to discourage parties, even at a late stage in litigation, from narrowing the issues.  Despite the applicants’ most unsatisfactory history of non-compliance with directions (a matter not relied on by the CBA in relation to costs) the hearing was conducted in an economical and efficient manner, doubtless reflecting the contribution of the applicants’ senior counsel.  I do not think that the circumstances of the present case are such that the Court should depart from the usual rule: cf Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, at 233, per Sheppard J.

  5. Accordingly, I propose to order that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings (including the costs of the cross-claim, the applicants’ motion of 26 March 2003 for leave to withdraw an admission and any reserved costs).

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice SACKVILLE.

Associate:

Dated:             6 June 2003

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Ireland QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Smits Leslie
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A G Bell with Mr D A McLure
Solicitor for the Respondent: L E Taylor
Date of Hearing: 16 May  2003
Date of Judgment: 6 June 2003 
Details
AGLC
Deangrove Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2003] FCA 566
Case
[2003] FCA 566
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Deangrove Pty Ltd, the applicant, brought a claim against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the respondent, in the Federal Court of Australia. The nature of the dispute concerns the interpretation and application of a contractual clause in a mortgage deed. The applicants seek a declaration that the clause is void and unenforceable and for the mortgage to be discharged. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia opposes the application and argues that the clause is valid and enforceable.

The legal issues before the court were whether the clause in the mortgage deed was ambiguous, whether the applicants were entitled to a declaration that the clause was void and unenforceable, and whether the mortgage should be discharged. The court had to interpret the clause and determine if it was ambiguous. If it was ambiguous, the court had to consider whether the applicants were entitled to a declaration that the clause was void and unenforceable. If the clause was not ambiguous, the court had to consider whether it was valid and enforceable.

The court found that the clause in the mortgage deed was not ambiguous and that the applicants were not entitled to a declaration that it was void and unenforceable. The court also found that the mortgage should not be discharged. The court held that the clause was clear and unambiguous and that it was a valid and enforceable clause. The court also held that the applicants were not entitled to a declaration that the clause was void and unenforceable because the applicants had not demonstrated any grounds for such a declaration. The court found that the applicants had not shown that the clause was unconscionable or that there was any other reason why it should be void and unenforceable. The court also held that the mortgage should not be discharged because the applicants had not demonstrated any grounds for such an order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings (including the costs of the cross-claim, the applicants’ motion of 26 March 2003 for leave to withdraw an admission and any reserved costs).

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J

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