Dawkins & Penton

Link copied
Case Copied 16 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Dawkins & Penton [2021] FedCFamC1A 74

Appeal from: Penton & Dawkins [2021] FCCA 1502
Appeal number(s): EAA 84 of 2021
File number(s): CAC 62 of 2018
Judgment of: ALDRIDGE J
Date of judgment: 1 December 2021
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PARENTING – INJUNCTION – Appeal against orders restraining the father from communicating or approaching the child – Where the grounds of appeal do not identify any error on part of the primary judge – Appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 68B, 114

Statute of Westminster Adoption Act (1942) (Cth)

Cases cited:

Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 166 FCR 415; [2008] FCAFC 30

Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28

Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418; [1950] HCA 35

Number of paragraphs: 39
Date of hearing: 28 October 2021
Place: Sydney (via video link)
The Appellant: Self-represented litigant
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Coleman SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Family Lawyers
The Independent Children’s Lawyer: No appearance

ORDERS

EAA 84 of 2021
CAC 62 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MR DAWKINS

Appellant

AND:

MS PENTON

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

order made by:

ALDRIDGE J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 December 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dawkins & Penton has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ALDRIDGE J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Dawkins (“the father”) and Ms Penton (“the mother”) have a child who was born in 2015 (“the child”). On 2 July 2021, a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known) ordered that the child live with the mother who is to have sole parental responsibility for her.

  2. Included in the orders of 2 July 2021 were the following:

    4.The child shall have no time or communication with her father unless otherwise agreed in writing by the mother.

    …

    8.Pursuant to section 68B of the Family Law Act 1975, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the mother, the father is hereby restrained from:

    (a)       approaching within 100 metres of the child;

    (b)       approaching within 100 metres of the mother;

    (c)       approaching within 100 metres of the mother’s residence;

    (d) approaching within 100 metres of the mother’s place of employment, except to obtain urgent medical attention or for a planned admission to hospital and,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Dawkins & Penton and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FedCFamC1A 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Dawkins & Penton, the primary dispute revolved around the care and custody of a child between the father and the mother. The matter was brought before the Family Court of Australia, which was tasked with determining the living arrangements and parental responsibilities of the child.

The legal issues at the heart of the case included the interpretation and enforcement of previous orders regarding the child's living arrangements and parental responsibility. The father contested certain aspects of these orders, particularly those that provided for the child to live predominantly with the mother and designated her as the sole decision-maker regarding the child's welfare. The court had to decide whether the father's submissions were valid and whether the previous orders should be modified or upheld.

The court's reasoning focused on the existing orders, which were already in place and had not been appealed by the father regarding the primary living arrangements and parental responsibility. The court found that the dismissal of the father's appeal meant that all existing orders remained in effect, and the father was legally bound by these orders. The court emphasised that the mother had the sole authority to determine the child's living situation and that the father could not act contrary to these orders. The dismissal of the appeal confirmed that the mother's decisions regarding the child's welfare were legally binding, and the father had no grounds to challenge these decisions further.

The court concluded by dismissing the father's appeal and upheld all previous orders. It further noted that no order regarding costs was sought as the father's legal team, including senior counsel, had provided their services pro bono.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is to be recalled that the father has not appealed against the orders providing for the child to live with the mother or the order for sole parental responsibility. They are enough, absent any other order, to empower the mother to decide that the child should not spend any time with the father. It is the consequence of some of the father’s submissions that these orders do not bind him. He should be under no illusion that the effect of the dismissal of the appeal is that all the orders remain in place and that he cannot act other than in accordance with them.CONCLUSION AND COSTS The appeal will be dismissed. No order as to costs was sought by the appellant as her lawyers, including senior counsel, acted pro bono.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.