DDC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DDC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1356

Appeal from: DDC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1267
File number: NSD 1059 of 2017
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 27 November 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge made an appealable error when dismissing the proceeding – whether primary judge failed to consider all the grounds raised and failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness

Held: appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36, 473DA, Pt 7AA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.24

Cases cited:

BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 802; 241 FCR 450

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69; 243 FCR 556

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34

Date of hearing: 17 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1059 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DDC16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. This appeal relates to a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), which rejected the appellant’s judicial review application in respect of a decision dated 26 September 2016 of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA). The IAA affirmed a decision dated 22 July 2016 of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The IAA’s decision was said to have been made under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).  The Minister has filed a notice of contention. 

    Summary of background facts

  2. The appellant, who is a citizen of Sri Lanka, departed Sri Lanka in September 2012 and arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 26 September 2012.  The primary judge noted at [2] of DDC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1267 that the appellant had previously travelled to India on two occasions between 2008 and 2010 and had travelled to Singapore on approximately 12 occasions between 2007 and 2011. The appellant also travelled to Malaysia from Singapore approximately four times.

  3. The appellant claimed to fear harm from the Karuna Group.  He said that he was a supporter…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1356
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DDC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, who appeared in person, challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to not grant him a protection visa. The appeal was lodged before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was required to determine whether the primary judge made an appealable error in dismissing the proceeding. Specifically, the appellant argued that the primary judge failed to consider all the grounds raised and did not afford him procedural fairness.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly assessed the grounds of appeal and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. The primary judge considered both the grounds presented in the originating application and additional grounds proposed by the appellant. The originating application contained three grounds: (1) the decision was tainted with jurisdictional error, (2) the IAA failed to consider all claims and circumstances, and (3) the IAA failed to consider the claims cumulatively. The primary judge also allowed the appellant to raise four additional grounds related to the IAA’s consideration of specific risks and inconsistencies in its reasoning.

The court found that the primary judge had properly considered all the grounds raised by the appellant. The primary judge concluded that the generalised assertion of jurisdictional error was unparticularised and no actual jurisdictional error was present. The court further found that the IAA had adequately considered the appellant’s claims and circumstances, and there was no failure to consider claims cumulatively. The additional grounds proposed by the appellant were also rejected as they amounted to disagreements with the IAA’s adverse findings rather than errors in the decision-making process. The primary judge's assessment was thorough, and no procedural unfairness was identified.

The appeal was dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed. The court's decision underscores the necessity for appellants to particularise their claims and for the primary judge to carefully consider all arguments presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, DDC16, was a citizen of Sri Lanka who had applied for a visa under the complementary protection pathway. His application was ultimately rejected by the Immigration and Asylum Reviewer (IAA). DDC16 sought judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed his proceeding. DDC16 appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, arguing that the primary judge had made an appealable error by dismissing the proceeding and by not considering all the grounds raised and not affording him procedural fairness. The appellant represented himself in both the primary judge's hearing and the appeal to the Full Court.

The appellant's originating application in the Federal Circuit Court included three grounds for judicial review. The primary judge permitted the appellant to raise four additional proposed grounds in his written submissions. The primary judge rejected all seven grounds, leading to the dismissal of the proceeding. The appellant then appealed the primary judge's decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and determined by the Full Court, which dismissed the appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For substantially similar reasons the IAA was not satisfied that the appellant met the relevant complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The primary judge’s decision summarised The applicant represented himself below. He provided an outline of written submissions in support of his judicial review grounds. The primary judge noted that the appellant’s originating application initially included the following three grounds (without alteration):(1) The IAA’s decision is tainted with jurisdictional error.(2)The IAA failed to consider all my claims and circumstances and not to so was procedurally unfair.(3) The IAA failed to consider my claims cumulatively. The primary judge also permitted the appellant to raise some additional proposed grounds, as set out in the appellant’s written submissions. In summary, those grounds were as follows (all of which were particularised):(1)proposed ground 1, which was to the effect that the IAA failed to consider the real risk of significant harm the appellant may face due to his “proximity” to the Karuna bases and Army camp;(2)proposed ground 2, which was to the effect that the IAA’s reasoning was inconsistent and illogical with its own findings in the sense that, even though the IAA found that the influence of the Karuna Group and the TMVP had significantly faded, there remained a risk of the appellant being harmed by the Army or police if he were to return to Sri Lanka and engage in politics;(3)proposed ground 3, which was to the effect that the IAA’s reasoning was inconsistent and illogical with its own findings in respect of its finding that it did not accept the appellant’s claim that he had witnessed a murder, yet the IAA explicitly and implicitly accepted that he had knowledge of “their crimes” and was a witness; and(4)proposed ground 4, which was to the effect that the IAA’s reasoning was infected with legal error by reference to the Full Court’s decision in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69; 243 FCR 556 (SZTAL Full Court). The primary judge rejected each of the three grounds set out in the originating application, as well as the proposed four additional grounds summarised above. In respect of ground 1 in the originating application, the primary judge noted that the generalised assertion of jurisdictional error was unparticularised and no jurisdictional error was made out. In relation to ground 2, the primary judge found that no jurisdictional error was made out because there was no claim or circumstance identified by the appellant which the IAA failed to take into account. In relation to ground 3, the primary judge found that the IAA had expressly referred to taking into account the appellant’s claims cumulatively in respect of both ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) respectively. In relation to proposed ground 1, the primary judge found that the IAA’s reasons disclosed that the IAA was aware of the proximity of the appellant’s location to the Karuna Group’s bases and the Army camp. The primary judge noted that the appellant’s argument amounted to a disagreement with the IAA’s adverse findings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, found that the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion in dismissing the proceeding. The appeal was dismissed on the basis that the primary judge's findings were not shown to be in error. The court held that the primary judge considered all the grounds raised by the appellant, including the additional grounds permitted by the primary judge. The court concluded that the primary judge did not fail to afford the appellant procedural fairness by considering all the claims and circumstances, as the appellant had not identified any claim or circumstance that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) failed to take into account. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the primary judge's reasons for rejecting the grounds were adequate, and the appellant's arguments amounted to disagreements with the IAA's adverse findings. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a primary judge adequately considers all grounds raised by an appellant and exercises his discretion correctly, the appeal will be dismissed. The court did not depart from any prior authority in this decision.