FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
De Rose v The State of SA (No 4) [2001] FCA 1616
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to admit documents pursuant to s 64 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether production of witnesses would cause undue delay or cost relative to the whole of the trial itself
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 63, 64, 67
Caterpillar v John Deere Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 1903 referred to
Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (1996) 859 FCA 1 referred to
ACCC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR 41-650 referred toPETER DE ROSE AND OTHERS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS (NO 4)
NO SG 6001 OF 1996
O’LOUGHLIN J
18 OCTOBER 2001
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SG 6001 OF 1996
BETWEEN:
PETER DE ROSE
FIRST APPLICANTOWEN KUNMANARA
SECOND APPLICANTPETER TJUTJATJA
THIRD APPLICANTJOHNNY WIMITJA DE ROSE
FOURTH APPLICANTMICHAEL MITAKIKI
FIFTH APPLICANTPANNIKAN BAKER
SIXTH APPLICANTPEGGY CULLINAN
SEVENTH APPLICANTRINI KULYURU
EIGHTH APPLICANTPUNA YANIMA
NINTH APPLICANTJULIE TJAMI
TENTH APPLICANTSADIE SINGER
ELEVENTH APPLICANTWHISKEY TJUKANKU
TWELTH APPLICANTAND:
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENTR D FULLER PTY LTD AND DOUGLAS CLARENCE FULLER
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 OCTOBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The evidence sought to be adduced by the State pursuant to its notices dated 15 October 2001 is not admissible, subject to the qualification in order 2.
2.The map of David Horton, MFI S6, be received into evidence as Ex S6 for the limited purpose of the markings drawn on it by the applicants’ witnesses.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SG 6001 OF 1996
BETWEEN:
PETER DE ROSE
FIRST APPLICANTOWEN KUNMANARA
SECOND APPLICANTPETER TJUTJATJA
THIRD APPLICANTJOHNNY WIMITJA DE ROSE
FOURTH APPLICANTMICHAEL MITAKIKI
FIFTH APPLICANTPANNIKAN BAKER
SIXTH APPLICANTPEGGY CULLINAN
SEVENTH APPLICANTRINI KULYURU
EIGHTH APPLICANTPUNA YANIMA
NINTH APPLICANTJULIE TJAMI
TENTH APPLICANTSADIE SINGER
ELEVENTH APPLICANTWHISKEY TJUKANKU
TWELTH APPLICANTAND:
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENTR D FULLER PTY LTD AND DOUGLAS CLARENCE FULLER
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE:
18 OCTOBER 2001
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR RULING
The first respondent, the State of South Australia (“the State”), has sought the leave of the Court to tender certain documents. It relies on the provisions of s 64 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Act”). Subsection (1) of s 64 states that its provisions apply in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is available to give evidence about an asserted fact. That particular provision is to be compared with subs (1) of s 63 of the Act which states that s 63 applies in a civil proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 1616
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the evidence proposed by the State was admissible in the case. This involved an examination of the relevance of the evidence to the matters at hand, as well as considerations of prejudice and the probative value of the evidence. The court also needed to determine if the evidence met the legal standards for admissibility, including whether it was likely to confuse or mislead the tribunal of fact.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence sought by the State was not admissible, as it did not meet the required standard of relevance and probative value. The court found that the evidence was likely to be more prejudicial than probative, and therefore excluded it from being presented in the case. However, the court did allow a specific map, the map of David Horton, MFI S6, to be admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of the markings drawn on it by the applicants' witnesses. This decision was made to ensure that the court had all necessary information to make an informed judgment, while also protecting the rights of the applicants by excluding potentially prejudicial evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The evidence sought to be adduced by the State pursuant to its notices dated 15 October 2001 is not admissible, subject to the qualification in order 2.
2. The map of David Horton, MFI S6, be received into evidence as Ex S6 for the limited purpose of the markings drawn on it by the applicants’ witnesses.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case has been brought before the court as part of a series of legal proceedings between the applicants and the State of South Australia. The court is considering the admissibility of evidence as per the State's notices from 15 October 2001, and the admissibility of the map of David Horton, MFI S6, with the applicants' markings, for a limited purpose. The matter has been subject to various applications and considerations regarding the evidence to be presented, including the State's attempts to introduce certain documents and the applicants' objections to these attempts.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the evidence sought to be adduced by the State pursuant to its notices dated 15 October 2001 is admissible.
2. Whether the map of David Horton, MFI S6, with the markings drawn on it by the applicants' witnesses, is admissible for the limited purpose identified by the applicants.
Held
1. The evidence sought to be adduced by the State pursuant to its notices dated 15 October 2001 is not admissible, subject to the qualification in order 2.
2. The map of David Horton, MFI S6, with the markings drawn on it by the applicants' witnesses, is admissible for the limited purpose identified by the applicants.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court approached the admissibility of the evidence with a focus on its relevance and reliability. Regarding the first issue, the court found that the evidence sought by the State did not meet the threshold for admissibility, as it was not sufficiently relevant to the matters being adjudicated. However, the court did not rule out the possibility of the State presenting this evidence at a later stage if it could be demonstrated to be pertinent. This decision was based on the principles of relevance and probative value, which are key considerations in the admissibility of evidence under the Uniform Evidence Acts.
In addressing the second issue, the court considered the map of David Horton, MFI S6, and the markings added by the applicants' witnesses. The court accepted that these markings could be relevant for the limited purpose of illustrating the applicants' case. The court's decision to admit the map was grounded in the legal principle that evidence should be admitted if it has any probative value, even if that value is slight, provided it is not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The ratio decidendi here is that maps and diagrams can be admissible for the limited purpose of assisting the court in understanding the factual context of the case, as long as they do not mislead the court.
The court distinguished this decision from cases where the evidentiary value of a map was deemed to be speculative or where the map was considered to be misleading. It followed the precedent that where a map or diagram is clear and the markings are reliable, it can be a valuable tool in the court's determination of the facts. The court's reasoning demonstrates a balanced approach to the admissibility of evidence, taking into account the potential for prejudice while also valuing the probative assistance that well-marked maps can provide.