DDG17 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor

The applicant, DDG17, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against a decision concerning the review of a "fast track reviewable decision" by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The Minister for Home Affairs was the first respondent. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the IAA, in conducting its review, was required to exercise its discretion under section 473DC of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) to obtain further documents, specifically prior statements made by the applicant to international bodies.

The legal issue before the High Court was the scope of jurisdictional error in the context of the IAA's review powers, particularly concerning the exercise of discretion under section 473DC. The applicant argued that when the IAA raised concerns about the applicant's credibility due to alleged "recent invention" of facts, and was aware of the applicant's prior statements to international bodies like the UNHCR and Red Cross, it was incumbent upon the IAA to consider exercising its discretion to obtain these prior versions. This was to allow the applicant an opportunity to demonstrate consistency and rebut the adverse credibility finding, thereby avoiding jurisdictional error.

The applicant contended that previous High Court decisions, such as *Minister for Immigration v SZIAI*, had identified circumstances where a decision-maker not under a duty to make inquiries might still be required to exercise discretion to obtain further documents. These circumstances included where an inquiry related to a critical fact, the existence of information could be easily ascertained, and there was a substantial reason for not believing the applicant. The applicant argued that the IAA's awareness of the applicant's prior statements to international bodies, coupled with the raising of the "recent invention" issue, met these criteria, and that the IAA had failed to consider exercising its discretion under section 473DC, thus committing jurisdictional error. The respondent argued that the IAA was not under a duty to obtain further information under the fast-track review scheme and that the applicant had not provided sufficient basis to warrant the exercise of the discretionary power.

The High Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding that it did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave.