Dawson; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services an D
[2003] AATA 962
•26 September 2003
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 962
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2002/407
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES Applicant
And
ANNETTE DAWSON
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr M Allen, Member Date26 September 2003
PlacePerth
The decision of the Tribunal is that:
(a) the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal made on 18 September 2002 is set aside; and
(b) in substitution therefor the Tribunal decides that a debt of $4,748.60 (after allowing for $100.00 previously recovered) should be raised and recovered from the respondent, representing a preclusion period from 2 February 2001 to 19 July 2001.
.............(sgd M Allen)..........................
Member
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – payments and benefits – lump sum compensation payment – whether in special circumstances of the case all or part of the compensation payment should be treated as not having been made – whether operation of statutory formula can be a special circumstance – other circumstances personal to the respondent – decision of SSAT set aside
Social Security Act 1991 ss17(1), 17(3)(a), 1160, 1169, 1170, 1178, 1184K
Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 157 ALR 359
Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services v Chamberlain [2002] FCA 67
Re Kulakou and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 63 SSR 879
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Ellis (1997) 46 ALD 1
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hulls (1991) 22 ALD 570
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 51 ALD 695
REASONS FOR DECISION
26 September 2003 Mr M Allen, Member 1. This is an application by the Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services for review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) made on 18 September 2002.
2. On 3 July 2002 a delegate of the Secretary decided to raise and recover a debt of $4,848.60, representing the amount of aged pension (“AP”) payments made to the respondent, Ms Dawson, during a preclusion period between 2 February 2001 and 19 July 2001.
3. In its decision the SSAT decided to “vary the decision under review and substitute its decision that the compensation part of the lump sum settlement is $6,500.00.” The effect of the SSAT decision would, therefore, have been to reduce the preclusion period applicable to the respondent from 24 weeks to 11 weeks with a corresponding reduction in the amount of the debt to be recovered.
4. At the hearing the Secretary was represented by Ms Hackney and Ms Dawson represented herself. The Tribunal received into evidence the documents filed pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (T1 – T22) and also received one document tendered by the respondent (R1). Oral evidence was given at the hearing by Ms Dawson.
Background
5. Most of the information concerning the matter was not in dispute and the following findings of fact can be made.
6. In 1997 and 1998 Ms Dawson was involved in two separate motor vehicle accidents. Thereafter she received Sickness Benefits. In May 1999 her claims for damages arising out of those two accidents were settled by consent and a consent judgement was entered in her favour in the sum of $35,000.00 plus costs of $5,700.00 in settlement of the two claims. In the months leading up to the settlement of those claims the solicitor representing Ms Dawson had approached Centrelink on a number of occasions to obtain estimates of the preclusion periods that would be applicable if the claims were settled for various nominated amounts. In the event, when the matters were settled as described above, Centrelink calculated that Ms Dawson was subject to two separate preclusion periods, each of 20 weeks, and recovered from the solicitor amounts of $2,942.10 and $1,925.71 representing the sickness benefits paid to Ms Dawson during those preclusion periods.
7. Ms Dawson started to receive AP in August 2000.
8. On 2 February 2001 Ms Dawson was involved in a third motor vehicle accident. On 20 June 2002 her claim for damages arising out of that accident was settled by consent, with the Insurance Commission of Western Australia to pay Ms Dawson a total amount of $28,420.40. That amount was made up of $1,500.00 that had previously been advanced by the Insurance Commission, $6,420.40 by way of costs and a balance of $20,500.00 – which included an amount of $6,500.00 by way of compensation for economic loss. That settlement was reached at a Pre-Trial Conference. The solicitor representing Ms Dawson (the same person who had represented her in the previous claims) had not approached Centrelink for an estimate of the preclusion period and the amount to be recovered.
9. By letter dated 25 June 2002 (T9) Ms Dawson’s solicitor informed her that “if Social Security become aware of your accident sustained injuries and your damages award, you will have to repay the Department of Social Security approximately $2,300.00.” Upon receipt of that letter Ms Dawson telephoned Centrelink to clarify the position because (for reasons that will be referred to below) Ms Dawson was under the impression that no amount would be repayable to Centrelink from her award. At T10 folio 23 there is a record of the telephone conversation between Ms Dawson and a Centrelink officer on 3 July 2002 concerning the claim and the possibility of an amount to be recovered by Centrelink. Up to that date Centrelink had no record of the claim.
10. Centrelink obtained information from the Insurance Commission and on 4 July 2002 wrote to Ms Dawson (T13) advising her that the amount of $14,210..20 was deemed to be for loss of earnings and on that basis the amount to be recovered by Centrelink was $4,848.60 – based on a preclusion period between 2 February 2001 and 19 July 2001.
11. T10 also contains notes made by Centrelink officers of a number of telephone conversations that occurred between Ms Dawson and Centrelink officers between 8 July 2002 and 23 July 2002 in which Ms Dawson expressed unhappiness with that recovery; informed Centrelink that she had been given contrary advice by a person known as “Kaye” from Centrelink in June 2002; and provided information about possible special circumstances that might cause the Secretary to exercise the discretion available under section 1184K of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”) to treat all or part of the compensation amount received as not having been paid.
12. The original decision was reviewed by the original decision-maker and by an authorised review officer, both of whom affirmed the original decision. Ms Dawson’s application to the SSAT was heard on 18 September 2002 and on that day the Tribunal made the decision referred to above. The SSAT decision is at T2. In its “Discussion of the Evidence” section the SSAT said that it considered that because Ms Dawson was over 61 years of age at the time of the accident and earning a minimal amount of income, it was unnecessarily harsh to treat 50% of her settlement as being for economic loss. The SSAT found that the debt had been validly raised, and considered whether there were special circumstances for the purposes of section 1184K. It concluded (at para 22) as follows:
“In the circumstances of Mrs Dawson case, a person near the end of her working life, who was earning a minimal amount to supplement the Aged Pension and who has been unable to work since her accident, has been notionally remunerated in accordance with the 50% rule for economic loss at an amount far in excess of that likely if the damages were determined by a court. The Tribunal considered that the arbitrary nature of the 50% rule and its application to Mrs Dawson’s settlement amount was harsh and unfair and combined with Mrs Dawson’s other circumstances, as an aged pensioner who prior to accident was earning around $45.00 per week and was now in poor health as well as straitened financial circumstances, was such as to enable the Tribunal to find that special circumstances existed.”
Legislative Framework
13. Part 3.14 of the Act provides a regime by which some or all of certain types of benefits received by a person (known as “compensation affected payments”) may be required to be repaid because of the receipt of compensation by a person: s 1160. The AP is such a compensation affected payment: s 17(1).
14. So far as is relevant, section 1169 of the Act provides that if a person receives or claims a compensation affected payment and the person receives a lump sum compensation payment then the compensation affected payment is not payable to the person in relation to any day or days in what the Act refers to as “the lump sum preclusion period”.
15. It is not in dispute that Ms Dawson received a compensation affected payment (ie the AP) and that she received a lump sum compensation payment. Subsection 1170(3) provides that a lump sum preclusion period is the period that begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of capacity to earn began and ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out in accordance with a formula set out in subsections 1170(4) and (5).
16. That formula involves dividing what the Act refers as the “compensation part of a lump sum” by what the Act refers to as the “income cut out amount”. The resulting number (of weeks) is then rounded down to the nearest whole number.
17. Section 17(3)(a) defines the “compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment” as:
(a) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
i)the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
ii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgement being entered into in respect of the settlement or otherwise;
…”
18. Subsection 17(1) provides a formula to determine the “income cut out amount”. In essence, this represents the maximum amount of weekly earnings beyond which a pension at the single person rate is no longer payable. That amount may bear no relationship to the amount of income actually received by a person in the relevant period.
19. In Ms Dawson’s case, 50% of the total gross payment received (ie $28,420.40) was divided by $590.50 (being the “income cut out amount”) and a preclusion period of 24 weeks – being the period during which Ms Dawson was not entitled to her AP – was established. That was a period that ran from 2 February 2001 until 19 July 2001 and in that period Ms Dawson received AP payments totalling $4,848.60.
20. Section 1178 of the Act provides that if a person receives a lump sum compensation payment and also receives a compensation affected payment during the lump sum preclusion period then the Secretary may, by written notice to the person, determine that the person is liable to pay to the Commonwealth the amount specified in the notice. The notice given to Ms Dawson by way of the letter of 4 July 2002 (T13) was such a notice. An amount of $100 was recovered from Ms Dawson’s AP by instalments, but no amount have been received since the date of the SSAT decision.
21. However, Section 1184K of the Act provides as follows:
“(1) For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:
(a) not having been made; or
(b) not liable to be made;
if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.
22. It was not in dispute in the proceedings that the issue for the Tribunal to determine was whether the circumstances of Ms Dawson’s case are such that they can properly be described as “special” and whether the Tribunal should exercise the discretion available to the Secretary (and hence this Tribunal) under that subsection.
Evidence of Ms Dawson
23. Ms Dawson said that in the period immediately prior to the settlement of her claim in June 2002 she had been well aware of the preclusion period arrangements with Centrelink because of her experience when the two earlier claims had been settled. At that time the amounts to be repaid to Centrelink had been taken from the lump sum amount prior to it being paid to her. However, in June 2002 she thought that the situation might be different because she was now receiving the AP rather than Sickness Benefits. Her solicitor had not raised the question of any payments to be made to Centrelink and sometime shortly before the Pre-Trial Conference she had telephoned the Retirement Section of Centrelink and spoke to a person who identified herself as “Fran”.. She told Fran that she expected to settle the claim in the near future and asked specifically whether there would be any money payable to Centrelink out of the settlement. Fran had told her that there would be no money payable and there would only be an affect on her pension if the settlement was in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. That conversation had specifically been about the preclusion period situation.
24. Because of the advice she had received from Fran and because her solicitor had not raised the issue, she had gone to the Pre-Trial Conference clear in the knowledge that no money would be payable to Centrelink out of whatever settlement she received. She had, therefore, been surprised and somewhat upset when she received the letter of 25 June from her solicitor (T9). She had not liked the way the paragraph of the solicitor’s letter that is quoted at para 9 above in these reasons had been worded – so she promptly telephoned Centrelink to establish the situation. It would be fair to say that she was upset in the light of the conflicting advice she had received from Fran and her solicitor and at that stage she assumed that the advice she had got from Fran was correct and that what the solicitor said in the letter was incorrect.
25. Ms Dawson confirmed that the majority of the records made of the various telephone conversations with Centrelink officers that are set out in T10 are basically correct, although she was adamant that at no time had she told Centrelink that she had received advice from a person named “Kaye”. She was sure that the person’s name was Fran and that she had used that name when she spoke to the Centrelink officer on 8 July.
26. As regards her health, Ms Dawson said that she still experienced problems caused by the motor vehicle accident in that she had constant stiffness and soreness in her neck, shoulders and upper arms. These require anti-inflammatory medication and hypro-therapy/massage and Ms Dawson tendered exhibit R1, which is a certificate from her general practitioner, Dr Walker, to that affect. In addition to that, she suffers from ulcers (which she attributes to the anti-inflammatory medication for her muscular problems) and she also suffers from diverticulitis. She takes medications for all of these conditions on a more or less daily basis and also takes hormone replacement medication daily. She also suffers from anxiety and takes daily medication for that condition. She is quite unable to work because of these conditions and she is unable, therefore, to supplement her income in the way that she did prior to the last motor vehicle accident.
27. As regards her financial position, Ms Dawson said that her only income at the moment is the AP of $446.10 per fortnight. She pays $54.00 per month to the Commonwealth Bank in repayments of a personal loan (approximately $1,200.00 still due). Her only other debts are approximately $400 - $500 on a credit card – which she pays at about $20 per month and approximately $500 owed on the local government rates on her home (which she owns). She also owes water rates but does not know the actual amount. She finds in very difficult to make ends meet and has to budget extremely carefully in everything that she spends. Despite that, there are often days when she is unable to buy food.
28. At the time of the SSAT hearing Ms Dawson had an amount of $5,000.00 remaining from her compensation claim and which was held on a term deposit. She said that she had used part of that money to repay several debts due to friends and she had recently made a gift of $3,000.00 to her daughter who is soon to be married. She has none of the $5000.00 left.
Contentions
29. Ms Hackney submitted that the SSAT had appeared to take account of three circumstances, namely the arbitrary nature of the 50% rule, the poor health of Ms Dawson and her straitened financial circumstances. It was also appropriate to consider the possible incorrect advice allegedly given by a Centrelink officer and the lack of advice from the solicitor acting for Ms Dawson. In relation to the perceived arbitrary nature of the 50% rule, Ms Hackney relied upon the decision of Keifel J in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain [2002] FCA 67 as authority for the proposition that any application of the 50% formula that resulted in a preclusion period being calculated by use of an amount that exceeded the actual amount that the person received by way of compensation for economic loss, could not, by itself, amount to a special circumstance. Ms Hackney acknowledged that health can be a relevant circumstance and that Ms Dawson suffered from poor health. However, ill health alone cannot be held to be a special circumstance, relying on the decision of this Tribunal in Re Kulakou and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 63 SSR 879.
30. As regards Ms Dawson’s financial position, Ms Hackney acknowledged that financial hardship can be a special circumstance but the degree of hardship must be beyond straitened circumstances and must be truly exceptional. The recent gift of $3000.00 was a voluntary action that made Ms Dawson’s financial position worse than it would otherwise have been.
31. As regards the question of whether or not Ms Dawson had received incorrect or inadequate advice from Centrelink and her solicitor, Ms Hackney contended that Centrelink could find no record whatsoever of any contact between Ms Dawson and a person known as Fran. However, even if it could be assumed that Ms Dawson had received advice from Centrelink that no amount of money was repayable, on the evidence it was established that at least by the time she received the letter from her solicitor in late June Ms Dawson knew that at least $2,300.00 would be repayable. This was confirmed by her telephone conversation with a Centrelink officer on 3 July when she was told that the amount to be recovered might be more than $2,500.00 and the full correct figure was contained in the letter of 4 July sent to her by Centrelink – which she appears to have received prior to the telephone contact on 8 July. It follows that, whatever misapprehensions she may have been under initially, she was aware of the correct position by no later than early July 2002 and, hence, the existence of the amount repayable should have been taken into account by her from that early stage when she was making decisions about how to spend the money received. As regards the possibility that her lawyer may have given her inadequate advice, it was relevant to consider that the lawyer had been involved in the earlier cases and had sought estimates from Centrelink. If, as appeared to be the case, the lawyer had chosen not to approach Centrelink for estimates in the present case then that is something in respect of which Ms Dawson should seek a remedy directly from the lawyer concerned.
32. Ms Dawson contended that the special circumstances of the case included the unfair operation of the 50% rule in the statutory formula, the fact that she had received incorrect information from Centrelink, she was in a extremely vulnerable financial position, her injuries had had a significant effect on her quality of life and she was now suffering further health problems from the medication that she had been taking. She said that she had not, and would not, consider taking any action against her solicitor.
Consideration
33. As Hill J observed in Naim Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1998] 994 FCA at 10, “the discretion under [a predecessor of s 1184K] is expressed in wide terms untrammelled by specificity.” His Honour referred to the history of the provision and continued:
“So, as von Doussa J observed in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56, in a passage quoted by Einfeld J in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Thompson (1994) 53 FCR 580 at 583-4, an attempt was made to balance on the one hand finite budgetary allocations against the interests of the recipient of the payment. Without putting too fine a point upon it, the purpose of the basic thrust of the legislation was to avoid a claimant being entitled both to social security benefits and benefits in the nature of income through lump sum payments.
However, the legislature was conscious of the possible harshness of a rule structured in an arbitrary way. Section 1184, therefore, provided the means whereby the Secretary or, in the event ultimately of an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that Tribunal, could alleviate the harshness of the statutory provision in an appropriate case but only where there were special circumstances. The question of what constitutes special circumstances has been the subject of a number of decisions of this Court. It suffices here to say no more than that something is required which would take the matter out of the usual ordinary case: Groth v secretary, Department of Social Security 91995) 40 ALD 541 at 545 per Kiefel J, Secretary, Department of Social Security v Ellis (1997) 46 ALD 1 at 5 per Carr J.”
34. As regards the argument advanced by Ms Dawson that the operation of s 17(3)(a), by “deeming” that 50% of the total amount received is to be treated as being in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn is unfair and arbitrary – and hence a special circumstance – I note that the point has been considered in a number of decisions of the Federal Court, one of the most recent being that of Keifel J in Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services v Chamberlain [2002] FCA 67. Her Honour observed as follows:
“20 The question whether the strict application of the Act can result in unfairness or inappropriateness and therefore qualify as a “special circumstance” has been considered in a number of cases…
…
23 It may generally be accepted that the statutory provisions here in question were intended to operate upon factual bases which were assumed and were not intended to reflect the true position. This is so with respect to the figure of fifty per cent taken of the lump sump compensation payment; the amount of basic rate of pension used to divide it; the period during which double payment is assumed to have occurred; and perhaps even the commencement of the period when the loss of earning capacity arose, which would normally be taken to be the date when the compensable injury was occasioned to the person.
24 Unlike a presumption, which may be rebutted by evidence, the purpose and effect of a deeming provision is to prevent any attempt, by either party, to prove the truth…
25 Here the factual assumptions upon which the calculations are based, including that which treats fifty per cent of the total compensation payment as representing the economic loss component, could not have been intended to be subject to rebuttal in the process of applying the formulae. The statutory purpose is to overcome the need in each case to determine what part of a lump sum compensation payment in truth represents economic loss. Although the assumptions to be made and the result reached are necessarily arbitrary, it is a course which has been taken for administrative simplicity: Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hulls (1991) 22 ALD 570, 579; Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56, 61.
26 These observations do not however conclude the matter, since s 1184 was inserted to ameliorate the harshness of the arbitrary provisions: Haidar v Department of Social Security (1998) 157 ALR 359, 367, Hill J. Pursuant to it the decision-maker is entitled to treat the compensation payment, or part of it, as if it had not been made, which is to say in a manner different from that required by the formulae. This is undertaken only if the requisite opinions are formed, namely that “special circumstances” exist and it is considered appropriate to treat the compensation payment such that there will either be no period when double payment is assumed to have been made, or there will be a shorter period.
…
33 In the present case the Tribunal considered that the application of the formulae was unfair to the applicant because she would have to pay more than she had received by way of compensation for economic loss, indeed twice as much. That factor will however be present in most cases and is an aspect of the application of the formulae. In my view it cannot, by itself, amount to a special circumstance, one out of the ordinary.
34 The basis for the Tribunal’s view was its acceptance of what the parties to the settlement said had been offered and accepted for the economic loss component. It was far less than the statute assumed to be the case in applying the formulae. Again, however, this will be so in many, if not most, cases to which the Act applies. Further the extent of the difference from the basis upon which the parties acted could not provide the necessary “special circumstance”. The statute has selected a figure which may operate in an arbitrary way.
35 The statutory objectives in utilising the formulae, referred to above, must also be borne in mind. It is not intended that a decision-maker be required to consider contentions about what part of the compensation reflected the economic loss component. That is so whether one has regard to the application of the formulae or the discretion under s 1184. The latter does not alter the objective and must be read in light of it.
35. In the present case the amount nominated in the settlement of Ms Dawson’s claim as being for economic loss ($6500.00) exceeds the amount sought to be recovered by Centrelink ($4848.60) and in that sense it cannot be said that the operation of the statutory formula has operated unfairly or unjustly or inappropriately. From a different point of view, however, it can be seen that the $6500.00 represented only 22.9% of the total lump sum whereas the statutory formula requires 50% of the total sum to be used in the calculation.
36. Chamberlain (supra) is authority for the proposition that the fact that the statutory formula operates in that way – to result in a large difference between what was offered and accepted by way of the economic loss component and the amount that the statute assumed to be the case – can not, of itself, provide the necessary special circumstance. The difference between the agreed economic loss component and the statutory amount in the present case can not, therefore, be considered as a special circumstance.
37. I must, therefore, consider the circumstances that are pertinent to Ms Dawson personally. Those circumstances are set out above, and I accept all the evidence given by Ms Dawson subject to one qualification. That qualification concerns whether or not she did receive advice by telephone from a Centrelink officer named Fran about preclusion periods. The fact that Centrelink has no record of such a contact, when it has reliable records of all other contacts, suggests that it did not happen – or that, if it did, Ms Dawson did not identify herself in a way that enabled a record of the conversation to be entered into her computerised file maintained by Centrelink. However, I am prepared to assume that such a contact did occur and that Ms Dawson was told (incorrectly) that the compensation would not affect her pension.
38. On that assumption, it remains the case (as Ms Hackney contended) that by no later than early July 2002 Ms Dawson knew that money was due to Centrelink, and it was her responsibility to make arrangements to pay it. I should also add that, if Ms Dawson had been correctly advised about the recovery of pension payments from the amount of compensation received and had sought to obtain a greater amount of compensation to offset that recovery, then that greater amount would, in turn, have resulted in a longer preclusion period and a greater amount to be recovered (in accordance with the statutory formula).
39. I have no doubt that Ms Dawson’s health is not good and that she continues to suffer the effects of her motor vehicle accidents and from other conditions. Ill heatlh, on its own, can not be a special circumstance but must be considered as part of the factual matrix of circumstances.
40. Similarly, financial hardship alone will not constitute special circumstances but must be weighed in the balance with other relevant factors. Ms Dawson owns her own home and in that sense, is in a more fortunate position than many other aged pensioners. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that Ms Dawson does suffer from a degree of financial hardship and that she must watch her financial position closely. I cannot, however, overlook the fact that Ms Dawson has made a gift of $3000.00 to her daughter recently. I can appreciate fully the desire of a mother to make a substantial gift to a daughter who is to be married – but the fact remains that some of that money could have been used to pay off other debts (such as the personal loan) and thereby reduce the on-going burden on Ms Dawson of meeting regular payments. In the circumstances I consider that Ms Dawson’s financial position does not amount to severe or extreme hardship and that she has, by her own action, removed the means by which it could have been improved.
41. Having regard to the totality of Ms Dawson’s position as set out above I am not satisfied that her position can be properly described as being set aside from the usual or ordinary case. I do not consider that the circumstances of the case are sufficiently special as to justify the exercise of a discretion to treat all or any part of the lump sum compensation payment as not having been made. In my opinion the comments of French J in Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 51 ALD 695 that “the taxpayer is entitled to expect that in the ordinary course money paid to people which they are not entitled to receive will be recovered, albeit in a way appropriate to the circumstances which led to the overpayment and the circumstances of the person concerned” are apposite in this case.
42. For the reasons above my decision is that the decision of the SSAT made on 18 September 2002 is set aside and in substitution therefor I decide that a debt of $4748.60 (after allowing for $100.00 already recovered) should be raised and recovered from the respondent, representing a preclusion period from 2 February 2001 to 19 July 2001.
I certify that the 42 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr M Allen, Member
Signed: ..........(sgd V Wong)......................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 25 July 2003
Date of Decision 26 September 2003
Counsel for the Applicant Ms K Hackney
Solicitor for the Applicant Service Recovery Team, Centrelink
Counsel for the Respondent In person
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