Daws and Australian Securities and Investments Commission
[2006] AATA 246
•15 March 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 246
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No W2005/8
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re CHRISTOPHER JOHN DAWS Applicant
And
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr S Penglis, Senior Member Date15 March 2006
PlacePerth
Decision 1. The reviewable decision of the respondent dated 10 December 2004 is set aside.
2. The Tribunal substitutes a decision that::
(a) the respondent accept an enforceable undertaking from the applicant in the terms set forth in the Tribunal’s Reasons for Decision;
(b) upon the applicant’s provision to the respondent of such an enforceable undertaking, the banning order made by the respondent in respect of the applicant dated 2 May 2001 shall be revoked pursuant to s 420D of the Corporations Act 2001.
... ......Sgd [S Penglis]...............
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
Corporations law – prior decision of tribunal to revoke a banning order in favour of an enforceable undertaking – whether the tribunal should determine substance of undertaking to be given – whether detailed background of the matters giving rise to the original banning order and its revocation ought be included in enforceable undertaking.
Donald v ASIC [2001] AATA 622
ASIC v Donald [2003] FCFA 318
Corporations Act 2001, s420D
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1981, s93AA
REASONS FOR DECISION
15 March 2006 Mr S Penglis, Senior Member 1. On 14 February 2006 I heard evidence and submissions with respect to an application by the applicant to review a decision of the respondent not to revoke a banning order made by the respondent on 2 May 2001 (“Banning Order”) upon receipt from the applicant of an enforceable undertaking pursuant to s93AA of the Australian Securities and Investments Act, 2001.
2. On 15 February 2006 I gave detailed oral reasons for my decision that the Banning Order ought to be revoked pursuant to s 420D of the Corporations Act, 1991 upon the applicant providing to the respondent an enforceable undertaking.
3. The matter was then adjourned so that the parties could endeavour to agree upon the terms of the enforceable undertaking. They were subsequently unable to do so.
4. In accordance with directions given in the event the parties could not reach agreement, written submissions were then filed on behalf of the parties in respect to the terms of the enforceable undertaking.
The enforceable undertaking proposed by the respondent
5.The enforceable undertaking proposed by the respondent is as follows:
“ENFORCEABLE UNDERTAKING
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Section 93AA Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001
The commitments in this undertaking are offered to the Australian Securities & Investments Commission ("ASIC") by :
Christopher John Daws
147 Brighton Road,
SCARBOROUGH WA 6019
BACKGROUND
1.1Mr Christopher John Daws ("Mr Daws") held a proper authority as a securities representative of CIBC World Markets Australia Ltd ("CIBC World") and CIBC World markets Securities Australia Ltd ("CIBC") which was the broking arm of CIBC World from February 1994 to 29 August 1997.
1.2From 10 September 1997 to 23 February 2000 Mr Daws held a proper authority as a securities representative of Merrill Lynch Private (Australia) Ltd ("MLPA") and from 10 March 1999 to 23 February 2000 from Merryll Lynch Equities (Australia ) Ltd ("MLEA") the retail broking arm of MLPA.
1.3Following an ASIC investigation into his conduct, Mr Daws consented on 30 April 2001 to a banning order being made against him by ASIC pursuant to section 829 of the Corporations Law ("CL") as it then was and acknowledged that he had engaged in the following improper conduct as set out in the Consent to Banning Order.
1.4As a securities representative of CIBC Mr Daws changed adviser codes on buy orders to increase his commission contrary to WA Criminal Code section 378.
1.5 As a securities representative of MLPA Mr Daws:
·Failed to adequately complete and update client profile forms provided by MLPA in compliance with the policy of MLPA as licensee;
·Contrary to Business Rule 3.4.1 placed orders on the account of various clients without prior written client authorisation to operate the account on a discretionary basis;
·Contrary to CL section 851 placed orders and gave advice without making any or adequate enquiries as to the client's investment objectives, financial situation and individual needs;
·Contrary to CL section 843 bought shares as a principal and then allocated those securities without disclosing he was acting as principal and also charged commissions on those transactions.
·Contrary to CL sections 849 and 851 failed to act in the best interests of clients to whom he made buy recommendations by failing to inform clients that the majority of share price increases were attributable to trades resulting from his recommendation to other clients.
·Contrary to CL section 844 failed to act in the best interests of two clients by recommending the purchase of shares at a particular price and then placing orders for himself, family and associates at a higher price thus lowering his clients' bid positions on SEATS.
1.6On 2 May 2001 ASIC made an order ("the Original Banning Order") pursuant to CL section 829 permanently prohibiting Mr Daws from acting as a representative/proper authority holder of a securities dealer or investment adviser unless each of the following requirements were fully complied with:
·Within 12 months from the date of the execution of the order Mr Daws shall provide to ASIC the "Original Transcript of Academic Record" from the Securities Institute of Australia showing successful completion of the units known as "Financial Planning and Wealth Creation" (410) and "Stockbrokers Compliance "(961) or their equivalents;
·Prior to commencing employment with a licensed entity ("the Licensee") for whom Mr Daws will be an authorised representative, the Licensee shall nominate a director or principal of the Licensee who will be responsible for the supervision of Mr Daws ("the Supervisor");
·Prior to commencing employment with the Licensee, Mr Daws shall obtain from the Licensee a letter confirming that it undertakes to supervise him in the manner set out in this order. The letter shall include the name of the Supervisor; and
·The Licensee does not terminate Mr Daws' proper authority for improper conduct.
1.7As Mr Daws failed to comply with the above requirements within 12 months he became permanently banned.
1.8On 14 July 2004 Mr Daws made an application to ASIC under section 920D of the Corporations Act 2001 ("CA") seeking variation of the Original Banning Order.
1.9Following a hearing before the ASIC Delegate on 22 November 2004 the Delegate handed down a decision on 10 December 2004 refusing to vary or cancel the Original Banning Order.
1.10On 6 January 2005 Mr Daws appealed ASIC's decision not to vary or cancel the Original Banning Order to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
1.11Following a hearing before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 14 February 2006, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 15 February 2006 handed down its decision that it would revoke the Original Banning Order and directed that Mr Daws enter into and ASIC accept an Enforceable Undertaking pursuant to section 93AA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001.
1.12The Administrative Appeals Tribunal determined that:
(a) Mr Daws' cessation of employment was a change in circumstance falling within CA section 920D given that as at the date of the Original Banning Order he was employed and it later ceased;
(b) The unintended consequence of the Original Banning Order was that Mr Daws could not be appointed to the board of companies;
(c) It is a change in circumstance that Mr Daws was in the Securities Industry at the time and is now no longer and does not intend to continue in the industry;
(d) It is many years since the conduct giving rise to the Original Banning Order;
(e) It is 4 years since the Original Banning Order was made;
(f) ASIC's view was that the conduct did not warrant a "life time ban" and it was accepted Mr Daws was "not beyond redemption";
(g) The Applicant is remorseful and has expressed contrition and he is now a more mature person and is aware of what is right and wrong;
(a) The purpose of a banning is not punitive but is for the protection of the public;
(b) Deterrence is relevant but in this case there has already been publication of the Original Banning Order by ASIC's Media Release and an article in the West Australian.
2. UNDERTAKINGS
2.1In accordance with the decision of the AAT dated 15 February 2006, ASIC is obliged to accept the following enforceable undertakings made by Mr Daws pursuant to section 93AA of the ASIC Act.
2.2Mr Daws provides the following undertakings.
2.3 Mr Daws will comply with section 911A of the Corporations Act.
2.4 Within 3 months from the acceptance of this undertaking by ASIC Mr Daws will:
(a) complete the course known as "Directors Essentials" offered by the Australian Institute of Company Directors; and
(b) provide to ASIC a copy of the Certificate in Directors Essentials which he receives from the Australian Institute of Company Directors upon his successful completion of the "Directors Essentials" course.
2.5In the event that in the future Mr Daws wishes to re-enter the financial services industry, by either applying for an Australian Financial Services Licence or becoming an authorised representative of a Australian Financial Services Licence holder ("Licensee"), Mr Daws will comply with each of the following:
Education
(a) Mr Daws will comply with the training requirements set out in ASIC's policy statement 146;
Supervision by Licensee
(b) Prior to commencing employment with a Licensee for whom Mr Daws will be an authorised representative, the Licensee shall nominate a director or principal of the Licensee who will be responsible for Mr Daws' supervision (the "Supervisor"); and
(c) Prior to commencing employment with a Licensee, Mr Daws shall obtain from the Licensee a letter confirming that it undertakes to supervise him in the manner set out in this undertaking. The letter shall include the name of the Supervisor.
2.6In addition to any other measures the Licensee has in place for the supervision of its representatives:
(a) The Licensee shall not allow Mr Daws to trade on personal or associated accounts.
(b) The Licensee shall require that all orders placed by Mr Daws for direct shares or other investment products to be authorised by the Supervisor prior to execution, or in the absence of the Supervisor, by another person nominated by the Supervisor.
(c) The Licensee shall not allow Mr Daws to have any dealings in or discussions with clients in relation to corporate matters.
(d) The Licensee shall require Mr Daws to record in writing the substance of all his dealings conducted on behalf of the Licensee contemporaneously or as soon as practicable after such dealings take place. Written particulars of client profiles and updated client profiles, client warnings where clients have not given full personal information, disclosures of interests, material benefits and advantages and bases for securities recommendations must be kept.
(e) The Licensee shall require Mr Daws to provide a written report to his Supervisor as to his trading activities every fortnight. The report shall annex copies of all new client accounts opened by Mr Daws , any relevant authorities to open or trade upon accounts and the "adviser copies" of the buy and sell order forms completed by Mr Daws.
(f) As per normal compliance requirements of the Licensee for all authorised representatives, the Licensee must ensure that he attend compliance meetings and research meetings, maintain a comprehensive day book and appointment book, and complete client profiles for all new accounts.
(g) Within 7 days prior to the end of each month, the Supervisor shall conduct a written review to determine whether Mr Daws has performed his duties as a representative of the Licensee in accordance with the Corporations Act and the Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules during the previous month. The Supervisor shall also inspect Mr Daws' day book and appointment book during the course of this review.
(h) If the Supervisor considers that Mr Daws has not performed his duties, in that he:
i.has breached the Corporations Act; or
ii.has breached the Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules; or
iii.has not complied with the financial services law,
the Licensee shall immediately notify ASIC giving particulars of its concerns.
(i) At least 2 weeks prior to the supervision requirements set out herein ceasing to apply, the Licensee, through the Supervisor, will provide to ASIC a reasoned written report that states that in the opinion of the Supervisor, Mr Daws:
i.Has during the period of supervision performed his duties as an authorised representative of the Licensee in accordance with the Corporations Act;
ii.will in the future perform his duties as an authorised representative of the Licensee in accordance with the Corporations Act.
(j) The Licensee shall submit to an audit of Mr Daws' duties as an authorised representative of the Licensee which may be conducted by ASIC at least twice randomly during the 12 month period of supervision.
(k)The requirements set out at paragraphs 2.5(b) and (c) and 2.6(a) to (j) shall cease to apply once Mr Daws has acted as an authorised representative of a Licensee for a period of 12 months. The only absences that are permitted are for study leave, writing exams, annual leave and sick leave in terms of the Licensee's standard employment conditions.
3. NOTIFICATIONS
3.1Any notification to be provided to ASIC in accordance with this enforceable undertaking is to be sent to:
Assistant Director Enforcement WA
Australian Securities & Investments Commission
3 Floor, 66 St George's Terrace
PERTH WA 6000
4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
4.1 Mr Daws acknowledges that ASIC:
(a) may issue a Media Release on execution of this enforceable undertaking;
(b) may from time to time publicly refer to this enforceable undertaking;
(c) will make this enforceable undertaking available for public inspection;
4.3 Mr Daws further acknowledges that :
(a) this enforceable undertaking in no way derogates from the rights and remedies available to any other person or entity arising from any conduct leading to the undertaking;
(b) ASIC's acceptance of an enforceable undertaking does not affect ASIC's power to investigate a contravention arising from future conduct, or pursue a criminal prosecution, or its power to lay charges or seek a pecuniary penalty civil order; and
(c) this enforceable undertaking has no operative force until accepted by ASIC.
SIGNED this day of March 2006
by CHRISTOPHER JOHN DAWS ……………………………………….
In the presence of :
……………………
Witness……………………….
Name (Print)…………………………….
………………………………
AddressACCEPTED BY THE Australian Securities & Investments Commission pursuant to section 93AA of the ASIC Act by its duly authorised delegate
………………………….
ASIC Delegate
Dated this day of March 2006.”matters in issue
6.The applicant opposes the inclusion of :
(a) the whole of Section 1 (ie “Background”); and
(b) paragraph 2.1.
Submissions
7. In short, the applicant submits that:
“in light of the findings made by the Senior Member, the current circumstances surrounding the making of the proposed EU and the protective purpose of accepting the EU, it would be grossly unfair to include any background information in the EU. These circumstances were fully published by ASIC at the time the Banning Order was made. The inclusion of the background information now has a real potential to substantially obviate the remedial effect the Tribunal’s decision was intended to have. The public interest does not require the inclusion of the paragraphs referred to in the individual circumstance of this case.
It is unfair for ASIC to require the publication of the background information. Such publication achieves no protective purpose but would likely achieve the applicant continuing to suffer from the unintended consequence of the Banning Order. This is more so since the applicant has a positive intention, which is reflected in the terms of the EU, not to return to the financial services industry.”
8. The applicant submits that the terms of Section 1
“provide unnecessary and damaging re-publication of conduct which occurred many years ago.
The purpose of revoking the Banning Order and entering into the Enforceable Undertaking is to alleviate the unintended consequences on the applicant of the Banning Orders. As set out above, the Senior Member made a finding that the Banning Order did have unintended consequences for the applicant.
In re-publishing the matters contained in Paragraph 1 in the Enforceable Undertaking the applicant will likely continue to suffer the same unintended consequence and the punitive effect of the Banning Order.
Further, at no time during the hearing did ASIC make any suggestion that the EU proposed by the applicant was inadequate”.
9. In response, the respondent submits that
“Paragraph 1 is an essential part of an EU and is consistent with the standard terms set out in ASIC Practice Note 69 “Enforceable Undertakings”… PN 69.18 states that ASIC will only accept an EU where the Promisor makes a positive commitment to stop the particular conduct or alleged breach that concerns ASIC and that the EU must set out how the Promisor will rectify the consequence of the conduct. PN 69.20 notes that the EU must set out what the Promisor is going to do to ensure that the conduct does not occur again. In addition, PN 69.33 requires that the Promisor acknowledges ASIC’s concerns set out in the EU or the Promisor acknowledges breaching the relevant legislation. PN 69 clearly envisages that appropriate and adequate background detail, enabling the public to properly understand ASIC’s concerns, will be provided within the EU itself, so that the EU is not read by the public in the context of an information vacuum. Consequently, recital of the relevant factual background in this instance is necessary to ensure that any member of the public is fully aware of the Applicant’s conduct the subject of the enforceable undertaking; that a banning order was imposed, the procedural history, and in particular, the decision of the Tribunal”.
10. The respondent further submits that a register of enforceable undertakings is maintained by ASIC on the publicly available database on its website and that a member of the public is entitled to be properly informed of any previous relevant conduct of the applicant. It is submitted that the proposed deletion of the background information will result in an “information vacuum” “that serves only the interest of the applicant and not the public interest”.
11. In support of its position, the respondent has provided to the Tribunal various examples of enforceable undertakings which is said to be illustrative of the manner in which the respondent structures enforceable undertakings. Each of those enforceable undertakings provides background information identifying the relevant conduct giving rise to the provision of the enforceable undertaking.
12. The respondent also referred to the enforceable undertaking imposed upon Mr Donald in the case of Donald v ASIC [2001] AATA 622. The Tribunal ordered, in part, that the respondent accept a written undertaking from the applicant to the effect that the applicant:
(a) “enrol in and complete the Business and Finance Industry and/or the Financial Markets Law, Regulations and Compliance Courses offered by the Securities Institute;
(b) co-operate with the Australian Securities and the respondent in the preparation and presentation of seminars which will consider issues of law, practice and procedures relevant to acting as a Designated Trading Representative;
(c) Undertake for a period of three and half years from the date of the undertaking not to create, or do anything that is likely to create, a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any securities on a stock market or a false misleading appearance with respect to the market for, or the price of, any securities; and
(d) During the term of the undertaking, give a copy of the undertaking to all licensed dealers by whom he is employed.”
13. The respondent submitted that the Tribunal “did not direct a format nor the specified wording necessary to give effect to that order. Upon appeal the Court referred to the manner in which the EU would be implemented:
“There was some discussion at the hearing of the appeal as to how the Tribunal might give effect to a decision that the Commission accept a written undertaking. Bearing in mind the full terms and effect of s 93AA, is for the Commission, and not the Tribunal, to accept an undertaking given under this provision. As in Fletcher, the original decision-maker is obliged to “follow up” the Tribunal’s decision by entering into the undertaking that the Tribunal has prescribed in the same way the original decision maker would have done had the original decision-maker decided to accept the undertaking in the first place.”
(ASIC v Donald [2003] FCFA 318 per Kenny J at paragraph 36)”.
14. To this the applicant has provided a search result of the applicant’s entry in the “Register of Banned and Disqualified Persons” available on the respondent’s website. Apart from noting that the applicant is banned, no other detail is provided. The applicant submits that the information contained in the enforceable undertaking should not be more onerous than the current information about the Banning Order. The applicant submits that this “ is given more force by the fact that the applicant, as the Senior Member found, has a positive intention not to re-enter the financial services industry. A specific deterrent by public shame is not required in general deterrents and is no longer relevant in this case given the lapse of time”.
15. The applicant submits that the public may need to have access to the background information of a person who has given an enforceable undertaking to the respondent if that person continues in the financial services industry and the public deals with such a person in that capacity. In such circumstances, the public may need to have access to background information so that they can make an assessment about whether they wish to continue to deal with person who has given an undertaking in light of the conduct which gave rise to the enforceable undertaking.
16. The applicant further submits that protection of the public has to be considered in the context of the risk. In this case, it is submitted that the applicant has a positive intention to not re-enter the financial services industry and thus “there is no obvious reason why it would be necessary for the public to have access to background information in relation to conduct which is accepted as being irrelevant to his present occupation. The applicant’s intention not to re-enter the financial services industry is reflected in the terms of the EU”.
17. The applicant further notes that, as I found in my oral reasons for decision, there has already been publication (a media information release published by the respondent and an article in the West Australian newspaper) about the conduct which gave rise to the Banning Order and the making of the Banning Order. The ASIC media information release remains available on the respondent’s website, which is searchable.
18. With respect to the other enforceable undertakings provided by the respondent as examples of the usual form of such undertakings, the applicant submits that the circumstances surrounding the making of this enforceable undertaking is significantly different to the circumstances surrounding the making of other undertakings given to the respondent, because in respect of those undertakings, there were no prior banning orders and further because the undertaking was close in time to the conduct in question and remained relevant to the person’s future activities.
19. As for Donald’s case, the applicant submits the respondent “misinterprets the decision of the Full Federal Court”. The applicant points out that the respondent has not quoted the entire passage from the decision at paragraph 36 and that Kenny J went on to say that “to adopt the observations of Jenkinson J in Stevenson, the appropriate course was for the Tribunal, first, to decide that the Commission accept a written undertaking by the respondent in the terms it specified, and, secondly, that the matter be remitted to the Commission with a direction that it enter into the Undertaking accordingly. The remitter of the matter was, in the present case, to be implied from the terms of the Tribunal’s decision and Reasons for Decision”.
20. The applicant submits that, read in its entirety, this passage makes it “plain that it is for the Tribunal to determine the terms of the undertaking to be given, not ASIC. The statements made by Kenny J are a reference to the process by which the EU is accepted”.
21. Finally, the applicant submits that respondent’s Practice Note has no statutory force and cannot be used to fetter the discretion of the Tribunal. The applicant further submits that, in any event, it would be inappropriate to inflexibly apply policy without regard to the particular circumstances of an individual case.
22. Having considered the submissions of the applicant and the respondent, I make the following findings:
(a) There is no reason why the Tribunal cannot determine the precise wording of the enforceable undertaking which ought be provided by the applicant and accepted by the respondent having regard to the facts determined by the Tribunal. I do not read anything in the decision of the Full Federal Court in Donald’s case to suggest otherwise. Indeed, it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal not to concern itself with the precise terms of the enforceable undertaking to be given by the applicant to the respondent given that, as a consequence of the provision of such an undertaking, the Banning Order is to be revoked.
(b) Although it has no statutory force or effect, and whilst it therefore does not bind the Tribunal as such, the Tribunal should, where possible, give effect to relevant Practice Notes of the respondent.
(c) There is nothing in PN 69 that expressly provides that detailed “background” must be included in the terms of the enforceable undertaking. However, PN 69.33 does provide that “the following are examples of the standard terms that will be included in every Enforceable Undertaking unless otherwise specifically excluded by ASIC:
(i)X acknowledges ASIC’s concerns set out in this undertaking {or X acknowledges that it has breached section Y of the (name the relevant legislation)} …”
(d) It is clear from PN 69.33 that the respondent has a discretion to exclude any of the “standard terms” set out in PN 69.33.
(e) I accept that the enforceable undertaking cannot simply exist in a vacuum. I accept that the enforceable undertaking must exist in a context, and that context ought to be apparent from the document itself. I am of this opinion irrespective of the fact that the applicant does not propose to return to the financial services industry.
(f) The case advance by the applicant at the hearing of this matter was that the existence of the Banning Order was having unintended consequences. It was never suggested by the applicant in evidence that the fact that the enforceable undertaking may refer to the Banning Order would have the same consequences. To the contrary, the evidence which was given by and on behalf of the applicant, and which I accepted, was that his progress in the commercial world, particularly his desire to become a company director, was being impeded by reason of the fact that he was subject to the Banning Order.
(g) The fact that the applicant has been the subject of the Banning Order is a fact that the applicant must carry with him into the future. I have accepted that the applicant should be freed from the shackles of the Banning Order, in return for the provision of an enforceable undertaking, but I am not prepared to accept that the applicant is entitled to effectively hide from those who may see the enforceable undertaking what has preceded it.
(h) In the circumstances of this case, however, I see no reason why it is necessary to detail the conduct which gave rise to the Banning Order in order to put the enforceable undertaking in its proper context. I say this because, first, the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s initial banning were given publicity by the respondent. Secondly, the relevant conduct occurred many years ago. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the applicant does not propose to re-enter the financial services industry. Accordingly, it is not necessary for users of that industry to understand why the applicant was initially banned given that they would not be able to use the applicant’s services as he is not intending to re-enter the industry.
(i) In other words, I do not see how the public interest requires the matters set forth in paragraph 1.4 and 1.5 of the enforceable undertaking proposed by the respondent to be included in the terms of the enforceable undertaking to be given by the applicant. The balance of section 1, however, is material that I consider should properly be included in the enforceable undertaking to put it in its proper context. Nothing in the evidence before me persuades me that I ought exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant with respect to those paragraphs.
23. I therefore conclude that the enforceable undertaking ought to include paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 (with the paragraph numbering being amended accordingly), but not paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5.
24. I see no reason why paragraph 2.1 needs to be included in the enforceable undertaking: it adds nothing. Indeed, on one view it is misleading given that the decision of the Tribunal in fact stands as the decision of the respondent.
25. Accordingly, I also conclude that paragraph 2.1 ought be excluded, and what is presently paragraph 2.2 shall become paragraph 2.1 (with the subsequent paragraph numbering being amended accordingly).
I certify that the 25 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Penglis
Signed: ...............Sgd [S da Motta].................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 14 and 15 February 2006
Date of Decision 15 March 2006
Counsel for the Applicant Mr S Hall SC
Solicitor for the Applicant Fairweather & Lemonis
Counsel for the Respondent Mr J McGrath
Solicitor for the Respondent Bernard Rassool
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