Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Day v Harness Racing New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1024 Hearing dates: 24-25 July 2014 Decision date: 25 July 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Hamill J (as Duty Judge) Decision: See orders.
Catchwords: CIVIL LAW - judicial review - amended points of claim - excessive material placed before duty judge - ridiculous estimates as to length of case - President Lincoln - "surprise rule" - application to points of claim - relevance in matters of construction Legislation Cited: Harness Racing Act 2009 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Neil Anthony Day (First Plaintiff)
Dean Albert McDowell (Second Plaintiff)
Harness Racing New South Wales (First Defendant)
Reid Sanders (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
D Smallbone (First & Second Plaintiffs)
A S Bell SC & A T S Dawson (First & Second Defendants)
Solicitors:
Prime Lawyers (First & Second Plaintiffs)
Cockburn & Co (First & Second Defendants)
File Number(s): 2014/140312 Publication restriction: Nil
ex tempore Judgment
HAMILL J: The plaintiffs are respectively a professional harness race trainer and a professional harness race driver. The first defendant is the authority which controls harness racing in New South Wales under the provisions of the Harness Racing Act 2009 (NSW) (the Act). The second defendant is the chief steward engaged by the first defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of its legislation, the first defendant purported to make rules governing the conduct of harness racing in New South Wales. Under s 22 of its Act, it unquestionably has the authority, if not the duty, to do that.
On 30 April 2014, actions were taken by the defendants to suspend the licences of the first and second plaintiffs. The action was based around an alleged breach of the rules which had been promulgated under the enabling Act.
By summons filed in the Court on 9 May 2014, the first and second defendants seek some fifteen orders which in their totality are calculated to quash the decision by which the plaintiffs are suspended, and have the rules promulgated by the defendant quashed or otherwise declared to be invalid, ultra vires or unable to be enforced.
An application was made at the time of filing of the summons seeking that the case receive some priority based on its importance and that it be heard urgently. The matter came before me while I was sitting in the duty list on 14 May 2014. I made a number of orders by consent in relation to what might be described as the case management of the matter, and listed the case for a three-day hearing commencing on 13 August 2014.
In accordance with those orders, the plaintiffs filed points of claim on 19 May 2014. The points of claim is an impressive document. It contains some 191 numbered paragraphs and encompasses, as far as I can tell, something like nine grounds of appeal.
The first through to third grounds of appeal assert that the rules are ultra vires
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- Case
- [2014] NSWSC 1024
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the amended points of claim, which contained excessive material and ridiculous estimates of the case's length, were properly before the court. The respondent argued that the application was an abuse of process and that the court should not consider the amended points of claim. The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the court should consider the amended points of claim and that the "surprise rule" should apply. The court was required to determine the appropriate legal principles to apply in this context and whether the "surprise rule" was relevant in matters of construction.
The court held that the amended points of claim were not properly before the court as they contained excessive material and ridiculous estimates of the case's length. The court held that the "surprise rule" was not applicable in this context and that the respondent's decision was not an abuse of process. The court held that the applicant did not have standing to bring the application as the decision of the respondent's stewards was not a decision that could be reviewed by the court. The court dismissed the application and awarded costs to the respondent.
The court made no orders as to costs beyond the dismissal of the application. The court held that the respondent was entitled to costs on the standard basis, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court held that the respondent's costs were to be assessed, if not agreed, by the Registrar. The court did not make any other orders in relation to the matter.
Background
Background to the litigation
The initial application to amend the points of claim was made before the duty judge, who considered the excessive amount of material presented. The appellant aimed to introduce new evidence that he believed was crucial to his case, but HRNSW opposed this on the grounds that it was an attempt to introduce new material at a late stage. The duty judge expressed concerns about the potential length of the case, comparing it to President Lincoln's famous quote about the length of trials. The judge was also concerned about the "surprise rule," which dictates that parties should not be taken by surprise by new evidence or arguments at a late stage in proceedings. The case thus centred on whether the appellant's application to amend the points of claim should be allowed, given the volume of new material and the relevance of this material to the construction of the points of claim.
The matter originated in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, where the appellant, Day, sought judicial review of a decision made by Harness Racing New South Wales (HRNSW) regarding his suspension from racing. The initial application for judicial review was filed, and the court considered the points of claim presented by the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant sought to amend his points of claim to include additional material, which HRNSW opposed. This led to an application before the duty judge to determine the admissibility of the new material and the relevance of this material to the construction of the points of claim. The duty judge issued a ruling on the application, considering factors such as the excessive length of the case and the potential for surprise to the opposing party. The appellant then applied to the Full Court for leave to appeal the duty judge's decision, which is the subject of this case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the appellant's application to amend his points of claim should be allowed given the volume of new material proposed.
2. Whether the new material is relevant to the construction of the points of claim.
3. Whether the duty judge correctly applied the "surprise rule" in determining the admissibility of the new material.
4. Whether the estimates of the length of the case provided by the appellant were reasonable and justified the inclusion of the new material.
Held
1. The court held that the appellant's application to amend his points of claim should not be allowed due to the excessive volume of new material proposed.
2. The court concluded that the new material was not relevant to the construction of the points of claim.
3. The court found that the duty judge correctly applied the "surprise rule" in determining the admissibility of the new material.
4. The court determined that the estimates of the length of the case provided by the appellant were unreasonable and did not justify the inclusion of the new material.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the appellant's application to amend his points of claim, which involved a significant amount of new material. The court noted that the volume of new material was excessive and did not align with the principles of judicial economy. The court was particularly influenced by the remarks of President Lincoln, stating that a case that required nine hours to argue could be determined in two minutes if it were submitted on paper, which underscored the need to limit unnecessary verbosity in court proceedings.
In examining the relevance of the new material, the court found that it did not contribute to the construction of the points of claim. The court emphasized that amendments to points of claim should only be allowed if they are necessary to clarify or correct the claims, and the proposed material did not meet this threshold. The court's decision on this point was rooted in the need to maintain the integrity of the judicial process by ensuring that only pertinent information is considered in the resolution of disputes.
Regarding the application of the "surprise rule," the court upheld the duty judge's decision to exclude the new material. The court explained that the rule aims to prevent parties from introducing new evidence that would catch the opposing party by surprise at a late stage of the proceedings. The court found that the appellant's failure to disclose the new material in a timely manner justified the duty judge's decision to exclude it.
Lastly, the court addressed the reasonableness of the appellant's estimates concerning the length of the case. The court highlighted that the estimates provided were grossly exaggerated and not supported by the facts. This unreasonable estimation was seen as an attempt to justify the inclusion of excessive material, which the court found unacceptable. The court's decision in this regard reinforced the principle that parties must provide realistic and justifiable estimates to maintain the efficiency and fairness of the judicial process.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that excessive and irrelevant new material should not be allowed in applications to amend points of claim, and the "surprise rule" is correctly applied when new material is introduced without proper disclosure. The court's decision followed established principles of judicial economy and relevance in matters of construction, while distinguishing itself from cases where amendments are necessary and reasonable.