DBD16 v Minister for Immigration - [2020] FCCA 1249

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DBD16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2020] FCCA 1249

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection Visa – whether Administrative Appeal Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error – where no error established in Administrative Appeal Tribunal’s decision – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Applicant:

DBD16

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number:

PEG 477 of 2019

Judgment of:

Judge Vasta

Hearing date:

20 April 2020

Date of Last Submission:

20 April 2020

Delivered at:

Brisbane

Delivered on:

20 April 2020

REPRESENTATION

Applicant in person

Solicitors for the First Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

That the Application filed 4 December 2019 is dismissed.
That the Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $6,000.00.

IT IS NOTED:

A. That the Court will not provide a written version of the reasons for judgment delivered today, unless an appeal has been lodged and the Court has received a request in writing from either party seeking that written reasons be produced.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

PEG 477 of 2019

DBD16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex Tempore)

On 14 November 2019, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) affirmed a decision of the Delegate not to grant the Applicant, DBD16, a Protection visa. On 4 December 2019, the Applicant asked this Court to review that decision.
The background to this matter is that the Applicant arrived in Australia around October 2012. On 31 October 2012, he was interviewed by way of an entry interview. On 26 November 2015, the Applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The Delegate refused the visa, but the Department was of the view that the Applicant was a fast‑track applicant.
This is because the Applicant had been on a boat that had been intercepted at Ashmore Reef. The Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) made their decision, and that decision was reviewed by his Honour, Judge Smith. On 26 April 2018, His Honour ruled that Ashmore Reef was not validly designated as one of the ports to which an entrant to Australia would be a fast‑track applicant. It would seem that the Applicant first set foot on Australian soil in Darwin.
Because of this, the IAA had no jurisdiction and so, therefore, His Honour quashed the decision of the IAA. That meant that the Delegate's decision had to be reviewed not by the IAA, but to have a full merits review before the AAT.
By the time that the matter was reviewed by the AAT, the Applicant had made claims in an entry interview, and then in two separate statements that had been given to the Department. Since lodging that, there were also some other changes to the Applicant's circumstances, as well as an additional claim that was raised in a post-interview submission.
In summary, the claims are that the Applicant was born in Bonni Village in the Jessore District in the Division of Khulna in Bangladesh. He is a national of Bangladesh and is Bengali by ethnicity. He lived all of his life in Bangladesh prior to coming to Australia. His mother is deceased, but his father, stepmother, half-brother and half-sister still reside in his home village. He does have a full sister who is married, but resides in another village in the Jessore District. The Applicant said that he had resided in his home village from his birth until June 2011.
In June 2011, he moved to Dhaka where he worked for a year and then, in June 2012, he moved to Technaf where he resided and worked for three months until September 2012. The Applicant said that he was educated by completing five years of primary education which finished in December 1998, and that, from 1999 to 2008, he worked with his father in the fields, and then he worked in a workshop from 2008 to 2011. Whilst in Dhaka, the Applicant worked in the construction field roofing, plastering and welding, and then worked at a fruit shop in St Martin's in Technaf.
The Applicant said that he left Bangladesh by fishing trawler on 25 September 2012. The fishing trawler sailed eventually to Indonesia, and, in Indonesia, he boarded a boat headed for Australia. In the first document that he gave to the Department in November 2015, he claimed that he and his family, including his father and uncle, were aligned to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“the BNP”). He said that he was a supporter of the BNP, and that in 2006 he was an acting president of the local BNP committee for about six months.
He said his uncle was a BNP member, and was elected as a member of the Bonni Union Council. Because of this alignment with the BNP, the Applicant said that he suffered harm at the hands of the rival political party, the Awami League (“the AL”).
He said that, in 2008, he developed a relationship with a girl whom I will call "H", and H's family were linked to the AL. The Applicant said that he received death threats and suffered harm from H's family on account of his relationship with H, and that H's family did not approve because of the fact that they supported the AL and the Applicant was affiliated with the BNP.
He said that he was physically beaten by H's family, and that the family threatened to kill him if he continued to see H. He said that these threats happened eight to 10 times throughout 2011. He said that, in January 2011, H's family began beating her because she continued to have a relationship with the Applicant.
He said that H's family forced her to marry a man and in June 2011. On the night before her wedding, H took poison and killed herself. The Applicant claimed that after H died, he fled to Dhaka, and that, whilst in Dhaka, he was informed by his family that H's family had hired thugs and killers, and that these people were harassing the Applicant's family and searching for the Applicant.
The Applicant claims that H's family forcibly took the motor bike of his uncle, that the Applicant's father was beaten and that these thugs and killers demanded money from the father and uncle, and that the ongoing harassment was due to the family support of the BNP. The Applicant claimed that H's family and other AL members threatened to continue beating members of the Applicant's family, and drive the Applicant's family from the local area unless the Applicant's family abandoned their commitment to the BNP and supported the AL at the coming election.
The Applicant claimed that he would be subjected to serious harm if he returned to Bangladesh on account of his association with the BNP and an imputed anti-Awami League political opinion.
In the second statement that the Applicant gave the Department, the statement dated 20 April 2016, the Applicant added to his claims. He said that he is 29 or 30 years old, but he does not know the exact date of his birth. The Applicant claims that he was born a Muslim, but he recently changed his religion to Christianity. The Applicant claimed that the documents that he had given to the Department may not have the correct information, and he was at some loss as to why it was that, for example, his birth certificate had his stepmother's name as his mother.
The Applicant claims now that he had been raised as a Sunni Muslim, but changed his religion to Christianity, and that in Bangladesh, he had Christian friends and always thought that they were very nice people. He said that he had a copy of the Bible in his room for about a year, and that he read the Bible in bits and pieces. The Applicant said that he likes Christianity because it is based on love and respect and care for other people and, therefore, it is a peaceful religion whereas in other parts of the world, Muslims fight each other and there are bombs and violence.
The Applicant identified a Christian priest, whom he called Father John, who would come to Wickham Point every Sunday, and that the Applicant had been to three services so far, as at the time of the claims, and that he believes he was going to be baptised at some point in the next week. The Applicant feared that if he converted to Christianity, he would have additional problems if he returned to Bangladesh because people who convert from Islam to Christianity are in danger of being killed.
On 18 August 2014, a letter was sent to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. It was from 15 Bangladeshi detainees, one of whom was the Applicant. All 15 signatories said in the letter that they recanted their offshore criminality. I will talk of this letter again later in these reasons.
The Applicant also claimed that there was a data breach on 31 January 2014 where, on the departmental website of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, details were published that identified the Applicant as being a person in detention at that time.
The Tribunal, therefore, had quite a deal of material before it when it came to the time of assessing the Applicant's application. The AAT also had a s.438 certificate before it. That certificate stated that there was certain information that would be contrary to public interest if it were to be disclosed. The Tribunal considered that the material identified in the certificate was not such and, therefore, the certificate was not valid. It then identified all of the material to the Applicant.
Having regard to all of that material, the Tribunal then summarised the Applicant's claims to him as follows. Firstly, that the Applicant claimed fear of persecution by reason of his actual and imputed political opinion opposed to the ruling AL Party; secondly, that the Applicant feared persecution by reason of his actual political opinion as a member of the BNP; thirdly, that the Applicant feared persecution by reason of his membership of a particular social group on account of his relationship with H whose family are linked to the AL Party; fourthly, that the Applicant claimed fear of persecution by reason of his religion on account of his conversion from Islam to Christianity; fifthly, that the Applicant claimed fear of persecution by reason of the Department's data breach, and also on account of his being a returned asylum seeker.
The Tribunal also noted that there was a written claim that as a child, the Applicant was physically hurt and prevented from attending school by his stepmother, and his stepmother would want to harm him to prevent him from inheriting the father's property.
The Tribunal then went about assessing all of these claims. The Tribunal, it would seem, discussed all of the issues that it had with the particular claims with the Applicant as the hearing went along. The Tribunal first looked at the Applicant's claim of conversion to Christianity.
The Applicant was asked about when he first became interested in Christianity. He said that it was in 2015 when he decided, to use his words, to "go for it". The Tribunal noted that the Applicant had not referred to his interest in Christianity at the time of the statement of 26 November 2015. The Applicant replied that he did mention Christianity to the Delegate when he was interviewed.
The Tribunal noted that the Applicant had said on 20 April 2016 that Father John had told him that he would be baptised the following week. But, the Applicant was not actually baptised until 14 July 2017 which was a year later, and he was not baptised as a Catholic but ended up being baptised as an Anglican.
The Tribunal asked him about this, and the Applicant responded by stating that he decided to become an Anglican instead, and that he did not know much about religion, but now knows more about it and decided to become an Anglican. The Tribunal asked the Applicant about his attendance at church services and he replied that he went every week, and was sometimes taken out of detention to go to religious services. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant seemed to have an understanding of the Holy Trinity and when asked what he understood about Christianity, the Applicant replied that there is a celebration in December and that he loves God.
The Applicant called a witness, a Reverend Holgate. Reverend Holgate told the Tribunal that she has known the Applicant since he went to Yongah Hill, and that he attends Christian fellowship. The Tribunal asked her to comment upon the Applicant's commitment to Christianity and, whilst acknowledging that it was a hard question to answer, she noted that the Applicant attended Fellowship willingly, that he appeared to be a gentle person, and she believes that he wants to understand the scriptures.
The Tribunal asked Reverend Holgate why it was that she believed the Applicant wanted to change from Islam to Christianity. She said that the Applicant wanted hope, and believed that a new faith would give him that hope.
The Tribunal discussed with her the concern that it had that the Applicant may have become engaged in Christianity in order to enhance his protection claims. She responded that she was confident that the Applicant's intentions were genuine, and that avoidance of returning to Bangladesh was not the reason for him becoming a Christian. After the witness left, the Tribunal discussed the same concern with the Applicant who replied that his Christianity has nothing to do with his visa application, and that he really loves being a Christian.
The Tribunal asked the Applicant what it was that he actually feared. The Applicant replied that by converting from Islam, he thinks that no one will help him, that his family will be under pressure and will not be allowed to go to the mosque and that he, the Applicant, would be in trouble because there would be small groups and religious leaders who will not tolerate his conversion and will seek to harm him. The Applicant said that he had no fear of his family because his family have cut him off, but they have made no threats to him.
The Tribunal then discussed the country information, specifically reports from DFAT, with the Applicant. That report noted that there were no laws prohibiting religious conversion in Bangladesh, but that individuals converting from Islam to another religion are more likely to face societal pressure than individuals converting to Islam. DFAT assessed that the risk associated with conversion from Islam to Christianity varies according to individual circumstances, especially when such risk is associated with family objections, and also that a lone convert in a small community would be likely to face a greater risk.
The Applicant was asked to comment on that aspect of the report, and he replied that people would kill him. The Tribunal asked him, "which people?" and he said that they are unidentified people and religious leaders in the village who will tell others to kill him. The Tribunal then referred again to the DFAT report which spoke of threats against Christians, and assessed that Christians faced a low risk of societal violence in the form of occasional localised incidents, but that the risk was higher for Christians who convert from Islam in the context of a lone conversion without the support of community or family. The Applicant replied to that, that the Applicant would not be able to get help from anyone.
The Tribunal then looked at the matter of the Applicant's engagement with the BNP. The Applicant was asked questions about when he joined the BNP. He said that his family was always involved. The tale that the Applicant told about his relationship with the BNP did not fit in with what was known of the BNP, especially aspects of their constitution. An example of this was that the Applicant said that he did not fill in an application form, nor did he pay any fees for the BNP.
However, the constitution says that to qualify for membership, one must fill in the form and then pay a fee of 5 Tks; and that an annual payment of 5 Tks was required thereafter. The Applicant replied to this that he was not in the limelight, and that he was just a supporter and attended meetings.
He was asked whether he had been harmed in any way by virtue of being just a supporter, and he replied he had not been harmed as being a supporter. The Tribunal noted that this was consistent with country information, that low-level supporters were not the victims of assaults.
The Tribunal discussed the DFAT report with the Applicant, especially the fact that most of the violence is more intra-party rather than inter‑party; that is, internally the AL has more violence than the violence committed by the AL to the BNP and vice versa. The Applicant stated that members of the BNP will always be targeted and that, as a member of the BNP, he cannot do anything. The Applicant said that now that he has converted to Christianity, he would not get support from the BNP or his family.
The Tribunal then looked at the claim regarding the girl, H. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant said in his interview with the Department that:
I was seeing a girl in Bangladesh and she passed away approximately September/October 2011 - she was being pressured from her family not to marry me and she committed suicide; her father threatened to put a case against me and kill me because of what she did.
The Tribunal asked the Applicant what he meant by this, and he said that the family of H tried to extort the Applicant by demanding money. The Tribunal noted that this claim was not in the entry interview or any of the two statements.
The Tribunal then looked at the fact that the Applicant had given to the Department documents, that purported to come from the police, which indicated that there were allegations against the Applicant regarding his role in H's death. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant said that he got these documents from a lawyer in Bangladesh. The Applicant said that he knew that it was wrong to submit those documents, but he did it only because he was stressed. The Tribunal noted the Applicant had advised the Minister, in the letter I had already referred to, that any claims that he had any offshore criminality, or was being investigated for that, were false.
The Tribunal then asked the Applicant about the actual relationship with H. He had said that he would talk to her and meet her all the time, but that these meetings were secret. However, the Applicant said that he would meet her at coffee shops and outside the village. When asked then whether the relationship must be, therefore, publicly known, the Applicant changed his evidence to say that most of the time they would talk on the phone. They did not talk much in public and that no villagers had seen them together publicly.
When reminded about his evidence regarding coffee shops, the Applicant then said that the coffee shop had a separate compartment where they could meet, and they did not talk much in public but would go into places like the side alley. He was asked about when H's family found out about the relationship. He said they found out in May or June of 2011. The Tribunal expressed that they had a concern that the Applicant had said to the Delegate that in February 2010, H's cousins and members of the AL Party, who were friends with H's family, beat him up and threatened to kill him if he continued to be in contact with H.
When asked to comment on that inconsistency, the Applicant said that they knew a little bit and were suspicious and wanted to warn him off, and that is why they beat him up then. The Applicant said that he and H had broken up in April but still spoke to each other on the telephone. The Tribunal noted the Applicant claimed that his family members were attacked in June 2011 and their home was attacked in July 2011. The Tribunal asked why, if there had been a break-up with H in April, was there an attack in June and July. The Applicant replied that H's family knew that they were still talking on the phone.

The Tribunal noted that the problem with this was that if the family were not aware of the relationship until May or June of 2011, this was at a time after the Applicant had claimed that he and H had actually stopped seeing each other. The Tribunal asked the Applicant again when H had passed away, and he said it was in 2012 or 2013. He was asked where he was when he learnt of her death. It then became clear to Tribunal that the Applicant was having a problem with this question and he requested a break. The Tribunal agreed to adjourn the hearing to another day.
When the hearing resumed, the Applicant's evidence did not clear up the matter any further, and the Applicant was still quite inconsistent as to when it was that she died, where it was that he was at the time, and how it is that the attacks could have been consistent with that particular timeline.
The Tribunal then looked the Applicant's claim about his stepmother, and he told the Tribunal that he feared being harmed by his stepmother who might poison his food. The Applicant was reminded that he had managed to live for a long period of time without being poisoned. He said that when he was younger he did not fear for his life, but when he turned 18, they wanted him to sign over the land to them.
The Applicant told the Tribunal he was 24 when he left home, and the Tribunal noted that there was six years from the time that he was 18 until the time he left, and that he had not been poisoned during those six years. The Applicant agreed, but said that they kept asking for the land.
The Tribunal then looked at the data breach, and they asked the Applicant what concerned him about the data breach. He replied he was concerned about the authorities learning of the Applicant's Christianity.
The Tribunal noted to the Applicant that the information was not released as part of a data breach, but, in any event, at the time of the data breach in 2014, the Applicant was not a Christian.
The Tribunal then discussed the country information from the DFAT report with the Applicant regarding the Applicant's returning from a western country back to Bangladesh, and the Applicant returning after being an illegal departee. The country information did not indicate that there was any justification for a fear of serious harm. When asked to comment on that, the Applicant again replied that he was concerned about the authorities knowing about his Christianity.
The Tribunal then assessed all of what it was that the Applicant had said.
As far as BNP support was concerned, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant was not a member of the BNP, and would not be considered to have the profile of a senior member of the BNP. The Tribunal was not persuaded that the Applicant's low-level participation as a supporter of the BNP constituted active opposition to the AL government, and the Tribunal was not persuaded that the Applicant would be targeted by the AL government. The Tribunal was satisfied the Applicant does not have the profile of a political activist or a person who actively opposed the AL government.
The Tribunal found that the Applicant's evidence regarding his relationship with H was vague, contradictory and implausible. They noted that the Applicant was unable to provide any physical evidence of the existence of H, and that his evidence as to how the relationship developed and how they would meet also lacked coherency. The Tribunal had grave concerns about the Applicant's credibility and the genuineness of his claims in relation to a relationship with H.
The Tribunal said that they did not accept that the Applicant had any relationship with anyone called H. The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was threatened or attacked by the family of H, or by anyone else at the direction of H's family including after the time he left Bangladesh. The Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant suffered harm at the hands of the AL who he claimed were affiliated with H's family, and did not accept any claims made by the Applicant in relation to any relationship with a girl named H.
The Tribunal looked at the Applicant's conversion to Christianity, and noted that they were impressed by the evidence presented by Reverend Holgate. However, the Tribunal had problems with the fact that the Applicant had not made any claims to Christianity at the time of making his Safe Haven Enterprise Visa application; that at the time of the interview, he had only been to church on three occasions, and that at the time of the interview, he claimed that he intended to be baptised as a Catholic within a week of the interview. The Tribunal noted that, in fact, the Applicant did not become baptised until more than a year later and, at that time, was baptised as an Anglican.
The Tribunal noted all of the material that the Applicant had given to it, and also noted what was said in the DFAT reports about people who had converted from Islam to Christianity. The broader issue for it to consider was whether it accepted that the Applicant's conversion to Christianity was genuine. The Tribunal said that they found the Applicant's explanation for wanting to become a Christian quite vague in that all that he said was that he liked it, and fell in love with it. Together with the Tribunal's grave concerns about the Applicant's credibility and the genuineness of his other claims, the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant's interests or conversion to Christianity was genuine.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant entered into Christian observances and practices in order to strengthen his claim to be a refugee. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant would practise the Christian faith should he return to Bangladesh now or at any time in the future or tell anyone, including his family, about his Christian practices. Whilst the Tribunal was aware that there is information that could have been sent to the Applicant's family or others in Bangladesh about what the Applicant had been doing whilst in Australia, the Tribunal did not consider that such gave rise to a real risk or real chance of any harm to the Applicant in Bangladesh; given that he had not genuinely converted his religion to Christianity.
With regard to the concerns the Applicant had about his stepmother, the Tribunal looked at the fact that the Applicant had lived from the ages of 18 to 24 with the stepmother and that there had been no harm done to him by the stepmother during that period. The Tribunal did not consider that there was a real risk that he would suffer serious harm at the hands of his stepmother because of any entitlement to inherit property from his father, or in relation to land that he has already inherited.
The Tribunal looked at the fact of the Applicant being a failed asylum seeker, and did not consider there was a real risk that he would suffer serious harm at the hands of Bangladeshi authorities because of this.
Then they looked at the illegal departure, and also did not consider that there was a real risk of the Applicant suffering serious harm at the hands of the Bangladeshi authorities because of the illegal departure.
As far as the data breach was concerned, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence that there was anything other than the Applicant's basic biodata that was published on that website, and did not accept that there was any aspects of the Applicant's claim for protection that was on that website.
The Applicant said that he was only concerned that the data breach may have disclosed his Christian conversion. However, that had not happened at the time of the data breach, which was in January 2014.
Having looked at all of those matters separately, the Tribunal then looked at the matters cumulatively. The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not meet the refugee criteria.
The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not meet the criteria for complementary protection.
The Tribunal, therefore, affirmed the decision not to grant the Applicant a Protection visa.
The application that was filed by the Applicant lists eight grounds of application. The Applicant, who appeared before me today unrepresented, but with the help of a Bengali interpreter, told me that he did not wish to add anything further; though he wanted me to understand that he believes that he is in danger if he goes back to his country.
The first ground of the application was that:
The Tribunal was in error by making the decision on my case which is not in a substantive sense, fair; it is a denial of natural justice.
The decision, as I have painstakingly detailed, was extremely thorough. It complied with all of the requirements for natural justice and procedural fairness as enacted by the Parliament. The reality is that the ground is really a statement that the Applicant does not agree with the decision that was made by the Tribunal, and, therefore, he thinks it is unfair. In effect, it is an application for merits review which is prohibited in these matters. Therefore, there is no substance in ground 1 and it fails.
The second ground is:
The Tribunal failed to assess where the legislation properly construed the obligation to accord natural justice.
It is difficult to see how the claim, that the Tribunal has not construed the obligation to accord natural justice, can be maintained. What the Tribunal has done is gathered all of the material that the Applicant has presented them and ensured it was coherent; and ensured that all the claims that the Applicant had wanted to put before the Tribunal were, in fact, there before it. The Tribunal methodically went through each of the claims, and put to the Applicant at all times what its concerns were, so that the Applicant could answer them.
When the Applicant was having trouble regarding the time of death of the girl, H, the Tribunal adjourned the matter so that the Applicant could come back on another day somewhat refreshed and, hopefully, in a manner where he could get his dates correct.
The Applicant was allowed to say whatever it was that he wished to say, and the Tribunal ensured that everything that was put before it was taken into account. It seems to me that the Tribunal has gone above and beyond what it needed to do to provide natural justice and procedural fairness to the Applicant. There is no merit in ground 2 and, therefore, it fails.
Ground 3 is:
The Tribunal did not assess/consider the real risk of significant harm to my person upon return to Bangladesh.
As my recitation of the Tribunal's reasons indicates, the Tribunal was very thorough at looking at all of the aspects that the Applicant claimed would give rise to a risk of significant harm. For some of those matters, the Tribunal found that there was no substance to them, such as the relationship with H or the membership of the BNP. For others, such as returning as a failed asylum seeker or as an illegal departee, the Tribunal found that the risk would not get to the level of being at a risk of significant harm. It seems to me that the Tribunal did assess and consider those risks and, accordingly, this ground also fails.
Ground 4 is:
They relied on irrelevant factors and materials which had nothing to do with my persecution.
This ground does not give any particularity. For that reason I asked the Applicant, notwithstanding that he said that he did not want to add anything further, what it was that he meant by this ground. His reply was that he received a letter from the AAT, which he later particularised as being a letter that he received a week after the AAT decision. That letter, he said, explained that the AAT would not consider everything that the Applicant had said, and that he should apply for another visa. That letter has not been identified by the Applicant. He has not put it before this Court, nor is it in the Court Book. Ms Ladhams, who appears for the Minister, has been unable to identify what it is that the Applicant is actually talking about. However, it still does not tell me what irrelevant factors and materials were relied upon by the AAT. It does not identify which matters the AAT was prohibited from considering with regard to the application. Because of that, I do not find there is any merit in this ground and, accordingly, it also fails.
Ground 5 is:
They ignored relevant materials. Identified the wrong Issue and asked themselves wrong questions.
Again, there is no particularity with regard to that ground, and again, despite the Applicant not wanting to add anything further, I asked him what he meant by that ground. The Applicant said to me that the Tribunal asked him unnecessary and wrong questions to confuse him. Upon my recitation of the Tribunal decision, it would seem that the questions that were asked, especially those ones that related to the girl H, were questions designed to get to the truth.
Even if there were some confusion by the Applicant, that was not because of the wrong or irrelevant or unnecessary questions that were asked. In any event, the Tribunal allowed the Applicant an adjournment so that he could, as it were, get his mind together to be able to be in a state where he could sensibly answer the questions. Any allegation that the Tribunal deliberately asked questions designed to confuse the Applicant has no substance whatsoever. There is no identification of any material that the Tribunal was mandated to consider that was not considered. There has been no identification of any issue that the AAT has looked at that was wrong. Because of this, I cannot find that there is any substance to this ground, and it also fails.
Ground 6 is:
They made an incorrect interpretation and applied applicable law in a way that affects the exercise of power.
There were no interpretations of the law that have been identified as being incorrect. There is no application of the law that was incorrect that could be said to affect the exercise of power. There has been no particularity given to this ground. It, therefore, also fails.
Ground 7 is:
The Tribunal did not seriously consider my well-founded fear of being persecuted/harmed for reason of renouncing Islam, not simply because I have converted to Christianity.
The Tribunal went through this aspect in quite a thorough way as my recitation of the facts has illustrated. What the Applicant did was that he did not actually make a claim that he would be persecuted because he renounced Islam; instead, it is that he would be persecuted because he has converted to Christianity. The Tribunal had quite an issue with regard to the Applicant’s claim that he had converted to Christianity, and I have gone through that. But he has not identified that it is a rejection of Islam that would have caused him any harm.
The Tribunal went through quite a deal of country information with regard to the conversion to Christianity, and what happens to persons with regard to religion. It seems to me that the ground is predicated upon the Applicant making a specific claim that he will be harmed simply because he has renounced Islam. That was a claim that was not expressly raised by the Applicant. It is not one that squarely arose on the materials before the Tribunal. The whole of the claim was predicated upon what would happen to the Applicant because of his Christianity.
The Applicant has not said, nor is there anything to say, that the Applicant could have renounced Islam independent upon his conversion to Christianity. As the claim was not made, and does not squarely arise on these facts, I find that ground 7 is simply not established, and there is no jurisdictional error illustrated by it.
Ground 8 is:
The Tribunal failed to make relevant enquiries into critical facts the existence of which was easily ascertained under the Migration Regulations.
Again, this ground has no particularity and, notwithstanding that the Applicant did not want to add anything further, I asked him about this ground. The Applicant’s response was that if they had asked him more questions, then they would have had a positive view of his situation. As is evident from my recitation of the Tribunal decision, the Tribunal was extremely thorough, and asked quite a number of questions. It would seem to me that it would not matter the questions that were asked, or whether there could have been any more questions asked. The Tribunal had been able to come to a view of the situation after, what must be seen to be a very thorough and painstaking assessment of the Applicant’s claims. From the recitation of the Tribunal’s decision, it would seem to me that all relevant inquiries were made by the tribunal. There is no jurisdictional error illustrated by ground 8.
I asked the Applicant whether there was anything more that he wished to say. He reiterated again that it was not safe for him to go back, and that he was entitled to protection. However, he did say that he was disturbed that the AAT had told him that the assessment and inquiries it was making would all be discreet and confidential, but the Applicant says the matter is online. That is not correct. There was the data breach which had his biodata and that he was in detention, but his claims were not part of that information and so, it was not online and the statement that the AAT made about that was some five years after the data breach. There has been nothing else that is online.
As I explained to the Applicant at the beginning of the proceedings, I am calling him DBD16 so that no one will be able to know who he actually is. Therefore, there is nothing in any concerns that he has, not that it would have constituted a jurisdictional error in any event.
Having gone through the matter as I have, I can find no jurisdictional error. I therefore dismiss the application with costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.

I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Vasta

Date: 27 May 2020