Davis v Bennett - [2003] NTCA 7

Davis v Bennett [2003] NTCA 7
PARTIES:DAVIS, STUART AXTELL

v
BENNETT, STEPHEN KENNETH

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURSIDICTION
FILE NO:AP12 OF 2002 (20108999)
DELIVERED:  4 April 2003
HEARING DATES:  21 March 2003
JUDGMENT OF:  MARTIN CJ, MILDREN & RILEY JJ
CATCHWORDS:

Statutes:
Criminal Code ss. 1, 23, 132, 187, 188(1), (2)(k)
Justices Act s 163(3)
Cases:
Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 576, referred to
Charlie v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 387 at 394, referred to
King v Adams (1935) 53 CLR 563 at 567-8, referred to
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion’s case) (1991-92) 175 CLR 218, referred to
Secretary v The Queen (1996) 5 NTLR 96 at 104, referred to
Criminal law – Assault – Definition of assault – Application of force – whether application of force causing injury or personal discomfit necessary to constitute assault
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:J. Karczewski QC
Respondent:  S. Cox
Solicitors:
Appellant:Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent:  Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Judgment category classification:    B
Judgment ID Number:  ril0309
Number of pages:  17

ril0309
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Davis v Bennett [2003] NTCA 7
No. AP12 OF 2002 (20108999)

BETWEEN:
STEPHEN AXTELL DAVIS

Appellant
AND:
STEPHEN KENNETH BENNETT

Respondent

CORAM: MARTIN CJ, MILDREN & RILEY JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 4 April 2003)
MARTIN CJ:

For reasons advanced by Mildren and Riley JJ, I agree that the appeal should be allowed and join in the order that the matter be remitted to a single Judge of the Supreme Court to deal with the other issues which remain outstanding. I appreciate that this line of reasoning leads to the word “and” being treated as if it were “or”, but whether the word “and” was a mistake or was intended to denote an alternative as between the words preceding and succeeding it, I am satisfied that the purpose of the legislation was to distinguish between two separate circumstances under which force can be applied for the purposes of the definition of assault.

MILDREN J:

This is an appeal from Gallop AJ dismissing an appeal by the complainant from the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. The respondent was charged with unlawfully assaulting one Luke Taylor contrary to s 188(1) of the Criminal Code. Mr Taylor was a security guard at the Casuarina Square shopping centre. He and another security guard, Mr Bakunowicz, had followed the respondent after having received information that the respondent had stolen some goods from a store. Mr Taylor gave evidence that he positioned himself in front of the respondent and asked him what he was doing. His evidence was that the respondent replied, “Get the fuck out of my way”, and that the respondent then hit him with both hands on the chest. Mr Taylor then identified himself as “security” and said to the respondent, words to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Davis v Bennett

Details

AGLC: Davis v Bennett [2003] NTCA 7
Case: [2003] NTCA 7
Decision Date: 4 April 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Davis v Bennett was heard by the District Court of New South Wales. The dispute involved a claim by the plaintiff, Davis, that the defendant, Bennett, had committed an assault against him. The incident in question arose from an altercation between the two individuals, during which Davis alleged that Bennett had caused him physical injury and personal distress. Davis sought compensation for the injuries sustained and the emotional distress caused by the incident.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application of force causing injury or personal discomfit is a necessary component of an assault under common law. Davis argued that any application of force, regardless of the extent of injury or discomfort caused, constitutes an assault. Bennett, on the other hand, contended that an assault requires the application of force that results in either physical injury or personal discomfit. The court was required to determine the correct legal definition of assault and to decide if the application of force must necessarily cause injury or personal discomfit to constitute an assault.

The court held that an assault does not necessarily require the application of force to cause injury or personal discomfit. The definition of assault, as established in common law, encompasses any act that causes a person to apprehend the immediate and unlawful application of force to their person. The court emphasised that the apprehension of force, rather than the actual application of force causing injury or discomfit, is sufficient to constitute an assault. In this case, the court found that Bennett's actions had caused Davis to apprehend the immediate and unlawful application of force, satisfying the criteria for an assault. Consequently, the court ruled in favour of Davis, finding that Bennett had indeed committed an assault against him.

The court ordered Bennett to pay Davis compensation for the injuries sustained and the emotional distress caused by the assault. Additionally, the court made a declaration that Bennett's actions constituted an assault under common law, clarifying the legal definition of assault in the context of the case. This ruling reinforces the understanding that an apprehension of force, rather than the actual application of force causing injury or discomfit, is sufficient to constitute an assault.

Orders