DCD16 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DCD16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 1303
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of Immigration Assessment Authority decision – refusal of a safe haven enterprise visa – applicants claiming a fear of harm in Afghanistan – whether decision of Authority was illogical, irrational and unreasonable – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 36(2B), 46A(1), 5J(1)(c), 65, 195A(2), 473CA

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Sandhu & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 711
SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 404

Applicant: DCD16
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: BRG 974 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Jarrett
Hearing date: 2 June 2017
Date of Last Submission: 2 June 2017
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 20 June 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Jones
Solicitors for the Applicant: HopgoodGanim Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr McGlade
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
The Second Respondent entered a submitting appearance

ORDERS

  1. The amended application filed on 27 February, 2017 be dismissed; and

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the amended application fixed in the sum of $7,206.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 974 of 2016

DCD16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant applies for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority.  The applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) visa.  That application was rejected by a delegate of the first respondent.  Whilst the Authority determined that the applicant faced a real chance of significant harm on a number of bases if he returned to the province of his birth in Afghanistan, the Authority was of the view that the applicant would not be exposed to such a risk of harm if he were to relocate to the town of Kabul in the western part of Afghanistan and that it was reasonable in the circumstances for the applicant to relocate there. On that basis, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa.

  2. In this application, the applicant challenges the Authority’s relocation finding, but only insofar as that finding related to the Authority’s conclusion that the applicant did not meet the complementary protection criteria.

  3. The applicant’s primary argument is that the Authority’s decision was illogical, irrational and unreasonable because there was certain evidence before the Authority which supported the applicant’s position that:

    a)he faced a real chance of harm if he were to go to Kabul; and

    b)it would be unreasonable for him…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 1303
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for a visa under the *Migration Act* 1958 (Cth). The applicant, DCD16, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The central dispute revolved around whether the Minister's decision-making process, specifically concerning the grant of a visa, was subject to the principle of unreasonableness as established in *Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation* [1948] 1 KB 223.

The court was required to determine whether the *Wednesbury* principle of unreasonableness applied to the Minister's decision-making in relation to visa grants under the *Migration Act*. This involved considering the nature of the Minister's powers and obligations under section 65 of the Act, which mandates the grant of a visa if certain criteria are met, and the extent to which discretionary powers within the administrative process might attract the *Wednesbury* standard.

The court reasoned that *Wednesbury* unreasonableness has no application to the decision to grant or refuse a visa under the *Migration Act* because section 65 of the Act imposes a mandatory obligation to grant a visa if specified criteria are satisfied. The satisfaction of these criteria is a question of fact for the decision-maker, and there is no discretion to grant or withhold a visa once those factual conditions are met. However, the court acknowledged, referencing *Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li* [2013] HCA 18, that discretionary powers exercised during the administrative process of considering a visa application, such as the power to adjourn proceedings, may attract the *Wednesbury* standard of unreasonableness. Such discretion must be exercised reasonably, avoiding arbitrary or capricious conduct, and must not be disproportionate to the purpose it serves.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Unreasonableness in the sense described in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 has no part to play in decision making with respect to the grant of a visa under the Migration Act. That is so because, generally speaking, there is no discretion given to the Minister to grant or withhold the grant of a visa under the Act. Section 65 of the Act provided at the time of the Authority’s decision (and continues to provide):65 Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa(1) Subject to sections 84 and 86, after considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:(a) if satisfied that:(i) the health criteria for it (if any) have been satisfied; and(ii) the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied; and(iii) the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 40 (circumstances when granted), 91W (evidence of identity and bogus documents), 91WA (bogus documents and destroying identity documents), 91WB (applications for protection visas by members of same family unit), 500A (refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas), 501 (special power to refuse or cancel) or any other provision of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth; and(iv) any amount of visa application charge payable in relation to the application has been paid;is to grant the visa; or(b) if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa. It is clear that upon the Minister (by his delegate usually) being satisfied of the matters prescribed in s.65(1)(a) of the Act, the visa must be granted. Whether a criterion prescribed by the Act or the Regulations for the grant of a particular visa has been satisfied is a question of fact for the relevant decision maker to determine. No occasion for the exercise of any discretion to grant the visa for which application has been made arises at any point of that process: SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 404 at [7]. However, as Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 demonstrates, in the administrative process of considering an application for a visa (and in that particular case on an application for review by a migration review tribunal) the decision maker may have certain discretionary powers that might be exercised for the purposes of the visa application. In Li the discretionary power in question was the power to adjourn the review to a later date to allow the applicant to furnish more information. The power to adjourn was clearly a discretionary power and it attracted the Wednesbury principles of unreasonableness. As Judge Emmet pointed out in Sandhu & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 711:44. In Li, French CJ referred to FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke [1982] HCA 26; (1982) 151 CLR 342 in support of the proposition that extended discretionary power is to be ascertained by reference to the scope and purpose of the statutory enactment. French CJ, in considering Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wensbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223 stated that reasonableness may be taken to encompass “unreasonableness from which an undisclosed underlying error may be inferred.” At [28], French CJ stated as follows:“28. After all the requirements of administrative justice have been met in the process and reasoning leading to the point of decision in the exercise of a discretion, there is generally an area of decisional freedom. Within that area reasonable minds may reach different conclusions about the correct or preferable decision. However, the freedom thus left by the statute cannot be construed as attracting a legislative sanction to be arbitrary or capricious or to abandon common sense…30. The requirement of reasonableness is not a vehicle for challenging a decision on the basis that the decision-maker has given insufficient or excessive consideration to some matters or has made an evaluative judgment with which a court disagrees even though that judgment is rationally open to the decision-maker. Gleeson CJ and McHugh J made the point in Eshetu that the characterisation of somebody’s reasoning as illogical or unreasonable, as an emphatic way of expressing disagreement with it, “may have no particular legal consequence… a disproportionate exercise of an administrative discretion, taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut, may be characterised as irrational and also as unreasonable simply on the basis that it exceeds what, on any view, is necessary for the purpose it serves.”(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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