| [2024] FWC 2019 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Dean Adam Jones
v
Bondi Beach Pty Ltd
(C2024/3219)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT MILLHOUSE | MELBOURNE, 30 JULY 2024 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
Mr Dean Adam Jones made a general protections application involving dismissal pursuant to s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) on 17 May 2024.
Section 365(1) of the Act prescribes that a general protections application involving dismissal must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect or within such further period as the Commission allows under s 366(2). As the Form F8 application records, the application was filed outside the 21-day statutory timeframe. Accordingly, Mr Jones requires an extension of time.
The application has been made against Bondi Beach Pty Ltd. In its Form F8A response to the application, the respondent objects to Mr Jones’ application on the basis that it is out of time and further, because it contends that Mr Jones was not dismissed by it. Rather, the respondent contends that Mr Jones’ employment ended by mutual agreement.[1]
For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the discretion to extend the time in which the application may be made is not enlivened.
Relevant context
Mr Jones commenced employment with the respondent on 20 February 2024.[2] Mr Jones performed the role of Venue Manager.[3] Mr Jones appears to have been the subject of a proposed conduct or performance review arising from concerns raised by employees of the respondent about Mr Jones’ management style, the specifics and extent of which are in dispute.
Mr Jones contends that he was notified of his dismissal on 16 April 2024 at a meeting with the respondent’s owner, Mr Mykal Bartholomew.[4] It is not in dispute that Mr Jones’ employment ended on 24 April 2024.[5]
Having regard to the content of Mr Jones’ Form F8 application, for the application to have been within time it must have been filed by midnight on 15 May 2024. Mr Jones’ application was filed on 17 May 2024. The application was therefore filed two days outside the statutory timeframe for lodgement.
Statutory framework
The Commission has the power pursuant to s 366(2) of the Act to extend the time within which a general protections application involving dismissal can be made only if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. The meaning of this term was considered by the Full Bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd.[6] In order to be exceptional, the circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon, although they need not be unique or unprecedented. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[7]
Under s 366(2) of the Act, the matters the Commission must take into account in order to determine…
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- Case
- [2024] FWC 2019
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Deputy President considered various factors in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed, including the reason for the delay, any action taken by Mr Jones to dispute the dismissal, prejudice to the employer, the merits of the application, and fairness as between Mr Jones and other persons in a similar position. Mr Jones claimed that the delay was due to him mistakenly filing an unfair dismissal application instead of a general protections application, which he discovered when he was informed by the Fair Work Commission that he did not meet the minimum employment period for an unfair dismissal claim. The Deputy President found that Mr Jones had not provided an acceptable or reasonable explanation for the delay, as he had not demonstrated how his distress or lack of experience had caused the delay, nor had he provided medical evidence to support his claims of depression and anxiety. The Deputy President also found that Mr Jones had taken a positive step to dispute his dismissal by writing to the respondent, which weighed in his favour. However, the other factors weighed neutrally, and the Deputy President concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time.
The Deputy President dismissed Mr Jones' application, finding that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify extending the statutory time limit. The Deputy President did not need to consider the respondent's second objection that Mr Jones was not dismissed, as the application was dismissed on the grounds of the delay. The Deputy President observed that if the application had proceeded, Mr Jones would need to demonstrate the specific workplace right he relied upon and why his dismissal was for a prohibited reason. The Deputy President noted that the statutory time limit for bringing a general protections application involving dismissal reflects the intention of parliament that such rights be exercised promptly, and the test of exceptional circumstances in s 366(2) of the Act establishes a high hurdle for an applicant for an extension of time.
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