De Pledge v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport - [2022] WADC 51

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

LOCATION:   PERTH
CITATION:   DE PLEDGE -v- CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT [2022] WADC 51
CORAM:   COMMISSIONER COLLINS
HEARD:   28 MARCH 2022 AND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS 24, 25 & 30 MARCH 2022
DELIVERED          :   3 JUNE 2022
FILE NO/S:   CIVO 16 of 2022
BETWEEN:   KIMBERLY THOMAS DE PLEDGE
Applicant
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Respondent

Catchwords:

Motor vehicles - Application for extraordinary driver's licence - Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) s 27(1) and s 30 - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), s 27(1), s 30
Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA)
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Ms K Louden
Respondent	:	Ms B Veloo

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Jeremy Noble Barristers & Solicitors
Respondent	:	Department Of Transport - Legal And Legislative Services

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Director General of the Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147
Italiano v The Director General of Transport [1999] WASCA 40

Table of Contents

A. Introduction

B. General background - overview

B.1 Mr De Pledge's background

B.2 Yanrey Station

B.3 Hooley Station

B.3 Mr De Pledge owns other farming properties

B.4 Cattle properties have cattle that need to be transported

B.5 Mr De Pledge owns a transport company - Cob & Co Transport

B.6 Mr De Pledge's prior criminal and traffic history

C. Mr De Pledge applied for a MC class driver's licence

C.1 MC class driver's licence

C.2 Why did Mr De Pledge need a driver's licence

D. Extraordinary licences - relevant legal principles

E. Issues for determination

F.Section 30(4)(c) - Is Mr De Pledge deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr De Pledge was employed?

F.1 Overview

F.2 Applicant's submissions

F.3 CEO's submissions - not the only practicable means of travelling

F.4 Would Mr De Pledge be deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr De Pledge is employed?

G. Section 30(2) - has Mr De Pledge satisfied the statutory criteria

G.1 Overview

G.2 Safety of the public generally

G.3 The character of Mr De Pledge

G.4 Circumstances of the case

G.5 The nature of the offences giving rise to Mr De Pledge's disqualification

G.6 Mr De Pledge's conduct subsequent to the disqualification

H. Conclusion

COMMISSIONER COLLINS:

A. Introduction

On 1 February 2022, Kimberly Thomas De Pledge applied for an extraordinary driver's licence (EDL). In his application, Mr De Pledge sought an EDL to drive vehicles:
(a)of a class MC, namely a prime mover;
(b)from Broome to Harvey and all shires along routes in between; and
(c)24 hours a day, seven days a week, for the purposes of work.
The application was made in the context where Mr De Pledge, a station owner and truck driver, was seeking an EDL for work purposes.
As presented to the District Court, the application relied on s 76(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA). The Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport (CEO), while noting that the application had been brought under the wrong legislation and wrong section of that legislation, did not oppose the amendment of the application to rely on s 27(1) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (RTAD Act) instead. Ultimately though, the CEO opposed Mr De Pledge's application for an EDL.
Mr De Pledge filed an affidavit sworn 25 January 2022, in support of his application. Annexed to Mr De Pledge's affidavit were affidavits from Shane Edward Flemming (livestock agent) sworn 30 December 2021, Joanna Edmunds (his sister and pastoralist) sworn 29 December 2021 and Clint Thompson (pastoralist at Wyloo Station) sworn 13 January 2022. Donald Hubert Percy (helicopter pilot/captain) provided a sworn affidavit dated 14 January 2022 in support of Mr De Pledge's application. In addition, Mr De Pledge gave evidence via a combination of audio and visual facilities from Yanrey Station located on Yanrey Road, between Carnarvon and Karratha, Western Australia.
George Foreman McMeeken gave evidence in support of Mr De Pledge's application. Mr McMeeken also gave his evidence via audio facilities from Yanrey Station.
Both Mr De Pledge and Mr McMeeken were cross-examined by the CEO's counsel.
Both the CEO and Mr De Pledge filed outlines of written submissions dated 24 March and 25 March 2022 respectively. The CEO also filed short submissions in response to a question from the bench (dated 30 March 2022). The CEO did not file any affidavit evidence.
I heard the application on 28 March 2022. For the reasons that follow, I dismiss Mr De Pledge's application for an EDL.

B. General background - overview

In his affidavit Mr De Pledge gave evidence about his background and personal circumstances. At the hearing of the matter, Mr De Pledge provided further evidence in this regard. Much of that evidence was largely uncontroversial and not challenged. Accordingly, I make the following findings of fact.

B.1 Mr De Pledge's background

Mr De Pledge was born on 10 February 1970. At the time of the hearing, Mr De Pledge was 52 years of age.
He grew up with his family on Mandora Cattle Station, which is in the north‑west of Western Australia. He has worked full‑time on cattle stations since leaving school in Year 12.
Mr De Pledge has three daughters who at the date of the hearing, were aged 16, 14 and 12. His daughters live with their mother in Muchea.
In September 2019, after trial by jury, Mr De Pledge was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing the deaths of Mark and Lara Dawson.
In October 2019, Mr De Pledge was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 3 years 10 months immediate imprisonment and made eligible for parole. He was also disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for two years in relation to each offence, to commence upon his release from prison. The disqualifications were ordered to be served concurrently.
Mr De Pledge was released on parole on 28 September 2021.

B.2 Yanrey Station

Mr De Pledge currently lives at Yanrey Station.
In 2005, Mr De Pledge purchased Yanrey Station, near Carnarvon (which is in the Shire of Ashburton, located approximately 110 km south of Onslow) in the north‑west of Western Australia. The station comprises approximately 500,000 acres and has approximately 6,000 cattle on it with about 42 man-made watering points scattered around the property (ts 4). In good seasons (where there has been more rain than in the last three seasons), Yanrey Station would have closer to 8,000 to 9,000 cattle on it. Twitchen Road (being a public road) runs through Yanrey Station.
While Mr De Pledge was in prison for 29 months, Mr McMeeken and Ms Cassandra Parker ran Yanrey Station in his absence (ts 30). Mr Batty (referred to below) helped from time to time, especially during the mustering season (ts 32).
Since his release in September 2021 to the date of the hearing, Mr De Pledge has been able to work at Yanrey Station (ts 33). That included looking after his cattle (ts 34).
In total, Mr De Pledge said that there were about six or so people helping him with Yanrey Station in October 2021, including with the mustering and Mr De Pledge assumed that each of them had a motor vehicle licence (ts 33).

B.3 Hooley Station

In 2013, Mr De Pledge purchased a half share in Hooley Station, near Wittenoom (which is also in the Shire of Ashburton, located approximately 110 km north of Tom Price), in the north‑west of Western Australia. The station comprises approximately 380,000 acres and has approximately 6,000 cattle and 40 watering points scattered throughout the property.
The other half share was bought by his sister and brother‑in‑law (Joanna and Peter Edmunds (though Peter recently died)). In effect, Mr De Pledge is a half owner of Hooley Station (ts 29). Mr De Pledge's sister (Joanna) lives at Hooley Station (ts 46). Mr De Pledge's employee, David Batty, manages Hooley Station full‑time (ts 35). Mr Batty is married to Mr De Pledge's niece, Sarah Edmunds. Both Mr Batty and Ms Sarah Edmunds live at Hooley Station (ts 47).
While Mr De Pledge was in prison for 29 months, Mr Batty and Joanna ran the station in his absence (ts 30, ts 47).
Mr De Pledge was asked some questions about the Hooley Hills Cattle Company. He agreed in cross-examination that that company had a prime mover registered in its name. And he agreed that he had driven it from time to time, but said that it was his brother‑in‑law's truck. He could not recall who drove the truck now (ts 51, ts 52).

B.3 Mr De Pledge owns other farming properties

Mr De Pledge also owns the following properties, which he uses for his beef production enterprises:
(a)Jutomara Park, Boothendarra, which is located 25 km north of Badgingarra (about 200 km north of Perth);
(b)Coomallo Way, Boothendarra, near Badgingarra; and
(c)Willows Farm, Gingin.
Mr De Pledge's parents looked after the above farms and the cattle on them while he was in prison for 29 months (ts 50, ts 51). However, that did not extend to undertaking infrastructure work. The farms are all relatively close to one another.

B.4 Cattle properties have cattle that need to be transported

Mr De Pledge gave evidence to the effect that all of his properties have cattle on them. He said that the cattle needed to be transported from time to time, between his properties and to various sale yards and abattoirs. The cattle movements take place 'as needed and are not all scheduled in advance'. In a typical year, Mr De Pledge said he would take about 2,000 to 2,500 cattle to market. This depended on the season, rainfall and availability of feed.
Mr De Pledge gave evidence that he delivered his cattle to the Kimberley Meat Company Abattoir, which is located between Broome and Derby. He also said that he delivered cattle as far south as Harvey, to the Harvey Beef Abattoir. Hooley Station is about 1,600 km from Harvey while Yanrey Station is about 1,400 km from Harvey. Driving those distances takes about 24 to 28 hours (ts 10). He also took cattle to the abattoirs at Gingin and Northam. From time to time, Mr De Pledge also delivered cattle to various ports for live export.
Mr De Pledge gave evidence to the effect that he employed staff seasonally. During the busiest part of the year, which was the mustering season, Mr De Pledge employed up to 15 or 16 staff. At other times, he may only employ one.

B.5 Mr De Pledge owns a transport company - Cob & Co Transport

Mr De Pledge gave evidence that he owns a company called Cob & Co Transport, being a truck transport company (ts 10). Mr De Pledge's evidence was to the effect that that company owned two prime movers and several trailers which were used for transporting Mr De Pledge's cattle as well as cattle from other parties and other stations (ts 8). Prior to his conviction, Mr De Pledge drove one of the prime movers from time to time. Clifford Graham (known as Cliff Graham) has worked for Mr De Pledge for about the last eight years and is the main driver for Cob & Co Transport.
Cob & Co Transport engaged other drivers from time to time while Mr De Pledge was incarcerated, including Kim Stove (a personal friend) and Aaron Turner (an employee of Cob & Co Transport) (ts 38). Other than Mr Stove, the balance of the drivers were paid for their driving (ts 54) - that is, they were not volunteers. However, the exact numbers, who, when, for how long etc, was not explained in any great detail.
Mr De Pledge confirmed that while he was in prison, Mr Graham transported Mr De Pledge's cattle between his stations (ts 36, ts 37, ts 40). Other drivers with a MC licence would have driven Mr De Pledge's cattle to market (e.g. stock yards or abattoirs) (ts 39).
During his evidence, Mr De Pledge accepted that at the time of the hearing, he had four prime movers that could be used for transporting cattle and general freight (two prime movers capable of being road trains, one prime mover that he was going to sell and one prime mover that did not leave Yanrey Station) (ts 43, ts 112). All four were licensed to drive on the road as stock transporters (ts 45). Later, Mr De Pledge accepted that they were all prime movers and/or road trains (ts 45) (I note that the terms prime movers and road trains were used interchangeably and that there was not a material difference between the two - see for example, ts 112). However, Mr De Pledge was of the view that one of the road trains was mainly based on Yanrey Station and had limited use on the main roads. And he said that another of his road trains broke down a lot and was going to be sold. In effect, even though he owned four road trains, once one of them was sold, and with another permanently based at Yanrey Station, he essentially had two road trains (ts 45, ts 46).
Mr De Pledge bought his most recent prime mover in February 2022 for $60,000 (ts 44).
Mr De Pledge gave evidence that Cob & Co Transport provided transport services to other cattle stations. Mr De Pledge's counsel's written submissions referred to the following stations: Wyloo, Sylvania, Minderoo and Sheila Plains. However, Mr De Pledge did not refer to these stations in his evidence.
Mr De Pledge tendered an email dated 23 March 2022 from Kurt Elezovic on behalf of Emu Creek Station. In the email, Mr Elezovic said, in effect, that Emu Creek Station was not going to use Cob & Co Transport to transport its stock movements anymore due to the inability of Cob & Co Transport to supply two drivers to shift the cattle in one movement in a suitable weather window. i.e. suggesting that Cob & Co Transport would be losing third party business due to a lack of drivers.

B.6 Mr De Pledge's prior criminal and traffic history

Mr De Pledge provided a copy of his Western Australian criminal and traffic record dated 19 November 2021. Other than the offences involving the fatal accident, the record did not list any other offences. A certified copy of his traffic infringement record was also provided, which recorded his traffic infringement history for the last 10 years. That record revealed three speeding offenses of more than 10 km but less than 19 km per hour, and one offence of not more than 9 km per hour above the speed limit.

C. Mr De Pledge applied for a MC class driver's licence

C.1 MC class driver's licence

In his application, Mr De Pledge applied for a MC class driver's licence to drive between Broome and Harvey and all shires in between, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, for work purposes only.
Mr De Pledge explained in his evidence that he had applied for a MC class driver's licence, which is a truck licence with different classes. That involved, in effect, allowing the driver to drive a prime mover with up to three and a half trailers (in different combinations) (ts 56). Counsel for both parties made submissions on that basis.
In discussions between the bench and counsel, it was submitted that the application for a MC licence was a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under sch 5 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations2014 (RTAD Regulations) (ts 56). Later, it was said to be under sch 1 of the RTAD Regulations (ts 60). And later again, it was submitted that class MC meant a licence to drive 'any motor vehicle' (ts 90).
It seemed to me that reg 8 in combination with sch 2 were also relevant. Regulation 8 is in the following terms:
8.What a driver's licence authorises
(1)The extent to which a driver's licence authorises the licence holder to drive on a road depends on the class or classes of authorisation given in the licence.
(2)Schedule 2 column 1 designates each class of authorisation.
(3)A driver's licence giving a particular class of authorisation authorises the licence holder to drive on a road -
(a)a motor vehicle the class of which has the same designation as the class of authorisation; or
(b)a motor vehicle of any other class shown in Schedule 2 column 2 for that class of authorisation.
In sch 2, MC was defined as: a motor vehicle of class HC, HR, MR, LR or C or a moped. In effect, Mr De Pledge was seeking a MC class licence, which included a licence to drive a motor vehicle of class HC, HR, MR, LR or C or a moped.
Mr De Pledge's counsel was asked by email on the morning of the hearing to re-provide Mr De Pledge's affidavit to the court, because it appeared that parts of Mr De Pledge's affidavit had been cut-off during the process of faxing it to the court.
In response, the affidavit that was provided to the court was not signed by Mr De Pledge and was in a different format. On the front page was an unsigned and undated application for an extraordinary driver's licence followed by an unsworn affidavit by Mr De Pledge. This unsigned application relied on s 27 of the RTAD Act. The application sought an extraordinary licence that allowed Mr De Pledge to drive:
(a)vehicles of class: C, LR, MR, HR, HC MC;
(b)in these localities: all of Western Australia;
(c)on these days at these times: 24 hours per day, every day; and
(d)for these purposes: transporting cattle, transporting supplies, checking on welfare of cattle on my properties, business meetings.
As is apparent, the application was in materially different terms with respect to the vehicle class, the locality, and the purpose for which the licence was required from the application which was filed on 1 February 2022.
Neither counsel referred me to this different unsigned application during the hearing. The hearing did not proceed on the basis of this unsigned application. In the circumstances, this application is not relevant to Mr De Pledge's EDL application.
I will raise one other matter. Neither counsel made submissions to me at the hearing about Mr De Pledge applying for, in effect, different classes of motor vehicle licences and potentially being successful on one, but not others. In other words, no submissions were made about a fall-back position. For example, it was not submitted that if Mr De Pledge was unsuccessful in relation to his application for an MC class licence, that he might still be successful in relation to an application for a C class licence. A C class licence would enable Mr De Pledge to drive on Twitchen Road - being a public road, to go and inspect various watering points, or travel between his stations, farming properties, attend sales yards or suppliers; or travel for purely personal reasons. The application seemed to be fought on an 'all or nothing' approach.
Having heard the application and read the materials closely, it seems to me that that may have been the object of Mr De Pledge's application, even if it was not articulated that way by his counsel.
In the circumstances, I have considered Mr De Pledge's application at its highest and most favourable, namely, an application for an MC class licence but also, if he was not successful in that application, an application for licences within the umbrella of the MC class licence - including, a C class licence.

C.2 Why did Mr De Pledge need a driver's licence

Mr De Pledge said in evidence that he needed a licence so as to be able to drive his cattle between his stations and the farming properties listed above. This included between Yanrey and Hooley Stations (ts 36). He also said he needed the licence to be able to drive the cattle for the purposes of his cattle cartage company, Cob & Co Transport (ts 27).

Mr De Pledge also stated that he needed to be able to drive to:
(a) attend sale yards and other cattle stations;
(b) suppliers' depots; and
(c)to collect supplies such as cattle feed, medications, hay, and miscellaneous other supplies.
Mr De Pledge said that a further reason why he needed to be able to drive 24 hours a day, 7 days per week, was because of animal welfare issues concerning his cattle (and others if he was carrying them). Mr De Pledge said that there were various laws and regulations which governed the driving of road trains and the transport of cattle which required the driver of the vehicle to take breaks when driving which had implications for the welfare of the cattle being carried.
Mr De Pledge did not provide concrete examples of how he was affected by the various laws and regulations that governed the transport of cattle, other than being ultimately responsible for their safety. The submission seemed to be directed at circumstances where Mr De Pledge was given an EDL, but with conditions affecting what, when and where he could drive. If that was the effect of the submission, then I can understand how care would be needed to fashion the scope and ambit of the conditions under which Mr De Pledge would be permitted to drive. However, that was not the application before the court.
Mr De Pledge deposed to the fact that there was only one other driver employed at the time of the hearing who had the necessary licence to drive his other prime mover. It seemed implicit in this part of Mr De Pledge's evidence that there were few people who had the necessary licence and it would be difficult to hire another person with the relevant skills (ultimately, this was the submission that his counsel made).

D. Extraordinary licences - relevant legal principles

The application is governed by the RTAD Act. Division 3 of pt 3 of the RTAD Act is headed 'Extraordinary Licences' and comprises s 25 to s 39.
By s 27(1) of the RTAD Act, a person who is disqualified under the RTAD Act or any other written law from holding or obtaining a driver's licence, may apply to a court for an order directing the CEO to grant the person an extraordinary licence.
Section 30 of the RTAD Act is titled 'Matters for consideration of court'. Section 30(1) of the RTAD Act empowers the court to make orders (a) directing the CEO to grant an extraordinary licence for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date on which it is granted, or (b) refusing the application.
Section 30(2) of the RTAD Act provides as follows:
(2)In making a decision for the purposes of subsection (1), the court is to have regard to -
(a)the safety of the public generally; and
(b)the character of the applicant; and
(c)the circumstances of the case; and
(d)the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to disqualification; and
(e)the conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification.
[(3) deleted]
(4)Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court must not make an order directing the grant of an extraordinary licence unless it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would -
(a)deprive the applicant of the means of obtaining urgent treatment for an illness, disease or disability known to be suffered by the applicant or a person who is a member of his or her family; or
(b)place an undue financial burden on the applicant or his or her family, by depriving the applicant of his or her principal means of obtaining income; or
(c)deprive the applicant or a person who is a member of the applicant's family of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant or that person, as the case may be, is employed.
In Director General of the Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147 (McKenzie) [49] - [71] (Buss P, Murphy JA & Beech J agreeing), the Court of Appeal examined the operation of s 30 of the RTAD Act.
As to the matters in s 30(2) of the RTAD Act, the Court of Appeal held at [52] that they were mandatory relevant considerations.
As to the matters in s 30(4) of the RTAD Act, the Court of Appeal held at [54] that subsection (4) operated as a threshold which needed to be met before attention could turn to the relevant considerations contained in subsection (2), which involved the exercise of the court's discretion.
In the present case, Mr De Pledge relied on s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act.
The Court of Appeal held at [56] - [57] that it was necessary to address what is 'practicable' for the particular applicant and not what is 'practicable' for a hypothetical reasonable person. Further, the Court of Appeal held that the correct approach to determining 'the only practicable means' of travelling to and from his or her place of employment involved, in effect:
(a)identifying the applicant's other available transport options (if any);
(b)evaluating each other transport option (if any), in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances; and
(c)thirdly, making a judgment as to whether any other available transport option would be a 'practicable means' (that is, a reasonably feasible means) in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances, for the applicant to travel to and from his place of employment.
At [59], the Court of Appeal stated that ordinarily, the relevant facts and circumstances would include, for example:
(a)the circumstances of the applicant's employment including the nature of his or her place of employment;
(b)the nature of the journey or journeys which the applicant must undertake in travelling to and from his place of employment;
(c)the duration of the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered;
(d)the timing and frequency of the means of transport being considered;
(e)the cost of undertaking the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered; and
(f)the applicant's financial capacity to pay for the cost of undertaking the journey or journeys by the means of transport being considered.
The Court of Appeal went on to state that the above list was not an exhaustive statement of the facts and circumstances that ordinarily might be relevant to a particular case.
At [61] - [63], the Court of Appeal stated that:
61The correct approach is for the court to evaluate separately each available transport option (if any), apart from driving a motor vehicle, in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the applicant's personal circumstances, and to make a judgment as to whether the transport option under consideration would be a 'practicable means' (that is, a reasonably feasible means), in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances, for the applicant to travel to and from his or her place of employment.
62 Section 30(4)(c) refers to 'travelling to … the place at which the applicant … is employed', but does not expressly identify the place where the journey begins. Similarly, s 30(4)(c) refers to 'travelling … from the place at which the applicant … is employed', but does not expressly identify the place where the journey ends.
63These express omissions reflect, no doubt, the reality that an applicant's point of departure, when travelling to the place at which he or she is employed, and an applicant's point of destination, when travelling from the place at which he or she is employed, will not necessarily be the applicant's usual residence. An applicant may not have a single, fixed place of employment. For example, an applicant may have two part-time jobs each day at different locations. It may be necessary for the applicant to travel directly from one location to the other.
And at [66], the Court of Appeal stated that the objects of the statutory scheme for extraordinary licences are apparent primarily from s 30(2) and s 30(4) of the RTAD Act.
Section 32 of the RTAD Act provides for the imposition of certain conditions as the court deems proper, which may be imposed should Mr De Pledge be successful in obtaining an extraordinary licence.
Under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 81C r 6(1), Mr De Pledge bears the onus of proof.

E. Issues for determination

As matters developed during the oral hearing of the matter, the following issues became central to the application:
(a)whether Mr De Pledge was deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr De Pledge was employed, for the purposes of s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act; and
(b)whether Mr De Pledge met the statutory criteria contained in s 30(2) of the RTAD Act.
Each of these matters is addressed below.

F. Section 30(4)(c) - Is Mr De Pledge deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr De Pledge was employed?

F.1 Overview

Mr De Pledge grounded his application on s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act (ts 26; applicant's written submissions (AS), par 13).

F.2 Applicant's submissions

Set out below I have broadly summarised Mr De Pledge's submissions.
First, given the locations of the stations and cattle properties which Mr De Pledge owns, the locations of the various abattoirs, ports, stockyards and suppliers' depots, the only practicable means for Mr De Pledge to travel to and between those properties/locations is by vehicle. It is not possible to obtain public transport or a private charter such as a taxi or an Uber in remote Western Australia. Put differently, driving a vehicle was the only practicable means for Mr De Pledge to travel between his properties, abattoirs, stock yards and suppliers' depots to transport cattle for his business.
Secondly, Mr De Pledge submitted, in effect, that the arrangements that he had put in place while he was in prison, were no longer possible. While Mr De Pledge was in prison, his friends and family rallied around him to assist him to manage his properties and to move cattle around those properties and to various abattoirs. Evidence was led about assistance provided by Mr De Pledge's brother‑in‑law, Peter Edmunds, who was a half owner of Hooley Station. Tragically, Mr Edmunds passed away in 2020.
Mr De Pledge said that Mr McMeeken had managed Yanrey Station while Mr De Pledge was in prison (ts 13). Mr McMeeken confirmed this in his evidence. He also said that during the 29 months that he managed Yanrey Station, there were always other people assisting him (save for a week here or there (ts 67)).
Mr McMeeken gave evidence to the effect that he had very recently resigned from Mr De Pledge's employ and was moving to near Geraldton to be with his partner. He would no longer be available to assist with Yanrey Station (ts 62). He gave one month's notice and was scheduled to commence with his new commitments on 1 April 2022. A copy of Mr McMeeken's resignation letter was tendered to the court. The letter was dated 1 March 2022 (ts 17). In his letter, Mr McMeeken stated that he would continue to work for the 'Yanrey Cattle Trust until the end of March'.
Mr De Pledge gave evidence to the effect that since leaving prison in September 2021, the arrangements that he had put in place, were no longer sustainable. In summary, Mr De Pledge's evidence was as follows:
(a)Mr De Pledge's father, Joe, who is 81 years of age, had been driving from Badgingarra to Perth and then back to Yanrey Station to provide him with lifts. Given his age, Mr De Pledge did not want to put his father at risk with this long distance driving on an ongoing basis.
(b)Mr De Pledge's sister, Joanna Edmunds, had also driven Mr De Pledge around Yanrey and Hooley Stations so that he could inspect the properties.
(c)He had managed to obtain lifts with friends to Perth.
(d)Mr De Pledge had relied on his ex-wife to assist him from time to time.
(e) Mr De Pledge gave evidence that Meg Batty, David Batty's sister, who had worked at Yanrey Station for about the last six or seven years, had recently left on a 'gap year' to go 'to the Kimberley to see other stations and how they all work' (ts 34). Mr De Pledge hoped that she would come back 'but no one is expected to come back'.
None of these options were sustainable in the longer term to provide Mr De Pledge with personal transport.
Likewise, Mr De Pledge said that Mr Graham, his long term truck driver in his Cob & Co Transport business, had told him that, when he turned 60 in June this year, that he intended to reduce the amount of driving that he did for Mr De Pledge (ts 13, ts 37). Mr De Pledge said in effect, that he would need to find someone to replace him. I note here that the CEO's counsel said that this part of Mr De Pledge's evidence was hearsay and not supported by anything from Mr Graham. In my view, because Mr Graham did not give evidence and there was no explanation as to why that was the case, I may infer that nothing that Mr Graham would have said would have assisted Mr De Pledge.
Thirdly, Mr De Pledge tendered emails from Mr Shane Flemming dated 22 and 28 March 2022. In the emails, Mr Flemming purported to explain how cattle were sold from pastoral stations in Western Australia, and the then current weather conditions affecting Mr De Pledge's cattle, given their locations. The emails were tendered to support the contention that Yanrey Station was experiencing a dry period at present, and that that explained why Mr De Pledge had not entered into any forward contracts for the sale of his cattle (ts 17, ts 41). In effect, Mr De Pledge needed maximum flexibility to be able to fulfill these contracts. These contracts had not been fulfilled because there had not been enough rain (as of the time of the hearing). The significance of this was that by entering into forward contracts, Mr De Pledge was ordinarily undertaking to deliver a significant number of cattle by a given date (although, actual numbers were not given to the court).
It was submitted on Mr De Pledge's behalf that because of the absence of forward contracts, I could infer that there was some uncertainty about when and how many cattle Mr De Pledge would ultimately sell (ts 19, ts 20, ts 21). In substance, this context supported the grant of an EDL that applied 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, without limits because Mr De Pledge had no idea when the cattle would need to be moved, which cattle, how many or to where they were going to be moved (ts 20). The corollary of this was that Mr De Pledge did not know how many drivers he might need nor when he might need them (ts 21).
Mr De Pledge's counsel also submitted that the nature of the industry was strongly affected by weather events. This meant that it was often the case that cattle would have to be moved around to access better feed, if it was available. It also meant getting access to water was a priority. At the same time, flooding events could also impact on the welfare of the animals. In effect, there was no way of knowing in advance how the weather might impact on the movement of cattle. Whether because the conditions were so hot and dry and the cattle needed to be moved to access water facilities and/or feed, or because of heavy rain and flooding which had the potential to isolate the cattle with similar consequences.
Fourthly, Mr De Pledge gave evidence to the effect that neither he, nor Cob & Co Transport could employ a fixed driver (with an MC licence) because normally 'most drivers - well, they just like to get behind the wheel and drive' (ts 42); or as his counsel put it, 'truck drivers like driving trucks'. It was Mr De Pledge's experience that when not driving, the drivers would not normally want to, or have the skill set to, help out around the stations. This contrasted with Mr Graham, who did have this skill set, and who did help out around the stations when not driving road trains (ts 42).
Fifthly, in terms of transporting cattle and supplies, Mr De Pledge's counsel submitted that there was a shortage of truck drivers in Western Australia. Mr De Pledge's counsel also submitted that one of the most important factors to take into account when hiring potential station hands and/or truck drivers, was that there were animal welfare considerations and how they would handle the cattle. Mr De Pledge's counsel submitted, in effect, that Mr De Pledge had difficulties obtaining personnel with the right skills both in terms of the necessary heavy haulage driving licences and animal handling skills. In this respect, it was important that the potential employees could handle cattle safely without causing them any stress or harm. Mr De Pledge's counsel submitted that there was no one else at present (no suitable candidates), although counsel accepted that that might change in the future (ts 74).
Sixthly, there was some evidence which tended to suggest that Mr De Pledge might need a licence other than an MC licence. By way of example, Mr De Pledge's counsel submitted that Mr De Pledge needed a licence to be able to travel on Twitchin Road, being a public road, which ran through Yanrey Station to inspect man-made watering points on the other part of Yanrey Station (ts 69).
Even though Mr De Pledge's counsel did not state that Mr De Pledge's application covered a C class licence to drive a motor vehicle, that is how I have understood this aspect of his case. In effect, part of Mr De Pledge's case concerned obtaining a licence to drive a vehicle which was less than a MC class, such as a C class motor vehicle licence. Put differently, a licence to drive a prime mover was not required for all purposes.
In addition to the above, Mr De Pledge tendered an email from his parents, Joe and Jane De Pledge, which they had signed, about how it would be easier if there were more face-to-face meetings instead of having to find a driver and a work around. The purpose of the meetings related to Mr De Pledge's cattle businesses. Mr Joe De Pledge stated that he was a director of Yanrey Cattle Co. Face-to-face meetings would assist with farm management plans, cattle marketing programs and general farm management.

F.3 CEO's submissions - not the only practicable means of travelling

The CEO opposed the application. The CEO made submissions both in writing before the hearing and at the hearing of the application.
The CEO's principal submissions may be summarised as follows.
Mr De Pledge had not established that unless he was granted an EDL, he would be deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which he is employed. Several matters bear on this.
First, Mr De Pledge is a self-employed station owner. He lives at and works at Yanrey Station and has worked there since being paroled. He does not need an EDL to get to work.
Secondly, while Mr De Pledge was in prison for 29 months, his cattle stations and other properties continued to operate and were looked after by others.
Thirdly, insofar as Mr De Pledge submitted that he needed a licence to drive a prime mover to move cattle around his stations and other properties, and to other places (including stock yards and abattoirs), Mr De Pledge had not demonstrated why that could not be undertaken by others. It was undertaken by others while he was in prison. Mr De Pledge did not supply any evidence from suppliers, customers, abattoirs etc to the effect that it had to be Mr De Pledge that delivered his cattle (ts 104).
Fourthly, insofar as Mr De Pledge submitted that he needed a licence to inspect his properties and/or to carry out infrastructure maintenance and/or development, he had not demonstrated why that could not be undertaken by others. Inspections and the like were undertaken by others while he was in prison, though the evidence on this aspect was limited.

Fifthly, insofar as Mr De Pledge submitted that those who had helped him manage his properties while he was in prison were no longer able to do so, the CEO submitted that there was no reason why they could not be replaced. Ultimately, it was a matter for Mr De Pledge as to how he chose to run his properties. In the circumstances, the decisions being made appeared to be commercial decisions (ts 104).
Sixthly, there was no real evidence that Mr De Pledge had sought to hire appropriately qualified staff and been unsuccessful.
Seventhly, Mr De Pledge owned four prime movers. He was cross‑examined about this. He accepted that the prime movers were used to transport cattle for third parties, but said that that was about a third of Cob & Co Transport's business (ts 54, ts 78). And of that third, Mr De Pledge said that most of that was for Hooley Station and his brother. I observe here that what Mr De Pledge's brother owned, and how that related to Mr De Pledge's other stations and properties was not explained during the application. In any event, implicit in the submission was that Mr De Pledge had the means to transport his own cattle and cattle for others. The only issue was about organising suitably qualified drivers, which Mr De Pledge had done on previous occasions. In this regard, Mr Graham could not be expected to drive all four prime movers at once.
Eighthly, at Yanrey Station there was at least one person (being an employee) with a C class licence who could drive Mr De Pledge on Twitchen Road so that he could inspect the rest of his station should he choose to. Similarly, there was no reason in principle why Mr De Pledge could not have one of his employees drive him to other locations, should he need to or want to leave his farm (as he had done on past occasions).

F.4 Would Mr De Pledge be deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which Mr De Pledge is employed?

Under s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act, the court must not make an order directing the grant of an extraordinary licence unless it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would, in this case, 'deprive' Mr De Pledge of 'the only practicable means' of 'travelling' to and from his place of 'employment'.
I am satisfied that the refusal of an EDL would not deprive Mr De Pledge of the only practical means of travelling to and from his place of employment. I largely agree with the CEO's submissions for rejecting Mr De Pledge's EDL application.
Having regard to McKenzie at [58] and [59] amongst others, Mr De Pledge's personal circumstances, his stations and properties, his trucking company, his financial assets, and the statutory scheme, I am satisfied that Mr De Pledge has reasonably feasible means available to him to engage or request one of his employees to transport his cattle to or from his stations and/or properties as needed from time to time, and to drive him around his properties and to his other stations from time to time, as required. In effect, he is not deprived of the only practicable means of travelling to and from his place of employment.
I set out below in summary form my brief reasons for reaching this conclusion.
First, Mr De Pledge is a self-employed station owner and cattle property owner as well as owner of a truck transport company that transports cattle. He lives at Yanrey Station, being his place of employment. Evidence was led to the effect that he could have, but had not yet, engaged other drivers to transport his cattle and supplies to and from his various farms and abattoirs, ports and stock yards and suppliers as necessary.
Secondly, Mr De Pledge gave evidence to the effect that he owned:
(a)a significant number of cattle (approximately 10,000);
(b)a share in approximately six large cattle stations or other properties;
(c)a trucking company - being Cob & Co Transport; and
(d)four prime movers together with related trailers.
Implicit in this, is that Mr De Pledge owns and controls significant financial means. One inference from that is that he could engage a driver to drive him around his stations and/or deliver his cattle, when and where necessary. Mr De Pledge did not submit otherwise.
Thirdly, Mr De Pledge did not lead any evidence as to his financial capacity or that of Cob & Co Transport to engage an employee to drive him to various stations and beyond or to transport cattle on his behalf. Neither did Mr De Pledge lead any evidence to suggest that hiring an additional driver would place an undue financial burden on himself or his family (cf s 30(4)(b)).
Mr De Pledge did not refer to or submit any evidence about the revenue from his stations and cattle properties or their financial viability. In the circumstances, the court is not able to assess the impact, if any, of Mr De Pledge needing to engage someone to provide him with personal transport from time to time, or to work at Cob & Co Transport.
Mr De Pledge bears the onus of demonstrating that he has been 'deprived' of 'the only practicable means' of 'travelling' to and from his place of 'employment'. If there were financial reasons why Mr De Pledge could not engage one of his employees to drive him around his stations or to other stations, then it was incumbent on Mr De Pledge to lead that evidence. In the absence of such evidence, it may be inferred that Mr De Pledge has the financial means to engage one of his employees to drive him around his stations as necessary.
Fourthly, Mr De Pledge is a self-employed station owner and owner of a trucking company. While Mr De Pledge was in prison for 29 months, he engaged others to manage his stations and the cattle on those stations with the assistance of others. It seemed to me, that many of the tasks that Mr De Pledge spoke of wanting to do or needing to do, were undertaken or could be undertaken by others. In this regard, they were performed and managed by others while Mr De Pledge was in prison for over two years.
Fifthly, Mr De Pledge's case was that those arrangements could not and would not continue. I observe that there seem to be a confluence of circumstances conspiring against Mr De Pledge. His long term manager, Mr McMeeken had chosen to go live near Geraldton to be with his partner. His long term truck driver, Mr Graham, was considering winding down or retiring shortly. Other staff of reasonably long standing, like Meg Batty, had also recently left his employ.
I also observe that there was no evidence from Mr Graham, Joanna Edmunds (his sister, who runs Hooley Station with Mr Batty) or Meg Batty.
While there was some evidence led about Mr De Pledge's inability to maintain those arrangements, I am not satisfied that other arrangements could not be put in place to replace them or to ameliorate the effects of losing existing staff. Mr De Pledge has in the past run a sizeable business with the assistance of others and, it seems to me, will continue to run a sizeable business with the assistance of others.
Sixthly, it is not clear to me that Mr De Pledge needed to leave his station to go and inspect his cattle at his other stations or properties. This seemed to be something which could be done by others and was done by others while Mr De Pledge was in prison.
Seventhly, at the heart of the issue was whether Mr De Pledge could engage others to transport his cattle from time to time as required. Mr De Pledge did not lead any evidence about the financial consequences of those arrangements. I infer from the fact that Mr De Pledge did not rely on subparagraph s 30(4)(b) of the RTAD Act that no undue financial burden would be placed on Mr De Pledge by engaging another driver or drivers to move his cattle around.
Mr De Pledge did not lead any evidence as to the financial viability and/or success of his trucking company, Cob & Co Transport. Mr De Pledge did not provide tax returns and/or lead any evidence as to its revenue during any period. One may infer from the fact that Mr De Pledge has recently purchased a further prime mover, that the trucking company is doing reasonably well.
The fact that Mr De Pledge owns his own trucking company counts against his application. This tends to suggest that Mr De Pledge can employ a driver to transport his cattle to his other stations and to his other properties from time to time. The fact that Mr De Pledge owns several large properties, many head of cattle and four prime movers together with associated trailers, further suggests that he has significant financial means.
Eighthly, Mr De Pledge knew that coming out of prison, he would be banned from driving a motor vehicle for a period of two years (concurrent sentences). In effect, Mr De Pledge had a significant period of time in which to plan how he would continue to manage his stations and properties upon release from prison, knowing that he would not be allowed to drive a motor vehicle for some time thereafter. Mr De Pledge knew that when released, he would need to engage employees who could drive for him and for Cob & Co Transport.
Ninthly, little evidence was led as to the difficulties of finding suitable replacements for Messrs Graham or McMeeken. In his written submissions, Mr De Pledge submitted that he had been 'exploring the possibility of hiring a driver'. There was no evidence of job advertisements placed in local and national papers looking for suitably qualified employees or something similar or other objective evidence as to a lack of suitably qualified candidates in the market.
Finally, the same considerations apply whether Mr De Pledge applied for a MC class licence alone or a C class or other licences. In conclusion, I am satisfied that the refusal of an EDL would not deprive Mr De Pledge of the only practical means of travelling to and from his place of employment.

G. Section 30(2) - has Mr De Pledge satisfied the statutory criteria

G.1 Overview

There are five mandatory factors to consider in s 30(2) of the RTAD Act, namely:
(a)the safety of the public generally;
(b)the character of Mr De Pledge;
(c)the circumstances of the case;
(d)the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification; and
(e)the conduct of Mr De Pledge subsequent to the disqualification.
Each of these is addressed below.

G.2 Safety of the public generally

I have set out above Mr De Pledge's convictions as recorded in his criminal and traffic history.
In its submissions, the CEO submitted that Mr De Pledge had no other criminal convictions. It also submitted that Mr De Pledge received four speeding infringements between 2012 and 2020.
Mr De Pledge deposed to, amongst other things, that:
(a)the incident which led to his disqualification was an isolated incident;
(b)he had been driving trucks his whole life and had never had an accident prior to the incident; and
(c)Mr De Pledge was a social drinker only and did not use drugs.
I observe here that although Mr De Pledge has been driving trucks and other vehicles for in excess of 30 years, largely without incident, the one significant incident resulted in the tragic deaths of two people.
It seems to me that ultimately, I am required to weigh up two matters. On the one hand, Mr De Pledge's traffic record over a period of 30 years, and the references referred to below, which tend to suggest that Mr De Pledge is not a risk to the public's safety when driving a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the circumstances of the fatal accident which suggest that he is a risk. Added to that are several fines for speeding.
On balance, and in particular, having regard to the number of years that Mr De Pledge has been driving motor vehicles (including road trains and trucks) without incident, I do not consider Mr De Pledge to be a risk to public safety when driving a motor vehicle.

G.3 The character of Mr De Pledge

Mr De Pledge provided character references from Mr Flemming, Ms Joanna Edmunds, (Mr De Pledges' sister), Mr Thompson and Mr Percy. Each of the referees speak well of Mr De Pledge.
I also note that when sentencing Mr De Pledge on 30 October 2019, her Honour, Judge Burrows, referred to the 71 written references that she received for the purposes of sentencing. Her Honour noted how unique that was in this court and how that obviously reflected well on Mr De Pledge.
In her sentencing remarks, Her Honour also noted how Mr De Pledge had set up a trust fund for the two children who lost their parents in the fatal accident in 2017.
In its written submissions, the CEO submitted that apart from the offence leading to the fatal accident, the CEO does not have a concern with Mr De Pledge's character.
Having regard to the above materials and the evidence in this matter, I am satisfied that there is nothing which gives rise to a concern about Mr De Pledge's character.

G.4 Circumstances of the case

I have set out in detail above Mr De Pledge's current circumstances, including as to his employment and living arrangements.
In its written submissions, the CEO's principal submission as to this matter was that Mr De Pledge would, at the time of the hearing, have served about six months of his two year (concurrent) disqualification. That submission was made in the context where Mr De Pledge was seeking a licence to drive a prime mover 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, throughout Western Australia having only served six months out of a possible 24 months disqualification.
In substance, the CEO submitted that there were two factors that weighed against the grant of an EDL. First, Mr De Pledge had served only six months of his two year disqualification at the time of the hearing of his application for an EDL. And secondly, Mr De Pledge sought a broad licence, which would enable him to drive a similar vehicle to the one in which the offences occurred, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, throughout Western Australia.
In my view, consideration of this criterion overlaps and is interrelated with the next criterion. I refer to my findings and observations below. In summary, the circumstances of the case tend to weigh against Mr De Pledge's application.

G.5 The nature of the offences giving rise to Mr De Pledge's disqualification

Set out below is a summary of the offences giving rise to Mr De Pledge's disqualification. I do not understand these facts to be in dispute.
Mr De Pledge was convicted in September 2019, after trial by jury, of two counts of dangerous driving causing the deaths of Mark and Lara Dawson. As her Honour, Judge Burrows observed in her sentencing remarks, an objective feature of the offending involved the driving of a very large vehicle. The charges arose out of a collision which occurred on the Great Northern Highway, near the Coonarie Creek Bridge on Friday, 30 June 2017. The Coonarie Creek Bridge is located about 165 km south of South Hedland and about 275 km north of Newman.
In October 2019, Mr De Pledge was sentenced in the Perth District Court of Western Australia to a total effective sentence of 3 years 10 months immediate imprisonment. Mr De Pledge was made eligible for parole. Mr De Pledge was released on 28 September 2021 and will be on parole until 29 August 2023 (ts 25).
Mr De Pledge was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for two years in relation to each offence (under s 59(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA)) to commence upon release from prison. The disqualifications were ordered to be served concurrently.
On 25 January 2021, Mr De Pledge was convicted in the South Hedland Magistrates Court on three counts of dangerous driving occasioning bodily harm on 30 June 2017. Mr De Pledge was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for 18 months on each count and fined $400 on each count.
There is no doubt that the offences giving rise to the disqualification were serious. The offences resulted in the deaths of two innocent people. The seriousness and the gravity of the offences is reflected in the statutory maximum penalty for the offences, which is 10 years' imprisonment. I note that her Honour, Judge Burrows referred to this fact in her sentencing remarks on 30 October 2019 when sentencing Mr De Pledge.
Her Honour, Judge Burrows ultimately imposed a total sentence of 3 years and 10 months imprisonment to be served immediately. The significant custodial sentence reflects the seriousness with which the court and the community see traffic offences of this kind.
In McKenzie [78] - [79], the Court of Appeal referred to the so‑called 'punitive aspects of the disqualification', that were ordinarily an integral part of the 'nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification' within s 30(2)(d) of the RTAD Act. This aspect of the Court of Appeal's reasoning was in relation to the decision of McKechnie J in Italiano v The Director General of Transport [1999] WASCA 40 [19], where his Honour stated:
… A motor vehicle driver's licence is not a right, it is a privilege, the continued maintenance of which depends on avoidance of traffic offences.
In substance, because Mr De Pledge's disqualification carries with it an element of punishment for his serious offending, the nature of his offending and its consequences weigh against Mr De Pledge being granted the privilege of a broad EDL.
If the court were to grant Mr De Pledge's application and in effect, reduce his concurrent two year driver's licence disqualification, the effect of that would be to minimise the punitive aspects of the disqualification embedded in the punishment for his serious offending. If an EDL had been granted at the hearing of the application in March 2022, that would have reduced his concurrent disqualification period from 24 months to just over six months. That is a serious reduction, which in my view, is not warranted in the circumstances of this matter. The nature of Mr De Pledge's offending and its grave consequences tend to weigh heavily against the granting of an EDL and in effect, a reduction in the punitive aspects of his disqualification.
I also observe here that the CEO submitted that general deterrence was a significant and relevant consideration (ts 90, ts 96).
Finally, the same considerations apply whether Mr De Pledge applied for a MC class licence alone or a C class or another licence. This is also true with respect to the circumstances of the case criteria mentioned above.

G.6 Mr De Pledge's conduct subsequent to the disqualification

As set out above, Mr De Pledge was released on parole on 28 September 2021. As his evidence indicates, he has gone back to running his cattle businesses and transport business (other than driving).
In its written submissions, the CEO stated that Mr De Pledge had not been convicted or infringed any offences since his release from prison.

H. Conclusion

As I indicated above, I dismiss Mr De Pledge's application for an EDL.
Mr De Pledge has not satisfied me of the criteria in s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act.
Had I been persuaded as to the circumstances in s 30(4)(c) RTAD Act, I would have dismissed Mr De Pledge's claim under s 30(2) of the RTAD Act. The circumstances of the case (s 30(2)(c)) and the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification (s 30(2)(d)) count against the granting of an EDL. The gravity of the offences giving rise to the disqualification could not be more serious. The grant of an EDL in the circumstances, would seem to cut across the 'punitive aspects of the disqualification'. That is not warranted in the present case. Mr De Pledge is not being deprived of the ability to earn an income. Mr De Pledge has the ability and financial means to travel around Western Australia, as he has done since being released from prison in September 2021. Mr De Pledge would seem to have the means to engage additional drivers in his trucking business and/or his cattle business, and does not need to transport cattle personally. The absence of a motor vehicle licence is not a bar to Mr De Pledge being able to work. It may affect how Mr De Pledge would like to work, but that is not the test contained in the RTAD Act.

I will hear from the parties as to the orders that ought to be made and the issue of costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
SZ
Associate to Commissioner Collins
2 JUNE 2022