Davis v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport
[2021] WADC 6
•25 JANUARY 2021
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: DAVIS -v- CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT [2021] WADC 6
CORAM: PRIOR DCJ
HEARD: 9 DECEMBER 2020
DELIVERED : 25 JANUARY 2021
FILE NO/S: CIVO 178 of 2019
BETWEEN: JACOB ELI DAVIS
Applicant
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Respondent
Catchwords:
Application for extraordinary licence - Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA)
Legislation:
Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), s 27(1), s 29(1), s 30, s 32
Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA), sch 2
Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 59(1)(b)
Result:
Grant of extraordinary licence ordered
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Ms K Flanagan |
| Respondent | : | Ms P Femia |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Efficient Family Law (Perth) |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Director General of the Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147
Lenegan v Director General of the Department of Transport [2012] WADC 102
PRIOR DCJ:
Background
On 15 May 2019, Jacob Eli Davis, (the Applicant), filed an application for an order directing the chief executive officer of the Department of Transport to grant him an extraordinary licence (the Application) pursuant to s 27(1) and s 29(1) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (RTAD Act).
The Applicant by his Application, which was amended by consent at the hearing on 9 December 2020, seeks an extraordinary licence that allows him to drive:
1.vehicles of class HR (heavy rigid) and those other classes as prescribed in sch 2 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA) (RTAD Regs);
2.driving only in the course of his employment with DJ MacCormick Contractors within a 150 km radius of the Perth District Courthouse located at 500 Hay Street, Perth, Western Australia (WA), and for the purpose of travelling from his residence to his place of employment at DJ MacCormick Contractor's workshop, 94 Maddington Road, Maddington and DJ MacCormick Contractor's contracted worksites and return; and
3.between the hours of 6.00 am and 6.00 pm Monday through to Saturday inclusive.
The Application is based on the undue financial burden the current disqualification places on the Applicant and his family by depriving the Applicant of his principal means of obtaining income,[1] and the disqualification is depriving the Applicant of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the Applicant is employed.[2]
[1] Section 30(4)(b) of the RTAD Act.
[2] Section 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act.
Applicant's personal circumstances
The following facts relating to the present personal circumstances of the Applicant are not in dispute:
1.He is 41 years old, born on 5 April 1979.
2.He is employed casually at DJ MacCormick Contractors, 94 Maddington Road, Maddington and has been employed at this business since January 2020. He works Monday to Friday and occasionally on Saturday.
3.He presently travels to and from work by bicycle and public transport.
4.He is estranged from his wife Rebecca Davis (the Applicant's wife) but is trying to reconcile with her. The Applicant's wife separated from him when he was sentenced to prison for the offence the subject of his licence disqualification.
5.He has three young children, aged 6 years, 4 years and 11 months who live with his wife at a property in Brookdale.
6.The property in Brookdale (the family home) was the Applicant's marital home and is the subject of a substantial mortgage.
7.He resides at a property in Gosnells with his father‑in‑law.
8.Once or twice a week the Applicant stays at the family home.
9.Prior to his present licence disqualification, the Applicant was employed as a truck driver. His normal work was therefore driving trucks.
10.He has held a class A driver's licence since 5 June 1997 and later his licence was upgraded to include classes MR (medium rigid), HC (heavy combination) and MC (multi combination) licences.
11.The Applicant's wife does not work. She is a full-time carer for their children and receives $742 - $810 a fortnight from Centrelink.
The offence giving rise to the Applicant's current disqualification
On 13 March 2017, the Applicant was sentenced following his conviction at a trial in this court of dangerous driving occasioning death, an offence pursuant to s 59(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA). The Applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months immediate imprisonment and disqualified from driving for five years.
The Applicant was released from prison on parole on 12 December 2018 and successfully completed his parole period on 12 September 2020.
The Applicant's five year disqualification from driving runs from when he was released from prison on 12 December 2018.[3]
[3] Section 103(1) Sentencing Act 1995; and ts 12, District Court sentencing, 13 March 2017.
The Applicant's disqualification period expires on 12 December 2023.
At the date of the decision the Applicant will have served 25 months of his five year disqualification period.
The factual circumstances of the Applicant's offence of dangerous driving occasioning death can be summarised in the following terms:
1.The offence occurred at or about 5.30 am on 22 October 2015 when the Applicant was driving a Freightliner truck and trailer loaded with bricks and a forklift (a road train).
2.The total weight of the truck, trailer and load was about 42½ tonnes.
3.The vehicle the Applicant was driving was class MC (multi combination).
4.The Applicant was driving in a northerly direction on Wanneroo Road towards the junction of Karoborup Road and Romeo Road.
5.The Applicant had driven the route he took regularly, the topography was familiar to the Applicant and the Applicant was aware of the junction and the real possibility that a driver could negotiate a right-hand turn.
6.The Applicant was travelling no more than the 90 kilometres per hour speed limit.
7.Ahead of the Applicant's vehicle was a small 4 wheel drive SUV. In front of that vehicle was a Toyota Camry.
7.The victim was driving the Toyota Camry which she stopped at the intersection of Wanneroo Road and Koroborup Road with her right indicator operating which indicated her intention to turn right.
8.The SUV pulled out sharply behind the Toyota Camry and passed the Toyota Camry on the left hand side.
9.The victim had just started to undertake the right-hand turn when her Toyota Camry was struck on the right-hand side by the left‑hand front of the bullbar of the truck being driven by the Applicant resulting in the Toyota Camry and the truck colliding with a light pole.
10.The light pole snapped off at its base and then both vehicles ploughed into a paddock where the truck and trailer rolled to its left on top of and crushed the Toyota Camry resulting in the death of the victim.[4]
[4] ts 2 - ts 4, District Court sentencing, 13 March 2017.
The trial and sentencing judge described the Applicant's dangerous driving as:[5]
[T]his was a substantial breach of your obligation to drive your truck and trailer fully loaded, keeping a proper look out at an appropriate speed so that you would be able to react to any emergency or other occurrence which arose.
It was a substantial failure and the only inference to be drawn is that you were distracted not momentarily, but for a period of time given the circumstances.
[5] ts 11, District Court sentencing, 13 March 2017.
Applicant's previous record
The Applicant's criminal and road traffic record indicates he has been convicted of a variety of road traffic offences including driving under suspension (eight offences), driving with a blood alcohol in excess of 0.08%, reckless driving and careless driving.
The majority of the traffic offences are driving under suspension offences. Except for one offence committed on 18 April 2008, they do not involve driving a vehicle in a careless, dangerous or reckless manner but driving a vehicle when the Applicant's licence was suspended.
The Applicant has either been fined, sentenced to a suspended imprisonment order or had his driver's licence disqualified for all his road traffic offences.
The Applicant has also incurred numerous demerit points and in 2006 had been subject to a three month licence suspension for accumulation of 12 demerit points.
Excluding the offence the subject of the Applicant's present licence disqualification all the Applicant's road traffic offences for driving a motor vehicle occurred between April 2006 and July 2010 when the Applicant was a younger person. The majority of the Applicant's demerit points were incurred from October 2003 to September 2013.
Relevant provisions of the RTAD Act
An extraordinary licence is a restricted driver's licence. The extraordinary licence holder is still disqualified but the licence he or she holds is subject to the conditions the court considers appropriate pursuant to s 32 of the RTAD Act.
The conditions imposed on an extraordinary licence are usually reflective of the purpose for which an extraordinary licence is sought.
The court's discretionary power to impose conditions on an extraordinary licence must be exercised consistently with the objects of the statutory scheme for extraordinary licences.[6]
[6] Director General of the Department of Transport v McKenzie [2016] WASCA 147 [65] (McKenzie).
The conditions imposed on an extraordinary licence may in some cases mitigate concerns arising if an applicant was permitted to drive a motor vehicle pursuant to an extraordinary licence.
Section 30(1) of the RTAD Act provides that a court may make an order directing the respondent to grant an extraordinary licence for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date on which it is granted as the court thinks fit or refuse the application.
In making a decision for the purposes of s 30(1) of the RTAD Act:
… the court is to have regard to -
(a)the safety of the public generally; and
(b)the character of the applicant; and
(c)the circumstances of the case; and
(d)the nature of the offence or offences giving rise to the disqualification; and
(e)the conduct of the applicant subsequent to the disqualification.
Section 30(4) of the RTAD Act states that:
(4)Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court must not make an order directing the grant of an extraordinary licence unless it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would -
(a)deprive the applicant of the means of obtaining urgent medical treatment for an illness, disease or disability known to be suffered by the applicant or a person who is a member of his or her family; or
(b)place an undue financial burden on the applicant or his or her family, by depriving the applicant of his or her principal means of obtaining income; or
(c)deprive the applicant or a person who is a member of the applicant's family of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant or that person, as the case may be, is employed.
The above provisions of the RTAD Act and how they should be applied were outlined in McKenzie.[7]
[7] McKenzie [49] - [71] (Buss P with whom Murphy JA & Beech J agreed).
The court may only make an order directing the granting of an extraordinary licence if it is satisfied that the applicant has established, by evidence, to the court's satisfaction, that the refusal of the application would have a consequence specified in s 30(4)(a), s 30(4)(b) or s 30(4)(c)[8] and that it is appropriate to grant the licence after considering the factors in s 30(2) of the RTAD Act which are mandatory relevant considerations.
[8] McKenzie [53] - [54], [68].
The consideration by the court of the mandatory considerations in s 30(2) of the RTAD Act will often result in weighing countervailing considerations.[9] The court may, in a particular case, by the imposition of conditions under s 32(b) of the RTAD Act, reconcile countervailing considerations under s 30(2) of the RTAD Act in a manner which makes it appropriate, in all the circumstances, to grant an extraordinary licence.[10]
[9] McKenzie [67].
[10] McKenzie [52].
Section 30(4)(b) of the RTAD Act requires the court to consider whether it is satisfied that the refusal of the application would impose a disproportionate financial burden on the applicant by preventing him from doing his normal work.[11]
[11] Lenegan v Director General of the Department of Transport [2012] WADC 102 [26] (Lenegan). Staude DCJ considering the provisions of the repealed s 76(3b) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) which were replaced with the identical provisions of s 30(4) of the RTAD Act.
The court must decide whether the applicant is deprived of his means of obtaining an income without an extraordinary licence and if this is the case, the court must look at whether the effect of this places an undue financial burden, namely beyond what is warranted, excessive or disproportionate.[12]
[12] Lenegan [25] - [28].
Section 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act requires the court to be satisfied that the refusal of an extraordinary licence will deprive the applicant of the only practicable means of travelling to and from the place at which the applicant is employed.[13]
[13] McKenzie [55].
The meaning of the word 'practicable' depends to a significant extent on the context, but it ordinarily connotes that which is reasonably feasible or reasonably capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[14]
[14] McKenzie [56].
The court must assess what is practicable for the applicant and not what is practicable for the hypothetical reasonable person.[15]
[15] McKenzie [57].
To determine whether s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act is established involves:
1.identifying the applicant's other available transport options (if any);
2.evaluating each other available transport options (if any) in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances; and
3.making a judgment as to whether any other available transport option would be a 'practicable means' (that is, a reasonably feasible means) for the applicant to travel to and from his place of employment, in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances including the applicant's personal circumstances.[16]
[16] McKenzie [58].
Section 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act does not mandate or involve a comparison between the applicant driving a motor vehicle to and from his place of employment and the use of another available transport option. The correct approach is for the court to evaluate separately each available transport option (if any), apart from driving a motor vehicle, in the context of the statutory scheme and all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the applicant's personal circumstances and to make a judgment as to whether the transport option under consideration would be a 'practicable means' for the Applicant to travel to and from his place of employment.[17]
[17] McKenzie [60] - [61].
The Applicant has the onus of proof on the application and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
The respondent's position
The respondent opposes the Application. The respondent submits that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the evidential burden for the court to make an order pursuant to s 30(4)(b) or s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act.
The Applicant's previous road traffic record including the factual circumstances of the case relating to the offence the subject of his existing disqualification and the fact the applicant may suffer from post‑traumatic disorder, the respondent submits, raises a significant concern as to the safety of the public generally if the Applicant was to be issued an extraordinary licence.
The evidence
In support of the Application the Applicant has filed affidavits he has sworn on 13 May 2019 (first affidavit), 18 September 2020 (second affidavit), 18 November 2020 (third affidavit) and an affidavit sworn by his wife on 21 September 2020.
In response to the Application the respondent has filed affidavits sworn by Clifford Henry Warner on 27 August 2019 and 7 December 2020.
Materials which were annexed to the various affidavits included the following:
1.the Applicant's criminal and traffic record;
2.the Applicant's traffic infringement record;
3.the transcript of the Applicant's sentencing in this court on 13 March 2017;
4.a publication from the National Transport Commission 'Assessing Fitness to Drive for Commercial and Private Vehicle Drivers';
5.a letter from Dr Anne Witherow dated 24 October 2020; and
6.a letter from Stephen Gill the Operations Manager at DJ MacCormick Contractors dated 29 October 2020.
At the hearing of the Application I heard evidence from the Applicant, the Applicant's wife, Stephen Allan Gill, the Operations Manager at DJ MacCormick Contractors and Mr Warner.
Some of the original evidence filed by the Applicant in his affidavit sworn on 13 May 2019 is now irrelevant. The Application is now based on the applicant's present employment which he has held at DJ MacCormick Contractors since January 2020. The width of the Application in terms of hours the Applicant seeks to use an extraordinary licence has been reduced.
When the Applicant filed his Application in May 2019 he was not represented by counsel. The hearing of the Application was adjourned on a number of occasions to allow the Applicant to obtain further evidence in support of his Application and address issues raised by the respondent in its submissions.
The Applicant's evidence is that he works approximately 38 hours a week and earns $26.90 an hour, earning approximately $840 a week in his role as a labourer, storeman and yard person at the DJ MacCormick Contractors' workshop in Maddington.[18] He works between 7.00 am and 3.30 pm.
[18] ts 65, ts 70, ts 83.
Mr Gill corroborated that the Applicant works causally for DJ MacCormick Contractors in Maddington and can work from four to five days a week depending on the work available.[19]
[19] ts 100 - ts 110.
The Applicant's evidence is that he began employment with DJ MacCormick Contractors on the proviso of being offered full‑time employment by DJ MacCormick Contractors once he obtained his extraordinary licence[20] and therefore able to earn a higher income.[21]
[20] ts 70.
[21] The applicant's second affidavit par 51, and Annexure A; the Applicant's third affidavit par 6; and ts 84.
Mr Gill gave evidence that the Applicant's offer of employment at DJ MacCormick Contractors was conditional upon him having an extraordinary driver's licence.[22] The Applicant's evidence is that he believes, based on conversations with his employers, he will lose all employment with DJ MacCormick Contractors should his Application for an extraordinary licence be refused and he then would have to receive Centrelink payments.[23]
[22] ts 109.
[23] The Applicant's second affidavit par 52, and Annexure A; the Applicant's third affidavit Annexure A; and ts 78.
Mr Gill gave evidence that the Applicant has been employed casually as a yard hand with DJ MacCormick Contractors in Maddington since either February or March 2020 and the Applicant reports directly to him.[24] In cross-examination, he accepted the Applicant started his employment in January 2020.[25]
[24] ts 108 - ts 109.
[25] ts 119.
Mr Gill gave evidence that the Applicant was employed on the basis he was obtaining his driver's licence and whilst waiting for an outcome of the Application, the company had managed to find work for the Applicant but continuing to find work was becoming difficult.[26]
[26] ts 109 - ts 111.
Mr Gill gave further evidence that if the Application was successful, then the Applicant would have a full‑time job with DJ MacCormick Contractors and the predominant role would be driving a flat top truck, a HR class vehicle, to different contractual work sites for DJ MacCormick Contractors delivering equipment and supplies working from 7.00 am to 5.00 pm.[27] He stated that as a full-time employee, the Applicant would receive a higher wage due to longer work hours being at least five to six days a week and each day working 10 hours,[28] Saturday work[29] and he would also be entitled to annual and sick leave benefits.[30]
[27] ts 109.
[28] ts 110, ts 112.
[29] ts 110.
[30] ts 112.
The Applicant gave evidence that the role offered to him would double his income. He would work between 50 to 57 hours a week at a rate of $30 an hour,[31] which is a weekly salary of $1,500 to $1,710 before tax. Mr Gill gave evidence that the Applicant's annual income would be around $80,000 to $85,000.[32]
[31] ts 84.
[32] ts 112.
The Applicant's evidence is that if a HR licence is issued to him he will be driving HR vehicles and other classes from his employer's workshop in Maddington to contracted worksites. The worksites are within the Perth metropolitan area. He will also be required to take work vehicles home and drive them directly to worksites the following day. Mr Gill in his evidence stated all DJ MacCormick Contractors' vehicles are marked with the business name.[33]
[33] ts 116.
Mr Gill gave evidence that if the Application was unsuccessful, he would be unable to guarantee the Applicant any more than 30 hours a week casually.
Mr Gill gave evidence that if the Application was successful to the extent that the Applicant held an extraordinary licence for C class vehicles, there was more scope to give him full-time employment because the Applicant could travel to sites, but this would only be 38 hours a week.[34] A contractor would still be required to deliver equipment to sites for DJ MacCormick Contractors.[35]
[34] ts 111.
[35] ts 111.
The Applicant gave evidence that if he maintains his casual employment, he would 'be lucky to maybe get 30 hours a week' and 'maybe no job at all, being a casual'.[36] Mr Gill also gave evidence that if the Application was unsuccessful that DJ MacCormick Contractors could not guarantee even 30 to 38 hours a week.[37]
[36] ts 70.
[37] ts 120.
The Applicant's evidence is that following his release from prison, he was receiving Centrelink benefits, applying for thirty to forty jobs a fortnight and received no job offers.[38] The two jobs the Applicant did secure did not continue long-term because the Applicant did not hold a driver's licence.[39]
[38] ts 80.
[39] ts 80.
The Applicant's wife owns the property in Brookdale. The house is valued at approximately $300,000[40] and the approximate balance of the mortgage, with KeyStart, is $300,000.[41] Before he was incarcerated and since being released from prison the Applicant has contributed to paying the mortgage.[42] The Applicant's wife also gave evidence that the Applicant contributed to the mortgage prior to being incarcerated.[43]
[40] The Applicant's second affidavit par 42; and the Applicant's wife's affidavit par 17.
[41] The Applicant's second affidavit par 42; and the Applicant's wife's affidavit par 17.
[42] ts 84, ts 86.
[43] ts 102.
The Applicant's wife's evidence was that she has been and continues to be unable to solely financially support the couple's three children and maintain the mortgage on the family home. Both the Applicant and Mrs Davis gave evidence that the couple have relied upon the Applicant's worker's compensation payout,[44] withdrawals from the Applicant's wife's superannuation,[45] making hardship applications with KeyStart[46] and the Applicant's wife's parents to assist them in maintaining the mortgage payments and other day‑to‑day expenses.[47]
[44] The Applicant's second affidavit par 32.
[45] The Applicant's wife's affidavit par 22; and ts 105.
[46] The Applicant's wife's affidavit par 16.
[47] The Applicant's wife's affidavit par 16; and ts 102.
The Applicant's wife gave evidence that since the Applicant has been employed at DJ MacCormick Contractors, she relies on the Applicant's contributions to pay for all other expenses, excluding the mortgage.[48]
[48] ts 101.
The Applicant has no other assets except for nominal superannuation.[49] The Applicant's wife's only asset (other than her home) is her motor vehicle valued at approximately $4,000[50] and nominal superannuation.[51]
[49] The Applicant's second affidavit par 42.
[50] The Applicant's wife's affidavit par 17.
[51] The Applicant's wife's affidavit par 23.
Analysis of the evidence
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that if the Applicant is not granted an extraordinary licence it is most likely he will lose his employment at DJ MacCormick Contractors. The evidence indicates that DJ MacCormick Contractors employed the Applicant on the basis he would obtain a licence.
On the evidence, I am satisfied, even if the Applicant was to maintain his present casual employment role at DJ MacCormick Contractors his employment hours and income would decrease.
The Applicant has been employed at DJ MacCormick Contractors in his present role over the last 12 months whilst his employer has been waiting for the Applicant to obtain a licence.
I am satisfied on the evidence that since the Applicant has been released from prison on parole, notwithstanding his separation from his wife, he has tried to financially support his wife and three children.
I am satisfied that the Applicant intends to continue to financially support his family.
Considerations pursuant to s 30(1) of the RTAD Act
The Applicant's criminal and road traffic record shows significant gaps in his road traffic record which indicates the Applicant is capable of complying with the road traffic laws. The Applicant's record also indicates since he has entered into a relationship with his wife and had three children, his offending has decreased.
The applicant's original material filed in support of his Application suggests he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The Applicant gave evidence that whilst in prison he was told he suffers from PTSD. There has been no formal diagnosis that the Applicant suffers PTSD.[52]
[52] ts 75.
The letter of Dr Witherow dated 24 October 2020 states that the Applicant 'has not been diagnosed with PTSD'. Dr Witherow in her letter went on further, saying:
He has exhibited symptoms of anxiety and depression following his motor vehicle accident in 2015 for which he was treated with medication and psychology. His symptoms are now well controlled on Effexor 75mg daily.
The Applicant presently sees a counsellor once a month for anxiety and depression. He also takes prescribed medication for anxiety and depression.[53]
[53] ts 73 - ts 75.
On consideration of the Applicant's evidence and the letter from Dr Witherow, I am satisfied the Applicant's mental health does not pose a risk to the public if an extraordinary licence was granted to him for work purposes.
The evidence of Mr Warner indicates that if the Department of Transport becomes aware or if an applicant for a licence declares they have a psychiatric condition that impairs their ability to safely operate a motor vehicle, the Department of Transport will require that person to undergo an assessment by a medical practitioner as to their fitness to operate a motor vehicle before any licence is granted.[54]
[54] ts 124, ts 126.
I am satisfied if the Applicant was to provide a medical assessment certificate (A Fitness to Drive M107A), completed by a medical practitioner, the issue as to the Applicant's mental health and his ability to safely drive commercial vehicles could be resolved.
In my view, the offence the Applicant committed which led to his disqualification can be described as a low to mid-level offence of its type. There were no aggravating circumstances.
The Applicant does not seek an extraordinary licence for the class of vehicle he was driving when the offence the subject of his present disqualification occurred.
The Applicant's conduct subsequent to his disqualification has been very good. He has been released from custody after serving the minimum non‑parole period of his prison sentence. He has made concerted efforts to obtain employment. He has not committed any criminal offences or offences in relation to driving a motor vehicle during the two years of the disqualification he has now served.
In my view, the rehabilitation of the Applicant is a relevant consideration in the Applicant's case. Granting him an extraordinary licence which will allow him to continue to be employed will only assist his rehabilitation.
I am satisfied if the Applicant's Application for an order directing the respondent to grant an extraordinary driver's licence is refused, the Applicant and his family will suffer an undue, disproportionate, financial burden by virtue of the fact that he may, at best, continue to be employed casually probably receiving a lesser income than he does at present carrying out duties which are not his normal work, but more likely he will lose his employment through DJ MacCormick Contractors. In either event, the Applicant and his family will not be able to maintain their financial liabilities and this probably will result in the loss of their family home.
As the Applicant has made out his case for the grant of an extraordinary licence under s 30(4)(b) of the RTAD Act, it is unnecessary for me to consider the Applicant's case for the grant of an extraordinary licence pursuant to s 30(4)(c) of the RTAD Act.
Conclusion
I order that the respondent grant to the Applicant an extraordinary licence that allows him to drive on the following conditions:
1.vehicles of class HR and those other classes as prescribed in sch 2 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA);
2.driving only in the course of his employment with DJ MacCormick Contractors within a 150 km radius of the Perth District Courthouse located at 500 Hay Street, Perth, WA, and for the purpose of travelling from his residence to his place of employment at DJ MacCormick Contractors workshop, 94 Maddington Road, Maddington and to DJ MacCormick Contractors' contracted worksites and return;
3.between the hours of 6.00 am and 6.00 pm Monday through to Friday and Saturday 6.00 am and 3.00 pm inclusive; and
4.the Applicant to provide to the delegate of the respondent a completed medical assessment certificate (A Fitness to Drive M107A) before the extraordinary licence is issued by the respondent.
I will hear from the parties as to any other terms considered appropriate for the issue of the extraordinary licence to the Applicant and costs.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
TR
Associate
25 JANUARY 2021
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