IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S309 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
DDG17
Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM MELBOURNE BY VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY
ON FRIDAY, 12 JUNE 2020, AT 9.34 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR E.G.H. COX, SC: If your Honour pleases, I appear with MR M.D. SWANSON for the applicant.
MR G.J. JOHNSON: If the Court please, I appear for the first respondent. (instructed by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers)
NETTLE J: Yes, Mr Cox.
MR COX: Your Honours, the question that arises, we say, is the question of when a decision‑maker not under a duty to make inquiries of third parties is required as part of the review to exercise the discretion under section 473DC to get further documents was not considered in this Court’s earlier decisions in either SZIAI or SZGUR as to the scope of jurisdictional error.
In Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 the question of principle is set out in the judgment at paragraph 25 that we have quoted in the written submissions in the application book at page 69 in paragraph 21 where the Court identified three circumstances where the exercise of the discretion may arise and the three matters identified were an obvious inquiry related to a critical fact where the existence of information could be easily ascertained. The question did not need to be considered further.
Similarly, in Minister for Immigration v SZGUR the question was identified but because of an assumption made by the Federal Court it was not pursued further. The way in which we say it arises for consideration in this application is once the Authority in conducting their review was concerned about the applicant’s credibility and proposed a question of recent invention; it directly raised the question of what other versions the applicant had provided to international bodies such as the UNHCR or the Red Cross. The summary of ‑ ‑ ‑
GORDON J: Mr Cox, may I just ask one question before you undertake that analysis?
MR COX: Yes, your Honour.
GORDON J: What is the information, or new information, that gives rise to this obligation? When I read your submissions there seemed to be three potential matters raised. One was the representation itself. The second was, in a sense, what your client had told the international organisations. The third was what information might be gained from them. Fourth, was what Justice Abraham seemed to describe as unspecified further material. What are we actually dealing with here to give rise to this obligation in order to engage that relevant part, Part 7AA?
MR COX: Yes, your Honour. So, we say it arises from the submission that was made by the applicant to the Authority – which is set out in paragraph 15 of…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 82
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the High Court was the scope of jurisdictional error in the context of the IAA's review powers, particularly concerning the exercise of discretion under section 473DC. The applicant argued that when the IAA raised concerns about the applicant's credibility due to alleged "recent invention" of facts, and was aware of the applicant's prior statements to international bodies like the UNHCR and Red Cross, it was incumbent upon the IAA to consider exercising its discretion to obtain these prior versions. This was to allow the applicant an opportunity to demonstrate consistency and rebut the adverse credibility finding, thereby avoiding jurisdictional error.
The applicant contended that previous High Court decisions, such as *Minister for Immigration v SZIAI*, had identified circumstances where a decision-maker not under a duty to make inquiries might still be required to exercise discretion to obtain further documents. These circumstances included where an inquiry related to a critical fact, the existence of information could be easily ascertained, and there was a substantial reason for not believing the applicant. The applicant argued that the IAA's awareness of the applicant's prior statements to international bodies, coupled with the raising of the "recent invention" issue, met these criteria, and that the IAA had failed to consider exercising its discretion under section 473DC, thus committing jurisdictional error. The respondent argued that the IAA was not under a duty to obtain further information under the fast-track review scheme and that the applicant had not provided sufficient basis to warrant the exercise of the discretionary power.
The High Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding that it did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the application, asserting that there was no duty on the IAA to exercise its discretion to obtain new information. The Minister argued that the statutory scheme under Part 7AA of the Migration Act allows the IAA to conduct a review without accepting or requesting new information or interviewing the applicant. The discretion to obtain new information exists but is not mandatory. The Minister contended that even if the IAA had failed to consider exercising this power, it did not amount to jurisdictional error of the kind that warranted special leave to appeal. The Minister also argued that the applicant had not demonstrated how the international bodies' versions would have been critical or easily ascertainable, further undermining the applicant's case for the IAA's failure to act being a jurisdictional error.
This case involves an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, DDG17, originally sought a review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority under section 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Full Court dismissed DDG17's appeal, finding that the Authority was not required to exercise its discretion under section 473DC of the Act to seek further information from international organisations. DDG17 now seeks special leave to appeal this decision to the High Court of Australia. In the High Court, DDG17's counsel argued that the Authority failed to consider exercising its discretion to obtain prior consistent versions of the applicant's statement from international organisations, which would have been relevant once the Authority raised the issue of recent invention. The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the application, arguing that there was no duty on the Authority to exercise the discretion and that the applicant had the opportunity to provide the information himself. The High Court ultimately dismissed the application for special leave, finding that the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Immigration Assessment Authority was required to exercise its discretion under section 473DC to obtain further documents from international bodies to assess the applicant's credibility.
2. If the exercise of the discretion under section 473DC is mandatory in circumstances where the Authority intends to disbelieve the applicant due to a question of recent invention and is aware of the existence of prior consistent versions provided to international bodies.
3. Whether the failure to exercise the discretion under section 473DC constitutes a jurisdictional error, especially when the Authority has not considered or exercised the discretion at all.
4. Whether the principles set out in SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 apply to the jurisdiction under section 473DC, and if so, how they should be interpreted in the context of a Part 7AA review.
5. Whether the applicant's right to procedural fairness under Part 7AA of the Migration Act was violated by the Authority's failure to consider or exercise the discretion under section 473DC.
Held
1. Whether the Immigration Assessment Authority was required to exercise its discretion under section 473DC to obtain further documents from international bodies to assess the applicant's credibility.
The court concluded that there was no mandatory requirement for the Authority to exercise its discretion under section 473DC in this instance. The appeal was dismissed.
2. If the exercise of the discretion under section 473DC is mandatory in circumstances where the Authority intends to disbelieve the applicant due to a question of recent invention and is aware of the existence of prior consistent versions provided to international bodies.
The court concluded that the exercise of the discretion under section 473DC is not mandatory in such circumstances. The appeal was dismissed.
3. Whether the failure to exercise the discretion under section 473DC constitutes a jurisdictional error, especially when the Authority has not considered or exercised the discretion at all.
The court concluded that the failure to exercise the discretion under section 473DC does not necessarily constitute a jurisdictional error, particularly if the Authority did not consider or exercise the discretion at all. The appeal was dismissed.
4. Whether the principles set out in SZIAI [2009] HCA 39 apply to the jurisdiction under section 473DC, and if so, how they should be interpreted in the context of a Part 7AA review.
The court concluded that the principles set out in SZIAI do not apply to the jurisdiction under section 473DC in the context of a Part 7AA review. The appeal was dismissed.
5. Whether the applicant's right to procedural fairness under Part 7AA of the Migration Act was violated by the Authority's failure to consider or exercise the discretion under section 473DC.
The court concluded that the applicant's right to procedural fairness was not violated by the Authority's failure to consider or exercise the discretion under section 473DC. The appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in DDG17 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor examined whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was required to exercise its discretion under section 473DC of the Migration Act to obtain further documents from international bodies when reviewing the applicant's credibility. The court found that the exercise of this discretion is not mandatory in circumstances where the IAA intends to disbelieve the applicant due to a question of recent invention and is aware of the existence of prior consistent versions provided to international bodies. The court emphasised that section 473DB(1) of the Migration Act restricts the IAA's review to the material already provided without a duty to seek new information, making the exercise of discretion under section 473DC purely optional.
The court highlighted that the principles set out in SZIAI [2009] HCA 39, which outline three circumstances under which the exercise of the discretion may arise, do not necessarily apply to the jurisdiction under section 473DC. The court reasoned that the discretion under section 473DC is discretionary and not mandatory, and its exercise depends on the specific facts of each case. The court distinguished this from the principles in SZIAI, which pertain to jurisdictional error in the context of decision-making where the existence of information is apparent and critical. The court found that the case before it did not meet the criteria for an obvious inquiry related to a critical fact that could have been easily ascertained.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the failure to exercise the discretion under section 473DC does not constitute a jurisdictional error, particularly when the IAA has not considered or exercised the discretion at all. The court determined that the absence of such consideration did not result in a jurisdictional error but rather a dispute over whether there was an unreasonable failure to consider exercising the discretion. The court found that the applicant's argument did not raise a question of general principle warranting adjudication by the High Court.
Finally, the court assessed whether the applicant's right to procedural fairness under Part 7AA of the Migration Act was violated by the IAA's failure to consider or exercise the discretion under section 473DC. The court held that procedural fairness considerations are relevant to whether the IAA could have reasonably exercised the discretion, but the absence of such consideration did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for the IAA to be compelled to exercise the discretion, and the decision to not seek further documents did not prejudice the applicant's right to a fair review.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the exercise of discretion under section 473DC is not mandatory, and the failure to exercise this discretion does not constitute a jurisdictional error or a violation of procedural fairness, provided the IAA's review adheres to the statutory scheme outlined in Part 7AA of the Migration Act.