Davis v The Queen - [1995] HCATrans 151

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S125 of 1994

B e t w e e n -
ROBERT DAVIS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

DEANE J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 2 JUNE 1995, AT 12.41 PM

MR G.C. CORR: May it please the Court, I appear in this case for Mrs Davis. (instructed by B.R. Miles, Aboriginal Legal Service)

MR N.R. COWDERY, QC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales))

DEANE J: Mr Corr.

MR CORR: May it please the Court, I will go to the heart of this application that relates to flight, as I think it is fairly clear that that is the one which is the most serious and most likely to succeed in this matter.

It is submitted, your Honours, that this Court should continue in the line which the majority of this Court followed in Edwards in relation to lies and that there should be a direction given in relation to flight when it is used as a basis for evidence of consciousness of guilt. That was not done in this case and it is submitted that the decision of Justice Clarke in the Court of Appeal was the one which this Court should follow.

I would refer your Honours to page 56 of the application book at I where he said:

I think some warning of the dangers of acting on this class of evidence should have been given.

Then over on page 57, the paragraph starting at B, where he said:

This I regard as a most unfortunate circumstance and I am clearly of the opinion that in the way that the Crown dealt with this matter, it was incumbent on the trial judge, whether or not a direction was sought, to direct the jury that they should put the issue of flight right out of their minds except perhaps on one very minor issue and that was in explaining why it was that when he was apprehended he was not wearing a watch which he was earlier seen to be wearing.

I would submit, your Honours, that since the majority of this Court decided that a warning should be given in lies, it should be given more so in this case, given the view which was adopted by Justice McHugh in Edwards in relation to the ability of a jury to be able to sum up on lies before a court and to look at the demeanour of the witnesses and so on as the reason why he gave that such warning should not be given in that case. In this particular case, where the matter is extracurial and the jury did not have that particular

advantage, I would say that is a much greater reason why a warning should…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Davis v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Davis v The Queen [1995] HCATrans 151
Case: [1995] HCATrans 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Davis v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Davis, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence and the fairness of the trial process.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the applicant under duress, and consequently, whether the applicant's conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory due to the admission of this evidence. The court also considered whether the trial judge had adequately directed the jury on the issue of self-defence.

The High Court reasoned that evidence obtained in contravention of a person's will, particularly through oppressive means, should generally be excluded unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. In this instance, the court found that the evidence obtained from the applicant was procured under circumstances that rendered it inadmissible. Furthermore, the court determined that the jury directions on self-defence were insufficient, failing to adequately explain the relevant legal principles to the jury.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders