DDC24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DDC24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 646

Review of: DDC24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 519
File number: VID 512 of 2024
Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 14 June 2024
Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT — application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for judicial review of a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (the Circuit Court) – where the Circuit Court dismissed the applicant’s application under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of the time for filing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in relation to the applicant’s protection claims – where the Tribunal found that the applicant may suffer serious harm as a person perceived to be homosexual in his home village, but that relocation to another part of India was possible to avoid this harm – where the applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed properly to consider the possibility that the applicant would be perceived to be homosexual elsewhere in India on all the facts of the case – where the applicant did not make this point before the Tribunal or the Circuit Court – where the applicant submitted that the Circuit Court made a jurisdictional error in fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of the application for an extension of time because the Circuit Court failed to identify a significant arguable error, which ought to have been identified even on an impressionistic assessment of a broad ground of general legal error – the principles relating to jurisdictional errors made by inferior courts are distinct from those relating to administrative tribunals – the Circuit Court did not make a jurisdictional error by failing to consider claims that were not present in the case advanced to that Court – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J(1)(c), 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(a), 476A(1)(b), 476A(3)(a), 477(1), 477(2)

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

CZA19 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2021] FCAFC 57; 285 FCR 447

DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 403 ALR 604

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2023] HCA 3; 407 ALR 222

Tait v The Queen (1962) 108 CLR 620

Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; 217 FCR 55

Division: General Division
Registry:
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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 646
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In DDC24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, DDC24, sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Circuit Court) to dismiss his application for an extension of time to file a judicial review application regarding a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had found that the applicant may suffer serious harm due to his perceived homosexuality in his home village but could relocate within India to avoid this harm. DDC24 argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the possibility that he would be perceived as homosexual elsewhere in India.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the applicant's application for an extension of time and whether the Circuit Court made a jurisdictional error by fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of the application. The Court had to determine if the Circuit Court correctly assessed the merits of the application for judicial review and if it properly considered the applicant's claims regarding the Tribunal's decision.

The Court held that the Circuit Court did not err in dismissing the application for an extension of time. The principles governing jurisdictional errors by inferior courts, such as the Circuit Court, differ from those applicable to administrative tribunals. The Circuit Court was entitled to consider the merits of the proposed claim for judicial review at an impressionistic level. The Court found no error in the Circuit Court's assessment of the merits and concluded that the Circuit Court did not misunderstand the nature of the application. The Circuit Court did not make a jurisdictional error by failing to consider claims that were not presented in the case advanced to it. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Court made several orders, including amending the application for leave to appeal to an originating application for judicial review, adding a Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia as a third respondent, dispensing with filing and service of the amended process, proceeding with the final hearing forthwith, and dismissing the proceeding with the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal in this proceeding filed on 10 June 2024 be amended such that it is substituted by an originating application for judicial review under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in the form of the proposed application submitted to the Court on the applicant’s behalf.

2. “A Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2)” be added as a third respondent to the proceeding.

3. Filing and service of the amended process be dispensed with.

4. The final hearing of the proceeding proceed forthwith.

5. The proceeding be dismissed.

6. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,965.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Court made a referral for pro bono legal representation for the applicant, and has been assisted by the generosity of experienced and competent counsel, Mr Christopher McDermott, who took up the request, appeared for the applicant on the return of the interlocutory application today, and prepared associated paperwork on the applicant’s behalf.Background The background to the matter is set out in the reasons of the Circuit Court judge, to whom I will refer as the primary judge: DDC24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 519 at [3]–[21]. That background was not disputed and is incorporated by reference in these reasons. The applicant was unrepresented before the primary judge. There were two applications before the primary judge of an interlocutory character: (1) the application under s 477(2) of the Act to extend time for the making of an application to the Circuit Court for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal; and (2) an application for an injunction to prevent the applicant’s removal from Australia. The applications were supported by two affidavits of the applicant, to which the primary judge referred. The applicant’s first affidavit annexed a copy of the Tribunal’s reasons to which the primary judge referred, and which his Honour considered. There was also before the primary judge an affidavit of the solicitor acting on behalf of the Minister, to which the primary judge also referred. His Honour stated that only minutes before the hearing commenced, the Minister filed a court book; however, due to its late filing his Honour did not have regard to it. In relation to the application to extend time, the primary judge took account of the conventional considerations by reference to the condition for the exercise of power in s 477(2) of the Act, that is, that the Court must consider that the extension is in the interests of the administration of justice. This involves an evaluative judgment as to a state of satisfaction which is “not low”, because the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice: Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 403 ALR 604 at [10], [12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ) in relation to the corresponding provision in s 476A(1)(b) of the Act. There were no mandatory relevant considerations: Katoa at [13]. The primary judge appropriately referred to authority containing guidance in relation to the exercise of a discretion to extend time, including the decision of Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344. His Honour addressed: (1) the extent of delay; (2) the explanation for the delay; (3) whether there was any prejudice to the Minister; and (4) the merits of the application for judicial review. In summary, the primary judge concluded that although the applicant’s delay was slight, his Honour was not satisfied on the evidence that the applicant had an acceptable explanation for the delay. The Minister had not claimed that there was any relevant prejudice, which the judge held was a factor that weighed in favour of the applicant. As to the merits of the application, his Honour set out the applicant’s grounds of review. The grounds were unparticularised, and were generic in character, claiming that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by an error of law, and that the Tribunal had denied the applicant procedural fairness. His Honour considered that the lack of particularisation was a sufficient basis upon which the grounds could be dismissed. However, his Honour asked the applicant to expand upon his grounds in oral submissions. His Honour set out a summary of the submissions that were made, and addressed them. The applicant made submissions that the Tribunal had not considered certain of his claims. As to those submissions, the primary judge referred to relevant paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons, and held that the applicant’s claims of error by the Tribunal were not sufficiently arguable, and had little to no prospect of success. Otherwise, his Honour stated that, to the extent that the applicant cavilled with findings of fact, the Court could not engage in a merits review, and that the points raised had no prospect of success. On the question of denial of procedural fairness, the primary judge stated that the applicant was unable to identify how he was denied procedural fairness, and that his Honour’s own review of the Tribunal’s reasons disclosed that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness. His Honour held that the applicant had not established a prima facie case, and in the context specifically of the application to extend time, held that the applicant’s case was not sufficiently arguable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the applicant submitted that if the submissions at [24]–[25] above were accepted, then jurisdictional error in the Circuit Court’s decision would be manifest from its “fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the application … [addressing] the wrong grounds, [overlooking] part of the grounds altogether or so fundamentally [misunderstanding] the basis for the application that in effect the application is not considered”, citing CZA19 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2021] FCAFC 57; 285 FCR 447 at [34]. It was submitted that, put another way, the discretion in s 477(2) of the Act miscarried through the Circuit Court’s failure to identify a significant arguable error in the Tribunal’s decision which ought to have been relevantly picked up in an impressionistic assessment of a broad ground of general legal error, as was asserted by the self-represented applicant.Consideration The starting point is to identify the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the primary judge. I have referred already to the High Court’s decision in Katoa. For the purposes of considering whether in its evaluative judgment the Circuit Court was satisfied that it was in the interest of the administration of justice to extend time for filing an application for judicial review, the Circuit Court was entitled, if not guided by authority, to look at the merits of the proposed claim for judicial review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”. There could be no error, let alone a jurisdictional error, in the primary judge taking that course. The next stage in assessing whether the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error is to identify the principles relating to jurisdictional error by inferior courts essayed by the High Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 176–8 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531 at [72] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), and Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2023] HCA 3; 407 ALR 222 at [55]–[57] (Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). In the case of inferior courts, as opposed to administrative decision-makers, jurisdictional error takes on a different complexion. Courts have jurisdiction to be wrong, including by making errors of law and failing to take some matters into account which they are required to take into account. As to what might amount to jurisdictional error by an inferior court, the majority in Stanley stated at [57] –The circumstances in which an inferior court may fall into jurisdictional error are not closed. In Craig, the Court gave examples of the circumstances in which an inferior court will fall into jurisdictional error, including, as is presently relevant, “if it misconstrues [the statute conferring its jurisdiction] … and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case”, or “if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist”, or if it “disregards … some matter in circumstances where the statute … conferring its jurisdiction requires that that particular matter be taken into account … as a pre-condition of the existence of any authority to make an order”. For instance, in Samad v District Court of New South Wales, certiorari was granted to quash a decision based on the District Court Judge’s misapprehension of the scope of his discretion to cancel a licence. In this case, it is not necessary to go beyond the instances of jurisdictional error by an inferior court that were identified in Craig and reinforced in Kirk.(Footnotes omitted.)